航空公司收入管理价格与舱位控制的统一分析

收入管理对于改善民航企业的经济效益、增强民航企业的竞争能力具有重大意义. 文章 运用随机过程理论和最大凹向包络原理,探讨航空公司客运收入管理研究中动态价格与舱位 控制的统一分析模型,即在任意订票时刻,决定航班的哪些舱位该开放,以什么价格开放,从而 实现单个航班的收入最大化. 文章指出,航空公司可通过三阶段方法来获取最优的动态价格与 舱位控制策略,即确定最优价格集、开放舱位数及最优价格. 最后给出了实例分析.     

Disentangling the European airlines efficiency puzzle: A network data envelopment analysis approach

In recent years the European airline industry has undergone critical restructuring. It has evolved from a highly regulated market predominantly operated by national airlines to a dynamic, liberalized industry where airline firms compete freely on prices, routes, and frequencies. Although several studies have analyzed performance issues for European airlines using a variety of efficiency measurement methods, virtually none of them has considered two-stage alternatives – not only in this particular European context but in the airline industry in general. We extend the aims of previous contributions by considering a network Data Envelopment Analysis (network DEA) approach which comprises two sub-technologies that can share part of the inputs. Results show that, in general, most of the inefficiencies are generated in the first stage of the analysis. However, when considering different types of carriers several differences emerge – most of the low-cost carriers’ inefficiencies are confined to the first stage. Results also show a dynamic component, since performance differed across types of airlines during the decade 2000–2010.     

Network Game and Capacity Investment Under Market Uncertainty

This paper investigates the impacts of competition and market uncertainty on airlines' network structures and capacity investment. The airlines choose their network structures and construct capacities while demands are unknown. After uncertainty is resolved, they determine the total number of seats to offer in each leg constrained by their capacities built earlier. We conclude that market uncertainty is the driving force of hub‐and‐spoke networks, whereas the market mean is the driving force of point‐to‐point networks. Which of the two countervailing forces dominates determines the equilibrium network structures. Moreover, we find that the airlines' total expected profits in the mixed equilibrium in which the airlines employ different networks are larger than in the pure hub‐and‐spoke network equilibrium in which each airline employs the hub‐and‐spoke network. However, the mixed equilibrium does not necessarily yield larger profits than the pure point‐to‐point equilibrium in which each airline employs the point‐to‐point network.     

航空公司交叉持股对产能共享策略的影响研究

产能共享与交叉持股是航空公司常用的运作与财务策略,两种方式都能在一定条件下起到缓和竞争的作用。本文考虑两家航空公司的两种交叉持股模式,构建了包含顾客忠诚度的价格竞争模型,依据产能是否对称以及是否实施产能共享策略形成八种不同的情形,求解并分析了不同情形下的最优价格决策及对应期望利润。通过对比不同情形下的利润,本文发现,在单向持股模式下,当产能对称时,两家企业始终愿意采用产能共享策略,而当产能不对称时,如果存在产能共享,产能较小的企业将更愿意降低产品价格,导致市场竞争加剧,从而损害产能较大企业的盈利能力。因此,只有当持股比例相对较小时企业才愿意实施共享产能策略。在交叉持股模式下,当产能对称时,企业在交叉持股比例适中时才愿意实施产能共享策略。而当产能不对称时,企业始终不愿意采用产能共享策略。这也表明产能共享和交叉持股策略之间存在一定的相互替代作用,企业应根据不同市场状态协调使用两种策略。     

基于竞争的航班座位分配问题研究

主要研究水平竞争(相同航线的竞争)下的座位控制问题。证明了纳什均衡的存在性,且对竞争条件下各票价等级可获得的座位总数与无竞争条件下的座位总数进行了比较。分析结果表明:水平竞争下竞争性订票限额与垄断者订票限额之间的大小取决于溢出乘客(被一家公司拒绝而转移到另一家公司的乘客)所属的需求类型。     

Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets

We provide a practical method to estimate the payoff functions of players in complete information, static, discrete games. With respect to the empirical literature on entry games originated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992), the main novelty of our framework is to allow for general forms of heterogeneity across players without making equilibrium selection assumptions. We allow the effects that the entry of each individual airline has on the profits of its competitors, its “competitive effects,” to differ across airlines. The identified features of the model are sets of parameters (partial identification) such that the choice probabilities predicted by the econometric model are consistent with the empirical choice probabilities estimated from the data. We apply this methodology to investigate the empirical importance of firm heterogeneity as a determinant of market structure in the U.S. airline industry. We find evidence of heterogeneity across airlines in their profit functions. The competitive effects of large airlines (American, Delta, United) are different from those of low cost carriers and Southwest. Also, the competitive effect of an airline is increasing in its airport presence, which is an important measure of observable heterogeneity in the airline industry. Then we develop a policy experiment to estimate the effect of repealing the Wright Amendment on competition in markets out of the Dallas airports. We find that repealing the Wright Amendment would increase the number of markets served out of Dallas Love.     

