Equilibrium Labor Turnover,Firm Growth,and Unemployment

This paper considers equilibrium quit turnover in a frictional labor market with costly hiring by firms, where large firms employ many workers and face both aggregate and firm specific productivity shocks. There is exogenous firm turnover as new (small) startups enter the market over time, while some existing firms fail and exit. Individual firm growth rates are disperse and evolve stochastically. The paper highlights how dynamic monopsony, where firms trade off lower wages against higher (endogenous) employee quit rates, yields excessive job‐to‐job quits. Such quits directly crowd out the reemployment prospects of the unemployed. With finite firm productivity states, stochastic equilibrium is fully tractable and can be computed using standard numerical techniques.     

Prices,Markups, and Trade Reform

This paper examines how prices, markups, and marginal costs respond to trade liberalization. We develop a framework to estimate markups from production data with multi‐product firms. This approach does not require assumptions on the market structure or demand curves faced by firms, nor assumptions on how firms allocate their inputs across products. We exploit quantity and price information to disentangle markups from quantity‐based productivity, and then compute marginal costs by dividing observed prices by the estimated markups. We use India's trade liberalization episode to examine how firms adjust these performance measures. Not surprisingly, we find that trade liberalization lowers factory‐gate prices and that output tariff declines have the expected pro‐competitive effects. However, the price declines are small relative to the declines in marginal costs, which fall predominantly because of the input tariff liberalization. The reason for this incomplete cost pass‐through to prices is that firms offset their reductions in marginal costs by raising markups. Our results demonstrate substantial heterogeneity and variability in markups across firms and time and suggest that producers benefited relative to consumers, at least immediately after the reforms.     

Buy,Keep, or Sell: Economic Growth and the Market for Ideas

An endogenous growth model is developed where each period firms invest in researching and developing new ideas. An idea increases a firm's productivity. By how much depends on the technological propinquity between an idea and the firm's line of business. Ideas can be bought and sold on a market for patents. A firm can sell an idea that is not relevant to its business or buy one if it fails to innovate. The developed model is matched up with stylized facts about the market for patents in the United States. The analysis gauges how efficiency in the patent market affects growth.     

Systems Collaboration and Strategic Collaboration: Their Impacts on Supply Chain Responsiveness and Market Performance*

Recognizing the importance of interfirm collaboration and recent advancement of information technology (IT) to enhance joint decision making between firms, this study conceptualizes systems collaboration and strategic collaboration as two essential types of interfirm collaboration. The study then simultaneously examines the multiple roles of systems collaboration and strategic collaboration, and how they directly and indirectly influence a firm's supply chain responsiveness and market performance. Hypotheses are tested on survey data collected from 184 firms. Results suggest that the sequential relationships among IT competency, interfirm collaboration, and supply chain responsiveness have significant market performance implications.     

Market Orientation,Ownership Type,and E‐Business Assimilation: Evidence from Chinese Firms

While more and more firms have implemented e‐business in business operations, a better understanding of the factors that successfully drive the assimilation of e‐business will provide insights for firm executives and practitioners to develop effective strategies for e‐business. Different from previous studies that focus on individual‐level factors related to business executives and top management teams, this study examines how firm‐level strategic and cultural factors shape e‐business assimilation. Based on the strategy and marketing literature on market orientation and firm ownership, we developed a research model to describe how a firm's market orientation impacts e‐business assimilation. The model also describes the moderating effect of firm ownership type on the relationship between market orientation and e‐business assimilation. Based on data from 301 Chinese international trade firms, we found that two dimensions of market orientation (i.e., customer orientation, competitor orientation) had significant effects on e‐business assimilation. However, the third dimension, interfunctional coordination, was only partially significant. In addition, ownership type was a significant moderator of the effects of customer orientation and competitor orientation on e‐business assimilation, although ownership type was not a moderator of interfunctional coordination. Being one of the first studies of the impact of market orientation and firm ownership type on e‐business assimilation, we conclude with a discussion of the implications for future research and practice.     

