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1.
企业通过对拥有旧产品的老消费者提供以旧换新补贴能够提升自身销量与利润。然而,面临竞争对手时企业的以旧换新决策是否会受到影响?本文求解了先后进入市场的双寡头竞争企业所面临的以旧换新与定价博弈均衡,并分析了竞争存在与否对于企业以旧换新策略产生的影响。研究结果表明,第一,面对竞争时企业的定价决策受到市场中老消费者比例、两家竞争企业各自新产品的创新提升水平、老产品的使用残值这四个因素的共同影响。第二,当老产品残值相对较低而市场中老消费者数量适中时,两企业均不提供以旧换新可能成为博弈均衡,而其他条件下,两企业均提供以旧换新为博弈均衡。第三,先进入的企业没有动机单独为消费者提供以旧换新补贴。第四,竞争对手的存在对于先进入企业自身的以旧换新决策与相应的定价策略都产生了显著的影响。 相似文献
2.
焕新计划是生产商为提升自身竞争优势而推出的一种促销手段,加入焕新计划的消费者在第一阶段可以享受全方位服务,在第二阶段可以享受以旧换新抵扣优惠。消费者将权衡加入焕新计划的费用、服务水平以及抵扣力度等因素决策是否在第一阶段加入焕新计划。本文假设时尚型消费者每阶段都会购买最新产品,而节俭型消费者第一阶段购买产品后在第二阶段继续使用,针对这两类消费者在实施焕新计划和不实施焕新计划两种情况下,构建两阶段模型以决策产品的最优定价;运用解析方法分析了产品的生产成本等参数对最优定价的影响;运用解析方法和数值算例方法对两模型进行对比。 相似文献
3.
《Omega》2019
B2C platforms are increasingly implementing trade-in programs to boost sales. Most of these platforms have adopted dual-format retailing model including both self-run stores and third-party stores. Under trade-in program framework, B2C platforms will determine the optimal trade-in rebate, and whether to offer the rebate to consumers with gift card (GC) or cash coupon (CC). GC can only be used in self-run stores, while CC can be used in both stores. To entice more consumers to trade-in products, platforms may launch trade-in efforts in the market. To address such decision-making challenges, we consider a B2C platform who owns a self-run store and hosts a third-party store, and examine the optimal trade-in strategy for the platform by developing four theoretical models. We first present two models without considering trade-in efforts, i.e., one model regarding GC payment, and one model regarding CC payment, and then extend them by taking trade-in efforts into consideration. Some interesting findings and insights are achieved. In particular, we find that both GC and CC do not always benefit the platform. Interestingly, offering high quality and low selling price for products in both the self-run store and the third-party store are also not always beneficial to the platform. So is the competition between both stores. Launching trade-in efforts may lead to a lower trade-in rebate but a higher profit for the platform. A counterintuitive finding is obtained that a higher gift card redemption rate is not beneficial to the platform, and vice versa. 相似文献
4.
To entice consumers to purchase both current and next generation products, many manufacturers and retailers offer trade‐in programs that allow buyers of the first generation product to trade‐in the product and purchase the new generation product at a lower price. By considering the interactions between “forward‐looking” consumers and a firm when a trade‐in program is offered, we analyze a two‐period dynamic game to determine the optimal prices of two successive‐generation products in equilibrium, and examine the conditions under which trade‐in programs are beneficial to the firm. Our model incorporates market heterogeneity (valuation of the first generation product varies among the consumer population), product uncertainty (the incremental value of the new product is uncertain before its introduction), and consumers' forward‐looking behavior (consumers take future product valuation and prices into consideration when making purchasing decisions). With the trade‐in option, we show that consumers are willing to pay a price that is higher than their valuations of the current product. Furthermore, trade‐in programs are more beneficial to the firm when: (i) the durability of the current product is high; (ii) the market heterogeneity is low; or (iii) the uncertainty level (or the expected incremental value) of the new product is high. Finally, when the incremental value of the new product is more uncertain, consumers are more willing to purchase the current product because of the “option” value of the trade‐in programs and thus trade‐in programs can be more beneficial to the firm in this case. 相似文献
5.
本文研究策略型消费者对零售商的定价和库存决策的影响。与以往的研究假设残值固定不变,且消费者均为策略型消费者不同的是,本文考虑了顾客的异质性以及残值由清仓期库存决定这一特点。本文的研究表明:在消费者均为策略型消费者,且清楚零售商将采取残值定价策略的情况下,零售商可以通过数量保证策略来提高自身的期望利润,降低库存订货量。在考虑顾客异质性的条件下,当零售商采取估值定价策略时,零售商的最大期望利润与短视型消费者在市场上的比例成正相关。并且,存在一个唯一的阈值点,当短视型消费者在市场上的比例高于这一阈值点时,估值定价策略优于保留价格定价策略,反之,则保留价格定价策略更优。 相似文献
6.
