Supplier Encroachment and Investment Spillovers

It is conventional wisdom that a manufacturer's encroachment into retail space will likely hurt an existing retailer. In contrast to this conventional belief, current research indicates that a retailer may welcome a manufacturer's encroachment despite the new competition in the final market. The encroachment may help the manufacturer have some “skin in the game” at the retail level, which will cause the manufacturer to make a selfish cost‐reducing investment that spills over to the retailer as a lower wholesale price. Such a spillover effect enhances the retailer's profit as long as the encroachment does not result in extreme retail competition by a certain degree of product differentiation, and ultimately generates Pareto gains in the supply chain. The spillover effect is so robust that the retailer's benefit from the encroachment remains even after considering potential mitigating factors such as selling costs, a nonlinear form of cost reduction, decentralized encroachment, additional retail competition, price competition, and a negotiation between the manufacturer and the retailer.     

面向网络零售平台的合作广告策略研究

制造商通过第三方网络零售平台开展直销渠道已经成为普遍模式。除价格策略外，广告宣传是企业获得消费者最常用的策略之一，已有研究表明，合作广告策略可有效协调供应链冲突和优化绩效，但在新零售模式中，传统渠道和网络渠道的特点使得网络零售平台和传统零售商的广告宣传对不同销售渠道的影响更加复杂和有趣，因此本文研究网络零售平台的参与对制造商合作广告策略的影响。在文中通过数学建模的方法比较制造商的四种不同策略：不合作策略、制造商仅与传统零售商合作的策略、制造商仅与网络零售平台合作的策略和制造商与两者均合作的策略，通过对不同策略中渠道成员的利润进行比较，可得以下结论：1）制造商的最佳策略为同时与传统零售商和网络零售平台合作；2）当两渠道的广告存在相互"搭便车"行为时，渠道成员之间最优策略一致；3）当网络、传统渠道的广告宣传为竞争关系时，渠道成员的最优策略不一致，但存在"相对"最优策略：传统零售商和网络零售平台同时与制造商合作，该策略下传统零售商、网络零售平台的利润可能会降低，但降低比例为最小。     

考虑消费者退货的制造商入侵策略研究

在考虑消费者退货的情形下，通过构建包括一个制造商、一个零售商和消费者的二级供应链模型，研究了订货量决策以及制造商开通直销渠道的问题。分析提供退款保证和决策顺序对均衡结果以及制造商开通直销渠道的影响。研究发现：在单一渠道供应链中，提供退款保证提高销量，制造商和零售商利润以及消费者剩余；在不提供退款保证情形下，制造商利润和零售商利润都随零售满意度递增；在提供退款保证情形下，制造商利润和零售商利润都随零售满意度先递减后递增；当直销渠道的成本较高时，制造商将不开通直销渠道；提供退款保证有利于制造商开通直销渠道。在双渠道供应链中：在顺序决策情形下，直销量随零售满意度递增，然而在同时决策情形下，直销量却随零售满意度递减；提供退款保证虽然降低零售商利润但能够提高消费者剩余，零售商利润随直销成本递增，在提供退款保证情形下，制造商利润和总利润随直销成本先递减后递增；当零售满意度较高，且直销成本也较高时，提供退款保证使制造商和零售商“双输”，当零售满意度较高，但直销成本较低时，提供退款保证使制造商和零售商达到(win-lose)。     

Mean-risk analysis of radio frequency identification technology in supply chain with inventory misplacement: Risk-sharing and coordination

This paper investigates the application of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology to eliminate the misplacement problems in the supply chain, which consists of a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer. By considering both fixed cost and tag cost of RFID implementation, we study the agents' incentives to adopt RFID in both uncoordinated and coordinated cases. We focus on analyzing the impact of risk attitudes on the agents’ incentives and on the supply chain coordination. The central semi-deviation is adopted to measure the retailer's risk attitude. In the uncoordinated case, we find that, in order to induce the retailer to adopt RFID, the manufacturer must assume more fixed cost if the retailer is more risk-averse. In the coordinated case, we first show that the standard revenue sharing contract does not always coordinate the channel. If the channel is coordinated, we observe that the agents’ incentives will be perfectly aligned and independent of the risk attitudes, if the revenue sharing ratio equals the fixed cost sharing ratio. Then we propose a risk-sharing contract that offers the risk protection to the retailer, to achieve the channel coordination. An interesting finding is that the manufacturer's incentive will not decrease with the tag cost, if she takes much risk from the retailer. The corresponding impacts of RFID adoption on the two contracts are also analyzed in this paper. Finally, a case study in a tobacco industry is presented to show the real RFID cost in practice.     

