Safety culture: Key theoretical issues

The organizational preconditions to major systems failures are seen as increasingly important for risk management. However, existing empirical attempts to study safety culture and its relationship to organizational outcomes have remained fragmented and underspecified in theoretical terms. This is despite the existence of a number of well-developed theories of organizationally induced accidents and disasters. Reasons for this disfunction of theory and practice are first considered. The paper then outlines four key theoretical questions for safety culture researchers: the fact that culture acts simultaneously as a precondition both for safe operations and for the oversight of incubating hazards (the paradox of 'safety' culture); the challenge of dealing with complex and ill-structured hazardous situations where decision makers are faced with deep forms of uncertainty represented by incompleteness of knowledge or ignorance; the need to consider the construction of risk perceptions in workgroups, and to view risk acceptability as the outcome of a process of social negotiation; and the fact that institutional politics and power are critical for determining the achievement of safety culture goals, and in particular that of organizational learning.     

An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated environment

Culture is a complex construct in organizations, consisting of attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs, which must necessarily be set in context. Many authors imply that culture is organization-wide and common to all employees. In terms of safety culture, the organizational context may determine its salience and likelihood of affecting behaviour, especially in a highly regulated environment such as the nuclear industry. This study investigates the components of safety culture and how it varies in a highly-regulated nuclear power plant. A 60-item questionnaire measuring safety attitudes and values was administered anonymously to 1550 employees at two plants in the UK nuclear industry, with a 64.7% mean response rate. Principal components analyses revealed six factors conceptually common to shop floor and management (supervisor/manager/professional) groups for both plants, relating to: management style and communication; responsibility and commitment; risk-taking; job satisfaction; complacency; and risk awareness. A canonical discriminant analysis of the items suggested that the data could distinguish three employee groups. The implications of these findings and the proposal that there are two or more safety cultures in the organization is discussed.     

Exploring the Effects of Cultural Variables in the Implementation of Behavior-Based Safety in Two Organizations

Abstract

The present case study examines how culture can influence behavior-based safety in different organizational settings and how behavior-based safety can impact different organizational cultures. Behavior-based safety processes implemented in two culturally diverse work settings are described. Specifically, despite identical implementation plans, similarities and differences in the actual implementation of the two behavior-based safety processes are presented with an emphasis on the effects of employee-driven decisions. Data on both implementations and outcome measures are provided. The results are discussed with respect to the potential impact of specific cultural variables.     

4 Person–Environment Fit in Organizations: An Assessment of Theoretical Progress

Abstract

Person–environment (P–E) fit is a central concept in organizational behavior research. Historically, reviews of P–E fit research have summarized empirical studies but said little about whether P–E fit research has made theoretical progress. This chapter applies criteria for evaluating theory to review and assess the theoretical status and progress of P–E fit research. The review encompasses P–E fit theories that span nearly a century and cover research on job satisfaction, job stress, vocational choice, recruitment and selection, and organizational climate and culture. This review indicates that most theories in P–E fit research fall well short of criteria for developing strong theory, and theories presented in recent years are no stronger than those developed decades earlier. Reasons for theoretical stagnation in P–E fit research are identified, and ways to promote theoretical progress are discussed.     

Human and organizational factors in offshore safety

The role of human and organizational factors in predicting accidents and incidents has become of major interest to the UK offshore oil and gas industry. Some of these factors had been measured in an earlier study focusing on the role of risk perception in determining accident involvement. The current study sought to extend the methodology by focusing on perceptions of organizational factors that could have an impact on safety. A self-report questionnaire was developed and distributed to 11 installations operating on the UK Continental Shelf. A total of 722 were returned (33% response rate) from a representative sample of the offshore workforce on these installations. The study investigated the underlying structure and content of offshore employees' attitudes to safety, feelings of safety and satisfaction with safety measures. Correlations and step-wise regression analysis were used to test the relationships between measures. The results suggest that 'unsafe' behaviour is the 'best' predictor of accidents/near misses as measured by self-report data and that unsafe behaviour is, in turn, driven by perceptions of pressure for production.     