The limits of price leadership: needs-based positioning strategy and the long-term competitiveness of Europe’s low fare airlines

This article argues that a strategy of low operating costs and cheap prices is not sufficient in and of itself to establish long term competitive advantage for a growing company. Companies also need to leverage their distinctive corporate capabilities and unique experiences. In the case of service sector companies such as airlines, capabilities derive from the relationship which exists between the company, its employees, and its customers, as well as the reputation which is gradually established on the basis of reliability and quality of service. Unique experiences arise from the corporate culture and route network which an airline builds over time.     

Supply Chain Consequences of Subsidies for Corporate Social Responsibility

The use of government incentives tied to market prices as means of boosting corporate social responsibility (CSR) has expanded notably in recent decades. Enhanced business tax deductions for charitable donations and credits for conservation easements are notable cases. While providing incentives for socially desirable behavior to achieve legislative goals has intuitive appeal, the broader economic consequences are not always fully understood. In this study, we examine such wider consequences for supply chains when subsidies for CSR are offered. One effect we identify is that since incentives are typically tied to market value, firms have not only an added incentive to achieve societal objectives (say by donating inventory) but also an incentive to raise output (retail) market prices. A second consequence is that since firms forgo potential revenues by engaging in socially desired behavior, they become increasingly sensitive to supplier pricing; in an uncoordinated supply chain this leads to input (wholesale) price concessions. Among other things, the results underscore that incentives put in place to meet broader societal objectives also have notable ramifications for suppliers, retailers, and consumers in primary markets.     

Regulating the domestic air travel in India: an umpire's game

This paper analyses the competitive strategies available to an Indian airline in a scenario where the entry of private domestic airlines has only recently been allowed. The Calcutta-Delhi route is initially analysed as an example—where there are three major players competing. The fare charged by each airline being the same, the number of departures is used as one of the major competitive weapons. Game theory is used here as a useful tool to analyse such situations. The equilibrium behaviour of the airlines is studied and the possibility of the game being played at the focal point is then analysed.All over the world, airlines have had a long history of economic regulation of both their national and international operations with governments often regarding regulation as necessary—both to achieve a comprehensive route network and to achieve stable markets. The game formulated is then analysed from the point of view of the regulating body and it is found that the game-theoretic framework is able to provide powerful insights regarding regulatory interventions. Two types of interventions, viz. fare regulation as well as the introduction of a licence fee per flight, are analysed and their ability to shift the Nash equilibrium to the focal point are studied. Finally, the problem is generalised and some results are obtained which are applicable to any route with any number of operators as long as the basic nature of the competitive situation remains the same. Use of the game-theoretic approach as a powerful tool to decide regulatory interventions is thus highlighted.     

存在网络外部性下的两阶段圆周模型

本文分析了存在网络外部性下的两阶段圆周模型。网络外部性的存在使厂商有动机降低产品价格以获得更大的市场份额,模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡表明消费者剩余和社会净福利水平得到改进,同时行业内产品的差异程度偏少。特别地,在强网络外部性下,垄断结构能使社会净福利最大化。     

Penalizing passenger’s transfer time in computing airlines revenue

Airline strategic alliances result in a form of cooperation where firms can access the resources of others network members in order to create added value for their passengers. The shortcoming of this process is that each member of the network makes individual revenue management decisions to maximize its own income, resulting in a sub-optimal income for the network members.To deal with this problem, this paper suggests a resource allocation based on a transfer pricing mechanism, to cooperatively divide the revenue of a passenger between network members. The method penalizes the total time that a passenger takes for reaching the final destination. The model takes into consideration that the profit is independent of the number of available seats (with a maximum determined for each airline). The method computes the optimal transfer pricing and, at the same time, optimizes the quantity of seats (the booking limits). The solution results in a strong Nash equilibrium, which incorporate both the transfer prices and booking limits. We describe the transfer pricing process using an ergodic, finite and continuous-time Markov game model for multiple players. The revenue of each airline in the supply chain will depend on the number of flight transfers and the transit time of the passenger at the airports: the longer the time to the final destination, the lower the price. We compute a collaborative equilibrium point, useful for understanding the resulting revenue of each member of the network. For solving the game, we employ an iterative method based on a proximal approach that involves time penalization. In our final contribution, we present results from a numerical example, which validates the proposed Markov game model and measures the benefits of the transfer pricing resource allocation.     

