How Sourcing of Interdependent Components Affects Quality in Automotive Supply Chains

In the automotive industry, many firms source key components from different suppliers, even though the components may function interdependently. In this study, we investigate how component level interdependence impacts quality performance and analyze how various operational factors moderate this relation. We synthesize information from several case studies to model the quality challenges faced by an automotive firm. For several sub‐assemblies that go into its products, the firm sourced key components from two different suppliers. The sub‐assemblies would fail whenever a component fails, but due to interdependent operations, failure of one component could cause the failure of the other. The firm found it challenging to improve the suppliers' quality performance as it was difficult to trace the failures to specific components. Our analysis reveals that – (i) the impact of interdependence is governed by the supply chain structure: reducing the interdependence between components improves quality when suppliers provide the components, but reducing interdependence worsens quality when the firm manufactures the entire sub‐assembly; and (ii) the relation between interdependence and quality performance is moderated by factors such as penalties, production costs, and interdependence costs. Additionally, we find that quality performance is lower when the firm outsources the components than when the firm manufactures the entire sub‐assembly. We identify coordinating mechanisms that leverage incentives and penalties to bridge the quality performance gap.     

Does a Supplier's Operational Competence Translate into Financial Performance? An Empirical Analysis of Supplier–Customer Relationships

We conduct an empirical investigation of how a supplier's operational competence, as reflected by outcomes in the areas of quality, cost, delivery, flexibility, and new product development, translates into financial gains from a key customer. In contrast to previous research directed at the firm level, this study focuses on the supplier–customer relationship level. Using survey data from 158 suppliers in the manufacturing industry, we perform structural equation modeling to map out the paths from operational competence to financial performance—via dependencies and cooperative behaviors between suppliers and their customers. This study is the first scholarly attempt to examine the link between suppliers’ operational competencies and financial performance in interorganizational relationships. It is also an early investigation into operational competence as a source of bi‐lateral dependence. Our findings show that the supplier's operational competences increase its customer's dependence by enhancing the value of its products/services. However, the resulting increase in the supplier's power is not leveraged to shape relationship behaviors or capture value from its customer. In contrast, the customer's existing power as a major buyer plays an important role in shaping cooperative behaviors and affecting the supplier's financial performance from the customer relationship.     

Linking Entrepreneurial Orientation to Environmental Collaboration: A Stakeholder Theory and Evidence from Multinational Companies in an Emerging Market

Revisiting stakeholder theory as a potential theory of the firm giving rise to expectations about organizing, we analyze when and under what circumstances entrepreneurially oriented firms increase their environmental collaboration with suppliers. Specifically, we investigate the association between entrepreneurial orientation and environmental collaboration with suppliers by accounting for the degree of employees’ work engagement and market environment complexity as stakeholder-oriented moderators of this relationship. We test our hypotheses using multi-level analyses on 249 managers nested in 66 multinational companies (MNCs) in Turkey. We find that entrepreneurial orientation positively impacts environmental collaboration with suppliers. A high level of work engagement (as an organizing principle favouring a stakeholder focus) and a low level of market environment complexity (as an organizing principle favouring the customer as an instrumental stakeholder) moderate this linkage. We enrich the debate on entrepreneurial orientation, strategy, and environmental sustainability by providing logic rooted in stakeholder theory of the conditions under which MNCs’ entrepreneurial orientation in emerging markets prioritizes and privileges environmental collaboration with suppliers.     

The Promise of Strategic Customer Behavior: On the Value of Click Tracking

Click tracking is gaining in popularity, and the practice of web analytics is growing fast. Whether strategic customers are willing to visit a website when they know their clicks may be tracked is an important yet complex problem, which depends on various factors. Using a newsvendor framework, we examine this problem by focusing on the operational factor: how product availability induces strategic customers to voluntarily provide advance demand information. We find that a strong Nash equilibrium exists where every customer is willing to click, and customer incentives to click are robust to noise. Hence, we demonstrate the promise of strategic customer behavior in the context of click tracking, contrary to the conventional wisdom that it is typically a peril for the firm. Notably, click tracking is typically advantageous to both the firm and its customers, compared with other strategies such as advance selling, quantity commitment, availability guarantees, and quick response. Lastly, we extend to two settings by including marketing decisions, price‐sensitive demand and markdown pricing, and discuss how operations and marketing decisions interact in influencing the value of click tracking.     