Safety sans Frontières: An International Safety Culture Model

The management of safety culture in international and culturally diverse organizations is a concern for many high‐risk industries. Yet, research has primarily developed models of safety culture within Western countries, and there is a need to extend investigations of safety culture to global environments. We examined (i) whether safety culture can be reliably measured within a single industry operating across different cultural environments, and (ii) if there is an association between safety culture and national culture. The psychometric properties of a safety culture model developed for the air traffic management (ATM) industry were examined in 17 European countries from four culturally distinct regions of Europe (North, East, South, West). Participants were ATM operational staff (n = 5,176) and management staff (n = 1,230). Through employing multigroup confirmatory factor analysis, good psychometric properties of the model were established. This demonstrates, for the first time, that when safety culture models are tailored to a specific industry, they can operate consistently across national boundaries and occupational groups. Additionally, safety culture scores at both regional and national levels were associated with country‐level data on Hofstede's five national culture dimensions (collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long‐term orientation). MANOVAs indicated safety culture to be most positive in Northern Europe, less so in Western and Eastern Europe, and least positive in Southern Europe. This indicates that national cultural traits may influence the development of organizational safety culture, with significant implications for safety culture theory and practice.     

Beyond demand and control: The contribution of organizational risk factors in assessing the psychological well-being of health care employees

Abstract

The job demand–control(–support) model is frequently used as a theoretical framework in studies on determinants of psychological well-being. Consequently, these studies are confined to the impact of job characteristics on worker outcomes. In the present study the relation between work conditions and outcomes (job satisfaction, emotional exhaustion, psychological distress, and somatic complaints) is examined from a broader organizational perspective. This paper reports on an analysis that examines both the unique and the additional contribution of organizational characteristics to well-being indicators, beyond those attributed to job characteristics. A total of 706 care staff from three public residential institutions for people with mental or physical disabilities in the Netherlands took part in this research. To assess organizational risk factors a measurement instrument was developed, the organizational Risk Factors Questionnaire (ORFQ), based on the safety-critical factors of the Tripod accident causation model. Factor analyses and reliability testing resulted in a 52-item scale consisting of six reliable sub-scales: staffing resources, communication, social hindrance, training opportunities, job skills, and material resources. These organizational risk factors explained important parts of the variance in each of the outcome measures, beyond that accounted for by demographic variables and job demand–control–support (JDCS) measures. Communication and training opportunities were of central importance to carers’ job satisfaction. Social hindrance, job skills, and material resources explained a substantial amount of unique variance on the negative outcomes investigated.     

A Systemic View of Enterprise

Abstract

Uniqueness of person, organization, and environmental situation is a fact of life. Imitating practices that occurred in a different unique environment does not work well. Improving organizational performance requires managing within the constraints of two sets of variables that are specific to each organization: variables that connect the organization to the environment and variables that support individual human performances. Organizational variables include those relevant to two specific categories of value-adding outputs (the financial marketplace and the consumer service marketplace), and four specific categories of costly but necessary inputs (money, technology, materials and labor). The paper specifies ten guidelines for understanding and managing the interplay between the organizational variables and psychological variables. The guidelines permit systemic organizational and performance management which enables organizational improvement.     

Safety culture: under-specified and overrated?

Is the measurement of ‘safety culture’ a valid management tool in the effort to reduce accident rate and improve safety performance, or is it a fuzzy academic concept, lacking empirical validation? The answer to this question seems to depend on whom one asks. The UK Health and Safety Commission has encouraged companies to improve their safety performance through the development of a ‘positive safety culture’. However, academic discussions in this area suggest that the concept remains vague, lacks empirical validation and is used as an ‘umbrella term’ for all the social and organizational factors that affect accident rate. This paper reviews the existing literature on safety culture and provides some clarification in terms of definition, empirical evidence and theoretical development. A theoretical framework of the mechanisms by which safety culture affects safety behaviours in organizations is proposed. The implications for practical management issues are discussed and future challenges and areas for further research are identified.     

Complements or Substitutes? Culture–Technology Interactions in Healthcare

The U.S. government recommends that hospitals adopt Computerized Provider Order Entry (CPOE) systems to improve the quality problems that plague U.S. hospitals. However, CPOE studies show mixed results. We hypothesize that CPOE effectiveness depends on the prevalence of patient safety culture within a hospital. Using organizational information processing theory, we describe how patient safety culture and CPOE enable healthcare organizations to better process information. Specifically, we posit that CPOE complements some aspects of patient safety culture and substitutes for others. Using ridge regression, we empirically test this proposition using data from 268 hospitals and multiple data sources. Results show that while CPOE complements the patient safety dimensions of handoffs and transitions, feedback and communication about error, and organizational learning, CPOE substitutes for the dimension of management support for safety, in the context of our dependent variable. As organizations work to implement new systems, this research can help decision‐makers understand how culture impacts such initiatives and account for culture when anticipating effects.     

