Mythos Flexibilisierung?

In this article, we address the current debate of increasing work life flexibility in (West-) Germany. In order to shed some light on the contradiction between a widely accepted decrease in work life stability and empirical findings that do not confirm such a decline, we contrast “objective” evidence from occupational trajectories with “subjective” evidence on various dimensions of perceived continuity and discontinuity of job histories. We use the West German part of the German Life History Study for a survival analysis of occupational mobility for cohorts born between 1929 and 1971. Here, using a new concept, we distinguish between direct mobility and indirect mobility which is defined as an occupational change that happens after an employment interruption. In addition, we analyze a new German cross-sectional data set from 2005 on retrospective career perceptions. We employ multinomial regression models to understand whether younger individuals report more unwanted occupational mobility and employment interruptions than older individuals. Our findings indicate that direct occupational mobility has neither increased across cohorts nor has it surged upward for the most recent cohorts, but that there has been an increase in indirect occupational mobility. Furthermore, while there is no higher incidence of unwanted occupational mobility in younger age groups, we find mixed evidence regarding the increased occurrence of unwanted career interruptions in younger age groups. Finally, the desire to experience occupational and firm changes has grown for younger age groups.     

Trapped in the Working Class? Prospects for the Intergenerational (Im)Mobility of Latino Youth

Opportunities for upward mobility have been declining in the United States in recent decades. Within this context, I examine the mobility trajectories of a contemporary cohort of 1.5‐, second‐, and third‐plus‐generation Latino youth. Drawing on survey data from California that accounts for the precarious legal status of many 1.5 generation immigrants, I find that Latino youths' patterns of postsecondary enrollment and employment do not differ by generation since migration. Additionally, I do not find evidence of racial/ethnic barriers to Latino youths' enrollment in less selective colleges and participation in the labor market. Yet, given the low socioeconomic origins of many Latino youth and their correspondingly low 4‐year college enrollment rates, only a small proportion will likely enjoy upward mobility through jobs that require a bachelor's degree. Overall, the cohort of Latino youth coming of age during the Great Recession is poised to experience working‐class stagnation. This group's future access to economic and political positions of power will likely be limited by their low enrollment rates in 4‐year colleges in general, but in selective postsecondary institutions in particular.     

The mobility problem in Britain: new findings from the analysis of birth cohort data

Social mobility is now a matter of greater political concern in Britain than at any time previously. However, the data available for the determination of mobility trends are less adequate today than two or three decades ago. It is widely believed in political and in media circles that social mobility is in decline. But the evidence so far available from sociological research, focused on intergenerational class mobility, is not supportive of this view. We present results based on a newly‐constructed dataset covering four birth cohorts that provides improved data for the study of trends in class mobility and that also allows analyses to move from the twentieth into the twenty‐first century. These results confirm that there has been no decline in mobility, whether considered in absolute or relative terms. In the case of women, there is in fact evidence of mobility increasing. However, the better quality and extended range of our data enable us to identify other ‘mobility problems’ than the supposed decline. Among the members of successive cohorts, the experience of absolute upward mobility is becoming less common and that of absolute downward mobility more common; and class‐linked inequalities in relative chances of mobility and immobility appear wider than previously thought.     

The changing relationship between university education and intergenerational social mobility

This paper examines the intergenerational occupational mobility patterns for five cohorts of male and female university graduates who received degrees between i960 and 1976. After 1964 there is a marked decline in the prospects of both males and females for upward intergenerational mobility. Males still experience more mobility than females in all time periods, although the sex difference appears to be diminishing over time. This pattern reflects worsened mobility prospects for males rather than any improvement for females. Regional comparisons in the 1976 national data identify differences in the distribution of father's occupational prestige across Canada and, therefore, different structural conditions by region for intergenerational occupational mobility.
This paper examines three issues in intergenerational social mobility as measured by occupational achievement. Using new and earlier published data on five cohorts of graduates, we examine the extent to which university education has declined over time as a route to upward intergenerational mobility. Changes in the labour market for graduates are identified as the major reasons for such declines. Second, we examine the extent to which sex differences in intergenerational mobility have diminished over time and the extent to which this is a consequence of worsening mobility prospects for males rather than improving prospects for females. Third, we examine some differences in intergenerational mobility patterns for the five economic regions of Canada.     

Religion, social mobility and education in Scotland

The relationship among religion, education and social mobility in Scotland is analysed statistically using the Scottish Household Survey of 2001 . The large sample size allows much greater statistical power for this purpose than any previous source, and thus allows a more reliable assessment of claims that the stratifying effect of religion in Scotland may have declined. The questions investigated are as follows. What are the religious differences in the distributions of class origins and class destinations, in the movement between these (absolute mobility), and in the association of these (relative mobility, or social fluidity)? Do changes in social fluidity across cohorts vary among people with different religious affiliation? Are there religious differences in the association of origins and education, in the association of education and destinations, or in the role of education in social fluidity, and do any of these vary over cohorts? The conclusions are that, in younger cohorts, there is no religious difference in social status, and that in older cohorts Catholics are generally of lower status than Protestants and the non‐religious. Social fluidity does not, however, vary among religious groups, even for older cohorts, and does not change over time. The reason for convergence in social status of religious groups over time is probably the equalizing of educational attainment among the groups: there is no evidence for any of the cohorts that the labour‐market rewards to education differ by religion.     