Strategic Product/Service Innovations of an Online Firm

We study the incentives that drive an online firm to make various types of innovations in a competitive environment. We develop and use a simplified price competition model between two retailers, one online and one offline. A given fraction of consumers, called the Internet penetration, comparison shop online, independent of their customer type, thereby creating two markets for the offline retailer, a captive market and a competitive market. The online product has the steeper of the two linear utility functions, which means that the customers who buy online in our model are high end. We focus on the competitive region in which both retailers are (strictly) profitable in the competitive market and consider innovations that increase high‐end appeal, low‐end appeal, and/or reduce unit cost. We find that the online firm has a strong incentive to invest in innovations that either reduce unit cost and/or, equivalently, increase the appeal to all consumers equally. Investments of this type are strategic complements: implementing one increases the value of another, so the value of two innovations of this type is more than the sum of the values of each individually. We identify a relative strength measure of the online firm such that, as its high‐end appeal increases and/or its unit cost decreases, we say that the online firm is stronger. This strength measure facilitates drawing an explicit dividing line between strong and weak online firms. If Internet penetration increases, the online firm's profits increase if and only if it is strong. If penetration increases over time, it is possible for a strong firm to turn weak and see its profits decrease and possibly disappear completely. A strong online firm has more opportunity to profit from low‐end innovations than does a weak one, while the opposite is true for high‐end innovations. Interestingly, some innovations may actually decrease the online firm's profits. We discuss the implications of our results for existing and future online innovations.     

MONITORING IN TEAMS: USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO STUDY A THEORY OF THE FIRM

Alchian and Demsetz’s influential explanation of the classical business firm (The American Economic Review, 1972, 62, 777–795) argues that there is need for a concentrated residual claim in the hands of a central agent, to motivate the monitoring of workers. We model monitoring as a way to transform team production from a collective action dilemma with strong free riding incentives to a productivity‐enhancing opportunity with strong private marginal incentives to contribute effort. In an experiment, we have subjects experience team production without monitoring, team production with a central monitor, and team production with peer monitoring. Then subjects vote on whether to employ the central monitor, who gets to keep a fixed share of the team output, or to rely on peer monitoring, which entails a coordination or free riding problem. Our subjects usually prefer peer monitoring but they switch to the specialist when unable to successfully self‐monitor. We provide evidence for situations in which team members resist the appointing of a central monitor and succeed in overcoming coordination and free riding problems as well as for a situation in which an Alchian–Demsetz‐like firm grows in the laboratory.     

Dynamic Supply Risk Management with Signal‐Based Forecast,Multi‐Sourcing,and Discretionary Selling

We examine the critical role of advance supply signals—such as suppliers’ financial health and production viability—in dynamic supply risk management. The firm operates an inventory system with multiple demand classes and multiple suppliers. The sales are discretionary and the suppliers are susceptible to both systematic and operational risks. We develop a hierarchical Markov model that captures the essential features of advance supply signals, and integrate it with procurement and selling decisions. We characterize the optimal procurement and selling policy, and the strategic relationship between signal‐based forecast, multi‐sourcing, and discretionary selling. We show that higher demand heterogeneity may reduce the value of discretionary selling, and that the mean value‐based forecast may outperform the stationary distribution‐based forecast. This work advances our understanding on when and how to use advance supply signals in dynamic risk management. Future supply risk erodes profitability but enhances the marginal value of current inventory. A signal of future supply shortage raises both base stock and demand rationing levels, thereby boosting the current production and tightening the current sales. Signal‐based dynamic forecast effectively guides the firm's procurement and selling decisions. Its value critically depends on supply volatility and scarcity. Ignoring advance supply signals can result in misleading recommendations and severe losses. Signal‐based dynamic supply forecast should be used when: (a) supply uncertainty is substantial, (b) supply‐demand ratio is moderate, (c) forecast precision is high, and (d) supplier heterogeneity is high.     

Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

HYBRID R&D

We develop a model of R&D collaboration in which individual firms carry out in‐house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non‐core activities with other firms. We develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which R&D investments in different projects of a firm are complementary. We show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models. We then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investments and profits. In this context, we identify a second aspect of complementarity: Equilibrium investments in in‐house as well as in each joint project are increasing in the number of projects. However, we find that an increase in number of joint projects of all firms lowers collective profits, suggesting the presence of excessive incentives for conducting research. (JEL: L13, L14, L22, O31, O32)     

Can Environmental Insurance Succeed Where Other Strategies Fail? The Case of Underground Storage Tanks

Private risk reduction will be socially efficient only when firms are liable for all the damage that they cause. We find that environmental insurance can achieve social efficiency even when two traditional policy instruments—ex post fines and risk management mandates with ex ante fines—do not. Inefficiency occurs with ex post fines, when small firms declare bankruptcy and escape their liabilities, limiting the incentives from this policy tool. Firms ignore mandates to implement efficient risk management because regulatory agencies do not have sufficient resources to monitor every firm. The evolution of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's and states’ underground storage tank programs suggests that mandating environmental insurance can address inefficiency due to small firms declaring bankruptcy. Comparing insurance mandates to risk management mandates, the burden on a regulator is lower if all it has to do is to confirm that the firm has insurance rather than that the firm has actually, and effectively, implemented required management practices. For underground storage tanks, we show that insurance lowered toxic releases.     