Learning in and from projects: the learning modes and a learning capability model

Abstract

The notion of ‘project delivery’ is well embedded in and across the management and organizational sciences literature – generating a narrative that reflects and recognizes the instrumental nature of projects and programmes in strategy execution. Project management, as a distinct and well-established body of research enquiry, has increasingly sought to focus our attention on the impacts of complexity, risk and uncertainty in projects; the corollary being a desideratum to strengthen our theoretical understanding of how insight and learning from projects may influence improvements to organizational efficiency. The wider literature suggests that organizational learning remains a challenging proposition, particularly in the context of organizations operating in environments of high complexity. In this paper, we enhance the conversation on organizational learning through a series of case studies, generating evidence of thirteen ‘learning modes’. The paper proposes that mature organizations tend to exhibit a greater number of learning modes and that there is a tendency to capture and socialize knowledge with a greater emphasis on the context of the learning situation rather than the learning artefact in isolation. The empirical evidence gathered in this paper forms the basis of a capability model, characterized by the thirteen modes of learning. The model intimates that learning occurs, and is more effective, when knowledge and information are enacted in practice through the learning modes which form a nucleus of the organizational learning capability. The research concludes with a 'call to action' that emphasizes the strategic importance of learning practices and routines in project oriented-organizations.     

Safety culture: under-specified and overrated?

Is the measurement of 'safety culture' a valid management tool in the effort to reduce accident rate and improve safety performance, or is it a fuzzy academic concept, lacking empirical validation? The answer to this question seems to depend on whom one asks. The UK Health and Safety Commission has encouraged companies to improve their safety performance through the development of a 'positive safety culture'. However, academic discussions in this area suggest that the concept remains vague, lacks empirical validation and is used as an 'umbrella term' for all the social and organizational factors that affect accident rate. This paper reviews the existing literature on safety culture and provides some clarification in terms of definition, empirical evidence and theoretical development. A theoretical framework of the mechanisms by which safety culture affects safety behaviours in organizations is proposed. The implications for practical management issues are discussed and future challenges and areas for further research are identified.     

Psychosocial safety climate as an antecedent of work characteristics and psychological strain: A multilevel model

Abstract

Psychosocial safety climate (PSC) refers to a specific organizational climate for the psychological health of workers. It is largely determined by management and at low levels is proposed as a latent pathogen for psychosocial risk factors and psychological strain. Using an extended Job Demands-Control-Support framework, we predicted the (24 month) cross-level effects of PSC on psychological strain via work conditions. We used a novel design whereby data from two unrelated samples of nurses working in remote areas were used across time (N=202, Time 1; N=163, Time 2), matched at the work unit level (N= 48). Using hierarchical linear modelling we found that unit PSC assessed by nurses predicted work conditions (workload, control, supervisor support) and psychological strain in different nurses in the same work unit 24 months later. There was evidence that the between-group relationship between unit PSC and psychological strain was mediated via Time 2 work conditions (workload, job control) as well as Time 1 emotional demands. The results support a multilevel work stress model with PSC as a plausible primary cause, or “cause of the causes”, of work-related strain. The study adds to the literature that identifies organizational contextual factors as origins of the work stress process.     

Improving Risk Management: From Lame Excuses to Principled Practice

The three classic pillars of risk analysis are risk assessment (how big is the risk and how sure can we be?), risk management (what shall we do about it?), and risk communication (what shall we say about it, to whom, when, and how?). We propose two complements as important parts of these three bases: risk attribution (who or what addressable conditions actually caused an accident or loss?) and learning from experience about risk reduction (what works, and how well?). Failures in complex systems usually evoke blame, often with insufficient attention to root causes of failure, including some aspects of the situation, design decisions, or social norms and culture. Focusing on blame, however, can inhibit effective learning, instead eliciting excuses to deflect attention and perceived culpability. Productive understanding of what went wrong, and how to do better, thus requires moving past recrimination and excuses. This article identifies common blame‐shifting “lame excuses” for poor risk management. These generally contribute little to effective improvements and may leave real risks and preventable causes unaddressed. We propose principles from risk and decision sciences and organizational design to improve results. These start with organizational leadership. More specifically, they include: deliberate testing and learning—especially from near‐misses and accident precursors; careful causal analysis of accidents; risk quantification; candid expression of uncertainties about costs and benefits of risk‐reduction options; optimization of tradeoffs between gathering additional information and immediate action; promotion of safety culture; and mindful allocation of people, responsibilities, and resources to reduce risks. We propose that these principles provide sound foundations for improving successful risk management.     

