不对称信息下信息技术服务外包合同设计

本文针对客户企业向IT供应商外包信息技术服务这一背景,考虑IT供应商不仅具有开发信息系统能力的私有信息,且其开发过程中的努力行为对于客户企业不可见的情况,研究了客户企业信息技术服务外包合同设计问题。研究发现,不对称信息下,客户企业可以通过设计最优合同菜单来甄别不同能力的IT供应商,但是此时客户企业需要向高能力IT供应商支付信息租金。同时,客户企业可以通过设计最优合同有效规制高能力IT供应商系统开发过程中的努力行为,但是相比于信息对称的情况,不对称信息下低能力IT供应商会存在努力不足的现象。低能力IT供应商努力不足的现象会降低社会福利和客户企业的期望利润;客户企业向高能力IT供应商支付信息租金的行为也会减少客户企业的期望利润。增加系统调试阶段的调试时间或者选择信息系统故障检出率高的IT供应商,可以降低高能力IT供应商的信息租金,并缓解低能力IT供应商努力不足的现象,进而减少信息不对称给客户企业带来的利润损失。     

Build-operate-transfer Outsourcing Contracts in Services – Boon or Bane to Emerging Market Vendor Firms?

Build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracting has been widely used in the engineering and construction industry and has recently spread into the service industry domains. Notably, service provider firms from emerging markets, India in particular, are now offering BOT outsourcing contracts in which the client firms are allotted call options, i.e. the right, but not the obligation, to transfer pre-specified assets from the service provider. As such, BOT outsourcing contracts seems to be an interesting contractual novelty that combines the advantages of outsourced and captive offshoring operations. In this paper we investigate under which circumstances a BOT outsourcing contract (i.e. a contract where the client firm exercises its call option) is beneficial, or the opposite, to the emerging market vendor firm. Whether BOT outsourcing contracts are boon or bane to an emerging market vendor basically hinges, we submit, on its internal diffusion of client-specific knowledge and capabilities prior to the execution of the call option.     

How Provider Selection and Management Contribute to Successful Innovation Outsourcing: An Empirical Study at Siemens

It is becoming increasingly common to involve external technology providers in developing new technologies and new products. Two important phases involved in working with technology vendors are vendor selection and vendor management. Because for both steps theory development of key decision guidelines is still immature, we use detailed case studies of 31 innovation outsourcing projects at Siemens to develop grounded theory on provider selection criteria and on project management success drivers. A selection criterion often associated with successful outsourcing is the provider's “track record” or previous experience. Our cases suggest that there is no standard “track record” for success but that a “match” between the client firm's outsourcing motivation and the provider's strengths appears to be a necessary condition for a successful outsourcing collaboration. As to the second phase—managing the vendor—we identify a number of operational project success drivers. There seems to be no universal checklist, but the most important drivers seem to be contingent on the type of vendor chosen and on the maturity of the technology. We compare five provider types—universities, competitors, customers, start‐up companies, and component suppliers—and find that some success drivers are common to all providers, while others are relevant only for certain types of provider. Moreover, drivers in the case of a mature technology are more focused on successful transfer to manufacturing than on development itself. Our findings offer guidelines for innovation managers on how to select innovation providers and how to manage them during the project.     

The Role of Contracts on Quality and Returns to Quality in Offshore Software Development Outsourcing

In this study, we examine how the different incentive structures inherent in two primary contract types—time and materials (T&M) and fixed price (FP)—influence the quality provided by the vendor in the software development outsourcing industry. We argue that the incentive structure of FP contracts motivates a vendor to be more efficient in the software development process, which results in higher quality as compared to projects executed under a T&M contract. We thus argue that vendors consistently staff FP projects with better trained personnel because they face the most risk on these contracts, resulting in better outcomes on these projects. We extend our analysis to propose that providing higher quality is associated with higher profit margins for the vendor only for FP contracts. We develop and test these hypotheses on data collected from 100 software projects completed by a leading Indian offshore vendor. The results provide strong support for our fundamental thesis that the drivers of and returns to quality vary by contract type. We discuss the implications of our research for both researchers and practitioners.     

Determinants of Interoutsourcing: An Analytical Approach

Interoutsourcing is a round‐way process in which the vendor is its customer's customer and the customer is its vendor's vendor. While interoutsourcing is emerging as a prominent outsourcing strategy in many industries, there are no rigorous analytical studies focusing on this mechanism. In this article, we analytically demonstrate the efficacy of interoutsourcing by comparing it with normal outsourcing. Our results show that, compared with normal outsourcing, interoutsourcing acts as a self‐enforcer of vendor firms' behaviors toward increasing outsourcing service value. However, in situations where there is a mismatch of outsourcing activities, a high degree of incentive that is based on outsourcing service value, and a high cost of capital, interoutsourcing is not preferred to normal outsourcing. We discuss these results in detail and provide managerial implications for firms involved in interoutsourcing decisions.     