Customer satisfaction: Cost driver or value driver? Empirical evidence from the financial services industry

We investigate the relation between customer satisfaction, customer servicing costs, and customer value in a financial services firm. We find that customer satisfaction is positively associated with future customer servicing costs, as well as with customer value. The relation between customer satisfaction and customer value appears non-linear; higher customer satisfaction appears to have a higher return for the most profitable customer segments. Our findings indicate that customer satisfaction is a value driver; however, customer satisfaction is not cost-free and managers have to consider the costs, as well as the benefits, of increasing customer satisfaction.     

Managing Disruptions in Decentralized Supply Chains with Endogenous Supply Process Reliability

Supply disruptions are all too common in supply chains. To mitigate delivery risk, buyers may either source from multiple suppliers or offer incentives to their preferred supplier to improve its process reliability. These incentives can be either direct (investment subsidy) or indirect (inflated order quantity). In this study, we present a series of models to highlight buyers’ and suppliers’ optimal parameter choices. Our base‐case model has deterministic buyer demand and two possibilities for the supplier yield outcomes: all‐or‐nothing supply or partial disruption. For the all‐or‐nothing model, we show that the buyer prefers to only use the subsidy option, which obviates the need to inflate order quantity. However, in the partial disruption model, both incentives—subsidy and order inflation—may be used at the same time. Although single sourcing provides greater indirect incentive to the selected supplier because that avoids order splitting, we show that the buyer may prefer the diversification strategy under certain circumstances. We also quantify the amount by which the wholesale price needs to be discounted (if at all) to ensure that dual sourcing strategy dominates sole sourcing. Finally, we extend the model to the case of stochastic demand. Structural properties of ordering/subsidy decisions are derived for the all‐or‐nothing model, and in contrast to the deterministic demand case, we establish that the buyer may increase use of subsidy and order quantity at the same time.     

Customer‐Base Concentration and Inventory Efficiencies: Evidence from the Manufacturing Sector

What is the link between customer‐base concentration and inventory efficiencies in the manufacturing sector? Using hand‐collected data from 10‐K Filings, we find that manufacturers with more concentrated customer bases hold fewer inventories for less time and are less likely to end up with excess inventories, as indicated by the lower likelihood and magnitude of inventory write‐downs and reversals. Using disaggregated inventory disclosures, we find that inventory efficiencies primarily flow through the finished goods inventory account, while raw material efficiencies are offset by higher work‐in‐process holdings and longer work‐in‐process cycles. In additional analysis, we document a valuation premium for more concentrated manufacturers after controlling for other firm characteristics, including default risk and cost of capital estimates. We conclude that investors trade off the costs and benefits of relationships with a limited number of major customers and, on balance, consider customer‐base concentration as a net positive for firm valuation. Overall, our study adds to interdisciplinary research in accounting and operations management by shedding new light on the relevance of major customer disclosures for fundamental analysis and valuation in the manufacturing sector.     

Quality Risk Ratings in Global Supply Chains

Extended enterprises face many challenges in managing the product quality of their suppliers. Consequently characterizing the quality risk posed by value‐chain partners has become increasingly important. There have been several recent efforts to develop frameworks for rating the quality risk posed by suppliers. We develop an analytical model to examine the impact of such quality ratings on suppliers, manufacturers, and social welfare. While it might seem that quality ratings would benefit high‐quality suppliers and hurt low‐quality suppliers, we show that this is not always the case. We find that such quality ratings can hurt both types of suppliers or benefit both, depending on the market conditions. We also find that quality ratings do not always benefit the most demanding manufacturers who desire high‐quality suppliers. Finally, we find that social welfare is not always improved by risk ratings. These results suggest that public policy initiatives addressing risk ratings must be carefully considered.     

The effects of suppliers’ trust on manufacturers’ innovation capability: an analysis of direct versus indirect relationships

The study offers an alternative explanation for the role of trust in economic exchange, answering the critical research questions of how and under what conditions suppliers’ trust affects manufacturers’ innovation capability. The study adopts a transaction value approach suggesting combining strategy and organisational economic literature to fully investigate the processes through which joint value is generated and developed by interacting partners. Using survey data from a sample of 235 supplier–manufacturer relationships, we find broad support for the model hypotheses. The results confirm the mediating role of asset specificity and knowledge sharing as procedural dimensions in the relation between suppliers’ trust and manufacturers’ innovation capability. However, the direct path between trust and innovation capability was not confirmed. The study provides theoretical and practical implications for firms seeking to translate inter-firm trust into innovation-based competitive advantage.     

