A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF PARTIAL DECENTRALIZATION

We revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations, and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization. A capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods. The expectation of high capital taxes, however, results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution. The median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes. She does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the Constitution. The equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results. We show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality, increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision, and decreasing in capital productivity. When public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds, all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized.     

POLITICIANS AT WORK: THE PRIVATE RETURNS AND SOCIAL COSTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS

We quantify the private returns and social costs of political connections exploiting a unique longitudinal dataset that combines matched employer–employee data for a representative sample of Italian firms with administrative archives on the universe of individuals appointed in local governments over the period 1985–1997. According to our results, the revenue premium granted by political connections amounts to 5.7% on average, it is obtained through changes in domestic sales but not in exports, and it is not related to improvements in firm productivity. The connection premium is positive for upstream producers for the public administration only, and larger (up to 22%) in areas characterized by high public expenditure and high levels of corruption. These findings suggest that the gains in market power derive from public demand shifts towards politically connected firms. We estimate that such shifts reduce the provision of public goods by approximately 20%.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION IN MARKETS WITH NAÏVE CONSUMERS

In a model of a competitive industry selling base goods and add‐ons, we investigate the conditions under which citizen‐consumers will support policies that eliminate behavioral inefficiencies induced by naïve consumers. Unregulated competitive markets have two effects: they produce deadweight losses, and they redistribute income away from biased consumers. Both unbiased and naïve consumers believe that they benefit from this redistribution (the naïve consumers are wrong), so support for efficiency‐improving regulation is limited. Extending our model to consumers with partial sophistication about their naïveté, we predict patterns of regulation consistent with the form and timing of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009.     

PUBLIC EDUCATION AND PENSIONS IN DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY

A dynamic political economy theory of fiscal policy is presented to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies. The driving force of the model is the intergenerational conflict over the allocation of the public budget. Successive generations of voters choose fiscal policies through repeated elections. The political power of elderly voters creates the motive for adults to support public investment in the human capital of future generations since it expands future pension possibilities. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the voting game in a small open economy. The equilibrium reproduces salient features of intergenerational fiscal policies in modern economies.     

EXPLAINING GIFT‐EXCHANGE—THE LIMITS OF GOOD INTENTIONS

This paper explores the limitations of intention‐based social preferences as an explanation of gift‐exchange between a firm and a worker. In a framework with one self‐interested and one reciprocal player, gift‐giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead, any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players. Besides gift‐exchange, this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self‐interested player never benefits from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift‐exchange in employment relations.     

THE LOT OF THE UNEMPLOYED: A TIME USE PERSPECTIVE

This paper provides new evidence on the time use of employed and unemployed individuals in 14 countries. We devote particular attention to characterizing and modeling job search intensity, measured by the amount of time devoted to searching for a new job. Job search intensity varies considerably across countries, and is higher in countries that have higher wage dispersion. We also examine the relationship between unemployment benefits and job search.     

KNOWING THE RIGHT PERSON IN THE RIGHT PLACE: POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

We use a political economy model of Schumpeterian growth with entry to investigate how an incumbent politician can strategically use the level of red tape to acquire incumbency advantage. By setting sufficiently high red tape, the politician induces the incumbent firm in the intermediate sector to invest in political connections, which are valued also by voters, who recognize that bureaucratic costs can be reduced by connected firms. Within this framework, we study the Markov perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated game among politicians, firms, and voters, and show that all equilibria are characterized by investments in political connections and the re‐election of the incumbent politician. Political connections may prevent entry of advanced competitors and cause the economy to lag behind the technological frontier. Our model provides a possible explanation for the persistence of inefficient democracies and political barriers to technology development, where these reflect shared rather than conflicting interests.     