碳限额与碳交易机制下考虑公平关切的供应链定价与协调研究

供应链企业的公平关切是发展与维持良好供应链上下游合作关系的重要因素。面对消费者的低碳偏好与碳排放规制约束,供应链企业在确定最优定价与减排水平等运作决策时,常常表现较强的公平关切倾向。探究环保规制下公平关切如何影响供应链的运作决策,可以为供应链合作提供对策。本文在碳限额与碳交易机制下,研究了由公平关切制造商和公平关切零售商组成的低碳供应链的最优定价和碳减排率等决策,分析了公平关切对最优定价和碳减排水平及利润的影响,并讨论了收益共享-成本共担契约模型对供应链的协调性,最后通过数值仿真验证了主要结论。结果表明：(1)制造商和零售商都公平关切时,收益共享-成本共担契约的参数若满足一定条件,供应链可以实现协调。(2)批发价与制造商公平关切系数正相关,零售价与制造商和零售商公平关切系数都正相关;若制造商考虑零售商公平关切则批发价的变化取决于碳减排成本系数的大小,碳减排率与制造商和零售商的公平关切系数是负相关;若制造商忽视零售商的公平关切,则批发价仅受制造商自身公平关切的影响, 碳减排率与制造商公平关切负相关,与零售商公平关切无关。(3)制造商公平关切对双方利润具有负向影响,零售商公平关切对制造商利润也有负向影响,而零售商利润随自身公平关切的变化情况取决于制造商是否考虑其公平关切,若考虑则两者正相关,否则两者负相关。     

Contracting Under Vendor Managed Inventory Systems Using Holding Cost Subsidies

Vendor managed inventory systems are becoming increasingly popular. An important issue in implementing a vendor managed inventory scheme is the contracting terms that dictate the ownership of the inventory and the responsibility of inventory replenishment decisions. Thus the performance of a vendor managed system crucially depends on these terms and on how inventory‐related costs are shared in a supply chain. We consider a system where a manufacturer supplies a single product to a retailer who faces random demand in a competitive market. The retailer incurs a fixed cost per order, inventory holding cost, and a penalty cost for a stockout (unsatisfied demand is back‐ordered). Further, the manufacturer incurs a penalty cost when there is a stockout at the retailer and a fixed replenishment cost. We assume that the players are rational and act noncooperatively. We compare the performance of retailer managed inventory systems, where the retailer places orders and makes replenishment decisions, with vendor managed inventory systems, wherein the vendor or manufacturer makes inventory and replenishment decisions. Specifically, in the vendor managed inventory system, we propose and evaluate holding cost subsidy‐type contracts on inventories offered by the retailer to improve system performance. We evaluate this contract in the context of three widely used inventory systems—deterministic economic order quantity, continuous review (Q, r) policies, and periodic review policies—and show when such contracts may improve channel performance.     

Item‐Level RFID in the Retail Supply Chain

Analyzing the proliferation of item‐level RFID, recent studies have identified the cost sharing of the technology as a gating issue. Various qualitative studies have predicted that conflict will arise, in particular in decentralized supply chains, from the fact that the benefits and the costs resulting from item‐level RFID are not symmetrically distributed among supply chain partners. To contribute to a better understanding of this situation, we consider a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. Within the context of this retail supply chain, we present analytic models of the benefits of item‐level RFID to both supply chain partners. We examine both the case of a dominant manufacturer as well as the case of a dominant retailer, and we analyze the results of an introduction of item‐level RFID to such a supply chain depending on these market power characteristics. Under each scenario, we show how the cost of item‐level RFID should be allocated among supply chain partners such that supply chain profit is optimized.     