以旧换再补贴政策已经在我国试点施行,相关原型新品和再制品的市场购买行为和企业定价决策受此影响。根据传统销售和售后渠道以及消费者持有旧件质量的不同细分市场,考虑到消费者的"以旧换再"偏好程度构建了制造商分级定价利润模型并分段优化,得到了"以旧换再"补贴下的最优分级定价决策,面向企业给出了旧件分级再制造的成本条件,面向政府给出了授予企业产品补贴资格的参考依据。考虑到再制造领先企业和一般企业再制造条件的不同,采用算例分析展示了补贴对领先企业及一般企业再制造分级定价决策的影响,并分析了消费者"以旧换再"偏好程度的变化对企业分级再制造决策的影响。结果表明,分级定价可以提高再制造系统的整体利润;换购补贴对促进再制造领先企业与一般企业再制造体系发展的积极作用不同,政府应根据产业及企业特点结合其他举措选择实施补贴的时机和补贴比例。 相似文献
7.
8.
Kutsal Dogan 《决策科学》2010,41(4):755-785
Consumers need to exert effort to use the incentives provided in a promotion campaign. This effort is critical in the consumers’ decision process and for the success of the campaign. We develop a model of consumer redemption effort that is general in nature and is applicable to coupons, rebates, and other price‐discrimination devices. We find that the impact of redemption effort is quite intricate on a firm’s profit and consumers’ surplus. We find that there are cases where a firm would like to operate in a low redemption cost environment while consumers would be better off with higher costs. We identify cases where price can remain the same with or without the promotion. In these cases, it is possible that the surplus for each individual consumer is higher when a firm price discriminates and improves its profit. Our results indicate that a firm would rather have variation in consumer redemption costs than to have variation in consumer valuations. However, in a market with low valuation variability, consumer redemption cost variability is essential for an efficient promotion campaign. Therefore, the markets that naturally have a lot of variability in consumer valuations should be the ones targeted for online promotion programs that reduce consumer effort levels, not the markets with low variability. 相似文献
9.
We consider manufacturer rebate competition in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling to a common retailer. We fully characterize the manufacturers’ equilibrium rebate decisions and show how they depend on parameters such as the fixed cost of a rebate program, market size, the redemption rate of rebate, the proportion of rebate‐sensitive consumers in the market and competition intensity. Interestingly, more intense competition induces a manufacturer to lower rebate value or stop offering rebate entirely. Without rebate, it is known that more intense competition hurts the manufacturers and benefits the retailer. With rebate, however, more intense competition could benefit the manufacturers and hurt the retailer. We find similar counterintuitive results when there is a change in some other parameters. We also consider the case when the retailer subsidizes the manufacturers sequentially to offer rebate programs. We fully characterize the retailer's optimal subsidy strategy, and show that subsidy always benefits the retailer but may benefit or hurt the manufacturers. When the retailer wants to induce both manufacturers to offer rebate, he always prefers to subsidize the manufacturer with a higher fixed cost first. Sometimes the other manufacturer will then voluntarily offer rebate even without subsidy. 相似文献
10.
顾客忠诚计划是零售商的重要销售策略之一. 本文针对两期折扣问题中零售商的订货和积分回馈计划投入的联合决策问题,基于完全理性假设,并结合问题的实际情况,考虑了全价期单期以及全价期和折扣期两期的积分回馈计划,构建了基于这两种积分回馈计划下的策略型消费者决策模型. 分析了不同积分回馈计划对策略型消费者行为的影响,进而讨论了零售商在不同决策下的收益情况,探索了零售商订货和积分回馈计划联合决策的制定. 研究发现:(1)积分回馈计划会对策略型消费者行为产生影响,从而影响零售商的决策和收益;(2)订货和忠诚计划制定的联合决策有利于零售商提高收益;(3)对于单位成本低的商品,面向全价期的积分回馈计划的最优收益提升较大;(4)对于商品价值与实际价格差异较小的商品,积分回馈计划对最优收益的提升作用较大. 具体而言,如果商品单位成本小于等于折扣价,则面向全价期的积分回馈计划的最优收益提升较大,反之,则面向全价期和折扣期的积分回馈计划的最优收益提升较大. 相似文献
11.
