考虑满意度的两阶段DEA固定成本分摊方法

考虑具有相同的投入和产出的两阶段决策单元的固定成本分摊问题。将待分摊的固定成本作为一种新的投入,建立两阶段加性DEA模型。首先证明了各决策单元从自身角度出发可以找到至少一种分摊方案,使其自身整体和阶段效率都达到Pareto有效。然后证明了在公共的权重下,至少存在一种分摊方案可以使得各决策单元整体和阶段效率都达到Pareto有效。并给出了这样的有效成本分摊方案集。为了得到公平的成本分摊方案,定义了各DMU各阶段对分摊方案的满意度,最大化最小的满意度,可以得到最终的成本分摊方案。将问题拓展到两阶段存在共享投入的生产系统中,这些性质定理同样成立。数值算例部分将本文与Yu等（2016）的研究结果进行了对比,验证了本文方法的有效性,指出了本文方法的优越性。本文的方法综合考虑了效率和公平,得到的固定成本分摊方案公平合理。     

Allocating a fixed cost based on data envelopment analysis and satisfaction degree

This paper uses the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique to solve the problem of allocating a fixed cost across a set of comparable decision making units (DMUs) in a fair way. It first investigates the effect of the fixed cost on each DMU and on the collection of DMUs. Next we prove that there exist some cost allocations which can make each DMU and the collection of DMUs efficient. We show that such a cost allocation is unique and equivalent to the proportional sharing method if the fixed cost allocation problem is a one-dimensional case. In a multidimensional case, the fixed cost allocations may not be unique. This paper defines the concept of satisfaction degree, and proposes a maxmin model and a corresponding algorithm to generate a unique fixed cost allocation. Finally, the proposed approach has been applied to a data set from prior literature.     

基于DEA联盟博弈核仁解的固定成本分摊方法研究

本文结合DEA(Data Envelopment Analysis)和联盟博弈理论研究了固定成本分摊问题.本文首先证明了在固定成本作为决策单元(Decision Making Unit,DMU)新投入要素的条件下,那么DMU个体和整体将同为DEA有效,在此结论的基础上,本文结合联盟博弈理论,定义了联盟博弈的特征函数,提出了基于核仁解的固定成本分摊模型,并给出了相应的求解算法,最终通过算例说明了本文方法的合理性和求解算法的可行性.     

Allocating a fixed cost across the decision making units with two-stage network structures

A prominent issue in many organizations involves the fair allocation of a total fixed cost among a group of entities. This paper extends the traditional fixed cost allocation problem to situations where the decision making units (DMUs) have a two-stage network structure. To this end, this paper first uses the data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology to determine the relative efficiency while taking the internal structure and possible allocated costs into account. It shows that each DMU can separately maximize its relative efficiency to one through determining a series of allocations and selecting a set of relative weights. Next, we demonstrate that there exists an efficient allocation set based on a set of common weights, using which all DMUs and their two sub-stages can be simultaneously efficient. However, there are alternative allocation plans in the efficient allocation set. According to this non-uniqueness problem, we further optimize the allocation plans by taking the size of operation units into account, such that the allocation result is proportional to current input usages and output productions from a size point of view. In addition, we suggest a min–max model and a feasible computation algorithm for it to generate the final allocation plan in a way that minimizes the deviation between the efficient allocations and size allocations. More importantly, by repeatedly minimizing the maximum deviation, our proposed method can guarantee a unique allocation plan for all DMUs and sub-stages. Finally, both a numerical example modified from previous literature and an empirical application of bank activities are used to demonstrate the efficacy and usefulness of the proposed approach.     

基于DEA的两阶段系统中间产品公平设定研究

在由两个子决策单元串联组成的两阶段系统中,公平设定中间产品目标对确保和激励两阶段相互合作以达到整个系统的最佳性能至关重要.数据包络分析(DEA)作为系统绩效评估的一种非参数方法吸引了众多学者的注意;基于此方法,本文提出一个考虑公平关切的两阶段DEA模型用于设定两阶段系统中间产品目标,并证明据此模型获得的设定方案正是一个纳什讨价还价博弈的均衡解.     

