Competitive Quality Choice and Remanufacturing

We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who faces competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR). The OEM decides the quality of the new product, which also determines the quality of the competing remanufactured product. The OEM and the IR then competitively determine their production quantities. We explicitly characterize how the OEM competes with the IR in equilibrium. Specifically, we show that the OEM relies more on quality as a strategic lever when it has a stronger competitive position (determined by the relative cost and value of new and remanufactured products), and in contrast it relies more heavily on limiting quantity of cores when it has a weaker competitive position. The IR's entry threat as well as its successful entry can decrease the consumer surplus. Furthermore, our results illustrate that ignoring the competition or the OEM's quality choice leads to overestimating benefits of remanufacturing for consumer and social welfare. In addition, we show an IR with either a sufficiently weak competitive position (so the OEM deters entry) or a sufficiently strong one (so the OEM is forced to limit quantity of cores) is desirable for reducing the environmental impact. Comparing our results with the benchmark in which the OEM remanufactures suggests that encouraging IRs to remanufacture in lieu of the OEMs may not benefit the environment. Furthermore, the benchmark illustrates that making remanufacturing more attractive improves the environmental impact when the remanufacturer is the OEM, while worsening it when remanufacturing is done by the IR.     

The Effect of Competition on Recovery Strategies

Manufacturers often face a choice of whether to recover the value in their end‐of‐life products through remanufacturing. In many cases, firms choose not to remanufacture, as they are (rightly) concerned that the remanufactured product will cannibalize sales of the higher‐margin new product. However, such a strategy may backfire for manufacturers operating in industries where their end‐of‐life products (cell phones, tires, computers, automotive parts, etc.) are attractive to third‐party remanufacturers, who may seriously cannibalize sales of the original manufacturer. In this paper, we develop models to support a manufacturer's recovery strategy in the face of a competitive threat on the remanufactured product market. We first analyze the competition between new and remanufactured products produced by a monopolist manufacturer and identify conditions under which the firm would choose not to remanufacture its products. We then characterize the potential profit loss due to external remanufacturing competition and analyze two entry‐deterrent strategies: remanufacturing and preemptive collection. We find that a firm may choose to remanufacture or preemptively collect its used products to deter entry, even when the firm would not have chosen to do so under a pure monopoly environment. Finally, we discuss conditions under which each strategy is more beneficial.     

Take‐Back Legislation: Consequences for Remanufacturing and Environment

In the last two decades, many countries have enacted product take‐back legislation that holds manufacturers responsible for the collection and environmentally sound treatment of end‐of‐use products. In an industry regulated by such legislation, we consider a manufacturer that also sells remanufactured products under its brand name. Using a stylized model, we consider three levels of legislation: no take‐back legislation, legislation with collection targets, and legislation with collection and reuse targets. We characterize the optimal solution for the manufacturer and analyze how various levels of legislation affect manufacturing, remanufacturing, and collection decisions. First, we explore whether legislation with only collection targets causes an increase in remanufacturing levels, which is argued to be an environmentally friendlier option for end‐of‐use treatment than other options such as recycling. While increased remanufacturing alone is usually perceived as a favorable environmental outcome, if one considers the overall environmental impact of new and remanufactured products, this might not be the case. To study this issue, we model the environmental impact of the product following a life cycle analysis–based approach. We characterize the conditions under which increased remanufacturing due to take‐back legislation causes an increase in total environmental impact. Finally, we model the impact of legislation on consumer surplus and manufacturer profits and identify when total welfare goes down because of legislation.     