Measuring Seat Value in Stadiums and Theaters

We study how the seat value perceived by consumers attending an event in a theater/stadium depends on the location of their seat relative to the stage/field. We develop a measure of seat value, called the Seat Value Index, and relate it to seat location and consumer characteristics. We implement our analysis on a proprietary data set that a professional baseball franchise in Japan collected from its customers, and provide recommendations. For instance, we find that customers seated in symmetric seats on left and right fields might derive very different valuations from the seats. We also find that the more frequent visitors to the stadium report extreme seat value less often when compared with first‐time visitors. Our findings and insights remain robust to the effects of price and game‐related factors. Thus, our research quantifies the significant influence of seat location on the ex‐post seat value perceived by customers. Utilizing the heterogeneity in seat values at different seat locations, we provide segment‐specific pricing recommendations based on a service‐level objective that would limit the fraction of customers experiencing low seat value to a desired threshold.     

Product Positioning and Pricing Under Production Cost Considerations*

A framework in a competitive environment is proposed that incorporates production cost and economies of scale in the problem of positioning a product for a market segment. The model facilitates the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices and product positions. As such, firms can simultaneously choose prices and product positions for the segment. This result improves the traditional theory on equilibria points in prices and product positions where firms choose their product positions first and then set their prices. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates the effects of changes in the unit savings derived from economies of scale or the cost of furnishing a product with its attributes by one firm on the product positions, prices, and profits of all competing firms. More important, the paper examines the effect on prices and profits of competing firms when one of the firms repositions its product closer to the segment's ideal point. It is shown that under certain conditions, the profit of a firm may actually decrease as it redesigns its product closer to the segment's ideal point. These conditions assist management to identify the product design beyond which enhancements of the product would lead to lower profits because of increasing production costs. It is also shown that the price of this firm increases. Past research supports the idea that positioning a brand closer to the ideal point, given fixed product positions of competing firms, would lead to greater buyer preferences and eventually higher profits. The price and profits of the competing firm may increase or decrease. Conditions are derived under which a movement towards the segment's ideal point by one firm would lead to higher profits by the competing firm.     

Assessing fairness of selfish revenue sharing mechanisms for airline alliances

Airline alliances offer flights including flight legs operated by different airlines. A major problem is how to share the revenue obtained through selling a flight ticket among the airlines in a fair way. Recently, Kimms and Çetiner [1] have proposed fair revenue allocations based on the solution concept nucleolus, which assumes that the decisions of the alliance are given centrally. However, in an alliance, each airline has a selfish behavior and tries to maximize its own revenue. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a method to evaluate the fairness of revenue sharing mechanisms applied in a selfish setting. The method includes a simulation model for the booking process of the alliance and uses the nucleolus-based allocations as benchmark. Second, we develop a revenue sharing mechanism based on the transfer of dual prices. The fairness of the new mechanism and several other existing approaches is assessed through a numerical study.     

Airline Safety Improvement Through Experience with Near‐Misses: A Cautionary Tale

In recent years, the U.S. commercial airline industry has achieved unprecedented levels of safety, with the statistical risk associated with U.S. commercial aviation falling to 0.003 fatalities per 100 million passengers. But decades of research on organizational learning show that success often breeds complacency and failure inspires improvement. With accidents as rare events, can the airline industry continue safety advancements? This question is complicated by the complex system in which the industry operates where chance combinations of multiple factors contribute to what are largely probabilistic (rather than deterministic) outcomes. Thus, some apparent successes are realized because of good fortune rather than good processes, and this research intends to bring attention to these events, the near‐misses. The processes that create these near‐misses could pose a threat if multiple contributing factors combine in adverse ways without the intervention of good fortune. Yet, near‐misses (if recognized as such) can, theoretically, offer a mechanism for continuing safety improvements, above and beyond learning gleaned from observable failure. We test whether or not this learning is apparent in the airline industry. Using data from 1990 to 2007, fixed effects Poisson regressions show that airlines learn from accidents (their own and others), and from one category of near‐misses—those where the possible dangers are salient. Unfortunately, airlines do not improve following near‐miss incidents when the focal event has no clear warnings of significant danger. Therefore, while airlines need to and can learn from certain near‐misses, we conclude with recommendations for improving airline learning from all near‐misses.     

Measuring the Benefit of Offering Auxiliary Services: Do Bag‐Checkers Differ in Their Sensitivities to Airline Itinerary Attributes?