Qingning Cao Kathryn E. Stecke Jun Zhang 《Production and Operations Management》2015,24(12):1931-1944
A firm's two‐product bundling decision is examined when the supply of one product is limited and consumer valuations are normally distSteckeributed. The firm can choose to sell products separately and/or through a bundle. We find that the impact of limited supply on a firm's bundling decision depends on the correlation between the consumer valuations of the two products as well as the symmetry level of the two products in terms of their attractiveness (how much they are valued by consumers). When the valuation correlation is high and the symmetry level of the two products is low, limited supply can drive bundling. When the valuation correlation is low or the symmetry level is high, limited supply can drive no bundling. When the attractiveness of both products are low or the valuation correlation is very high, limited supply has no impact on a firm's bundling decision: The firm should not bundle for all supply levels. This study offers a new driver for product bundling: the limited supply of a product. The existing bundling literature suggests that a firm should bundle symmetric products that have a low consumer valuation correlation, when bundling is driven by consumer valuation heterogeneity reduction. In contrast, when bundling is driven by limited supply, a firm should bundle asymmetric products with a high consumer valuation correlation. The benefit of supply‐driven bundling depends on the severity of supply limitation. When supply limitation is moderate, bundling creates value by expanding the market of the less attractive product. When supply limitation is severe, bundling enables a firm to extract a higher margin from the less attractive product. 相似文献
12.
《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2017,85(1):145-172
This paper proposes a framework for studying competitive (pure) bundling in an oligopoly market. We find that under fairly general conditions, relative to separate sales, bundling raises market prices, benefits firms, and harms consumers when the number of firms is above a threshold (which can be small). This is in contrast to the findings in the duopoly case on which the existing literature often focuses. Our analysis also sheds new light on how consumer valuation dispersion affects price competition more generally. 相似文献
13.
《Omega》2015
Companies can adopt trade-in and/or leasing to shorten consumers׳ upgrade cycle and gain control over secondary markets. In this paper, we consider a monopolistic manufacturer who offers a technology product to a market consisting of heterogeneous consumers. We focus on an exogenous, stochastic innovation process that determines the availability of new technology and consequently, residual value of the current product. We derive the optimal pricing strategy of trade-in and leasing, respectively, examine its impact on the manufacturer׳s expected profit, and compare the performance of the two strategies. Trade-in protects the manufacturer against residual value risk and allows the flexibility of offering the option at different innovation states separately. Leasing, on the other hand, provides the manufacturer an opportunity to circumvent low new product prices and thus increases expected profit when product reuse profitability is high. The interplay between the two forces, product reuse profitability and new product price, determines the preference between trade-in and leasing. Our findings provide monopolistic manufacturers guidance on how to optimally employ the trade-in and leasing strategies. 相似文献
14.
Ashutosh Prasad Kathryn E. Stecke Xuying Zhao 《Production and Operations Management》2011,20(1):129-142
Retailers often face a newsvendor problem. Advance selling helps retailers to reduce demand uncertainty. Consumers, however, may prefer not to purchase in advance unless given a discount because they are uncertain about their valuation for the product in advance. It is then unclear whether or when advance selling to pass some uncertainty risk to consumers is optimal for the retailer. This paper examines the advance selling price and inventory decisions in a two‐period setting, where the first period is the advance selling period and the second is the selling (and consumption) period. We find that an advance selling strategy is not always optimal, but is contingent on parameters of the market (e.g., market potential and uncertainty) and the consumers (e.g., valuation, risk aversion, and heterogeneity). For example, we find that retailers should sell in advance if the consumers' expected valuation exceeds consumers' expected surplus when not buying early by a certain threshold. This threshold increases with the degree of risk aversion but decreases with stock out risk. If the degree of risk aversion varies across consumers, then a retailer should sell in advance if the probability for a consumer to spot buy is less than a critical fractile. 相似文献
15.
本文从政府提供消费补贴以鼓励消费者选择购买再制品的视角,构建了政府消费补贴下的闭环供应链博弈模型,得到了政府的最优消费补贴策略,并探讨了政府消费补贴政策对闭环供应链新品与再制品的定价、供应链总利润、消费者剩余、社会福利的影响。研究结果表明:1)只有满足特定条件时,政府才需提供再制品消费补贴;2)政府的消费补贴在制造商和消费者之间进行平均分配,因而补贴政策对制造商和消费者均有激励作用;3)政府消费补贴政策有利于供应链总利润、消费者剩余、社会福利的提高;4)政府应引导制造商专注于再制造,将废旧品的回收交由第三方回收商来完成,这有利于提高废旧产品的回收率;5)政府消费补贴政策将造成再制品对新品的市场挤兑效应。论文最后利用数值试验对研究结果进行了验证。 相似文献
16.