WTP差异下的再制造进入决策研究

本文在消费者对再制造产品及新产品的支付意愿存在差异的条件下,分别对有无竞争环境下OEM的再制造进入决策边界条件进行了研究。研究结果表明,满足边界条件时,虽然再制造产品对新产品的市场产生了蚕食效应,但再制造产品的获利性能弥补这种损失,使得OEM进入再制造能获取更多的利润。在此基础上,通过数值仿真,讨论了不同参数对OEM及竞争者的产量及利润的影响。     

COMPETITION IN REMANUFACTURING

We present a two‐period model of remanufacturing in the face of competition. In our model, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) competes with a local remanufacturer (L) under many reverse logistics configurations for the returned items. After establishing the Nash Equilibrium in the second period sub‐game, we use numerical experiments for comparative statics. OEM wants to increase L'S remanufacturing cost. Surprisingly, while L competes in the sales market, she has incentives to reduce oem's remanufacturing cost. A social planner who wants to increase remanufacturing can give incentives to the OEM to increase the fraction available for remanufacturing, or reduce his remanufacturing costs.     

消费者品牌忠诚对品牌商再制造市场策略的影响

独立再制造商IR的市场进入给品牌商带来了显著的竞争压力。品牌忠诚源于消费者对某个产品品牌的信任和特殊情感,在产品选择中具有明显的倾向性和排他性,进一步增加了品牌商市场策略的复杂性。针对这一现象,本文采用博弈论结合数值仿真研究了消费者具有品牌忠诚特性下的品牌商再制造市场策略问题。建立并求解了IR不进入且品牌商不再制造（n）、IR不进入且品牌商再制造（nR）、IR进入且品牌商不再制造（nr）、IR进入且品牌商再制造（nrR）四种市场模式,对模型结果进行了灵敏度分析,并探讨了各成员的模式偏好。研究表明：新产品价格、品牌再制品价格、一般再制品价格均与品牌忠诚度正相关;品牌忠诚度的提高一定增大品牌商的利润,但不一定会降低IR利润;当新产品制造成本较高时,品牌商的模式偏好始终为nR$\succ$nrR$\succ$n$\succ$nr,较低时模式偏好受到消费者品牌忠诚度的大小的影响;nr和nrR模式下,品牌忠诚度仅可能提高品牌消费者剩余,但会降低普通消费者剩余、总消费者剩余和社会总福利。     

Contracting for Capacity under Renegotiation: Partner Preferences and the Value of Anticipating Renegotiation

This paper studies contract renegotiation in a stylized supply chain model. Two original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) sign fixed‐quantity contracts with a contract manufacturer (CM) prior to demand realization. Contract renegotiation after demand realization allows the OEMs to use capacity that is more or less than what they contracted for. We assume that the extra profit due to efficient allocation of capacity is allocated to the supply chain parties according to the egalitarian rule and investigate when an OEM's expected post‐renegotiation profit is maximized. We aim to understand how an OEM's expected post‐renegotiation profit is affected by her ability to negotiate a low wholesale price in the initial contract as well as the ability of the other OEM to do the same. Regardless of whether renegotiation is anticipated or not at the time of the initial contract, we find that an OEM, who had weak buyer power vis‐a‐vis the CM and was unable to negotiate a low wholesale price in the initial contract, may benefit more from renegotiation than a stronger OEM. In addition, we show that how the expected post‐renegotiation profit of an OEM changes with demand variance or anticipating renegotiation depends on the strength of the OEM's buyer power. Finally, we numerically test the robustness of our results in a supply chain with three OEMs and also identify when the OEMs prefer to leave the CM out of the renegotiation.     

奖惩机制下具竞争制造商的废旧产品回收决策模型

各国政府为保护环境加强了对废旧电器电子产品的回收再制造的管制。本文研究了两个制造商竞争情况下基于政府奖惩机制的制造商的废旧产品回收决策问题。具体研究时分两种情况:一种情况是两个制造商中只有一个回收再制造废旧产品,另一种情况是两个制造商都回收再制造废旧产品。研究表明:奖惩机制下回收再制造废旧产品的制造商的回收率提高;无论制造商是否回收再制造废旧产品,其新产品销售价均比无奖惩机制时低,奖惩机制对消费者有利;制造商竞争有利于奖惩机制引导制造商提高废旧产品的回收率;回收率随再制造率的提高而提高;无论另一个制造商回收再制造废旧产品与否,实施回收再制造制造商的利润随奖惩力度的提高而增加,随政府规定的目标回收率的提高而降低,且奖惩力度越大,降低幅度越明显。算例分析说明了上述结论的正确性。     

