Child-Care Choices by Working Mothers: The Case of Italy

In spite of relatively generous public subsidies and a reputation for high quality, only a very limited proportion of Italian families use public child-care and a large proportion use informal care. In this paper, we attempt to explore the determinants of the use of child-care among dual workers families. Given the limitations of data available we match two different data sets: the Bank of Italy (SHIW) and ISTAT Multiscopo. We find evidence that the availability of public child-care affects in an important way its demand. We also find that increases in costs of public child-care reduce the use of public as well as private indicating a shift to informal child-care. The presence of a grandmother who lives near and is in good health is an important explanation of the choice especially in presence of very small children. An understanding of the importance of these factors is relevant in the evaluation of child-care policies. This is particularly important in Italy, where the majority of families with children have only one child and children would benefit also from the socialization aspects of the child-care system. We would like to thank Christopher Flinn, Massimiliano Bratti, and Maria Concetta Chiuri for helpful comments, Donald Rubin for useful hints on the matching procedure, and participants at the ESPE meeting in New York 2003, the EALE meeting in Lisbon 2004. This research was partially supported by the EC Grant and the Compagnia di San Paolo.     

The cost of a child,mother's employment behavior and economic insecurity in Europe

The past two decades in Western European societies have been marked by a decline in fertility rates together with an increase in women's work-force participation. This has given rise to a massive transformation in traditional patterns of relationships, especially in gender roles and family size. This paper will examine the outcome of the birth of a child and link this outcome to specific family policies in Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The outcome of the birth of a child will be measured in the data by comparing the pre-child-birth income and its sources to the post-child-birth income and its sources. How does the financial impact of having a child differ in different countries? What is the impact of the compensation provided by the state in terms of transfer benefits for families? What is the impact on women's labor force activity? What are the changes in the wage income of the family members? This research uses the Consortium of Household panels for European socio-economic Research (CHER) longitudinal panel from 1990 to 2001 in the 10 European countries. Data provide for a detailed cross-national comparison before and after the birth of a child for market work, wage income, and public transfer income, including family benefits. The results indicate that there are important differences among the European countries studied.     

Why Do Women Want Children? The Case of Hong Kong,China: A Lowest-Low Fertility Context

ABSTRACT

Governments in low fertility countries tend to tackle low birth rates by addressing macro-level factors rather than the meaning that having a child holds for men and women. Yet whether or not an individual decides to have a child depends in part on what they think having a child will mean for their lives. This study examines the meanings that constitute reasons for wanting a child among a sample of middle-class, married, Hong Kong Chinese women who wanted children. These women were living in Hong Kong when it had one of the lowest total fertility rates in the world and the lowest in its history. Using semi-structured, in-depth interviews, it finds that for these women, to have a child makes one’s family complete; is the next stage of life; provides happiness, fun, and enjoyment; brings care and company in old age; and children are “lovely” and “cute.” Governments concerned about low birth rates can use research on what having a child means for women to improve policy so as to make having a child more attractive, and to create messages that hold greater appeal to women.     