以旧换新收购方式下的逆向物流网络优化设计 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
为提高企业回收积极性,构建了一个以以旧换新为收购方式的新的逆向物流网络优化设计的混合整数非线性规划(mixed-integer nonlinear programming,MINLP)模型,以确定最优选址(位置和数量)和折扣价格,使回收中心净利润最大。提出了启发式算法来解决大规模选址问题,并利用算例验证了模型和算法的有效性和可行性。最后分别算例分析了企业的品牌差异和采用两种策略(单一折扣价格策略和质量依赖折扣价格策略)对回收中心净利润的影响。 相似文献
17.
Anantaram Balakrishnan Shankar Sundaresan Bo Zhang 《Production and Operations Management》2014,23(7):1129-1145
Although online shopping is becoming popular, consumers who are unsure about whether to buy a product may find it advantageous to visit a brick‐and‐mortar retail store to first examine the product before purchasing it. But, after browsing at the store, consumers have the option of switching to an e‐tailer to purchase the item at a cheaper price rather than buying at the store. Recent business press refers to this browse‐and‐switch behavior as “showrooming,” and attributes to it the declining profits of brick‐and‐mortar retailers. To study the effect of the browse‐and‐switch option on retail and online pricing strategies and profits, we analyze a stylized economic model that incorporates uncertainty in consumers' valuation of the product, captures the heterogeneity among consumers in their inclination to purchase online, and permits product returns. We consider various equilibrium scenarios for different combinations of consumer shopping behaviors, characterize the parameter ranges for each scenario, and demonstrate that browse‐and‐switch behavior can indeed occur under equilibrium. Our analysis further shows that the option for consumers to browse‐and‐switch intensifies competition, reducing the profits for both firms. 相似文献
18.
在越来越多企业开始自主推行以旧换新业务的背景下,本文从供应链的视角出发,构建考虑市场细分和消费者效用的策略模型,研究零售商自主以旧换新策略选择及相应的供应链决策问题,着重分析市场细分和旧产品折旧程度对策略选择、决策和供应链效率的影响.研究发现:零售商的策略选择除了受产品制造成本影响外,还依赖于外部客户比例和旧产品折旧程度;当老客户占比和旧产品折旧度处于某区域时,自主以旧换新策略优于无以旧换新策略;在某些情况下,制造商的期望策略与零售商的最优策略相悖;供应链效率受客户比例和旧产品折旧度影响.此外,当老客户占比或旧产品折旧度高于某阈值时,老客户对主体的利润贡献大于新客户.本文的研究结论对企业在供应链环境下推行以旧换新政策有一定的理论指导意义. 相似文献
19.
品牌和单品忠诚对在线消费者选择行为的影响研究 总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0
不同消费者对于不同品牌特性有不同的偏好和忠诚度,如果不考虑不同类型的偏好,不在消费者品牌选择模型中引入消费者的品牌忠诚或单品忠诚行为,将不能很好地刻画消费者购买行为的异质性和动态性,难以提高模型的解释力度。文章通过构建动态多项Logit离散选择模型,研究和鉴别在线渠道每一个消费者品牌忠诚因子和单品忠诚因子。研究发现,在线环境下消费者在可乐产品的选择上,不同的忠诚特性对在线消费者品牌选择的影响强度是不同的,其中单品忠诚对在线消费者品牌选择的影响最为显著,这不仅刻画了消费者购买概率的异质性,而且提高了模型的解释力度;不同的属性虽然会对在线消费者的品牌选择行为产生影响,但这种影响并不是孤立存在的,而是会受到其他属性或忠诚变量的影响而产生相应变化。 相似文献
20.
从化解绿色技术创新的环境外部效应出发,对绿色产品消费过程中政府如何给购买者提供补贴问题进行了研究。假定绿色产品的市场需求存在不确定性,讨论了需求函数分别为加法形式与乘积形式时,企业如何确定产品的价格和销量,以及政府如何选择补贴方式的策略问题。研究认为:给定需求函数的具体形式,政府提供的最优补贴或者价格折扣、企业最优产量以及政府实际补贴支出随着政府期望实现销售目标的提高而增加,随着市场风险的增加而增加。从政府补贴支出最小化角度来看,固定额度补贴方式为政府的最优选择。给定政府补贴支出,从实现企业产量最大化角度来看,价格折扣方式为政府的最优选择。对消费者来讲,政府应用价格折扣方式能够降低消费者的购买支出,提高消费者获得的福利剩余。 相似文献