Ethical leadership supports safety voice by increasing risk perception and reducing ethical ambiguity: Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic

Misconduct by business and political leaders during the pandemic is feared to have impacted people's adherence to protective measures that would help to safeguard against the spread of COVID-19. Addressing this concern, this article theorizes and tests a model linking ethical leadership with workplace risk communication—a practice referred to as ‘safety voice’ in the research literature. Our study, conducted with 511 employees from UK companies, revealed that ethical leadership is positively associated with greater intention to engage in safety voice regarding COVID-19. We also find that this association is mediated by relations with the perceived health risk of COVID-19 and ambiguity about ethical decision making in the workplace. These findings therefore underscore the importance of good ethical conduct by leaders for ensuring that health and safety risks are well understood and communicated effectively by organizational members particularly during crises. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our study and highlight further opportunities for future research to address the ethical dimensions of leadership, risk management, and organizational risk communication.     

The structure of employee attitudes to safety: A European example

This paper concerns organizational safety culture and the structure or architecture of employee attitudes to safety as part of that culture. It begins by reviewing the somewhat scant literature relevant to this area, and then reports a study, conducted in a European company, which collected and factor analysed data on employee attitudes to safety. The framework provided for the study was that offered by Purdham (1984), and the results suggested that employees' attitudes to safety, within this company (across occupation/occupational level and country), could be mapped By five orthogonal factors: personal scepticism, individual responsibility, the safeness of the work environment, the effectiveness of arrangements for safety, and personal immunity. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, and attention is drawn to their subsequent use in an intervention to enhance safety culture within the organization by attacking supervisors' attitudes to safety.     

Giving Versus Giving In

Abstract

Altruism is central to organizational and social life, but its motivations are not well understood. We propose a new theoretical distinction that sorts these motivations into two basic types: “giving” indicates prosocial behaviors in which one willingly engages, while “giving in” indicates prosocial behavior in which one reluctantly engages, often in response to social pressure or obligation. Unlike those who give, those who give in prefer to avoid the situation that compels altruism altogether, even if doing so leaves the would-be beneficiary empty-handed. We review the existing literature on altruism in behavioral economics, psychology, and organizational behavior and suggest that the distinction between giving and giving in is not only central from a theoretical standpoint, but also has important methodological implications for researchers trying to study prosocial behavior and practitioners trying to encourage it.     

13 When Group Identities Matter

Abstract

Performance appraisals are a critical part of organizational life, and bias in appraisals is consistently mentioned as a barrier to advancement for diverse workers. This chapter reviews the literature on rater bias in performance appraisals, defined as effects on performance ratings due to ratee category membership. We focus on the major theoretical frameworks (e.g., stereotype fit and relational demography) used in the study of bias, organizing the research findings by the four most commonly studied demographic categories: gender, race, age, and disability. The review allows better understanding of the gaps in our knowledge and identifies needed future research directions in this literature stream. We conclude the chapter with several concerns including a lack of empirical research testing propositions concerning the effect of organizational variables on bias.     

Leadership’s Role in Process Safety: An Understanding of Behavioral Science Among Managers and Executives Is Needed

ABSTRACT

A recent prevalence of high visibility catastrophic events has garnered increased attention to process safety issues. While the use of Behavior-Based Safety interventions demonstrate a reduction in workplace injuries by targeting employee behavior, we believe that process safety requires a greater focus on the behavior of leaders (e.g., creating and executing strategy). One effective method to begin targeting leader behavior for the improvement of process safety is to teach leaders about the principles of behavior, including ways by which the science may be applied within their own organizational models.     

The case for complexity: A look at the relationship between individual and structure from the inside out

Abstract

This paper develops a model of the individual – structure relationship using a predominantly sociological explanation. Adopting the perspective of the individual and grounding the approach in a structurationist framework, a system of person-based and role-based relationships is proposed. The model's implications for the individual are developed from an examination of markets, hierarchies and networks. Main conclusions cross-cut individual, functional and organizational levels: (1) work- and non-work roles need to be intentionally maintained and leveraged as a way to develop individual and organizational complexity; (2) individual discretion is essential to achieving the proper balance between the two kinds of roles; (3) networks provide the greatest potential for role satisfaction; and (4) HRD assumes an instrumental role in establishing and maintaining a culture of trust and in designing and supporting jobs that foster complexity and discretion.