Testing Descriptive Utility Theories: Violations of Stochastic Dominance and Cumulative Independence

Choices between gambles show systematic violations of stochastic dominance. For example, most people choose ($6, .05; $91, .03; $99, .92) over ($6, .02; $8, .03; $99, .95), violating dominance. Choices also violate two cumulative independence conditions: (1) If S = (z, r; x, p; y, q) R = (z, r; x, p; y, q) then S = (x, r; y, p + q) R = (x, r + p; y, q). (2) If S = (x, p; y, q; z, r) R = (x, p; y, q; z, r) then S = (x, p + q; y, r) R = (x, p; y, q + r), where 0 < z < x < x < y < y < y < z.Violations contradict any utility theory satisfying transivity, outcome monotonicity, coalescing, and comonotonic independence. Because rank-and sign-dependent utility theories, including cumulative prospect theory (CPT), satisfy these properties, they cannot explain these results.However, the configural weight model of Birnbaum and McIntosh (1996) predicted the observed violations of stochastic dominance, cumulative independence, and branch independence. This model assumes the utility of a gamble is a weighted average of outcomes\' utilities, where each configural weight is a function of the rank order of the outcome\'s value among distinct values and that outcome\'s probability. The configural weight, TAX model with the same number of parameters as CPT fit the data of most individuals better than the model of CPT.     

Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability

Although it has been claimed that people care more about identifiable than statistical victims, demonstrating this identifiable victim effect has proven difficult because identification usually provides information about a victim, and people may respond to the information rather than to identification per se. We show that a very weak form of identifiability—determining the victim without providing any personalizing information—increases caring. In the first, laboratory study, subjects were more willing to compensate others who lost money when the losers had already been determined than when they were about to be. In the second, field study, people contributed more to a charity when their contributions would benefit a family that had already been selected from a list than when told that the family would be selected from the same list.     

Substitution of indifferent options at choice nodes and admissibility: a reply to Rabinowicz

Tiebreak rules are necessary for revealing indifference in non- sequential decisions. I focus on a preference relation that satisfies Ordering and fails Independence in the following way. Lotteries a and b are indifferent but the compound lottery 0.5f, 0.5b is strictly preferred to the compound lottery 0.5f, 0.5a. Using tiebreak rules the following is shown here: In sequential decisions when backward induction is applied, a preference like the one just described must alter the preference relation between a and b at certain choice nodes, i.e., indifference between a and b is not stable. Using this result, I answer a question posed by Rabinowicz (1997) concerning admissibility in sequential decisions when indifferent options are substituted at choice nodes.     

Utility theory and the Bayesian paradigm

In this paper, a problem for utility theory - that it would have an agent who was compelled to play Russian Roulette with one revolver or another, to pay as much to have a six-shooter with four bullets relieved of one bullet before playing with it, as he would be willing to pay to have a six-shooter with two bullets emptied - is reviewed. A less demanding Bayesian theory is described, that would have an agent maximize expected values of possible total consequence of his actions. And utility theory is located within that theory as valid for agents who satisfy certain formal conditions, that is, for agents who are, in terms of that more general theory, indifferent to certain dimensions of risk. Raiffa- and Savage-style arguments for its more general validity are then resisted. Addenda are concerned with implications for game theory, and relations between utilities and values.     

Risk,uncertainty and hidden information

People are less willing to accept bets about an event when they do not know the true probability of that event. Such uncertainty aversion has been used to explain certain economic phenomena. This paper considers how far standard private information explanations (with strategic decisions to accept bets) can go in explaining phenomena attributed to uncertainty aversion. This paper shows that if two individuals have different prior beliefs about some event, and two sided private information, then each individuals willingness to bet will exhibit a bid ask spread property. Each individual is prepared to bet for the event, at sufficiently favorable odds, and against, at sufficiently favorable odds, but there is an intermediate range of odds where each individual is not prepared to bet either way. This is only true if signals are distributed continuously and sufficiently smoothly. It is not true, for example, in a finite signal model.     