Centralized resource allocation based on efficiency analysis for step-by-step improvement paths

The existing centralized resource allocation models often assume that all of the DMUs are efficient after resource allocation. For the DMU with a very low efficiency score, it means the dramatic reduction of the resources, which can cause the organizational resistance. In addition, in reality, it is particularly difficult for the DMUs to achieve their target efficiencies in a single step, especially when they are far from the efficient frontier. Thus, gradual progress towards benchmarking targets is gaining importance. In this paper, we present a new approach for resource allocation based on efficiency analysis under a centralized decision-making environment. Through our approach, the central decision-maker can obtain a sequence of intermediate benchmark targets based on efficiency analysis, which provide a level-wise improvement path to direct the DMUs to reach their ultimate targets on the efficient frontier in an implementable and realistic manner. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the application procedure of the proposed approach.     

基于交叉效率和合作博弈的决策单元排序方法

在数据包络分析中，大量的交叉效率模型已被提出。然而选择不同的目标模型将实现不一样的交叉效率评价。本文基于针对单个决策单元实施的对抗型和仁慈型两个交叉效率模型，用合作博弈方法来研究交叉效率模型的选取，并利用Shapley值对决策单元进行排序。最后通过实例分析显示该排序方法充分利用了最小交叉效率和最大交叉效率的信息完全排序了所有决策单元，具有一定的综合性和合理性。     

基于证据推理和前景理论的交叉效率排序方法研究

针对由交叉效率评价策略和交叉效率集结方法的多样性而造成评价结果不一致的问题,提出利用证据推理方法和前景理论,综合各个交叉效率评价策略的评价结果,实现对决策单元的统一评价。首先,分别将选用的交叉效率评价策略以及各个评价策略中的他评效率设置成一级指标和二级指标,依据算数平均和前景理论分别确定一、二级指标的权重;其次,依据他评效率确定二级指标置信度,利用证据推理方法将各个交叉效率评价策略的他评效率综合转换成决策单元被评价为有效的置信度。决策者可通过比较决策单元被识别为有效的置信度的大小来判断决策单元交叉效率的大小,进而实现对决策单元的排序;最后,通过案例验证和说明本文提出方法的有效性和实用性。     

DEA game cross-efficiency approach to Olympic rankings

A number of studies have used data envelopment analysis (DEA) to evaluate the performance of the countries in Olympic games. While competition exists among the countries in Olympic games/rankings, all these DEA studies do not model competition among peer decision making units (DMUs) or countries. These DEA studies find a set of weights/multipliers that keep the efficiency scores of all DMUs at or below unity. Although cross efficiency goes a further step by providing an efficiency measure in terms of the best multiplier bundle for the unit and all the other DMUs, it is not always unique. This paper presents a new and modified DEA game cross-efficiency model where each DMU is viewed as a competitor via non-cooperative game. For each competing DMU, a multiplier bundle is determined that optimizes the efficiency score for that DMU, with the additional constraint that the resulting score should be at or above that DMU 's estimated best performance. The problem, of course, arises that we will not know this best performance score for the DMU under evaluation until the best performances of all other DMUs are known. To combat this “chicken and egg” phenomenon, an iterative approach leading to the Nash equilibrium is presented. The current paper provides a modified variable returns to scale (VRS) model that yields non-negative cross-efficiency scores. The approach is applied to the last six Summer Olympic Games. Our results may indicate that our game cross-efficiency model implicitly incorporates the relative importance of gold, silver and bronze medals without the need for specifying the exact assurance regions.     

A new two-party bargaining mechanism

If resources and facilities from different partners need to be engaged for a large-scale project with a huge number of tasks, any of which is indivisible, decision on the number of tasks assigned to any collaborating partner often requires a certain amount of coordination and bargaining among these partners so that the ultimate task allocation can be accepted by any partner in a business union for the project. In the current global financial crisis, such cases may appear frequently. In this paper, we first investigate the behavior of such a discrete bargaining model often faced by service-based organizations. In particular, we address the general situation of two partners, where the finite Pareto efficient (profit allocation) set does not possess any convenient assumption for deriving a bargaining solution, namely a final profit allocation (corresponding to a task assignment) acceptable to both partners. We show that it is not appropriate for our discrete bargaining model to offer the union only one profit allocation. Modifying the original optimization problem used to derive the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), we develop a bargaining mechanism and define a related bargaining solution set to fulfil one type of needs on balance between profit-earning efficiency and profit-earning fairness. We then show that our mechanism can also suit both Nash’s original concave bargaining model and its continuous extension without the concavity of Pareto efficient frontier on profit allocation.     