A Competitive Model of Customization with Lead‐Time Effects

In this article, we study the competitive interactions between a firm producing standard products and a firm producing custom products. Consumers with heterogeneous preferences choose between n standard products, which may not meet their preferences exactly but are available immediately, and a custom product, available only after a certain lead time l. Standard products incur a variety cost that increases with n and custom products incur a lead time cost that is decreasing in the lead time l. We consider a two‐stage game wherein at stage 1, the standard product firm chooses the variety and the custom firm chooses the lead time and then both firms set prices simultaneously. We characterize the subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. We find that both firms can coexist in equilibrium, either sharing the market as local monopolists or in a price‐competitive mode. The standard product firm may offer significant or minimal variety depending on the equilibrium outcome. We provide several interesting insights on the variety, lead time, and prices of the products offered and on the impact of problem parameters on the equilibrium outcomes. For instance, we show that the profit margin and price of the custom product are likely to be higher than that of standard products in equilibrium under certain conditions. Also, custom firms are more likely to survive and succeed in product markets with larger potential market sizes. Another interesting insight is that increased consumer sensitivity to product fit may result in lower lead time for the custom product.     

Strong Duality for a Multiple‐Good Monopolist

We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple‐good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them. We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure μ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions. This measure expresses the marginal change in the seller's revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types. As a corollary, we characterize the optimality of grand‐bundling mechanisms, strengthening several results in the literature, where only sufficient optimality conditions have been derived. As an application, we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on [c,c+1] is a grand‐bundling mechanism, as long as c is sufficiently large, extending Pavlov's result for two items Pavlov, 2011. At the same time, our characterization also implies that, for all c and for all sufficiently large n, the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on [c,c+1] is not a grand‐bundling mechanism.     

Promotion,Turnover, and Compensation in the Executive Labor Market

This paper develops a generalized Roy model with human capital accumulation, moral hazard, and career concerns. We identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives. The structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm‐size pay gap. We find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size, certainty‐equivalent pay decreases with firm size. In larger firms, and for more highly ranked executives, weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums. This risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm‐size gap in total compensation. Larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives. Finally, the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant, but their collective effect on firm‐size pay differentials nets out.     

Unemployment and Business Cycles

We develop and estimate a general equilibrium search and matching model that accounts for key business cycle properties of macroeconomic aggregates, including labor market variables. In sharp contrast to leading New Keynesian models, we do not impose wage inertia. Instead we derive wage inertia from our specification of how firms and workers negotiate wages. Our model outperforms a variant of the standard New Keynesian Calvo sticky wage model. According to our estimated model, there is a critical interaction between the degree of price stickiness, monetary policy, and the duration of an increase in unemployment benefits.     

Strategic Product/Service Innovations of an Online Firm

We study the incentives that drive an online firm to make various types of innovations in a competitive environment. We develop and use a simplified price competition model between two retailers, one online and one offline. A given fraction of consumers, called the Internet penetration, comparison shop online, independent of their customer type, thereby creating two markets for the offline retailer, a captive market and a competitive market. The online product has the steeper of the two linear utility functions, which means that the customers who buy online in our model are high end. We focus on the competitive region in which both retailers are (strictly) profitable in the competitive market and consider innovations that increase high‐end appeal, low‐end appeal, and/or reduce unit cost. We find that the online firm has a strong incentive to invest in innovations that either reduce unit cost and/or, equivalently, increase the appeal to all consumers equally. Investments of this type are strategic complements: implementing one increases the value of another, so the value of two innovations of this type is more than the sum of the values of each individually. We identify a relative strength measure of the online firm such that, as its high‐end appeal increases and/or its unit cost decreases, we say that the online firm is stronger. This strength measure facilitates drawing an explicit dividing line between strong and weak online firms. If Internet penetration increases, the online firm's profits increase if and only if it is strong. If penetration increases over time, it is possible for a strong firm to turn weak and see its profits decrease and possibly disappear completely. A strong online firm has more opportunity to profit from low‐end innovations than does a weak one, while the opposite is true for high‐end innovations. Interestingly, some innovations may actually decrease the online firm's profits. We discuss the implications of our results for existing and future online innovations.     