Reputation for Quality

We propose a model of firm reputation in which a firm can invest or disinvest in product quality and the firm's reputation is defined as the market's belief about this quality. We analyze the relationship between a firm's reputation and its investment incentives, and derive implications for reputational dynamics. Reputational incentives depend on the specification of market learning. When consumers learn about quality through perfect good news signals, incentives decrease in reputation and there is a unique work–shirk equilibrium with ergodic dynamics. When learning is through perfect bad news signals, incentives increase in reputation and there is a continuum of shirk–work equilibria with path‐dependent dynamics. For a class of imperfect Poisson learning processes and low investment costs, we show that there exists a work–shirk equilibrium with ergodic dynamics. For a subclass of these learning processes, any equilibrium must feature working at all low and intermediate levels of reputation and shirking at the top.     

Pay Dispersion and Executive Behaviour: Evidence from Innovation

Compensation packages are widely used to motivate top executives. Pay dispersion among a firm's executives, however, can be associated with the antithetic effects of social comparison and individual motivation, with unclear implications for the company. We focus on innovation activities, which represent an important channel through which pay dispersion can affect firm performance, and test our predictions by exploring innovative output as a function of executives’ pay dispersion in a panel of US firms. We find that executive pay dispersion acts as a double‐edged sword. On the one hand, the higher the dispersion in variable pay, the higher the innovation. On the other hand, the larger the dispersion in fixed pay, the lower the innovation. Results are robust to a number of tests, such as restricting the analysis to executives with direct responsibility for innovation projects and considering individual incentives in the form of cash pay.     

Coordinating Supply Chains via Advance‐Order Discounts,Minimum Order Quantities,and Delegations

To avoid inventory risks, manufacturers often place rush orders with suppliers only after they receive firm orders from their customers (retailers). Rush orders are costly to both parties because the supplier incurs higher production costs. We consider a situation where the supplier's production cost is reduced if the manufacturer can place some of its order in advance. In addition to the rush order contract with a pre‐established price, we examine whether the supplier should offer advance‐order discounts to encourage the manufacturer to place a portion of its order in advance, even though the manufacturer incurs some inventory risk. While the advance‐order discount contract is Pareto‐improving, our analysis shows that the discount contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. However, if the supplier imposes a pre‐specified minimum order quantity requirement as a qualifier for the manufacturer to receive the advance‐order discount, then such a combined contract can coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the combined contract enables the supplier to attain the first‐best solution. We also explore a delegation contract that either party could propose. Under this contract, the manufacturer delegates the ordering and salvaging activities to the supplier in return for a discounted price on all units procured. We find the delegation contract coordinates the supply chain and is Pareto‐improving. We extend our analysis to a setting where the suppliers capacity is limited for advance production but unlimited for rush orders. Our structural results obtained for the one‐supplier‐one‐manufacturer case continue to hold when we have two manufacturers.     

A Structural Analysis of the Effectiveness of Buying Firms' Strategies to Improve Supplier Performance

Many manufacturing firms have increased the amount of component parts and services they outsource, while refocusing on their core capabilities. Outsourcing parts and services to independent, external suppliers means that suppliers' performance is increasingly critical to the long‐term success of these buying firms. Buying firms are increasingly using disparate supplier development strategies to improve supplier performance including supplier assessment, providing incentives for improved performance, instigating competition among suppliers, and direct involvement of the buying firm's personnel with suppliers through activities such as training of suppliers' personnel. Using resource‐based theory, internalization theory, and structural equation modeling, we examine the impact of these supplier development strategies on performance. We conclude that direct involvement activities, where the buying firm internalizes a significant amount of the supplier development effort, play a critical role in performance improvement.     

Product Design and Supply Chain Coordination Under Extended Producer Responsibility

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation focuses on the life‐cycle environmental performance of products and has significant implications for management theory and practice. In this paper, we examine the influence of EPR policy parameters on product design and coordination incentives in a durable product supply chain. We model a manufacturer supplying a remanufacturable product to a customer over multiple periods. The manufacturer invests in two design attributes of the product that impact costs incurred by the supply chain—performance, which affects the environmental impact of the product during use, and remanufacturability, which affects the environmental impact post‐use. Consistent with the goals of EPR policies, the manufacturer and the customer are required to share the environmental costs incurred over the product's life cycle. The customer has a continuing need for the services of the product and optimizes between the costs of product replacement and the costs incurred during use. We demonstrate how charges during use and post‐use can be used as levers to encourage environmentally favorable product design. We analyze the impact of supply chain coordination on design choices and profit and discuss contracts that can be used to achieve coordination, both under symmetric and asymmetric information about customer attributes.