Contracting Under Vendor Managed Inventory Systems Using Holding Cost Subsidies

Vendor managed inventory systems are becoming increasingly popular. An important issue in implementing a vendor managed inventory scheme is the contracting terms that dictate the ownership of the inventory and the responsibility of inventory replenishment decisions. Thus the performance of a vendor managed system crucially depends on these terms and on how inventory‐related costs are shared in a supply chain. We consider a system where a manufacturer supplies a single product to a retailer who faces random demand in a competitive market. The retailer incurs a fixed cost per order, inventory holding cost, and a penalty cost for a stockout (unsatisfied demand is back‐ordered). Further, the manufacturer incurs a penalty cost when there is a stockout at the retailer and a fixed replenishment cost. We assume that the players are rational and act noncooperatively. We compare the performance of retailer managed inventory systems, where the retailer places orders and makes replenishment decisions, with vendor managed inventory systems, wherein the vendor or manufacturer makes inventory and replenishment decisions. Specifically, in the vendor managed inventory system, we propose and evaluate holding cost subsidy‐type contracts on inventories offered by the retailer to improve system performance. We evaluate this contract in the context of three widely used inventory systems—deterministic economic order quantity, continuous review (Q, r) policies, and periodic review policies—and show when such contracts may improve channel performance.     

不完全信息下多阶段移动应用产品与服务合作的可更新契约

考虑不完全信息下由提供移动应用产品与服务的ERP厂商、APP厂商与客户企业组成的产品服务供应链,针对ERP厂商与APP厂商产品服务合作中存在的逆向选择与道德风险问题,构建两阶段的动态博弈模型,分析了APP厂商隐藏与披露能力信息对产品与服务质量、供应链系统绩效与ERP厂商利润的影响,提出了信息披露、收益共享的单阶段契约与存在契约变更的两阶段契约激励策略,比较了两种契约的价值。研究表明：通过在产品开发阶段观察APP厂商的契约菜单选择以及获得的产品质量信息,甄别APP厂商的能力信息,在服务阶段进行契约变更,有利于提高产品与服务质量,降低ERP厂商风险,使供应链系统利润与ERP厂商自身利润实现帕累托改善。最后,通过算例对研究结论进行了直观考察和说明。     

不确定条件下的IT外包时机选择问题研究

IT外包的业务环境、技术环境和需求的不确定性往往会引起IT服务成本的不确定性。针对IT服务成本的不确定性和IT外包投资的不可逆性,运用传统净现值方法和实物期权方法比较固定价格合同、成本加成定价合同和收益共享合同3种常见合同的外包临界值,分析3种合同下客户企业的等待价值,并讨论客户企业推迟外包情形时的等待时间。研究结果表明,实物期权方法得出的外包临界值高于净现值方法得出的外包临界值;等待价值随无风险利率的增大而减小,随漂移率、变动率的增大而增大;当漂移率与变动率平方的比值大于二分之一时,客户企业选择外包的期望等待时间受无风险利率、漂移率和变动率的影响,其他情形下客户企业的期望等待时间不受无风险利率、漂移率和变动率的影响。研究结论为不确定条件下客户企业外包与否和外包时机的选择提供理论支持和实践指导。     

BOCOG's outsourcing contracts: The vendor's perspective

To date, most research on outsourcing is modeled from the client's perspective. In this paper, we approach the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) outsourcing contracts from the vendors’ perspective. Since a vendor always has the option to accept or not accept an outsourcing contract, we use the theory of options to analyze the vendor's decision making, i.e., the trigger point, which coincides with the optimal profit level, of the vendor's decision to pursue an outsourcing contract. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the model and its potential benefits for vendors’ decision making.     