Interorganizational System Characteristics and Supply Chain Integration: An Empirical Assessment*

Some firms have gained significant benefits by effectively deploying interorganizational systems (IOS) to tightly couple operations with their supply chain partners. In contrast, other firms with IOS deployments have struggled to achieve this level of success. So it is not clear how such systems can be configured to promote idiosyncratic interorganizational processes that integrate the supply chains and facilitate successful outcomes. To shed further light on this issue, we draw from multiple theoretical perspectives to develop a comprehensive and unique conceptualization of IOS characteristics that goes beyond the limited treatment it has received in extant literature. Furthermore, we empirically examine the IOS configuration choices made by firms with different supply chain integration (SCI) profiles. Our results support the notion that successful firms sequence the configuration of IOS characteristics toward effectively developing and supporting their supply chain process capabilities. In particular, we found that firms at the lower end of SCI configure IOS features to support supplier evaluation and automatic alerts. As organizations move to the upper end of the SCI spectrum, greater attention is paid to features associated with systems integration, planning, and forecasting. Recommendations to managers and academics stemming from our study are provided, along with avenues for future research.     

Supply Chain Strategy,Product Characteristics,and Performance Impact: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturers*

Supply chain management has become one of the most popular approaches to enhance the global competitiveness of business corporations today. Firms must have clear strategic thinking in order to effectively organize such complicated activities, resources, communications, and processes. An emerging body of literature offers a framework that identifies three kinds of supply chain strategies: lean strategy, agile strategy, and lean/agile strategy based on in‐depth case studies. Extant research also suggests that supply chain strategies must be matched with product characteristics in order for firms to achieve better performance. This article investigates supply chain strategies and empirically tests the supply chain strategy model that posits lean, agile, and lean/agile approaches using data collected from 604 manufacturing firms in China. Cluster analyses of the data indicate that Chinese firms are adopting a variation of lean, agile, and lean/agile supply chain strategies identified in the western literature. However, the data reveal that some firms have a traditional strategy that does not emphasize either lean or agile principles. These firms perform worse than firms that have a strategy focused on lean, agile, or lean/agile supply chain. The strategies are examined with respect to product characteristics and financial and operational performance. The article makes significant contributions to the supply chain management literature by examining the supply chain strategies used by Chinese firms. In addition, this work empirically tests the applicability of supply chain strategy models that have not been rigorously tested empirically or in the fast‐growing Chinese economy.     

When Does Predation Dominate Collusion?

I study repeated competition among oligopolists. The only novelty is that firms may go bankrupt and permanently exit: the probability that a firm survives a price war depends on its financial strength, which varies stochastically over time. Under some conditions including no entry, an anti‐folk theorem holds: when firms are patient, so that strength levels change relatively quickly, every Nash equilibrium involves an immediate price war that lasts until at most one firm remains. Surprisingly, the possibility of entry may facilitate collusion, as may impatience. The model can explain some observed patterns of collusion and predation.     

Managing Multiple Facets of Risk in New Product Alliances*

The trend of forming alliances to develop new products continues; however, many of these new product alliances fail. As such we explore how key risk types intrinsic in new product alliances, performance, relational, and knowledge appropriation risks, influence alliance success. Further, we theorize that different alliance governance mechanisms can reduce the negative impact of risks on alliance success. To disentangle possible heterogeneous factors across firms that may affect the interplay of risk assessments and the use of governance mechanisms, we employ latent class regression analysis on survey data collected from 128 new product alliance firms and find support for a two‐regime solution. Longer alliance relationships and lower technological turbulence are factors for some firms (regime one), while the opposite are factors for other firms (regime two). These two regimes show different patterns in the interplay of risk assessments and governance for alliance success. Our theory and results support viewing risk as a multiple‐factor concept and by understanding the different impacts of the risk types in new product alliances and how governance mechanisms mitigate such effects, we aid managers' decision making regarding the balance of contractual versus normative governance in new product alliances. Understanding the heterogeneous factors inherent in these complex relationships enables managers to understand the conditions in which various governance mechanisms promote new product alliance success.     

Large Matching Markets as Two‐Sided Demand Systems

This paper studies two‐sided matching markets with non‐transferable utility when the number of market participants grows large. We consider a model in which each agent has a random preference ordering over individual potential matching partners, and agents' types are only partially observed by the econometrician. We show that in a large market, the inclusive value is a sufficient statistic for an agent's endogenous choice set with respect to the probability of being matched to a spouse of a given observable type. Furthermore, while the number of pairwise stable matchings for a typical realization of random utilities grows at a fast rate as the number of market participants increases, the inclusive values resulting from any stable matching converge to a unique deterministic limit. We can therefore characterize the limiting distribution of the matching market as the unique solution to a fixed‐point condition on the inclusive values. Finally we analyze identification and estimation of payoff parameters from the asymptotic distribution of observable characteristics at the level of pairs resulting from a stable matching.     