ON THE THEORY OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

When considering engaging in conflict to secure control of a resource, a group needs to predict the amount of post‐conflict leakage due to infiltration by members of losing groups. We use this insight to explain why conflict often takes place along ethnic lines, why some ethnic groups are more often in conflict than others (and some never are), and why the same groups are sometimes in conflict and sometimes at peace. In our theory ethnic markers help enforce group membership: in homogeneous societies members of the losing group can more easily pass themselves as members of the winning group, and this reduces the chances of conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance between ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources. One of the insights is that the incidence of ethnic conflict is nonmonotonic in expropriable resources as a fraction of total resources, with a low incidence for either low or high values. We use the model’s predictions to interpret historical examples of conflict associated with skin pigmentation, body size, language, and religion.     

A WHITER SHADE OF PALE: ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

We consider an intertemporal policy game between changing governments that differ in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes, exemplified with environmental pollution. When in power, a government will choose policy instruments and set strictness of regulation with a view to influencing the policy of future, possibly different, governments. We demonstrate that a “brown” government favours emission quotas over effluent taxes, as quotas establish property rights that are costly to reverse. Conversely, a “green” government prefers to regulate by taxes, in order to limit the incentives of future brown governments to ease regulations. Strategic behaviour tends to exaggerate policy differences (making green governments greener and brown governments browner) compared to when such strategic considerations were not an issue. (JEL: D81, D9, H23, L51, Q28, Q38)     

POVERTY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION SPENDING: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL

A large body of literature has emphasized the elite capture of democratic institutions as the explanation for the low levels of spending on public education in many low‐income democracies. This paper provides an alternative to that longstanding hypothesis. Motivated by new cross‐country facts and evidence from Brazilian municipalities, we hypothesize that many democratic developing countries might invest less in public education spending because poor decisive voters prefer the government to allocate resources elsewhere. One possible explanation is that low‐income voters could instead favor redistributive programs that increase their incomes in the short run, such as cash transfers. To test for this possibility, we design and implement an experimental survey and an incentivized choice experiment in Brazil. The findings from both interventions support our hypothesis.     

How Do Policies Affect the Exit Rate out of Unemployment? Disentangling Job Creation from Labour Market Frictions

This paper assesses the effects of labour market policies on the unemployment outflow rate while disentangling two channels, namely labour market tightness and employer–employee matching efficiency. Using a sample of 11 OECD countries over the period 1985–2007, we treat the endogeneity of market tightness with business cycle shocks and the tax wedge as instruments. We find that the replacement rate of unemployment benefits, Active Labour Market Policies as well as the tax wedge in countries with poorly representative unions, have a significant, robust, and large impact on market tightness. Employment protection has a negative but small impact on matching efficiency. Overall, policy effects appear to be mostly channeled through market tightness and job creation.     

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. The underlying economy is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and increases in public production. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. Policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts. With the available policies, it is possible for the government to completely eliminate unemployment in the long run. However, with political decision making, the economy always has unemployment. Unemployment is higher when the private sector experiences negative shocks. When these shocks occur, the government employs debt‐financed fiscal stimulus plans which involve both tax cuts and public production increases. When the private sector is healthy, the government contracts debt until it reaches a floor level. Unemployment levels are weakly increasing in the economy's debt level, strictly so when the private sector experiences negative shocks. Conditional on the level of workers employed, the mix of public and private output is distorted.     

LABOR SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS

Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences‐in‐differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re‐election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.     

A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF TURNOUT AND VOTING IN MULTIPLE ELECTIONS

This paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections. The theoretical setting combines an uncertain‐voter model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior. We apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in US Presidential and Congressional elections. We structurally estimate the model using individual‐level data for the 2000 elections, and quantify the relationships between observed individual characteristics and unobserved citizens’ ideological preferences, information, and civic duty. We then use the estimated model, which replicates the patterns of abstention, selective abstention, split‐ticket voting, and straight‐ticket voting observed in the data, to assess the effects of policies that may increase citizens’ information and sense of civic duty on their turnout and voting behavior.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN WELFARE STATES: THE IMPACTS OF SOFT DURATION CONSTRAINTS

Abstract Based on a major reform of Norwegian unemployment insurance (UI), we examine the behavioral impacts of soft and hard UI duration constraints. A constraint is interpreted as hard if a claimant cannot rely on any form of income support after exhaustion, and as soft if UI is replaced by follow‐on benefits or participation in active labor market programs (ALMP). We find that both hard and soft constraints raise the job hazard significantly, with surprisingly similar spikes at UI exhaustion. Participation in ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job, but at the cost of lengthening the overall job‐search period.     

