Replication: Cheating,loss aversion,and moral attitudes in Vietnam

We use the coin-flip paradigm and a short survey about moral attitudes under three conditions to answer three questions: (i) Do people cheat more when financial incentives are present in comparison with no incentives? (ii) Do they find it more difficult to maintain their ethical standards when they have been given a small amount of money? and (iii) Do moral attitudes predict cheating behavior? Using a sample of Vietnamese college students, we discover that a financial incentive does not matter until people feel that they are facing a loss. In addition, we do not find any evidence that moral attitudes could predict the unethical behavior in our sample. Our findings shed further light on cheating behaviors and loss aversion through an experimental investigation.     

Wounds that time can’t heal: Life satisfaction and exposure to traumatic events

In this study, by employing large-scale survey data from four waves of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we explore the (potentially long-lasting) effects of individuals’ exposure to psychologically traumatic life experiences on their subjective well-being. To this aim, we exploit the richness of our dataset, that contains information about occurrence and timing of a set of extreme events out of individuals’ control that may leave a “scar” extending to their current levels of life satisfaction in general as well as with regard to specific life domains. Our findings indicate that having a close relative hit by a life-threatening illness or accident and, especially, having been victim of a serious physical attack or assault are negatively related to both general and domain-specific life satisfaction, even after controlling for personality traits. Next, life satisfaction is significantly lowered by being physically abused by a parent. Overall, we provide evidence that the effects of some traumatic events are persistent over time and mostly related to women. Surprisingly, the effects of child death are negligible also in the short term.     

Gender differences in social risk taking

Women in Western societies are typically more risk averse than men in individual risk taking decisions. In real life, however, risk taking decisions are usually made in a social context. So far, empirical evidence whether gender differences are also present in the social risk taking domain is missing. We use a controlled experiment to analyze gender differences in social risk taking. We find that inequality aversion is the main driver for risk aversion in social risk taking. Disaggregating the data for males and females shows that this effect is mainly driven by strong inequality aversion of women. Moreover, by running the experiment with non-standard subjects from an egalitarian small-scale society, our results suggest that gender differences in social risk taking are culture-specific.     

Gender differences in willingness to compete: The role of public observability

A recent literature emphasizes that gender differences in the labor market may in part be driven by a gender gap in willingness to compete. However, whereas experiments in this literature typically investigate willingness to compete in private environments, real world competitions often have a more public nature, which introduces potential social image concerns. If such image concerns are important, and men and women differ in the degree to which they want to be seen as competitive, making tournament entry decisions publicly observable may further exacerbate the gender gap. We test this prediction using a laboratory experiment (N = 784) that varies the degree to which the decision to compete, and its outcome, is publicly observable. We find that public observability does not alter the magnitude of the gender gap in willingness to compete in an economically or statistically significant way.     

Interpersonal risk assessment and social preferences: An experimental study

We investigate interpersonal risk assessment, that is how individuals use either their own or their partner’s monetary resources to offset the risk that affects them or their partner. The observed behavior is in line with the predictions of a simple piecewise linear model of social preferences. Overall, individuals opportunistically draw from others’ resources to offset risk; furthermore, they display higher levels of risk aversion when delegated to choose for others rather than when choosing for themselves. However, different social types differ in the assessment of interpersonal risk. Considering our results, we suggest that studies dealing with interpersonal risk assessment should not only focus on risk preferences, but also take into account social preferences.     

The effect of education,income inequality and merit on inequality acceptance

A large number of observational and experimental studies have explored the determinants of individual preferences for redistribution. In general, inequalities are more likely to be accepted by people of higher socioeconomic status, in richer societies and when inequalities are perceived as justifiable owing to differences in productivity. Almås et al. (2020) show that in a relatively unequal society (the United States), the highly educated accept inequality significantly more than the less educated, whereas, in a relatively equal society (Norway), the less educated accept inequality more, but not significantly more, than the highly educated. Here, we replicate this finding using data from experiments conducted in four locations across three countries all distinct from the ones studied by Almås et al. However, a closer look at the data indicates that the origin of the interaction effect varies depending on which societies one compares. Data for Norway and the United States indicate that meritocratic values among the highly educated are less prevalent in more equal societies and that this is the driver of the triple interaction effect. In contrast, in our data the interaction effects have multiple drivers.     

On the behavioural relevance of optional and mandatory impure public goods

Impure public goods combine a private good with a public good. Often, impure public goods have a charitable or ethical dimension, giving ethically motivated consumers a convenient option to contribute to public goods through the marketplace (in addition to direct donations). Impure public goods could potentially promote ethical giving or alternatively hinder charitable behaviour. We implement an economics experiment with a between-subject design to test the behavioural relevance of impure public goods with only a token (i.e. small) contribution to a public good. Contributions to the public good are negatively affected by the presence of impure public goods with token contributions. We explore one mechanism to offset this negative impact by making the token impure public good mandatory. We observe higher average contributions and several positive impacts on charitable behaviour, which supports the claim that this mechanism can potentially offset the negative impact of impure public goods.     

Spillovers from targeting of incentives: Exploring responses to being excluded

A growing set of policies involve transfers conditioned upon socially desired actions, such as attending school or conserving forest. However, given a desire to maximize the impact of limited funds by avoiding transfers that do not change behavior, typically some potential recipients are excluded on the basis of their characteristics, their actions or at random. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the behavior of individuals excluded on different bases from a new incentive that encourages real monetary donations to a public environmental conservation program. We show that the donations from the individuals who were excluded based on prior high contributions fell significantly. Yet the rationale used for exclusion mattered, in that none of the other selection criteria used as the basis for exclusion resulted in negative effects on contributions.     