Political attitudes, social participation and social mobility: a longitudinal analysis

It is often suggested that the political attitudes and social participation which have underpinned the welfare-state democracies have depended on large amounts of upward social mobility. The demographic heterogeneity of the service class, according to this view, induced in them a willingness to lead a common political project seeking to establish a common social citizenship. As the amount of upward mobility stagnates or even begins to fall, it has then further been claimed that there might emerge a degree of ideological closure in the service class that might erode their commitment to civic values. The 1958 British birth cohort study is used to investigate this question. Longitudinal data are invaluable here because they allow us to distinguish between two hypotheses: that upward mobility as such has induced in the service class certain attitudes and propensities to participate, or that the more important influence is the early socialization through which upwardly mobile people went. The conclusion of the analysis is that, although the civic values of the service class have not depended on upward mobility, this is much more true of cognitively able people than of others, and so is dependent on the somewhat meritocratic basis of selection into the salariat.     

How do macro- and micro-level changes interact in the emergence of educational outcomes?

This article uses data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) to examine how the composition of tertiary degree holders by social origin has changed across cohorts during a period of massive educational expansion. It also investigates how changes in the composition of social origins affect the proportion of downward mobility of children from academic families. The results of the empirical analysis reveal a surprising paradox: On the one hand, the rising share of children from academic families across cohorts has contributed to an increasing share of children from academic families among tertiary graduates. This is because of both the macro-level proportion of children from academic families and the micro-level probability of these children to obtain a tertiary degree have increased across cohorts. Thus, these macro-level and micro-level changes have reinforced each other. On the other hand, this change in the composition of social origin has also contributed to an increasing proportion of children from academic families who are downward mobile in successive cohorts. This is because the macro-level share of children from academic families has increased more across cohorts than their downward mobility risk has decreased at the micro level. Thus, macro-level changes were stronger and went in opposite direction to micro-level changes.     

Getting Ahead in the Capitalist Paradise: Migration from China and Socioeconomic Attainment in Colonial Hong Kong1

This article examines the initial labor market outcome and the subsequent mobility process of Chinese immigrants in Colonial Hong Kong using complete work history data and event history modeling. Contrary to the rhetoric that Hong Kong is a capitalist paradise for adventurers, the data showed that immigrants were penalized in their initial class placement, subsequent mobility, and current income attainment. Differences in educational attainment and the lack of transferability of pre‐migration human capital partly explained the attainment gap between immigrants and the natives. Yet the disadvantage of immigrants was also embedded in the local economic structure. The process of deindustrialization significantly lowered the chance of immigrants getting good first jobs when entering the labor market. Moreover, since deindustrialization benefited the natives by providing them with more opportunities in the service sector, it inadvertently widened the gap in upward mobility chances between natives and immigrants.     

Chinese Migrants' Class Mobility in Hong Kong

Resources such as education and social networks are likely to contribute to migrants' upward mobility in the class hierarchy. Moreover, according to structural fit theory, the contribution tends to be contingent on age and social network size. The contingency is the major concern of the present study of mainland Chinese migrants in Hong Kong, which is somewhat different from the Chinese mainland economically, politically and even culturally. In this study, we show that the conditions for upward mobility are some human and social resources and their various combinations. Notably, schooling after arrival in Hong Kong contributed more to the upward mobility of the migrant who was younger or had a larger social network at the time of arrival in Hong Kong. Purportedly, promoting the migrant's integration with the school and local social network would prepare the migrant for upward mobility.     

Social mobility and the well‐being of individuals

Several papers published in recent years have revived interest in Sorokin's dissociative thesis: the view that intergenerational social mobility has detrimental effects on the social relationships and wellbeing of individuals. In this paper, I test the dissociative thesis using data from the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society. On a wide range of indicators that measure participation in civic associations, contact with parents, close personal relationships, social support, subjective wellbeing, etc. individuals who have achieved long‐range upward mobility (i.e. those who move from working class origin to salariat destination) tend to fare better than those who are immobile in the working class. Those who have experienced long‐range downward mobility (moving from salariat origin to working class destination) do about as well as second‐generation members of the working class. Overall, there is no support for Sorokin's thesis.     