On the foundations of mean-variance analyses

Let (, ) and (, ) be mean-standard deviation pairs of two probability distributions on the real line. Mean-variance analyses presume that the preferred distribution depends solely on these pairs, with primary preference given to larger mean and smaller variance. This presumption, in conjunction with the assumption that one distribution is better than a second distribution if the mass of the first is completely to the right of the mass of the second, implies that (, ) is preferred to (, ) if and only if either > or ( = and < ), provided that the set of distributions is sufficiently rich. The latter provision fails if the outcomes of all distributions lie in a finite interval, but then it is still possible to arrive at more liberal dominance conclusions between (, ) and (, ).This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research.     

A note on Abraham Lincoln in probabilityland

Abraham Lincoln's dictum that you may fool all of the people some of the time; and some of the people all of the time; but you can't fool all of the people all of the time, is interpreted in terms of a simple binomial model, and potential ambiguities in Lincoln's assertion are clarified.     

Majority voting on orders

We characterize two lexicographic-type preference extension rules from a set X to the set of all orders on this set. Elements of X are interpreted as basic economic policy decisions, whereas elements of are conceived as political programs among which a collectivity has to choose through majority voting. The main axiom is called tournament-consistency, and states that whenever majority pairwise comparisons based on initial preferences on X define an order on X, then this order is also chosen by a majority among all other orders in . Tournament-consistency thus allows to predict the outcome of majority voting upon orders from the knowledge of majority preferences on their components.     

Comparative Risk Sensitivity with Reference-Dependent Preferences

Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses (i.e., they have S-shaped utility functions in an expected utility setting) and that they are loss averse. Furthermore, the evidence leads to a single definition of S-shaped utility, but it has led to several alternative specifications of loss aversion. This paper characterizes the relations more S-shaped than and more loss averse than for a utility function, and in so doing arrives at a new definition of loss aversion based on average instead of marginal utility.     

Uncertainty,information and resolution of medical malpractice disputes

This study assesses the role of defendant liability in determining whether the plaintiff receives payment, relationship of compensation to economic loss, and stage of dispute resolution. An options pricing model explains how information acquired affects both decisions to drop or continue and settlement values, as well as the role of pecuniary motives for claiming. Cases in which a panel of physician evaluators thought defendant(s) to be innocent were much more likely to be dropped, as were cases in which innocence became more apparent as the case developed. Compensation was much less than economic loss on average. Questionable defendant liability meant reduced compensation.The research was supported in part by a grant from The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation entitled, Resolution of Malpractice Claims: Birth- and Emergency Room-Related Injuries (Grant No. 14045). We thank Mingliang Zhang, Lars Runquist, and Stephen van Wert for research assistance.     

Equivalent decision trees and their associated strategy sets

The purpose of this paper is to examine the structure of individual decisions under uncertainty in extensive (i.e., decision-tree) form at a sufficient level of generality to encompass many traditional as well as novel criteria of general choice under uncertainty. Considerations both of structure and of strategic effect arise. In § 2 we define weak and strong forms of strategic equivalence of decision trees and describe partial-normalization procedures by which all economically defined complete pure strategies may be identified for the decider and for chance. In § 3 we examine characteristics of locally randomized, behavior strategies for the decider as the degree of normalization is varied, and we deduce useful properties of the function which specifies an outcome lottery for each behavior strategy of the decider in conjuction with a deterministic or stochastic selection by Chance. In § 4 we list a wide variety of choice criteria which may be invoked within the framework developed here.     

Experimental evidence on the irreversebility effect

This paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on how increased expected information affects subjects' choices. We show that Claude Henry's (1974) result (the Irreversibility Effect) is strongly supported by our experimental data. According to the Irreversibility Effect a rational (expected utility maximizing) agent who anticipates more information before making his future choices, will take a less irreversible position today. In our experiment, present and future choices are framed respectively as portfolio and investment decisions. The degree of irreversibility (or flexibility) chosen by experimental subjects in response to additional information indicated that subjects react to anticipated information as predicted by theory.     