Bertrand双寡头对上游供应商行为的演化博弈分析

针对目前普遍存在的供应链上下游由于力量不对等而导致的强势一方向弱势一方转嫁成本的现状,研究力量不对等供应链上零售寡头对上游供应商的行为策略.建立竞争环境下的Bertrand寡头模型,得到双寡头采用不同行为策略的支付矩阵.在此基础上,应用演化博弈论中双种群演化模型进行分析,得到双寡头对上游供应商行为的演化稳定均衡.研究结果表明,由于零售寡头之间的竞争,随着寡头对供应商利益侵占数额的增大,双寡头对上游供应商的均衡策略依次为(转嫁成本,转嫁成本)、(转嫁成本,不转嫁成本)以及(转嫁成本,不转嫁成本)与(不转嫁成本,转嫁成本)共存的情况.同时进一步指出市场容量、寡头实力差距、侵占度等参数变化对演化稳定均衡的影响.     

Preliminary Evidence on Wage Setting in Greek Manufacturing

Abstract. The negotiating power of the unions and their role in wage determination depends on the level of centralization of the wage bargaining system as well as on other institutional arrangements. In this study, we estimate a set of wage equations in order to study the employment effects of different unions’ stances in wage determination as well as to investigate other characteristics of employment in Greek manufacturing. We discriminate between workers and employees (blue‐ and white‐collar workers) and between sectors in order to capture differences in the relative supply as well as differences in the negotiating power among the staff of the same industry. Empirical findings reveal that the persistence of unemployment arises as a result of the great bargaining power of the unions in negotiations at a sectoral level. White‐collar workers exhibit a stronger negotiating power compared with blue‐collar workers because of differences in the institutional framework.     

碳交易机制下零售商合作的费用分配研究

在一个由单供应商和多个零售商组成的二阶供应链中，研究碳交易机制下多零售商合作的订货决策问题。对完全信息下零售商合作的费用分配问题，应用合作博弈理论建立了费用分配的博弈模型，证明了博弈为子模博弈且设计了属于核心的费用分配方案，该方案不仅可通过总体单调分配机制实现而且可使大联盟长远稳定。对不完全信息下零售商合作的费用分配问题，证明了纯策略纳什均衡的存在性。研究结果表明，零售商的合作不仅能降低总费用，而且能降低碳排放量；各零售商在不完全信息下分担的费用大于完全信息下分担的费用。     

The design of socially optimal decisions in a consensus scenario

Several situations of conflict between basic social principles can crop up during a consensus searching process. The majority principle and respect for minority groups is a possible example of a conflictive situation between two social principles. In this paper, we outline a specific consensus searching scenario, where individual preferences are expressed by “pairwise” comparison matrices. The set of compromise consensuses between the majority and minority principles is determined using a procedure based upon an adaptation of Yu's p-metric distances. Finally, we use three different theoretical approaches – utility theory, p-metric distance functions and bargaining theory – to obtain the social optimum from the set of compromise consensuses. The links and differences among the three approaches are analysed. Finally, the working of the proposed theoretical framework is illustrated with the help of a forestry case study.     

Duality Approaches to Economic Lot‐Sizing Games

Sharing common production, resources, and services to reduce cost are important for not for profit operations due to limited and mission‐oriented budget and effective cost allocation mechanisms are essential for encouraging effective collaborations. In this study, we illustrate how rigorous methodologies can be developed to derive effective cost allocations to facilitate sustainable collaborations in not for profit operations by modeling the cost allocation problem arising from an economic lot‐sizing (ELS) setting as a cooperative game. Specifically, we consider the economic lot‐sizing (ELS) game with general concave ordering cost. In this cooperative game, multiple retailers form a coalition by placing joint orders to a single supplier in order to reduce ordering cost. When both the inventory holding cost and backlogging cost are linear functions, it can be shown that the core of this game is non‐empty. The main contribution of this study is to show that a core allocation can be computed in polynomial time under the assumption that all retailers have the same cost parameters. Our approach is based on linear programming (LP) duality. More specifically, we study an integer programming formulation for the ELS problem and show that its LP relaxation admits zero integrality gap, which makes it possible to analyze the ELS game by using LP duality. We show that there exists an optimal dual solution that defines an allocation in the core. An interesting feature of our approach is that it is not necessarily true that every optimal dual solution defines a core allocation. This is in contrast to the duality approach for other known cooperative games in the literature.     