Social mobility and the interpretation of social class mortality differentials

The discussion of health inequalities in Britain (e.g. in the Black Report) has been conducted largely on the basis of social class mortality differentials measured by achieved social class and not by social class of origin. It is shown in this paper that social class mortality differentials by achieved social class are not invariant to the rate of social mobility and that the use of them is likely to result in a biased measure of trends in health inequalities when the absolute rate of social mobility varies over time. It is further shown that if, as is likely, health status is a factor systematically affecting the probability for an individual of upward or downward social mobility, then an increase in the rate of social mobility may well result in constant or widening social class mortality differentials by achieved social class even if the differentials are narrowing when measured by social class of origin. It is claimed that this process may well explain why the observed social class mortality differentials, which are measured by achieved social class, have not fallen in Britain during the post-1945 period.     

“Indian Arrivistes and Cyber Coolies: Reflections on Global Outsourcing and the Middle Class”

Globalization, we used to think, meant the movement of manufacturing jobs to the developing world. It brought work to regions that needed it, while dislocating the lives of the working classes in the richer countries. That was until it moved into the information technology and service sectors at the turn of the century. This article examines the globalization of white‐collar service work, with a view to its impact on emerging economies like India. The bulk of evidence suggests that while offshore outsourcing benefits the middle class in receiving countries, it does not appreciably expand it. Nor does it reliably produce upward mobility or recognizable career paths or even significant upskilling – most of the work being outsourced is rote and standardized. It produces decent jobs in holding patterns. And there are more and more of them as corporations look to continue cutting costs. Rather than authors of their own destinies, corporations have made of countries in the global south their willing and faithful scribes. I first provide a bird's eye view of what is happening and then look more closely at discoveries on the ground.     

Mexican Workers and U.S. Agriculture: The Revolving Door

Western U.S. agriculture is an industry that has shaped and been shaped by a peculiar labor policy: seasonal workers were outsiders who looked to agriculture for jobs, not careers. They did not plan to remain farm workers, and the industry and community in which they worked and lived did not see them as long‐term settlers. The immigration and integration policy, in effect, was to recruit new workers willing to accommodate themselves to seasonal employment, and to avoid their integration in agricultural areas. Thus, for most immigrant workers, economic mobility required geographic mobility. However, the major policy issue is not how to enhance the upward mobility of immigrant farm workers and their children; it is how U.S. agriculture should gain access to immigrant farm workers.     

Overcoming the odds: constricted ethnicity in middle-class Romà

How are different ethnic groups dealing with upward social mobility and assimilation? This is a large question that social research has tried to address in recent decades. In the United States, this issue has been framed by the theory of segmented assimilation. In Europe, regarding the Romà, the assumption still exists that upward mobility paths are intrinsically associated with a loss of ethnic identity, due to a process of full acculturation to the mainstream. In this article, through an analysis of 48 in-depth interviews with middle-class Romà in Spain, we identify other mobility paths, such as selective acculturation, that exist in addition to full acculturation. In this sense, we observe how symbolic differences exist between those middle-class Romà who live in an ethnic enclave and have a strong network of support and those who do not. In most cases, middle-class Romà tend to live outside the enclave and experience what we have called constricted ethnicity.     

Mehr Kinderlose oder weniger Kinderreiche?Increasing childlessness or fewer families with many children?

The decline of fertility in the course of the Second Demographic Transition is mainly caused by both an increase in childlessness and a decline of large families (three or more births). Which of these effects are stronger in Germany has been contested for a long time. An exact quantification of the particular effects is still missing. In this paper we develop a decomposition method which allows calculating the effects of the particular parity changes between cohort total fertility rates (CTFR) of different cohorts. This method is applied in order to compare German CTFRs for the cohorts the fertility decline occurred in, namely the cohorts between 1933 and 1968. The analyses are differentiated by regions and periods. The CTFR decline can be separated into four components: increasing childlessness, decreasing shares of higher order births (3+), a combined effect and a changing relation of first and second births. In Germany, the effect of the increasing childlessness accounts for 25.9 per cent of the CTFR decline, the decreasing higher order births for 68.0 per cent and the combined effect for 6.1 per cent. The relation of first and second births changed only marginally. Remarkably, these figures are based on two entirely different periods: The CTFR decline between the cohorts of 1933 and 1947 is solely based on the decline of women with three or more children. However, two thirds of the CTFR decline since 1947 is caused by an increasing childlessness. The results are relevant for fertility theories because increasing childlessness and decreasing higher order births have different reasons.     

Die Bildungsexpansion in der Schweiz und ihre Folgen

In this contribution the correlation of educational expansion and social inequality of educational opportunities (IEO) for social classes and gender has been investigated for Switzerland in the twentieth century. The empirical analysis is focused on the thesis of persistent inequalities claimed by Shavit and Blossfeld. For testing this thesis, data of the Swiss census in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 has been utilized. First of all, it is found for Switzerland that the moderate educational expansion has been carried out by the succession of birth cohorts. Secondly, this process has led to decreasing IEO. However, after 1990, for the individuals younger than 22 years we have witnessed an increase of social inequalities in becoming eligible for university training. Overall, in favour of disadvantaged social classes, there is a decrease in IEO since the start of educational expansion in the 1950s. Therefore, the thesis of persistent inequalities has been not confirmed for Switzerland.     