政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究

以政府“以旧换再”补贴政策为背景,建立了原始制造商、再制造商与零售商两阶段博弈模型.基于此博弈模型,考虑政府不采取补贴政策、政府补贴给再制造商及政府通过零售商补贴购买再制造产品消费者3种情况,对比分析了政府不同补贴策略对两种产品单位批发价格、零售价格、销售量、利润、消费者剩余及环境的影响.结果表明:当再制造产品的需求不受废旧产品回收量限制,政府补贴可以降低两种产品单位零售价格,增加再制造商和零售商的利润,提高消费者的剩余;当再制造产品的需求受到废旧产品回收量限制时,政府补贴可以增加两种产品的单位批发价格和两种产品制造商的利润,但是会降低零售商的销售利润.     

Segmentation Opportunities for a Social Planner: Impact of Limited Resources

In this research note, we investigate segmentation opportunities for social planners such as government agencies, nonprofits, and public organizations. These opportunities arise when the potential products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences toward quality. In these cases, whether to offer quality differentiated products and what quality level to choose are important decisions for a social planner. In this research note, we identify the conditions where it is socially optimal to offer either one homogenous or two quality differentiated products. We find that the resource limitations may result in a single product offering and that the quality of the product depends on the maximum surplus per unit resource consumed by the products. We also compare our findings to a profit‐maximizing firm. We find that the resource limitations may cause a profit‐maximizing firm to provide a better service to some consumers than the social planner. Contrary to common wisdom, we also show that the capacity limitations may force the social planner to act like a profit‐maximizing firm in terms of its pricing and product mix choice.     

Energy Performance Contracting in a Competitive Environment*

Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) is an important and effective energy conservation mechanism, under which an energy service company (ESCO) provides an energy‐saving service to its client and shares the resulting energy cost savings. Using a game‐theoretic model, we investigate the impacts of EPC on two competing manufacturers, of which one is more energy‐efficient in production than the other. The less energy‐efficient firm first proposes an energy‐saving sharing contract to the more energy‐efficient firm, who, if accepting the contract, acts as an ESCO that decides the energy‐saving target and helps realize it for the client. Then the firms engage in Cournot competition by producing/selling substitutable products. By solving the equilibrium solutions, we show that under an EPC project, the total production quantity of both firms increases (so the market price of the product decreases) with the ESCO producing less while its client producing more, which also leads to a higher consumer surplus. Meanwhile, both manufactures are better off under EPC and would obtain strictly higher profits when the service cost rate is high. Nevertheless, EPC may not result in a better environmental performance in that the total energy consumption of both firms may be higher under EPC, which happens when the market size is small and the ESCO has not much energy‐efficiency advantage over its client. We also study four extensions: When the energy saving service and production decisions are made separately, we find the more energy‐efficient firm is worse off when implementing EPC; when the energy‐saving sharing ratio is determined by the ESCO instead of the client, the ESCO extracts all the surplus derived from the EPC project while the total energy consumption of both firms is always reduced; when the energy‐saving sharing ratio is determined via Nash bargaining, the main insights from the base model remain valid; finally, when the client sets the target of overall cost reduction, it extracts all the surplus derived from the EPC project.     

