Attracting talent through diversity at the top: The impact of TMT diversity and firms' efforts to promote diversity on employer attractiveness

At a time where firms encounter a “race for talent”, it is crucial for many MNCs to present themselves as attractive employers. Failing to position themselves in the international labor market can reduce firms' ability to acquire valuable international human capital, thereby generating disadvantageous organizational effects. Against this backdrop, drawing on signaling theory and employer branding literature, our paper aims to shed light on the association between nationality diversity in the executive suite and MNCs' employer attractiveness. Our lines of argument build on the notion that top management team composition can affect MNCs' efforts to promote diversity among their employees. This focus on diversity, in turn, can affect MNCs' employer attractiveness. Examining firms from various European countries, we find that top management team nationality diversity is positively associated with firms' employer attractiveness for foreign job seekers. We also show that a firm's efforts to promote diversity mediate the relationship between TMT nationality diversity and employer attractiveness. We therefore advance the academic debate on diversity as an employer branding tool and a means to enhance employer attractiveness. In practical terms, we also provide valuable insights for firms wishing to transform into (more) diverse entities.     

Robust Contracts in Continuous Time

We study a continuous‐time contracting problem under hidden action, where the principal has ambiguous beliefs about the project cash flows. The principal designs a robust contract that maximizes his utility under the worst‐case scenario subject to the agent's incentive and participation constraints. Robustness generates endogenous belief heterogeneity and induces a tradeoff between incentives and ambiguity sharing so that the incentive constraint does not always bind. We implement the optimal contract by cash reserves, debt, and equity. In addition to receiving ordinary dividends when cash reserves reach a threshold, outside equity holders also receive special dividends or inject cash in the cash reserves to hedge against model uncertainty and smooth dividends. The equity premium and the credit yield spread generated by ambiguity aversion are state dependent and high for distressed firms with low cash reserves.     

Dynamic Pricing and Lead‐Time Policies for Make‐to‐Order Systems*

Make‐to‐order firms use different approaches for managing their lead‐times and pricing in the face of changing market conditions. A particular firm's approach may be largely dictated by environmental constraints. For example, it makes little sense to carefully manage lead‐time if its effect on demand is muted, as it can be in situations where leadtime is difficult for the market to gauge or requires investment to estimate. Similarly, it can be impractical to change capacity and price. However, environmental constraints are likely to become less of an issue in the future with the expanding e‐business infrastructure, and this trend raises questions into how to manage effectively the marketing mix of price and lead‐time in a more “friction‐free” setting. We study a simple model of a make‐to‐order firm, and we examine policies for adjusting price and capacity in response to periodic and unpredictable shifts in how the market values price and lead‐time. Our analysis suggests that maintaining a fixed capacity while using lead‐time and/or price to absorb changes in the market will be most attractive when stability in throughput and profit are highly valued, but in volatile markets, this stability comes at a cost of low profits. From a pure profit maximization perspective, it is best to strive for a short and consistent lead‐times by adjusting both capacity and price in response to market changes.     

Heterogeneous Firm Responses to Rising Teenage Wages

Substantial youth minimum wage changes in New Zealand between 2000 and 2007 raised teenage average wages by 5–10 per cent relative to those for adults. We use Statistics New Zealand's Linked Employer–Employee Database (LEED) to examine whether firms' teenage labour demand responses to these changes are greater for firms with higher teenage‐employment share. We find evidence that high teen‐employers reduced their teen employment relative to other firms and had lower survival rates over the period. However, firms that entered the main teen‐employment industries had higher teen‐employment shares than continuing firms. The results are consistent with endogenous technology adoption in response to non‐marginal changes in relative wages.     