Gray Markets and Supply Chain Incentives

“Gray markets” are unauthorized channels that distribute a branded product without the manufacturer's permission. Since gray markets are not officially sanctioned by the manufacturer, their existence is assumed to hurt the manufacturer. Yet manufacturers sometimes tolerate or even encourage gray market activities. We investigate the incentives of a manufacturer and its authorized retailer to engage in (or tolerate) gray markets. The firms need to consider the trade‐off between the positive effects of a gray market (price discrimination and cost savings) and the negative effects (cannibalization of sales and a loss in consumer valuation). Generally, gray markets can be categorized into two types: (i) a “local gray market,” where a retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers operating in the same region as the retailer; and, (ii) “bootlegging,” where the retailer diverts products to unauthorized sellers in another market where the manufacturer sells through a direct channel. We characterize the equilibrium in each type of gray market and identify conditions under which the retailer will divert products to the gray market. Incentive problems are more complicated when the retailer bootlegs and, in this case, we show that conflicting incentives may lead to the emergence of a gray market where both the manufacturer's and retailer's profits decrease.     

Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains

This paper examines the incentives of a manufacturer and a retailer to share their demand forecasts. The demand at the retailer is a linearly decreasing function of price. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price first, and the retailer sets the retail price after observing the wholesale price. Both players set their prices based on their forecasts of demand. In the make‐to‐order scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity after observing the actual demand; in the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity before the demand is realized. In the make‐to‐order scenario, we show that sharing the forecast unconditionally by the retailer with the manufacturer benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. We also demonstrate that a side payment contract cannot induce Pareto‐optimal information sharing equilibrium, but a discount based wholesale price contract can. The social welfare as well as consumer surplus is higher under the discount contract, compared with under no information sharing. In the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer realizes additional benefits in the form of savings in inventory holding and shortage costs when forecasts are shared. If the savings from inventory holding and shortage costs because of information sharing are sufficiently high, then a side payment contract that induces Pareto‐optimal information sharing is feasible in the make‐to‐stock scenario. We also provide additional managerial insights with the help of a computational study.     

不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链定价和销售努力决策

本文针对零售商销售努力和销售价格影响需求情况下的制造商-零售商两级供应链,研究不同渠道权力结构和信息结构下供应链的分散决策。基于博弈理论和建模方法,对几种权力结构和信息结构情景建立相应模型,通过理论与数值分析对不同博弈均衡进行比较。研究表明,随着零售商势力逐步增强制造商利润会逐步恶化;但零售商势力增强能否带来更多利润,取决于需求对价格和销售努力的敏感度、销售努力成本以及信息结构。占优一方可以通过获取对方更多信息来改善自己处境。若占优零售商不得不依赖于对制造商成本先验分布进行决策,当估计的均值大于真实成本时,适度的方差对零售商更有利。最后,讨论了销售努力成本分担的合作机制,针对非合作博弈给出了帕累托改进的合约区间和 Nash讨价还价均衡。     

The Value of Category Captainship in the Presence of Manufacturer Competition

This research investigates the value of category captainship (a management practice in which a retailer relies on a manufacturer for recommendations regarding strategic category management decisions) in retail supply chains. We consider a setting where the scope of category management is limited to assortment decisions and demand enhancing activities. We assume that the retailer selects a category captain among multiple competing manufacturers with privately known capabilities for driving category traffic. First, we consider a benchmark scenario where the retailer is responsible for category management. Then, we consider the category captainship scenario where the retailer selects one of the manufacturers as a captain to manage the category. We find that captainship is more likely to emerge in categories where the cost of managing variety, the retail margins, and the competition for captainship are moderate and the captain is more capable of driving traffic compared to the retailer. In such categories the collaboration between the retailer and the captain ensures sufficient surplus for both parties. Finally, we show that captainship can also benefit the non‐captain manufacturers.     