When firms evaluate their service system design choices, there is typically more uncertainty surrounding the value that a particular auxiliary service provides than there is on the cost of providing that service. To help inform this decision, we propose an approach where we compare the relative value of the segment of passengers who use an auxiliary service to the relative value of the segment that does not use it. We demonstrate this approach for a typical auxiliary service common to the airline industry. In 2008, most US airlines implemented checked baggage fee policies to decrease their costs by reducing the number of customer service agents needed in the check‐in and baggage handling processes. The success of this change has led to a current debate at many of these airlines on whether to make further staffing cuts in these areas, essentially making it even less attractive for passengers to check their baggage. Our proposed methodology helps answer whether passengers who continue to check bags in today's baggage‐fee era are more or less valuable than passengers who do not check bags. We explore this question empirically by examining, through a stated preference survey, if a history of checking or not checking bags can be used to segment passengers based on how their itinerary choices are influenced by common airline service attributes (on‐time performance, itinerary time, number of connections, airfare, and schedule delay). Contrary to the opinions of some top airline executives, we find that the passengers who continue to check bags at airlines that charge baggage fees are generally less sensitive to differences in three of these important service attributes and are less likely to switch airlines when a competing airline improves its offerings along these dimensions. Thus, airlines that charge for checked bags should consider improving the customer experience for their bag‐checking passengers, as they represent a potentially more valuable segment class to the airline.     

A Comparative Revenue Analysis of Hotel Yield Management Heuristics

Yield management is the dynamic pricing, overbooking, and allocation of perishable assets across market segments in an effort to maximize short-term revenues for the firm. Numerous optimization heuristics for allocation and overbooking exist for the airline industry, whose perishable asset is the airplane seat. When an airplane departs, no revenue is gained from the empty seat(s). In the hotel industry, the perishable asset is the hotel room-once a room is left empty for a night, that night's revenue cannot be recaptured. The literature on yield management heuristics for the hotel industry is sparse. For the hotel operating environment, no research has adequately (1) integrated overbooking with allocation, (2) modeled the phenomenon of hotel patrons extending or contracting their stay at a moment's notice, or (3) performed a realistic performance comparison of alternative heuristics. This research develops (1) two hotel-specific algorithms that both integrate overbooking with the allocation decisions, (2) a simulation model to reproduce realistic hotel operating environments, and (3) compares the performance of five heuristics under 36 realistic hotel operating environments. Seven conclusions are reached with regard to which heuristic(s) perform best in specific operating environments. Generally, heuristic selection is very much dependent on the hotel operating environment. A counterintuitive result is that in many operating environments, the simpler heuristics work as well as the more complex ones.     

航空客运舱位控制和超售综合静态建模研究

本文研究航空运输收益管理的舱位控制和超售综合静态建模问题.通过将机票销售过程模拟成排队过程,以收益最大化为目标函数,首先给出了单航段单等级票价下的超售水平公式.然后将该思路推广到多等级票价情况,应用动态规划方法建立了舱位控制和超售综合控制静态模型,在建立了两个定理的基础上,由该模型进一步推导出了各等级舱位最优订座限制的决策方程.最后分析了一个实例以说明决策方程的应用.     

飞行频率、拥挤成本和互补型航空联盟:中枢轮辐网络机场拥挤分析

本文在基于飞行频率、拥挤成本和互补型航空联盟的基础上系统分析了中枢轮辐网络机场拥挤问题。研究表明:航空公司的利润最大化使得航班飞行频率存在过度供给,飞机大小也是次优的,这进一步恶化了中枢机场的机场拥挤;航班飞行频率与航空公司的拥挤成本系数、旅行计划延迟效用系数正相关,与飞机每次起降的固定成本负相关;互补型航空联盟使得联盟体利润增加,航空联盟对连接市场乘客有利,对本地市场乘客不利,航空联盟还可以内化伙伴间拥挤,航班飞行频率得以优化,机场拥挤得以缓解。     

Significant Factors of Aviation Insurance and Risk Management Strategy: An Empirical Study of Taiwanese Airline Carriers

Aviation insurance premiums have become a heavy burden for the airline industry since September 11, 2001. Although the industry must constantly balance its operations between profitability and safety, the reality is that airlines are in the business of making money. Therefore, their ability to reduce cost and manage risk is a key factor for success. Unlike past research, which used subjective judgment methods, this study applied quantitative historical data (1999–2000) and gray relation analysis to identify the primary factors influencing ratemaking for aviation insurance premiums. An empirical study of six airlines in Taiwan was conducted to determine these factors and to analyze the management strategies used to deal with them. Results showed that the loss experience and performance of individual airlines were the key elements associated with aviation insurance premiums paid by each airline. By identifying and understanding the primary factors influencing ratemaking for aviation insurance, airlines will better understand their relative operational strengths and weaknesses, and further help top management identify areas for further improvement. Knowledge of these factors combined with effective risk management strategies, may result in lower premiums and operating costs for airline companies.