Reply to Sloan [on proxies for birth control

Sloan (1984) argues that annual changes in marital fertility of Swedish wives aged 35-39 between 1911 and 1974 is not a result of annual changes in the use of birth control, but is due to changes in health conditions that increase or decrease marital fertility. As evidence of the lack of effect of contraceptive practice on fertility Sloan cites a study published in 1916 whose author concluded that contraceptive use or nonuse had no effect on family size. Sloan is unaware of the shroud of ignorance that blinded such research in the distant past. There was no accepted methodology to determine contraceptive effectiveness until the 1930s, and scientists did not know key elemental facts about human reproduction. For example, the relationship of ovulation to the risk of pregnancy was unknown in 1916, and was to remain a mystery for more than a decade thereafter. Sloan's "declining health" explanation of low fertility in the West is merely a variant of an older attempt to explain low fertility as a result of high protein intake. Sloan's view that modern couples do not contracept to reach a desired family size and that changes in family size preference will not affect birth control practice among older (or younger it appears as well) couples seems to us to be an idiosyncratic view at best and directly opposed by all survey research. Couples do contracept most effectively when they are trying to prevent an additional birth. The view that failure of some Western couples to reproductively compensate for their child deaths as explained by poor reproductive health seems to assume that couples in non-Western population do so compensate, but this is wrong. The idea that such bereaved couples should have another child is so insensitive to tragedy as to defy further reply. Sloan's acceptance and use of reports that some couples say they wanted more children than they had ignores massive research findings of unwanted fertility among couples in populations with long histories of birth control practice. Further, it is difficult to have much faith in such responses since about 1/2 the couples in the Whelpton el al. study cited by Sloan also said they were fecund. These responses mean that couples may say that they want more than they actually had, but they deliberately did not have such a large and "ideal" family size because of other factors not considered by Sloan. Since it appears that Sloan was unable to find another authority, he cites a 3 page comment of his own in support of the hypothesis of deteriorating environment. He does not actually empirically link age patterns of chronic disease with fecundity loss; his view also ignores research indicating improved health conditions, at least among US women, after the mid-1930s that increased fecundity and then fertility. Thus, his argument that factors other than voluntary birth control could explain annual change in Swedish marital fertility among older couples is unsupported by empirical evidence. His remarks are also irrelevant to the use made in the author's article concerning marital fertility rates as a proxy for the use of annual birth control change among younger unmarried women. The marital rate varies, as does the illegitimacy rate. Annual increases in marital fertility are related to annual increases in illegitimacy; annual declines in marital rates to annual declines in illegitimacy. Sloan's hypothetical trends in fecundity have no bearing on our empirical study of annual change in Swedish illegitimacy rates. Finally, Sloan's claim that social demographers do not view a changing environment as problematic is unsupported and unjustified.     

‘He wants,I don't’: females' contrasting attitude about fertility intentions for a second child

Thanks to the use of household-level micro-data from the ‘Family and Social Subjects’ survey carried out by the Italian National Statistical Office in 2003, this paper aims at understanding the determinants of a woman's contrasting attitude towards her partner's positive intention for another child considering the bargaining process literature.

The econometric analysis is based on sample selection models that allow the study of this issue considering the probability of recording a couple's disagreement on higher-order fertility. The analysis finds that when within the couple the female partner is more educated, she disagrees less with her partner's positive intention for a second child. If we deal with the job-related features, the probability that the female contrasts her partner's positive fertility intention is higher when she is unemployed, when she is employed but she experiences a lack of provision of child-care, and if she perceives that another child might jeopardize her career.

The findings are coherent with the assumption that a higher consistency between the individual's and the couple's fertility intentions may be achieved; the presence of a rigid labour-market and the lack of public child-care provision and of public policies should contribute to explaining the problems in reconciling family and working life.     

Modernization and the demographic transition: cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of a revised model

Problems associated with past research on the fertility-development issue are identified in this article, and a model of the macro-level determinants of fertility -- a model informed by the revised theory of fertility transition -- is specified. This model is estimated both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. In addition, a model is specified that assesses the importance of a family planning program effort on fertility change in less developed countries. The effects on fertility change of other variables is controlled. Using crude birth rates for 117 countries, the model is operationalized and the revised model is applied to 1974 rates. A longitudinal model of 1955-1959 to 1974 change in rates is then tested. The final model for 81 less developed countries from the original set of 117 countries includes a measure of family planning effort. Results support the view that high levels of modernization increase motivation to control fertility, but they also show that excessive reliance on developmental change in less developed countries to bring about fetility declines would prolong unnecessarily the current period of rapid population growth. The dominant role of modernization in the models that lack data on family planning programs only facilitates understanding of the past. Modernization is not the only road to future lower fertility. Modernization, abortion, and family planning programs are explicit policy relevant variables. It was found that legalized abortion has a large and independent impact on lowering birth rates and that family planning programs also reduce unwanted births in less developed countries. These programs were the most important factor related to change in 1955-1959 to 1974 crude birth rate.     

