A CRITIQUE OF METHODOLOGICAL REASON

In this essay, we argue that, following their perception of practices in the natural sciences the social sciences have reified methodology, making it the chief imperative of social investigation and using it to ground their knowledge claims. We find this to be the case even in the work of social scientists who try to overcome or reject the dominant positivist paradigm. We argue that this obsession with method has led the social sciences to abandon thinking-beyond-the-given in favor of small, specialized studies whose justification is no longer substantive but methodology driven. After a review of the history of the role of method in traditional philosophies of science, the essay turns to the work of recent critics of social science who have become increasingly dissatisfied with modeling the social sciences after the natural ones. We distinguish between a hermeneutic and phenomenological critique of positivism, both of which, we argue, end up reproducing the scientism they reject. We identify this problem in our careful readings of some of the most influential critics of Popperian scientific philosophy. In the final section, we distinguish between contemporary social science, situated in what we term the epistemological paradigm, and our own critical science, stemming from an alternate, ontohistorical tradition in the history of ideas. Here, we begin to lay out what a critical, nonmethodology-driven, reflective and historical science might look like.     

THE EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF MONEY: A CRITIQUE

Money talks, but it does not give itself away. Lately there has been much talk about money, and even less agreement than heretofore about what it is. Because of the growing immateriality of money, the difficulty of defining it has waxed rather than waned with increased knowledge. This, of course, has not made the development of monetary theory or the determination of monetary policy any easier. Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz (hereafter referred to as F-S) prefer an empirical definition of money to a priori definitions, such as the generally acceptable means of payment.1 However, they fail to demonstrate either that complete freedom from a priori conceptualization is possible or that such procedure can avoid circularity of reasoning.2 If there is no "right" definition of money (F-S, 1970, pp. 137, 145–146, 151, 197–198), there is no "empirical" definition in the absence of the "right" monetary theory.     

SOCIAL WORK SCHOLARS' REPRESENTATION OF RAWLS: A CRITIQUE

Although Rawls is the most cited social justice theorist in social work, he is not always accurately represented in the literature. To clarify this claim, the author reviews social work scholars' views about social justice, shows social work scholars' representation of Rawls, and highlights aspects of Rawls' theory of social justice. The author's critique reveals that there have been and continue to be more differences than similarities between Rawls and social work scholars. Consequently, the article recommends revising the social work knowledge-base in relation to social justice and Rawls so that his ideas are authentically represented in future social work education and scholarship.     

DURKHEIM'S MACROFOUNDATIONS OF TIME: AN ASSESSMENT AND CRITIQUE

In this article, Durkheim's theory of time will be assessed in reference to his theory of transactions (organic solidarity). Specifically, Durkheim associated time with a metaphorical conception of the transaction that separated: (1) macrofoundations from microstates, and (2) external constraints from subjective states. This separation led to a conception of time as dominated by linear, rigid sequential, and categorical images. Counterposed to this metaphor are more dynamic, interpersonal, and cybernetic conceptions of temporality and transactions, which can be integrated with Durkheim's scheme to suggest another way of bridging the micro-macro distinction—through the use of time and temporality. This integration will be discussed in relation to five conceptions of time that will, in turn, be used to evaluate and critique Durkheim's macrofoundations. These conceptions are: (1) the evolutionary-transformational, (2) the categorical, (3) the iterative, (4) the rigid sequential, and (5) the negotiated sequential. The article concludes by suggesting that Durkheim's emphasis on the rigid sequential conception can inform and be informed by modern-day emphases on iterative and negotiated sequential conceptions.     

THE POLITICS OF FUNCTIONAL FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE*

This paper examines the political processes inherent in Functional Family Therapy (FFT). It argues that this model of family therapy takes a covert political stance which reinforces traditional gender roles in both family and therapist. Of particular interest are FFT's affirmation of existing interpersonal functions in the family, as well as suggested therapist use of self. The implications of this stance are discussed, as well as recommendations for change.     

UNDERPRICING IN PUBLIC LOTTERIES: A CRITIQUE OF USER-PAY AND ALL-PAY TARIFFS

A body of literature spanning from medical ethics to public economics has amassed regarding the rationing of underpriced public resources. This study investigates the effects of price on entry, individual and aggregate expected consumer surplus, and tax revenues in user-pay and all-pay (AP) lotteries. Comparative statics indicate that expected surplus may increase (decrease) as price increases (decreases) if entry is sufficiently responsive though entry in AP lotteries is inelastic at all prices. Further, the lotteries are shown to be outcome equivalent under revenue equivalency. Selected results are evaluated numerically with simulations performed across a broad class of distributions describing individual private values. ( JEL D45, D61, H42)     

THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE AND A DECADE OF PUBLISHED RESEARCH IN SOCIOLOGY JOURNALS

In the mid to early 1970s feminist writers raised four major criticisms about sociological research on women and expressed concern about the related issue of the discipline's treatment of women sociologists. Critics charged that sociological research underrepresented women as subjects, concentrated on research topics more central to men's than to women's lives, used concepts, paradigms, methods, and theories better portraying men's than women's lives, and used men and male experience as norms against which all social experience was assessed. Examination of published research in ten major sociology journals the 1974–83 period suggests that some concerns articulated in the critiques are reflected in subsequent published work, but others have had little or only limited impact. Findings suggest an association between women's participation as editors, board members, and authors in journals and the quantity and character of published gender articles.     

THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: QUESTIONS OF CONTEXT IN FAMILY THERAPY

Family therapy's neglect of social context as a factor in its continuing distortion of women's issues has led feminist critics to wonder if systems-based psychotherapy truly serves women. Rather than heralding the demise of family therapy, however, the feminist critique is here taken to open up concerns central to the epistemological discussion underway in the field. At first, these have to do with the functions of "punctuation,""boundary" and "closure" in systemic epistemology. Later, the central question becomes that of the place given to context in systems epistemology generally, as well as family therapy in particular. Several implications of a more lively interest in context for family therapy's work are explored. These are discussed with respect to women's issues, clinical epistemology, and the challenge to raise novel questions in family therapy.     

MULTIDIMENSIONAL PROBLEMS: A CRITIQUE OF JEFFREY ALEXANDER'S THEORETICAL LOGIC IN SOCIOLOGY*

This article examines Jeffrey Alexander's effort to overcome the impasse of sociology's entrenchment into opposing utilitarian and normativistic camps. The utilitarian and normativistic perspectives are described, and some of the requirements for a successful synthesis are stated. It is shown that Alexander does not actually attempt such a synthesis himself, but is content to present Weber's and Parsons's efforts in this direction. It is argued that his major contribution is to be found not in the promotion of a “multidimensional” synthetic approach, but in the formulation of an epistemological/methodological rationale for the alleged superiority of a multidimensional sociology over one-dimensional versions. An account is given of the claims of this “postpositivist” methodology, and its de facto treatment of the relationship between theory and data is criticized. Since issues of empirical adequacy are not sufficiently addressed, it is concluded that Alexander's advocacy of multidimensionality is less than convincing.