Reducing differences between profiles of weights: A “peer-restricted” cross-efficiency evaluation

This paper deals with the selection of the profiles of weights to be used in cross-efficiency evaluations. In an attempt to prevent unrealistic weighting schemes, one of the issues of main interest that we address here is that of the zero weights, since their use implies that some of the variables considered are excluded from the assessments to be made. In the calculation of cross-efficiency scores, we propose to ignore the profiles of weights of the DMUs that cannot make a choice of non-zero weights among their alternate optima. The different units are therefore assessed in a peer-evaluation that does not consider the profiles of weights of some inefficient DMUs. This approach is referred to as “peer-restricted” cross-efficiency evaluation. Aside from avoiding zero weights, the choice of weights that we make also seeks to reduce the differences between the weights profiles selected as much as possible. Thus, in the “peer-restricted” cross-efficiency evaluation in the present paper we also try to avoid that the different DMUs attach very different weights to the same variable. Finally, we extend this approach to derive a common set of weights by exploiting the idea of similarity between profiles of weights.     

基于最近距离投影的DEA两阶段效率评价方法研究

数据包络分析是进行效率评价最重要的方法之一。传统的数据包络分析理论主要寻找有效前沿面上的最远距离投影，在极大化无效性指数的同时也面临着效率改进的巨大难度和高额成本。对于具有两阶段内部生产结构的决策单元，本文从考虑最小改进难度的视角出发，提出了最近距离投影的两阶段效率评价方法。该方法首先得到所有强有效决策单元的线性组合，且这些组合均占优于被评价的两阶段决策单元。然后建立了两阶段范围调整效率评价模型，在确定具有最近投影距离的占优组合的同时，得到了两阶段评价效率。最后，本文运用我国32家上市银行的年度数据对所提出方法进行了应用验证。     

Target intermediate products setting in a two-stage system with fairness concern

In a two-stage system with two divisions connected in series, fairly setting the target outputs for the first stage or equivalently the target inputs for the second stage is critical, in order to ensure that the two stages have incentives to collaborate with each other to achieve the best performance of the whole system. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) as a non-parametric approach for efficiency evaluation of multi-input, multi-output systems has drawn a lot of attention. Recently, many two-stage DEA models were developed for studying the internal structures of two-stage systems. However, there was no work studying fair setting of the target intermediate products (or intermediate measures) although unreasonable setting will result in unfairness to the two stages because setting higher (fewer) intermediate measures means that the first (second) stage must make more efforts to achieve the overall production plan. In this paper, a new DEA model taking account of fairness in the setting of the intermediate products is proposed, where the fairness is interpreted based on Nash bargaining game model, in which the two stages negotiate their target efficiencies in the two-stage system based on their individual efficiencies. This approach is illustrated by an empirical application to insurance companies.     

Endogenous Contracts in Unionized Oligopoly

We study the endogenous determination of contracts in a unionized oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. Alternative contracts specify the sequencing in the selection of R&D and wages. They can be classified as ‘fixed’ when the unions set wages before the firms make their R&D decisions or ‘floating’ when the sequencing of these choices is reversed. If the unions are highly employment‐oriented, we find that either all firm–union pairs choose floating‐wage contracts or both contract types may coexist depending on the degree of technological spillovers. However, when the unions have stronger preference over attaining a good wage deal, then it becomes very likely that fixed‐wage contracts will endogenously emerge because they can serve as an insurance device against oppor tunistic wage increases. Our welfare analysis suggests that welfare‐improving contracts may nevertheless not always arise in equilibrium.     

An integrated model for slack-based measure of super-efficiency in additive DEA

As a non-radial approach, a super-efficiency model, Super SBM, was proposed by Tone [15] to rank efficient DMUs. Du et al. [7] extends the Super SBM model to the additive (slacks-based) DEA model. To obtain the super-efficiencies of the DMUs, one needs to identify the efficient DMUs first and then apply the additive super-efficiency model to those efficient DMUs. In this paper, we propose an integrated model so that the efficiencies of the inefficient DMUs and the super-efficiencies of the efficient DMUs can be obtained by a single model. The efficiency scores obtained by our integrated model are the same as those obtained by Du et al. [7] and the additive DEA model.