PERSPECTIVE ARTICLE: The impact of Nordic countries’ family friendly policies on employment,wages, and children

The Nordic countries at the same time exhibit a remarkably high participation rate of mothers and a more moderate decline in fertility rates compared to other Western countries. This has been attributed to the fact that the welfare state model and, especially, the family friendly policies chosen in the Nordic countries are unique. In this paper we evaluate the impact of Nordic countries’ family friendly policies on employment, wages and children’s well-being. We demonstrate that, although the ‘Nordic model’ has been successful in boosting female employment, it is a costly solution. Furthermore, family-friendly policies mainly directed towards giving mothers the right to be on long paid maternal leave have adverse effects on women’s wages with consequences for gender equality. Indeed, extensive family-friendly schemes may even have created a ‘system-based glass ceiling’ hindering women’s career progression. There is no evidence however of a trade-off between family-friendly policies and family welfare as effects on child development and children’s well-being of publicly provided child-care are found to be modest or even positive.

Modernity and Fertility Preference in Taiwan*

Data from interviews with 973 Taiwan women between the ages of 15 and 44 having at least one child and living with husbands are used to study the effects of modernity and social status on fertility preferences. The modernity attitude contributes significantly to the explanation of fertility preferences independent of social status variables. Social status variables also contribute directly to the explanation of fertility preferences. But there is little evidence to support theories that modernity acts as an intervening variable between social status and fertility preference.     

Child poverty and family policies across eighteen wealthy Western democracies

While a good deal has been written about the potential value of family policies in reducing child poverty in Western countries, few cross-national quantitative studies have been carried out on this topic. This article uses ordinary least squares regression analysis on panel data from 18 Western democracies from 1987 to 2007 to test the significance of family policies and other welfare policies on child poverty rates. It extends existing research on the relationship between family policies and child poverty by utilizing a broader data-set in terms of time, countries, and child poverty measures. The main finding is that all three of the main family policies studied – child cash and tax benefits, paid parenting leaves, and public support for childcare – correlate significantly with lower child poverty rates. Somewhat surprisingly, disability and sickness insurance also correlates significantly with lower child poverty in nearly every model and test. These findings provide valuable insight for future research and policy-making in the area of child poverty.     

Future perspectives on work and family dynamics in Southern Europe: the importance of culture and regional contexts

The Southern countries model (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece) take a specific family-oriented approach to work–family reconciliation. They are family-oriented in that they entrust the family with more responsibilities that in other countries. Work–family reconciliation is considered as a political action that gives quite limited and unstable support to encourage women’s labour-market participation; this results in the poor development of external services and in few benefits for women, who have to undertake multiple roles inside and outside the family. In these countries, negotiation is left to the private spheres of the couple or local communities, so that each family can decide on the best way to use the existing policies and consider the possibilities available to them. In this sense it is not possible only to apply ‘outside models’ (such as the Nordic, French, German, etc.) to find an effective approach for these countries. The special issue, starting from the current situation explores possibilities for future scenarios in Southern Europe countries concerning work–family dynamics. It includes general comparative papers or case study on work-care arrangements, family and care policies, early childhood education and care (ECEC) with regard to family well-being, gender equality, fertility or father involvement in Southern European countries.     

Proxies for birth control. Comment on Kelly and Cutright,Sociological Focus,April 1983

Kelly and Cutright (1983), using regression techniques, conclude that birth control is among the more important determinants of Swedish illegitimacy. To derive this conclusion, they use changes in the marital fertility of wives aged 35-39 as a proxy for birth control. They maintain that annual change in the marital fertility rate of wives aged 35-39 is not likely to be greatly influenced by annual change in factors other than birth control. The "argument" appears to derive from the "desired family size" model of childbearing--a basic assumption of social demography. In it simplest form it states that most couples do not practice birth control until they reach a preconceived goal, or desired family size. It thus implies that a change in family size preferences will most affect the birth control practices of the oldest reproductive age groups. The simple form of the model has been questioned by the failure of Western couples to reproductively compensate for a major proportion of their child deaths, by the proportions of Western couples who say they would have preferred larger families than they actually had, by the predictive inadequacy of family size preferences, and by suggestions that age may be the more important determinant of reproduction. As a result some demographers now concede its inadequacy. Others are trying to relax its assumptions, with as yet problematic success. Essentially every Western fertility decline to date has been characterized by an increasing concentration of childbearing in the youngest age groups. In discussing this pattern social demographers have maintained that it could only have come about by a decline in family size preferences. This then is the standard argument supporting Kelly and Cutright's proxy for birth control. The authorities who offer it generally ignore the difficulties with the desired family size model and simply assert without justification that couples do in fact conform to it. Data on the age patterns of chronic disease and on the reproductive effects of environmental stressors suggest that the modern age pattern of fertility could also be produced by a deteriorating environment. Kelly and Cutright are incorrect in asserting that factors other than voluntary birth control could not be responsible for changes in fertility at ages 35-39. At best they may argue that their proxy is uniquely definitive provided that the desired family size model can be saved and provided the health of Western populations has not been compromised by technological change. At issue is a debate between what Dunlap calls the human exemptionalist and the ecological world views.     