THE BALANCED US PRESS

We measure the relative ideological positions of newspapers, voters, interest groups, and political parties, using data on ballot propositions. We exploit the fact that newspapers, parties, and interest groups take positions on these propositions, and the fact that citizens ultimately vote on them. We find that, on average, newspapers in the United States are located almost exactly at the median voter in their states—that is, they are balanced around the median voter. Still, there is a significant amount of ideological heterogeneity across newspapers, which is smaller than the one found for interest groups. However, when we group propositions by issue area, we find a sizable amount of ideological imbalance: broadly speaking, newspapers are to the left of the state‐level median voter on many social issues, and to the right on many economic issues. To complete the picture, we use two existing methods of measuring bias and show that the news and editorial sections of newspapers have almost identical partisan positions.     

THE QUANTITATIVE ROLE OF CHILD CARE FOR FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND FERTILITY

I document that the labor force participation rate of West German mothers with children aged zero to two exceeds the corresponding child‐care enrollment rate, while the opposite is true for mothers whose children are older than two but below the mandatory schooling age. These facts also hold for a cross‐section of E.U. countries. I develop a life‐cycle model that explicitly accounts for this age‐dependent relationship by including various types of nonpaid and paid child care. I calibrate this model to data for West Germany and use the calibrated model for policy analysis. Increasing the supply of subsidized child care for children aged zero to two generates an increase in the maternal labor force participation rate consistent with empirical evidence from other settings; however, this increase is too small to conclude that the lack of subsidized child care accounts for the low labor force participation rate of mothers with children aged zero to two. The response along the intensive margin suggests that a large fraction of part‐time working mothers would work full‐time if they had greater access to subsidized child care. Finally, making subsidized child care available to more women does not achieve one of the commonly stated goals of such reforms, namely to increase the fertility rate.     

CLASH OF CAREER AND FAMILY: FERTILITY DECISIONS AFTER JOB DISPLACEMENT

In this paper we investigate how career considerations may affect fertility decisions in the presence of a temporary employment shock. We compare the birth rates of women displaced by a plant closure with those of women unaffected by job loss after establishing the pre‐displacement comparability of these groups. Our results reveal that job displacement reduces average fertility by 5%–10%, and that these effects are largely explained by the response of women in more skilled occupations. We offer an explanation of our results based on career interruptions of women.     

A MODEL OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

We present a model of conflict in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness—captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proposed change in ethnic policy—that induces individuals to mobilize, often violently, to support their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and militants have to be compensated accordingly. The model allows for both financial and human contributions to conflict and allows for a variety of individual attitudes (“radicalism”) towards the cause. The main results concern the effects of within‐group heterogeneity in radicalism and income, as well as the correlation between radicalism and income, in precipitating conflict.     

THE EFFECT OF JOINT CUSTODY ON FAMILY OUTCOMES

Since the 1970s almost all US states have introduced a form of joint custody after divorce. I analyze the causal effect of these custody law reforms on different family outcomes. My identification strategy exploits the different timing of reforms across the US states. Estimations based on state panel data suggest that the introduction of joint custody led to an increase in marriage rates, an increase in overall fertility (including a shift from nonmarital to marital fertility), and an increase in divorce rates for older couples. Accordingly, female labor market participation decreased. Further, male suicide rates and domestic violence fell in treated states. The empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that joint custody increased the relative bargaining power of men within marriage.