IT服务外包项目工期与费用控制的 多属性英氏逆拍卖机制

工期和费用是影响IT服务外包项目成败的两个重要因素,且两者之间呈负相关的关系。在IT服务外包项目执行前,发包方与接包方需要就项目的工期和费用达成一致。通常,发包方并不完全了解外包项目的市场行情,在这种情况下,就需要一种有效的方式使发包方和接包方之间就工期和费用达成一致。本文设计了改进的英氏逆拍卖机制,针对一对多的情况设计了新的拍卖协议;针对工期和费用的多属性情况,引入多属性效用理论解决,设计了相应的效用增加函数。最后通过一个算例来演示所设计的拍卖机制对解决此类决策问题的作用。得出一些结论:所设计机制能够以拍卖方式描述费用和工期管理流程;找到了发包方和接包方的最佳增量效用,并且建议的拍卖协议是发包方和接包方获得双赢结果的机制;从不同大小的案例中可以得到完全一致的结果,这表明设计的拍卖机制的有效性和效用增加函数对协商结果的有效性。     

Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard problem

In the past two decades many organizations have turned to other organizations to satisfy their information systems needs. Information systems outsourcing arrangements cover the spectrum from agreements involving the delivery of all information services to those providing specific services such as systems development, communications management, desktop computing provision and maintenance, and so on.In this paper we model information systems outsourcing arrangements as a non-cooperative game with two players: a company and an outsourcing vendor. The game between the two players has an inherent double moral hazard problem as the success of the information system outsourcing project depends on the actions of both players, which are costly for them and are not directly contractible. Both parties make their decisions taking into account the effects that these decisions have on the other player's actions. In our analysis, we compare the solution obtained without a moral hazard problem (the first-best solution) to the one obtained under a double moral hazard setting (the second-best solution). We demonstrate some results based on the assumption that increases in the productivity of the vendor lead to increases in the productivity of the company. Further we establish that outsourcing contracts should provide no separate payment for failure to the outsourcing vendor although effectively many of them do. We also provide a sharing rule for providing appropriate incentives for the vendor and examine the dynamics associated with this sharing rule. Finally, we further provide for the characterization of response functions and the ensuing Nash solution including the optimal outsourcing fee. This allows for the nuanced consideration of the degree of interaction between the effort of one party and the productivity of the effort of the other party. This particular interaction has not been explored formally in the extant research literature.     

Gatekeepers: How Procurement Personnel Guard Against Hybrid Accountability

Though much attention has been given to the relationship between contractor and vendor in regard to governmental accountability, little attention has been paid to the internal struggles that surface in regard to accountability in the procurement process. These informal horizontal relationships often circumvent vertical accountability controls most often thought to ensure equitable vendor selection. Similarly, though much attention has been paid to political influence in contracting, hierarchal organizational structures, and measures of performance, the contract officer-program manager relation has not been explored. Specifically, the informal tension that often forms between the program manager and contract officer has not been examined in regard to such accountability. This paper examines the relationship between the program officer and the contract officer in order to describe how hybrid public administration can affect the contracting process.     

Global Software Development: Commitment,Trust and Cultural Sensitivity in Strategic Partnerships

Much research has studied off-shore outsourcing from a Western client perspective. This article tries to shed light on what an Indian vendor perceives as important to manage large and complex strategic partnerships in IT outsourcing, and in particular how mutually profitable, long-term relationships with European clients are created and maintained, both at company and project levels. We investigate this issue through qualitative interviews with various vendor representatives in offshore and on-site teams in a top tier multinational company of Indian origin.In the analysis of interview accounts of close collaboration processes in two large and complex projects, where off-shoring of software development is moved to a strategic level, we found that the vendor was able to establish a strategic partnership through long-term engagement with the field of banking and insurance as well as through conscious relationship management with the clients. Three major themes describe important aspects of the strategic partnerships: 1) senior management commitment and employee identification with the projects, 2) mutual trust and transparency, and 3) cross-cultural understanding and sensitivity. The article draws attention to the important collaborative work done by people who are able to span boundaries in the complex organizational set-up of global IT development projects.     

The Comparison of Two Vertical Outsourcing Structures under Push and Pull Contracts

In a three‐tier supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a contract manufacturer (CM), and a supplier, there exist two typical outsourcing structures: control and delegation. Under the control structure, the OEM contracts with the CM and the supplier respectively. Under the delegation structure, the OEM contracts with the CM only and the CM subcontracts with the supplier. We compare the two outsourcing structures under a push contract (whereby orders are placed before demand is realized) and a pull contract (whereby orders are placed after demand is realized). For all combinations of outsourcing structures and contracts, we derive the corresponding equilibrium wholesale prices, order quantities, and capacities. We find that the equilibrium production quantity is higher under control than under delegation for the push contract whereas the reverse holds for the pull contract. Both the OEM and the CM prefer control over delegation under the push contract. However, under the pull contract, the OEM prefers control over delegation whereas the CM and the supplier prefer delegation over control. We also show that for a given outsourcing structure, the OEM prefers the pull contract over the push contract. In extending our settings to a general two‐wholesale‐price (TWP) contract, we find that when wholesale prices are endogenized decision variables, the TWP contract under our setting degenerates to either a push or a pull contract.     