Scheduling Truck Arrivals at an Air Cargo Terminal

We consider the scheduling of truck arrivals at an air cargo terminal. By coordinating arrivals of cargo delivery trucks with outbound flight departure schedules, some of the shipments can be transferred directly to the departing flights, while others will be stored at the terminal's storage facility and incur extra handling and storage costs. The objective is to obtain a feasible schedule so as to minimize the total cost of operations. We formulate the problem as a time‐indexed integer program and show that, even with limited number of unloading docks at the terminal, the problem is non‐trivial (NP‐hard in the strong sense). Our solution method includes an exact solution procedure to determine an optimal unloading sequence for the shipments carried by each truck, together with a Lagrangian relaxation‐based heuristic for assigning trucks to truck docks and determining truck arrival times. We conducted computational experiments to test the performance of our solution method. Computational results show that our method can generate near‐optimal solutions efficiently. Our simulation results indicate that the scheduling approach proposed in this paper has the potential to generate significant cost savings over a first‐come, first‐served approach currently used at the air cargo terminal that we observed.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

On the Smooth Ambiguity Model: A Reply

We find that Epstein's (2010) Ellsberg‐style thought experiments pose, contrary to his claims, no paradox or difficulty for the smooth ambiguity model of decision making under uncertainty developed by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). Not only are the thought experiments naturally handled by the smooth ambiguity model, but our reanalysis shows that they highlight some of its strengths compared to models such as the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). In particular, these examples pose no challenge to the model's foundations—interpretation of the model as affording a separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitude or the potential for calibrating ambiguity attitude in the model.     

How Excessive Stage Time Reduction in NPD Negatively Impacts Market Value

We empirically investigate how time reductions in particular product development stages impact market value. Using longitudinal project data from 107 firms, we compare stage times prior to and following investments in new product development process changes. Our analysis reveals a predominance of focus on time reduction in the late stages of product development. We also find support for the existence of an inverted‐U relationship between market performance and time reductions for some of these stages: beta testing and technical implementation. Therefore, while time reductions can improve time to market, we observe a clear limit to the benefits associated with stage time reductions at particular stages. We also investigate the role of strategic contextual factors such as the extent to which a firm's patented innovations rely upon a variety, as opposed to a limited range, of diverse technology classes. The extent of this technology‐span impacts optimal stage time reductions. We perform an in‐depth post hoc analysis with a small set of firms to uncover how they should invest in stage time reduction given our empirical results. The post hoc analysis highlights that some firms are likely overinvesting in stage time reductions and destroying market value.     

Willingness to Pay for Shifting Inventory Risk: The Role of Contractual Form

In order to reduce their inventory risk, firms can attempt to contract with their suppliers for shorter supply lead‐times, with their buyers for longer demand lead‐times, or both. We designed a controlled laboratory experiment to study contracts that shift a focal firm's inventory risk to its supply chain partners and address two questions. First, is it more effective if the cost of shifting inventory risk is framed as a fixed fee or in per‐unit cost terms? We find that, generally, our participants are willing to pay more to avoid supply–demand mismatches than the expected costs from such mismatches. This tendency to overpay is mitigated under fixed fee schemes. Second, does it matter whether the option to reduce inventory risk is the outcome of either increased responsiveness from the upstream supplier or advanced demand information from the downstream buyer? Our results suggest that this difference, when only a matter of framing, has no significant effect on willingness‐to‐pay.     

Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

When Gray is Good: Gray Markets and Market‐Creating Investments

Gray markets arise when an intermediary buys a product in a lower‐priced, often emerging market and resells it to compete with the product's original manufacturer in a higher priced, more developed market. Evidence suggests that gray markets make the original manufacturer worse off globally by eroding profit margins in developed markets. Thus, it is interesting that many firms do not implement control systems to curb gray market activity. Our analysis suggests that one possible explanation lies at the intersection of two economic phenomena: firms investing to build emerging market demand, and investments conferring positive externalities (spillovers) on a rival's demand. We find that gray markets amplify the incentives to invest in emerging markets, because investments increase both emerging market consumption and the gray market's cost base. Moreover, when market‐creating investments confer positive spillovers, each firm builds its own market more efficiently. Thus, firms can be better off with gray markets when investments confer spillovers, provided the spillover effect is sufficiently large. These results provide a perspective on why firms might not implement control systems to prevent gray market distribution in sectors where investment spillovers are common (e.g., the technology sector) and, more broadly, why gray markets persist in the economy.     

Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case

When firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for a competitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what happens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is used: exclusive capacity and first‐priority capacity. We model firms' investment and production decisions, and analyze the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one firm taps into the other firm's invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually discourages firms' investment. We also characterize the firms' and supplier's preference about the capacity type. While the non‐investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first‐priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to shut off the other firm's access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to invest. The supplier's preference depends on the trade‐off between over‐investment and flexibility.     

The Impact of Costliness,Competitive Importance,and Modularity of Investments on Outsourcing

This study is motivated by examples of outsourcing that are not readily explained by widely established economic theories. We extend recent literature that develops the idea that outsourcing can help firms avoid overinvestment by specifying more precisely the conditions under which this thesis is likely to apply. Our extension is realized through a two‐period game theoretic model in which the outsourcing and in‐house investments are driven by (1) the cost required to develop a product or process module, (2) competitive relevance, defined as the module's share in the production cost or the module's importance to the customer, and (3) modularity, defined as the extent to which generic investments in the module can approach firm‐specific investments in terms of the overall product/process performance. The analysis generates predictions about what types of insourcing, outsourcing, and non‐sourcing behaviors are likely to emerge in different parts of the parameter space. Outsourcing to a more concentrated industry upstream emerges at equilibrium when modularity is high, relevance low to medium, and development cost high enough that none or only a subset of focal firms wants to invest. While firms are forced to insource and overinvest due to a prisoner's dilemma when the development cost is sufficiently high relative to the module's relevance, we do not find outsourcing equilibria that solve this problem in a two‐period game with no commitment. This result implies that some form of tacit coordination in a multi‐period game may be necessary. We conclude the study with a discussion of empirical implications.     

Leveraging Supply Chain Integration through Planning Comprehensiveness: An Organizational Information Processing Theory Perspective

This study extends prior research on supply chain planning and integration by examining the underlying capabilities by which firms exploit the information they gain from integration activities. We use organizational information processing theory (OIPT) to develop hypotheses that identify the comprehensiveness of an organization's supply chain planning capabilities as an important mediator in the relationship between its supply chain integration activities and its operational performance. Further, our interpretation of OIPT suggests that an organization's usage of technology‐enabled supply chain management systems (SCMS) moderates these effects. Using survey data from 445 global firms, we estimate the corresponding moderated‐mediation structural model. The results indicate that usage of SCMS enables organizations to better utilize the information they gain from external integration efforts (relationships with customers and suppliers), thus improving the comprehensiveness of their supply chain planning capabilities. In contrast, the use of SCMS appears to be a partial substitute for internal integration as a driver of planning comprehensiveness. Most importantly, the results suggest that planning comprehensiveness is a significant generative means by which integration and technology investments produce superior operational performance. These findings provide a richer and more theoretically grounded explanation of relationships between supply chain integration, supply chain planning, and operational performance.     

Product Design Awards and The Market Value of The Firm

Product design has increasingly been recognized as an important source of competitive advantage. This study empirically estimates the impact of effective design on the market value of the firm. We use a firm's receipt of a product design award as a proxy for its design effectiveness. Based on data from 264 announcements of design awards given to commercialized products between 1998 and 2011, we find that award announcements are associated with statistically significant positive stock market reactions. Depending on the benchmark model used to estimate the stock market reaction, the market reaction over a two‐day period (the day of announcement and the preceding day) ranges from 0.95% to 1.02%. The market reaction is more positive for smaller firms and for firms whose award winning products are consumer goods. However, a firm's growth potential, industry competitiveness, and whether a firm is a first time or repeated award winner do not significantly affect the market reaction.     

Transnational Board Interlocks as a Source of Non‐experiential Knowledge for the Firm in Foreign Markets

Board interlocks between firms headquartered in different countries are increasing. We contribute to the understanding of this practice by investigating the transnational interlocks formed by the 100 largest British firms between 2011 and 2014. We explore the association between different attributes of a firm's internationalization process, namely performance, structural and attitudinal, and the extent of the firm's engagement in transnational interlocks. We posit that the value of transnational interlocks as a non‐experiential source of knowledge will vary according to which of these three attributes becomes more prominent as the firm internationalizes. We do not find a significant relationship between the performance and structural attributes of internationalization, as measured by the firm's percentage of foreign sales and assets, respectively, and increased engagement in transnational interlocks. We do, however, find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the attitudinal attribute of internationalization, represented by the psychic dispersion of the firm's foreign operations, and the firm's number of transnational interlocks. This non‐linear relationship reveals both a natural boundary for the firm's capacity to engage in transnational interlocks and a reduced willingness to engage in such ties once a certain degree of attitudinal internationalization has been reached.     