Managing Differentiation‐Integration Duality in Supply Chain Integration*

Existing research focuses on the positive returns to operational performance of firms’ supply chain integration (SCI) with suppliers, buyers, and customers. We draw on differentiation‐integration duality and contingency theory to suggest that manufacturing firms should seek to achieve both integration through supply chain coordination activities and differentiation through modularity‐based manufacturing practices (MBMP). Using a sample of 261 manufacturing firms, we identify an inverse U‐shaped relationship between SCI and operational performance. Furthermore, we find support for the importance of differentiation‐integration duality as a fit between high levels of SCI and high levels of MBMP results in enhanced operational performance. We find support for a contingency perspective as fit is especially critical at higher levels of environmental uncertainty. Implications for theory, practice, and further research are suggested.     

Organizational Integration for Product Development: The Effects on Glitches,On‐Time Execution of Engineering Change Orders,and Market Success

Deviations from requirements during the product development process can be considered as glitches. Fixing glitches, or problems, during the product development process consumes valuable resources, which may adversely affect product development time and hamper the firm's goal to pursue a first‐mover advantage. It is posited that an integrated organizational response can diminish incidences of glitches and improve the ability of the firm to respond to engineering changes, subsequently leading to improved market success. This organizational response frequently includes heavyweight product development managers who are seen as essential catalysts for internal integration. Though internal integration is vital, it is equally important to integrate with customers and suppliers alike because such network partners can provide access to information, knowledge, and unique and complementary resources that are otherwise unavailable to the firm. Findings, which are based on a sample of 191 product development projects in the automotive industry, suggest that some integration routines have a positive impact on product development outcomes and market success, while other routines can in fact hamper the collective effort.     

Asset Markets With Heterogeneous Information

This paper studies competitive equilibria of economies where assets are heterogeneous and traders have heterogeneous information about them. Markets are defined by a price and a procedure for clearing trades, and any asset can, in principle, be traded in any market. Buyers can use their information to impose acceptance rules which specify which assets they are willing to trade in each market. The set of markets where trade takes place is derived endogenously. The model can be applied to find conditions under which these economies feature fire sales, contagion, and flights to quality.     

Supply Networks as a Complex Adaptive System: Toward Simulation‐Based Theory Building on Evolutionary Decision Making

In this article, we examine how the firms embedded in supply networks engage in decision making over time. The supply networks as a complex adaptive system are simulated using cellular automata (CA) through a dynamic evolution of cooperation (i.e., “voice” decision) and defection (i.e., “exit” decision) among supply network agents (i.e., firms). Simple local rules of interaction among firms generate complex patterns of cooperation and defection decisions in the supply network. The incentive schemes underlying decision making are derived through different configurations of the payoff‐matrix based on the game theory argument. The prisoner's dilemma game allows capturing the localized decision‐making process by rational agents, and the CA model allows the self‐organizing outcome to emerge. By observing the evolution of decision making by cooperating and defecting agents, we offer testable propositions regarding relationship development and distributed nature of governance mechanisms for managing supply networks.     

Capability,Quality, and Performance of Offshore IS Vendors: A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Investigation

Information systems (IS) offshoring has become a widespread practice and a strategic sourcing choice for many firms. While much has been written by researchers about the factors that lead to successful offshoring arrangements from the client's viewpoint, the vendor's perspective has been largely scarce. The vendor perspective is equally important as offshore IS vendors need to make important decisions in terms of delivering operational and strategic performance and aligning their resources and processes in order to meet or exceed targeted outcomes. In this article, we propose and test a three‐level capability–quality–performance (CQP) theoretical framework to understand vendor outcomes and their antecedents. The first level of the framework represents three vendor capabilities: relationship management, contract management, and information technology management. The second level has three mediating variables representing process quality: partnership, service, and deliverable quality. The third level has three dependent variables representing vendor outcomes: operational performance, strategic performance, and satisfaction. The model was tested with 188 vendor firms from India and China, the two most popular destinations for IS offshoring. Results support the CQP framework; vendor capabilities are significant predictors of intermediate quality measures, which in turn affect vendor outcomes. Implications of the study findings to both theory development and IS offshore vendor strategic decision making are discussed.