Storage constrained vendor managed inventory models with unequal shipment frequencies

We consider a supply chain where a vendor manages its multiple retailers' stocks under a vendor managed inventory (VMI) contract that specifies upper stock limits at the retailers' premises and overstock costs for exceeding those limits. We formulate a mixed integer nonlinear program that minimizes total supply chain costs and allows unequal shipment frequencies to the retailers. We develop an algorithm to solve its relaxed version which provides a lower bound cost solution. We propose a cost efficient heuristic procedure to generate delivery schedules to the retailers. We conduct a sensitivity analysis to provide insights on the performance of the proposed heuristic. Results show that our heuristic finds optimal or near optimal solutions, and it proposes substantial savings compared to the total supply-chain cost in the cases where there is no VMI and where there is VMI but with equal shipment frequencies to retailers.     

Outsourcing Competition and Information Sharing with Asymmetrically Informed Suppliers

This paper studies an outsourcing problem where two service providers (suppliers) compete for the service contract from a client. The suppliers face uncertain cost for providing the service because they do not have perfect information about the client's type. The suppliers receive differential private signals about the client type and thus compete under asymmetric information. We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier competition. Then we investigate two of the client's information sharing decisions. It is shown that less information asymmetry between the suppliers may dampen their competition. Therefore, the client does not necessarily have the incentive to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers. We characterize the conditions under which leveling the informational ground is beneficial to the client. We also find that under the presence of information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different learning abilities), sharing more information with both suppliers may enhance the advantage of one supplier over the other and at the same time increase the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes in equilibrium. Consequently, the suppliers compete less aggressively and the client's payoff decreases in the amount of shared information. The findings from this study provide useful managerial implications on information management for outsourcing firms.     

基于心理契约关系的IT外包项目控制模式建构:多案例研究

基于控制和心理契约理论,本论文研究IT外包项目中客户与供应商双方心理契约匹配情境对于控制模式的影响.本文是一个包括五个IT外包项目的多案例研究,对象是国内一家著名通信设备制造商,它在其中两个项目中以供应商的角色出现,在另外三个项目中则作为客户方.根据本文第一作者参与这些项目的亲身经历和多次追踪访谈以及其它相关资料,本研究识别出项目双方心理契约关系的四种匹配模式--相互交易、客户弱势、供应商弱势和相互忠诚,及其各自对应的关系特征.研究结果显示,在相互交易情境中,客户对供应商执行更多的结果控制;相反,相互忠诚的情境涉及更多的非正式控制.此外,在客户与供应商心理契约不匹配的情况下,客户倾向对供应商施加更多的行为控制.     

R&D (Re)location and Offshore Outsourcing: A Management Perspective

The paper reviews and systematizes the management literature directly and indirectly related to (re)location of research and development (R&D), in the form of both insourcing and outsourcing. The focus in particular is on R&D offshore outsourcing and its main drivers, including locational constraints and opportunities, motives, strategic decisions and managerial challenges. The analysis synthesizes and links the main propositions and findings of the theoretical and empirical work to build an original management and strategy centred framework which looks at R&D (re)location from a client–vendor perspective. In this case, the client is the offshoring company, and the vendors are the firms located in the host country. The characteristics of the firms and locations considered vis‐à‐vis the offshoring firm's goals are examined, the strategies implemented, the management and organizational challenges that R&D offshore outsourcing entails, and the ways in which offshoring impacts on both home and host locations are investigated.     

论“单一外包商”与“多外包商”两种外包战略的选择

随着资源外包关系的日益复杂化,单一外包商与多外包商的数量确定成为外包决策中的一个重要问题.本文针对这两种战略的选择问题,通过建立"两阶段外包决策分析模型",从知识专用性影响的角度出发,对两种不同战略进行交易成本分析,进而总结出两种战略不同的适用条件,以期为外包商数量的决策提供一定的指导.     

效率参数不可观测下的SaaS云外包合约研究

客户企业在实施SaaS（软件即服务,Software as a Service）云外包时,面临因效率参数不可观测所引发的云服务提供商（Cloud Service Provider,CSP）道德风险问题。针对该问题,以激励机制设计方法为基础,以客户企业期望收益最大化为目标,在服务产出为公共信息,而效率参数信息为CSP私人信息下研究如何通过外包合约的设计诱使CSP显示出真实的信息,并付出最优的努力水平。研究表明,最优努力水平、服务报酬支付是效率参数的减函数;客户企业向CSP提供的最优合约可以用线性合约表示;在由固定服务报酬及收益共享构成的线性合约中,效率参数与固定服务报酬支付正相关,与收益共享系数负相关。