Manufacturer Rebate Competition in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

We consider manufacturer rebate competition in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling to a common retailer. We fully characterize the manufacturers’ equilibrium rebate decisions and show how they depend on parameters such as the fixed cost of a rebate program, market size, the redemption rate of rebate, the proportion of rebate‐sensitive consumers in the market and competition intensity. Interestingly, more intense competition induces a manufacturer to lower rebate value or stop offering rebate entirely. Without rebate, it is known that more intense competition hurts the manufacturers and benefits the retailer. With rebate, however, more intense competition could benefit the manufacturers and hurt the retailer. We find similar counterintuitive results when there is a change in some other parameters. We also consider the case when the retailer subsidizes the manufacturers sequentially to offer rebate programs. We fully characterize the retailer's optimal subsidy strategy, and show that subsidy always benefits the retailer but may benefit or hurt the manufacturers. When the retailer wants to induce both manufacturers to offer rebate, he always prefers to subsidize the manufacturer with a higher fixed cost first. Sometimes the other manufacturer will then voluntarily offer rebate even without subsidy.     

Does a Store Brand Always Hurt the Manufacturer of a Competing National Brand?

It is generally believed that store brands hurt the manufacturers of competing national brands while benefiting retailers. In this study, we challenge this notion by studying the impacts of a store brand when it is introduced by a power retailer. We show that a store brand may benefit the manufacturer when the interaction between the manufacturer and retailer is modeled as a retailer‐led Stackelberg game. This phenomenon occurs because the store brand changes the nature of the strategic interaction between the manufacturer and retailer in our model. In particular, while the interaction is always vertical strategic substitutability without a store brand, it may become vertical strategic independence with one. With the store brand, the demand for the national brand becomes larger, and the wholesale price for the national brand may increase, both of which benefit the manufacturer. Finally, the store brand may lessen the double marginalization problem of the supply chain for the national brand in the retailer‐led Stackelberg game, but does so in an unconventional way: The reduction in the double marginalization effect may come from a lowered retail markup instead of a lowered wholesale price. Our results reconcile some discrepancies between theoretical predictions and empirical findings regarding the impacts of store brands on manufacturers.     

产品和零售商品牌差异条件下的渠道价格策略

从渠道中的制造商和零售商相对力量对比的角度,对渠道中的价格决策问题进行了研究.采用博弈理论,研究了由两个制造商和两个零售商组成的典型渠道结构中的价格决策问题,在研究渠道价格决策时,同时考虑了产品和零售商的差异,将产品差异提炼为产品成本和产品品牌差异,将零售商的差异提炼为零售成本和零售商品牌差异,并考虑了需求函数和渠道权利结构对渠道价格决策产生的影响.研究表明,渠道权利结构、产品差异和零售商差异均对渠道价格决策会产生影响,且对不同制造商和零售商的影响程度有较大的差异.     

Designing Multi‐Attribute Procurement Mechanisms for Assortment Planning

This research investigates how to design procurement mechanisms for assortment planning. We consider that a retailer buys directly from a manufacturer who possesses private information about the per‐unit variable cost and per‐variety setup cost. We first develop a screening model to assist the retailer in integrating assortment planning into supply chain contracting processes when only one manufacturer is available. We demonstrate that the screening mechanism is optimal among all feasible procurement strategies. When there are multiple competing manufacturers, we propose a supply contract auctioning mechanism and evaluate its performance. In this mechanism, the retailer announces a contract menu and the manufacturer that bids the highest upfront fee paid to the retailer wins the auction. The winner then chooses and executes a contract from the contract menu. We show that when the retailer uses the optimal screening contract menu as the object of the auction, it achieves the optimal procurement outcome if the screening contract menu does not pay rent to any manufacturer type. This finding sheds light on the connection between screening and auction mechanisms when there exists multi‐dimensional private information.     