Modernization and the Demographic Transition: Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analyses of a Revised Model

Abstract

We specify a revised model of the demographic transition which accounts for national fertility levels and changes over the past two decades. The model includes cultural, geographic, demographic and family planning program variables, in addition to a measure of national socio-economic modernization. Using crude birth rates for 117 countries, we operationalize and then apply the revised model to 1974 rates, and then test a longitudinal model of 1955–59 to 1974 change in rates. A final model for 81 less developed nations from the original set of 117 countries includes a measure of family planning program effort. Including this highly significant measure in a model of 1955–59 to 1974 change results in further evidence favoring modification of the traditional demographic transition model. Implications for the future course of fertility in underdeveloped countries are discussed.     

Family Welfare Effort,Total Fertility,and In Vitro Fertilization: Explaining the Israeli Anomaly

The theory of family welfare effort is a leading macro‐sociological explanation of variation in human fertility. It holds that states which provide universally available, inexpensive, high‐quality day care, generous parental leave, and flexible work schedules lower the opportunity cost of motherhood. They thus enable women, especially those in lower socioeconomic strata, to have the number of babies they want. A considerable body of research supports this theory. However, it is based almost exclusively on analyses of Western European and North American countries. This paper examines the Israeli case because Israel's total fertility rate is anomalously high given its family welfare effort. Based on a review of the relevant literature and a reanalysis of data from various published sources, it explains the country's unusually high total fertility rate as the product of (1) religious and nationalistic sentiment that is heightened by the Jewish population's perception of a demographic threat in the form of a burgeoning Palestinian population and (2) the state's resulting support for pro‐natal policies, including the world's most extensive in vitro fertilization (IVF) system. The paper also suggests that Israel's IVF policy may not be in harmony with the interests of many women insofar as even women with an extremely low likelihood of becoming pregnant are encouraged to undergo the often lengthy, emotionally and physically painful, and risky process of IVF.     

Grasping the Diversity of Cohabitation: Fertility Intentions Among Cohabiters Across Europe

The authors examined the association between different meanings of cohabitation and fertility intentions. Using data from the Generations and Gender Surveys on 5,565 cohabiters from 9 European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, and Russia), they proposed a cohabitation typology based on attitudes toward marriage, intentions to marry, and perceived economic deprivation. Despite substantial variation in the prevalence and types of cohabiting relationships across Europe, cohabitation has become a living arrangement within which childbearing intentions are commonly formed and at times carried out. The authors found that the meaning that cohabiters attached to their union influenced significantly their short‐term fertility intentions, net of other covariates. Cohabiters who viewed their unions as a prelude to marriage were the most likely to plan to have a child in the near future, both in Western and Eastern European societies. The association between fertility intentions and marriage intentions was particularly strong among cohabiters who do not as yet have children in common, but it was also present in a more muted form among cohabitating parents. The findings suggest that, although marriage and childbearing are becoming less closely linked life events, they are not disconnected decisions for a large majority of cohabiters across Europe.     

Decoupling migration effects from income effects on reproduction in Central American migrant-sending households

Contemporary data for three Central American countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) surveyed by the Latin American Migration Project were analyzed to determine if migration length and remittance transfers had an influence on fertility. The analysis was structured to separate societal influences on fertility attributable to migration from the income effects associated with remittance transfers. At the couple level, the odds that a birth would occur were negatively associated with an increase in U.S. remittance receipts and an increase in a wife’s migration duration. However, no correlation was found between length of male migration and couple fertility.     