政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响研究

为分析政府碳税与补贴政策对外包再制造影响,基于政府两种政策构建了外包再制造下制造/再制造博弈模型。基于博弈模型,对比分析政府两种对策对外包再制造下最优解的影响,研究主要得到：政府补贴政策可以有效提高废旧产品回收率,但只有当单位新产品碳税额度只有大于某一阈值时,政府碳税政策才会提高废旧产品回收率;政府采取补贴政策时,原始制造商通过降低单位再制造产品外包费用来获取政府补贴;政府采取碳税政策时,原始制造商通过提高单位新产品零售价格,把部分碳税转移给消费者;政府补贴政策可以同时增加原始制造商和再制造商收益;政府碳税政策可以增加再制造商收益,但只有单位新产品碳税额度大于某一阈值时,才可以增加原始制造商收益;当单位新产品对环境造成影响一定,并且单位再制造产品对环境造成影响与单位新产品对环境造成影响之比大于某一阈值时,政府补贴政策对环境造成影响最大、政府碳税政策对环境造成影响最小。     

多再制造商回收定价竞争博弈

多个再制造商在同一回收市场中获取废旧产品并进行再制造,他们之间存在回收竞争.每个再制造商回收废旧产品的数量取决于自身付出的回收价格,同时和对手们的回收价格相关.目标是最大化各自的期望利润.本文首先利用优化理论和非合作博弈理论,证明了该博弈作为超模博弈,存在唯一的Nash均衡.然后通过比较发现竞争下的Nash均衡价格高于串谋下的合作均衡价格.最后通过数值仿真探讨了再制造商的数目和再制造成本对博弈的影响.     

制造商作为再制造商的经销商的合作模式研究

与传统的再制造商与制造商市场竞争模式研究不同,首次研究了制造商作为再制造商的经销商的合作模式。分别求得合作模式下的新产品与再制造产品的最优价格决策,并将该模式与竞争模式进行比较。通过数值仿真,分析了在合作模式下消费者对再制造产品的接受度、生产成本对生产商盈利的影响;比较了合作模式与竞争模式下生产商的盈利情况。     

基于市场划分的再制造许可费对定价策略的影响

研究了基于市场划分的再制造许可费对闭环供应链定价策略的影响。考虑到再制造商具有只针对于绿色消费者进行销售的高价策略和针对于全体消费者进行销售的低价策略，基于回收量约束构建了包含一个原制造商和一个再制造商的Stackelberg博弈模型，求解两类定价策略下的最优决策。分析表明存在再制造许可费取值区间，当再制造许可费在不同的区间时，原制造商将通过在闭环供应链中的领导者地位迫使再制造商决定不同的定价策略。最后通过数值分析验证了再制造许可费的取值区间以及不同许可费时的闭环供应链定价策略和利润。     

The Impact of Product Lifecycle on Capacity Planning of Closed‐Loop Supply Chains with Remanufacturing

Product recovery operations in reverse supply chains face rapidly changing demand due to the increasing number of product offerings with reduced lifecycles. Therefore, capacity planning becomes a strategic issue of major importance for the profitability of closed‐loop supply chains. This work studies a closed‐loop supply chain with remanufacturing and presents dynamic capacity planning policies developed through the methodology of System Dynamics. The key issue of the paper is how the lifecycles and return patterns of various products affect the optimal policies regarding expansion and contraction of collection and remanufacturing capacities. The model can be used to identify effective policies, to conduct various “what‐if” analyses, and to answer questions about the long‐term profitability of reverse supply chains with remanufacturing. The results of numerical examples with quite different lifecycle and return patterns show how the optimal collection expansion/contraction and remanufacturing contraction policies depend on the lifecycle type and the average usage time of the product, while the remanufacturing capacity expansion policy is not significantly affected by these factors. The results also show that the collection and remanufacturing capacity policies are insensitive to the total product demand. The insensitivity of the optimal policies to total demand is a particularly appealing feature of the proposed model, given the difficulty in obtaining accurate demand forecasts.     