Intergenerational class mobility in contemporary Britain: political concerns and empirical findings

In Britain in recent years social mobility has become a topic of central political concern, primarily as a result of the effort made by New Labour to make equality of opportunity rather than equality of condition a focus of policy. Questions of the level, pattern and trend of mobility thus bear directly on the relevance of New Labour's policy analysis, and in turn are likely be crucial to the evaluation of its performance in government. However, politically motivated discussion of social mobility often reveals an inadequate grasp of both empirical and analytical issues. We provide new evidence relevant to the assessment of social mobility - in particular, intergenerational class mobility - in contemporary Britain through cross-cohort analyses based on the NCDS and BCS datasets which we can relate to earlier cross-sectional analyses based on the GHS. We find that, contrary to what seems now widely supposed, there is no evidence that absolute mobility rates are falling; but, for men, the balance of upward and downward movement is becoming less favourable. This is overwhelmingly the result of class structural change. Relative mobility rates, for both men and women, remain essentially constant, although there are possible indications of a declining propensity for long-range mobility. We conclude that under present day structural conditions there can be no return to the generally rising rates of upward mobility that characterized the middle decades of the twentieth century - unless this is achieved through changing relative rates in the direction of greater equality or, that is, of greater fluidity. But this would then produce rising rates of downward mobility to exactly the same extent - an outcome apparently unappreciated by, and unlikely to be congenial to, politicians preoccupied with winning the electoral 'middle ground'.     

The problem posed by immigrants married abroad on intermarriage research: the case of Asian Americans

"Cross-sectional and longitudinal variations in rates of intergroup marriage [in the United States] have often been used as indicators of assimilation for minority groups. This article demonstrates that both types of comparisons can give misleading results when census data are used for calculating intermarriage rates without restrictions. Census data include immigrants who married abroad (IMAs) in the enumeration. The inclusion of these individuals in the study of intermarriage inevitably biases the level of minority inmarriage upward, making cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons of intermarriage rates for groups with different levels of IMAs inappropriate. Cumulation of IMAs also inflates the inmarriage rates of older cohorts, leading to a misimpression of increasing outmarriage among younger cohorts. These problems are illustrated for several Asian groups using 1980 Public Use Microdata Sample data for California. Alternative approaches for remedying the problem are proposed and their different implications for assimilation theory and research are discussed."     

Wie Nachhaltig Sind Die Bildungsaufstiege Wirklich?

In their article on the sustainability of educational upward mobility, Fuchs and Sixt (2007) investigate both the structure and the mechanisms of social inheritance of educational success across three generations. In theoretical respect the authors assume that children of educational climbers might have less educational chances than children of parents and grandparents with a long academic tradition. Utilizing data of the German Socio-Economic Panel as well as applying binary logistic regression they confirm their hypothesis calling the sustainability of educational expansion in question. In the present reanalysis data of the German Life History Study on educational histories of several generations are analysed by multinomial logistic regression. It can be demonstrated that the results by Fuchs and Sixt seems to be a statistical artefact because of multicollinearity. Additionally there are significant indications that educationally upward mobile parents are able to transfer their educational success to their children provided that these parents are also able to realize upward mobility in the status hierarchy or in the class structure. These both mechanisms of social mobility are essential for both the self-dynamic and the sustainability of the educational expansion in West Germany.     

Working‐class participation,middle‐class aspiration? Value,upward mobility and symbolic indebtedness in higher education

This paper interrogates the relationship between working‐class participation in higher education (HE) in England and social and cultural mobility. It argues that embarking on a university education for working‐class people has been construed in governmental discourses as an instrumental means of achieving upward mobility, or of aspiring to ‘become middle class’. Education in this sense is thus not only understood as having the potential to confer value on individuals, as they pursue different ‘forms of capital’, or symbolic ‘mastery’ (Bourdieu, 1986), but as incurring a form of debt to society. In this sense, the university can be understood as a type of ‘creditor’ to whom the working‐class participants are symbolically indebted, while the middle classes pass through unencumbered. Through the analysis of empirical research conducted with staff from working‐class backgrounds employed on a university Widening Participation project in England, the article examines resistance to dominant educational discourses, which understand working‐class culture as ‘deficient’ and working‐class participation in HE as an instrumental means of securing upward mobility. Challenging the problematic notion of ‘escape’ implicit in mobility discourses, this paper concludes by positing the alternative concept of ‘fugitivity’, to contest the accepted relationship in HE between creditor and debtor.