The arithmetic of outcome editing in financial and social domains

Outcome editing refers to a set of mental rules that people apply when deciding whether to evaluate multiple outcomes jointly or separately, which subsequently affects choice. In a large-scale online survey (n = 2062) we investigate whether individuals use the same outcome editing rules for financial outcomes (e.g., a lottery win) and social outcomes (e.g., a party with friends). We also test the role of numeric ability in explaining outcome editing. Our results show that people’s preferences for combining or separating events depend on whether those events are in the financial or the social domain. Specifically, individuals were more likely to segregate social outcomes than monetary outcomes, except for when all outcomes were negative. Moreover, numeric ability was associated with preferences for outcome editing in the financial domain but not in the social domain. Our findings extend the understanding of the arithmetic operations underlying outcome editing and suggest that people rely more on calculations when making choices involving multiple financial outcomes and more on feelings when making choices involving social outcomes.     

It does (not) get better: Reference income violation and altruism

We experimentally test whether the gap between reference and actual income impacts subsequent altruism. Participants first perform a real-effort task for a fixed wage and then play a dictator game. Between conditions, we vary the level and the timing of the revelation of the wage. In some conditions, participants know the wage before the real effort task and are not informed of the other potential levels. In some other conditions, they are informed of the distribution of wages before the real effort task, but the actual wage is only revealed afterward. Participants in the latter conditions can form references that may be higher or lower than their actual wage. Our hypothesis is that the gap between the reference and the actual wage impacts transfers in the subsequent dictator game, either because participants want to compensate their recent losses, or because of the emotional reaction to gains and losses. The results support this hypothesis: participants who get the low wage transfer less and are less likely to transfer when they are informed of the other potential levels than when they are not. Conversely, participants who get the high wage are more likely to transfer positive amounts when they are informed of the other potential levels. We use physiological (skin conductance response) and declarative data to discuss the role of emotions in our treatment effects.     

Tax morale and fairness in conflict an experiment

Most people pay their taxes most of the time, even if the expected disutility from enforcement is too low to deter tax evasion. One potential reason is tax morale and, more specifically, rule following. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes just because participants are told they are supposed to pay is indeed pronounced. Yet compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply.     

Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

In this experiment, I examine the extent to which competitive social preferences can explain over-bidding in rent-seeking contests. The Human treatment is a standard two-player contest. In the Robot treatment, a single player bids against a computerized player, eliminating potential social preference motives. The results show no difference in bids between treatments at the aggregate level. Further analysis shows evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects between impulsive and reflective subjects. Moreover, impulsive subjects are more likely than reflective subjects to deviate qualitatively from the shape of the theoretical best response function.     

Procrastination, prompts, and preferences: Evidence from daily records of self-directed learning activities

This paper presents evidence showing that a libertarian paternalistic intervention having significant but uneven effects on the student procrastination of a coursework assignment. We observe the degree of procrastination in a language course at a Japanese university with individuals’ electronic records of daily activities. With a quasi-experiment that generates variations in the frequency of interventions and the preference of students towards the course, we examine the effects of in-class verbal prompts by an instructor on the timing of task completion. We find that prompts affect behavior, especially when reinforced, but the responsiveness depends on the class preferences and the timing of interventions.     

The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

We study cooperation within and between groups in the laboratory, comparing treatments in which two groups have previously been in conflict with one another, in conflict with a different group, or not previously exposed to conflict. We model conflict using an inter-group Tullock contest, and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi-level public good game. We find that conflict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between groups. Moreover, we find that an increase in the gains from cooperation only increases cooperation between groups when the two groups have not previously interacted.     

Rank and response: A field experiment on peer information and water use behavior

Perception of peer rank, or how we perform relative to our peers, can be a powerful motivator. While research exists on the effect of social information on decision making, there is less work on how ranked comparisons with our peers influence our behavior. This paper outlines a field experiment conducted with 3896 households in Castro Valley, California, which uses household mailers with various forms of social information and peer rank messaging to motivate water conservation. The experiment tests the effect of a visible peer rank on water use, and how the competitive framing of rank information influences behavioral response. The results show that households with relatively low or high water use in the pre-treatment period responded differently to how rank information was framed. I find that a neutrally-framed peer rank caused a small “boomerang effect” (i.e., an increase in average water use) for low water use households, but this effect was eliminated by competitive framing. At the same time, a competitively-framed peer rank demotivated high water use households, increasing their average water use over the full period of the experiment. This result is supported by evidence that the competitive frame on rank information increased water use for households who ranked “last” in the peer group – a detrimental “last place effect” from competitively-framed rankings.     

Dictator game variants with probabilistic (and cost-saving) payoffs: A systematic test

Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, I systematically test the validity of common dictator game variants with probabilistic payoffs. Using a unified experimental framework, I include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators, paying only some players, paying only some decisions, and role uncertainty. I also relate transfers in the dictator game variants to established complementary individual difference measures of prosociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation to charity, and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. My data shows that the standard dictator game presents the expected correlations with the complementary measures of prosociality. Involving fewer receivers yields comparably valid results. By contrast, when only some players or decisions are paid or, particularly, when subjects face role uncertainty, the expected associations with complementary prosociality measures are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also significantly biased upward. I conclude that the validity of dictator game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods. Not all dictator game variants can be recommended for the valid measurement of social preferences.