Effects of Remanufacturable Product Design on Market Segmentation and the Environment

Despite documented benefits of remanufacturing, many manufacturers have yet to embrace the idea of tapping into remanufactured‐goods markets. In this article, we explore this dichotomy and analyze the effect of remanufacturable product design on market segmentation and product and trade‐in prices by studying a two‐stage profit‐maximization problem in which a price‐setting manufacturer can choose whether or not to open a remanufactured‐goods market for its product. Our results suggest that it is optimal for a manufacturer to design a remanufacturable product when the value‐added from remanufacturing is relatively high but product durability is relatively low and innovation is nominal. In addition, we find that entering a remanufactured‐goods market in and of itself does not necessarily translate into environmental friendliness. On the one hand, the optimal trade‐in program could result in low return and/or remanufacturing rates. On the other hand, a low price for remanufactured products could attract higher demand and thereby potentially result in more damage to the environment. Meanwhile, external restrictions imposed on total greenhouse gas emissions draw criticism in their own right because they risk stifling growth or reducing overall consumer welfare. Given these trade‐offs, we therefore develop and compare several measures of environmental efficiency and conclude that emissions per revenue can serve as the best proxy for emissions as a metric for measuring overall environmental stewardship.     

Cost Allocation in Manufacturing–Remanufacturing Operations

For firms remanufacturing their products, the total life‐cycle costs and revenues from new and remanufactured products determine their profitability. In many firms, manufacturing/sales and remanufacturing/remarketing operations are carried out in different divisions. Each division is responsible for only part of the product's life cycle. Practices regarding transfer pricing across divisions vary significantly among companies, affecting the life‐cycle profit performance of the product. In this research, we identify characteristics of transfer prices that achieve the firm‐wide optimal solution. To this end, we consider a manufacturer who also undertakes remanufacturing operations and we focus on price (quantity) decisions. We determine that a cost allocation mechanism that allocates a portion of the initial production cost to each of the two stages of the product life cycle should be used. We also conclude that cost allocation should be implemented as a fixed cost allocation, where charges to the remanufacturing division should be determined independently of the actual quantity of units remanufactured.     

无偏好市场下制造/再制造系统最优生产决策

尽管再制造可以重新获得产品的附加价值,但是再制造产品和新产品具有一定的替代性,厂商在各期应该采用何种生产策略?本文选取单一制造厂商,首先讨论无偏好市场下两期再制造最优生产策略,建立厂商利润最大化的经济优化模型;然后给出了再制造成本节约临界值,以便厂商在不同的再制造成本区域内采取合适的价格和产量决策策略;进而将模型拓展,研究无限期的最优产量和定价策略。由于不同产品的再制造成本节约s的比例并不相同,本文通过优化所得的结论进行数据模拟,研究产品回收率和降级率对s*的影响,s对厂商的产量、定价决策及利润的影响,进而分析降级率对产量和价格的影响,为厂商制定产品设计、生产和回收决策提供依据。     

第三方回收商领导型两级闭环供应链的回收与定价策略

与一般废旧产品的回收产品再制造相比,废弃电子电器产品回收拆解后需要兼顾产品与零部件再制造,从而减少电子电器产品对环境的污染,推进资源的重复利用。为了探讨第三方回收商的回收与定价策略对供应商和制造商的影响,本文构建由单一供应商、制造商和第三方回收商组成的两级再制造闭环供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型,研究两级再制造情形下和仅产品再制造情形下回收商的有效回收比例、回收定价和回收努力程度等决策,并对两种再制造情形下供应链各成员的决策与收益进行对比分析。研究发现：对于回收商而言,回收数量、有效回收比例的增加有助于回收商获得更多的额外收益。如果在仅产品再制造情形下的有效回收比例较大,回收商的决策和收益主要取决于无效零部件的回收价。当无效零部件的回收价较低时,回收商在仅产品再制造情形下的决策和收益更优;反之,回收商在两级再制造情形下的决策和收益更优。对于其他供应链成员而言,两种再制造策略都能够降低供应商和制造商的定价,促进市场需求的增加。具体而言,不同的再制造策略对批发价、零售价和市场需求的影响与有效回收比例和无效零部件的回收价密切相关。