Objective knowledge out of ignorance: Popper on body,mind, and the third world

In the fifties, Popper defended an interactionistic version of body-mind dualism. It distinguished between the world of physical bodies and states and the world of mental states. Later he added a third world of objective thought contents. He claims the assumption that there is the third world is a necessary presupposition of problem-solving in general and of his philosophy of science in particular. The present article contains separate reasonings to the effect that this presupposition is neither necessary nor even possible. It is further argued that postulating the existence of entities makes sense only relative to a criterion of ontological commitment, which Popper does not mention and obviously does not have, and that in addition it presupposes a theory, which is tentatively accepted as true and which according to the criterion implies the existence of the entities. But as yet there is no testable theory involving terms like mind, intention etc., which made the notion that itself or its terms are essentially different from what is already known in the empirical sciences at least plausible. Therefore the body-mind controversy is still pointless. Popper's stand on it seems to be but a reflex of his anti-behavioristic and anti-psychologistic attitude.     

Metatickles and the dynamics of deliberation

The traditional or orthodox decision rule of maximizing conditional expected utility has recently come under attack by critics who advance alternative causal decision theories. The traditional theory has, however, been defended. And these defenses have in turn been criticized. Here, I examine two objections to such defenses and advance a theory about the dynamics of deliberation (a diachronic theory about the process of deliberation) within the framework of which both objections to the defenses of the traditional theory fail.     

A μ-σ-Risk Aversion Paradox and Wealth Dependent Utility

We report a surprising property of --preferences: the assumption of nonincreasing relative risk aversion implies the optimal portfolio being riskless. We discuss a solution of that paradox using wealth dependent utility functions in detail. Using the revealed preference theory we show that (general, i.e. not necessary -) wealth dependent utility functions can be characterized by Wald's axiom.     

Mean variance preferences and the heat equation

Chipman (1979) proves that for an expected utility maximizer choosing from a domain of normal distributions with mean and variance ² the induced preference functionV(, ) satisfies a differential equation known as the heat equation. The purpose of this note is to provide a generalization and simple proof of this result which does not depend on the normality assumption.     

An axiomatic basis of accounting: A structuralist reconstruction

Set-theoretic axiomatizations are given for a model of accounting with double classification, and a general core-model for accounting. The empirical status, and representational role of systems of accounts, as well as the problem of how to assign correct values to the goods accounted, are analyzed in precise terms. A net of special laws based on the core-model is described.     

Minimax,information and ultrapessimism

Discussing the foundations of the minimax principle, Savage (1954) argued that it is utterly untenable for statistics because it is ultrapessimistic when applied to negative income, but claimed that such objection is not relevant when the principle is applied to regret. In this paper I rebut the latter claim. I first present an example where ultrapessimism, as Savage understood it, applies to minimax regret but not to minimax negative income. Then, for a sequential decision problems with two terminal acts and a finite number of states of nature, I give necessary and sufficient conditions for a decision rule to be ultrapessimistic, and show that for every payoff table with at least three states, be it in regret form or not, there exist an experiment such that the minimax rule is ultrapessimistic. I conclude with some more general remarks on information and the value of experimentation for a minimax agent.     

Friedman's ‘instrumentalism’ and constructive empiricism in economics

This reassessment of the long debate about Friedman's thesis on the pointlessness of testing assumptions in economics shows that Friedman's three famous examples, on which a large part of the credit given to this thesis is based, far from substantiating it, can be used to establish radically opposite conclusions. Furthermore, it is shown that this so-called instrumentalist thesis, when applied by Friedman to economics, is of a quite different nature and raises much more serious problems than the standard instrumentalist thesis devised by some methodologists of physics. To disentangle these ambiguities concerning realism and instrumentalism applied to physics or to economics, this paper refers to Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, which is helpful in reformulating, in a more satisfactory way, the essentials of Friedman's considerations about empiricism and anti-realism.     

Avoiding the voter's paradox democratically

This paper is concerned with selecting an appropriate perspective from which to understand and evaluate social-decision procedures. Distinguishing between agentrationality and option-rationality, the author argues that a rational agent may choose a social-decision procedure that is not itself agent-rational (but merely option-rational). The argument puts the voter's paradox in a context allowing evaluation of (a) its general import and (b) practical proposals for avoiding it in particular cases. Arrow's four conditions for a social-decision procedure are shown to have little relevance to the understanding or evaluation of constitutions. The author concludes that the more fruitful perspective for discussing social-decision procedures is that of option-rationality rather than (as Arrow, Wolff, and others have supposed) that of agent-rationality.