The Impact of Trade on Intra‐Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity

This paper develops a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms to analyze the intra‐industry effects of international trade. The model shows how the exposure to trade will induce only the more productive firms to enter the export market (while some less productive firms continue to produce only for the domestic market) and will simultaneously force the least productive firms to exit. It then shows how further increases in the industry's exposure to trade lead to additional inter‐firm reallocations towards more productive firms. The paper also shows how the aggregate industry productivity growth generated by the reallocations contributes to a welfare gain, thus highlighting a benefit from trade that has not been examined theoretically before. The paper adapts Hopenhayn's (1992a) dynamic industry model to monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium setting. In so doing, the paper provides an extension of Krugman's (1980) trade model that incorporates firm level productivity differences. Firms with different productivity levels coexist in an industry because each firm faces initial uncertainty concerning its productivity before making an irreversible investment to enter the industry. Entry into the export market is also costly, but the firm's decision to export occurs after it gains knowledge of its productivity.     

Impact of Customer‐based Corporate Reputation on Non‐monetary and Monetary Outcomes: The Roles of Commitment and Service Context Risk

A firm's reputation is an important intangible asset, because of its potential for value creation. The authors explore non‐monetary and monetary outcomes of customer‐based corporate reputation (CBR) and hypothesize that commitment serves as a partial mediator, while service context risk is a moderator, of these relationships. Using a large sample of service customers who evaluated the reputation of service firms in four service categories, the results show that (1) commitment partially mediates the relationship between CBR and most of the outcome variables, and (2) service provider selection risk moderates these relationships, such that reputation has a stronger effect on several non‐monetary outcomes for higher‐risk services and commitment has a stronger effect for lower‐risk services, consistent with a dual‐processing framework explanation. The authors discuss the theoretical and managerial implications.     

Opportunism in Capital Budget Recommendations: The Effects of Past Performance and Its Attributions*

This study uses an experiment to examine the separate and combined effects of managers' loss aversion and their causal attributions about their divisions' performance on tendencies to make goal‐incongruent capital budget recommendations. We find that managers' recommendations are biased by their loss aversion. In particular, managers of high‐performing divisions are more likely than managers of low‐performing divisions to propose investments that maximize their division's short‐term profits at the expense of the firm's long‐term value. We also find that managers' recommendations are biased by their causal attributions. In particular, managers are more likely to propose investments that maximize their division's short‐term profits at the expense of the firm's long‐term value when they attribute their division's performance to external causes (e.g., task difficulty or luck) rather than to internal causes (e.g., managerial ability or effort). Further, the effects of causal attributions are greater for managers of high‐performing divisions than for managers of low‐performing divisions. The study's findings are important because loss aversion and causal attributions are often manifested in firms. Thus, they may bias managers' decisions, which in turn may be detrimental to the firms' long‐term value.     

PRODUCT OFFERING,PRICING, AND MAKE‐TO‐STOCK/MAKE‐TO‐ORDER DECISIONS WITH SHARED CAPACITY

In an era of mass customization, many firms continue to expand their product lines to remain competitive. These broader product lines may help to increase market share and may allow higher prices to be charged, but they also cause challenges associated with diseconomies of scope. To investigate this tradeoff, we considered a monopolist who faces demand curves, which for each of its potential products, decline with both price and response time (time to deliver the product). The firm must decide which products to offer, how to price them, whether each should be make‐to‐stock (mts) or make‐to‐order (mto), and how often to produce them. The offered products share a single manufacturing facility. Setup times introduce disceonomies of scope and setup costs introduce economies of scale. We provide motivating problem scenarios, model the monopolist's problem as a non‐linear, integer programming problem, characterize of the optimal policy, develop near‐optimal procedures, and discuss managerial insights.