制造商RFID策略与零售商窜货策略的动态博弈分析

考虑由单一制造商、单一零售商及两个独立市场(高端市场和低端市场)组成的供应链系统，针对零售商可能窜货的问题，建立了制造商RFID采纳和零售商窜货的动态博弈模型，分析了零售商窜货策略和制造商RFID采纳策略，研究了RFID双重效应(成本效应和惩罚效应)对灰色市场、企业收益及社会福利的影响。研究表明：1)RFID可以有效抑制零售商的窜货行为。当不存在RFID时，若市场差异较大，零售商窜货，若市场差异较小，零售商不窜货。而当存在RFID时，即使市场差异足够大，若RFID惩罚效应较强，零售商不窜货；2)RFID可能使得零售商窜货反而会增加制造商的收益。当不存在RFID时，零售商窜货总是降低制造商的收益。而当存在RFID时，若市场差异较小且RFID成本效应较强，零售商窜货增加了制造商的收益；3)制造商并非总是采纳RFID，其策略取决于市场差异的大小和RFID双重效应的强弱。     

随机产出与需求下农产品供应链协调的收益共享合同研究

生鲜农产品生产受季节性和天气等影响,投入一定农资后产出呈随机分布。本文考虑产出和需求扰动服从均匀分布情形下,单个生产商和零售商的供应链协调问题。在收益共享合同模式下,生产商决定农资投入数(e)并将单一产品以低于生产成本的价格(ω)全部出售给零售商,零售商制定销售价格(p)进行销售并支付约定比例(1-Ф)的收益补偿生产商。在分析供应链协调的条件后,说明了合同参数ω与Ф的关系和Ф设定范围。研究结果表明,收益共享合同能有效地协调供应链,且协调的p和e与需求价格弹性有关;并且Ф取值范围随影响产出的随机变量的期望值变大而增大。最后以数值算例说明了分析结果的正确性。     

供应链中双边汇率风险传导机理及传导结果

利用批发价合同构建了一个包含国外零售商、国内零售商、制造商与供应商的博弈模型，其中制造商面临着进出口双边汇率风险。通过模型均衡，研究了双边汇率波动性及其相关性结构对供应链节点企业运作变量的波动性、期望业绩和业绩方差的影响（传导机理和结果）。结果表明：当进出口汇率波动负相关时，随着进（出）口汇率波动性程度的增加，（1）供应商和国外零售商运作变量的波动性、期望业绩和业绩方差，制造商对供应商和国外零售商的均衡批发价方差，制造商期望业绩均增加；（2）制造商对国内零售商的均衡批发价方差，国内零售商运作变量的波动性、期望业绩和业绩方差均先降低后增加，风险传导呈现出U-型特征；当进出口汇率波动正相关时，随着进（出）口汇率波动性程度的增加，（3）供应商和国外零售商运作变量的波动性、期望业绩和业绩方差，制造商对供应商和国外零售商的均衡批发价方差，制造商期望业绩均先降低后增加，此时风险传导也呈现出U-型特征；（4）制造商对国内零售商的均衡批发价方差，国内零售商运作变量的波动性、期望业绩和业绩方差均增加。     

考虑商誉的双渠道供应链动态定价与联合减排策略

考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链，将产品商誉和减排量作为状态变量构建微分博弈模型。文章首先讨论了不同渠道结构下供应链成员的最优均衡策略，随后探讨了广告合作-减排成本分担契约对供应链协调性的影响，最后通过算例对模型进行了分析。研究发现，产品商誉轨迹随时间变化呈现多变性，而减排量轨迹则具有单调性。与单渠道相比，双渠道下零售商的广告努力和利润下降，而制造商的减排努力和利润增大，只有当传统渠道市场占有率较高且制造商竞争较小时，制造商单渠道的利润才高于双渠道，此时制造商将不会开设网络渠道。广告合作-减排成本分担契约可以实现制造商、零售商和整个供应链系统利润的帕累托改善，且消费者低碳偏好和品牌偏好越高，制造商和零售商越有动力达成合作。     

欺压与风险分担:B2B电子交易市场环境下均衡策略分析

B2B电子交易市场为生产商和零售商提供了新的销售和采购渠道,从而改变了传统供应链结构.在考虑了随机需求和随机电子市场交易价格的基础上,文章研究了在B2B电子交易市场环境下单一生产商和单一零售商组成供应链的最优策略.在销售期之前,生产商首先决定批发价格和生产数量;作为跟随者,零售商决定零售价格和订购数量.在销售期,生产商和零售商可以在B2B电子交易市场中交易.研究结果表明,对于零售商,B2B电子交易市场可以作为投机市场或者第二采购渠道,而生产商在定价策略中通过欺压目的或者风险分担目的来进行风险管理.