Geburten aus geplanten und ungeplanten Schwangerschaften – Die Relevanz von Bildung,Arbeitslosigkeit und PartnerschaftChildren from Planned and Unplanned Pregnancies: The Importance of Education,Unemployment and Partnership

Micro theories on fertility such as the economic theory of family frame fertility behaviour in industrialized countries as a decision. Predictions of these theories have been tested in numerous empirical studies. This research widely ignores that childbirth may also result from unintended pregnancies. We discuss how education, educational and labour market participation as well as partnership status influence unplanned and planned pregnancy in Germany. To test our hypotheses, we use data from the Socio-Economic Panel Study, collected between 2001 and 2013. The focus is on the planning status of pregnancies leading to a first or third birth. Data on women are analysed with event history models for competing risks. Contrary to arguments of high opportunity costs, graduates show an above-average probability of planned pregnancies. Unemployed women, who should have lower opportunity costs, do not have an increased probability of planned pregnancies; instead their first children are more often unplanned. Consensual unions, which are less serious but offer the same opportunities for sexual activity as marriages, have the highest rate of unplanned pregnancies. The overall findings make clear that future surveys and empirical research might benefit from taking intentions into account, which would enable more rigorous testing of fertility theories.     

The Baby Boom and Its Explanations*

This article examines explanations of the sharp rise in the birth rate that occurred in the United States during the late 1940s and the 1950s (the so-called "baby boom") in light of recent research on the nature and magnitude of its demographic components. The paper includes a review of the fertility surveys that derived from concern about postwar fertility trends, a discussion of the kind and relative importance of the demographic components constituting the fertility increase of the period, an assessment of explanations of the baby boom, and a interpretation of one of the components– the rise in average family size-that was a demographically small, but theoretically significant, part of the upturn in the birth rate.     

Taking stock: parents' reasons for and against having a third child

In developed countries with below-replacement fertility, the proportion of people who have at least three children make a substantial difference to the aggregate level of fertility. This study, based on 40 in-depth interviews with Australian parents of two children, analyses what factors influence the decision to have a third child. Using a grounded theory method of qualitative analysis, the study finds that parents who have decided to stop at two children are more able to articulate their reasons than are parents who are considering having a third child. The reasons for stopping include age and health; work and finances; and the capacity to parent another child. The weighing up of multiple factors is evidence of parents taking stock of personal and financial resources when making complex family formation decisions. The reasons for having a third child are expressed with far less elaboration and are more guarded and personal. We conclude that there is less shared or familiar language for articulating the value of family relationships. The contemporary context is one in which parents are attempting to manage risks related to having children, including the personal and financial implications of time out of the workforce. This study finds a persistent story of limited resources among parents of two children. Policies aimed at increasing fertility need to address this perception of limited resources through direct measures like affordable childcare and more generally through greater government and community support for families.     

TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF FEMINIST AND DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES ON FERTILITY

In explaining fertility and reproduction and emerging patterns of childbearing, both demographers and feminists have centered their thinking on women's status (economic and social), women's changing roles and life experiences (increased labor force participation, increased availability of reproductive options, declining marriage rates in many parts of the industrialized world, and the centrality of women to development), and women as agents in micro- and macrolevel changes in family, fertility, and economic change. Although demography has recently begun to integrate feminist perspectives into fertility explanations, there is not yet a synthesis of feminist theoretical insights with demographic questions. Drawing from recent thinking on global and national political and policy challenges in the less and more developed worlds, to the epistemological shifts in knowledge of reproduction/mothering, to changes in the technologies of reproduction, this article moves toward an integration of feminist and demographic perspectives on fertility.
…far from the economic dependence of women working in the interests of motherhood, it is the steadily acting cause of a pathological maternity and a declining birthrate.
Charlotte Perkins Stetson, Women and Economics , 1899     

Early childbearing and later economic well-being

In a study of 1268 women, aged 20-24 in 1968, who were surveyed in 1968 and reinterviewed in 1973 and 1975 as part of the National Longitudinal Surveys of the Labor Market Experience of Young Women, the economic situation of the women at age 27 was compared for those who had given birth to a child during their teen years with those who did not bear a child until after age 18. The effects on economic status of early childbearing were primarily negative and operated indirectly through intervening variables such as, decreased educational levels and higher fertility rates. For each year a birth was postponed, annual earnings at age 27 were increased by $197. Surprisingly, women who had a child at age 15 or 16 experienced fewer negative economic effects at age 27 than those who had a child at age 17 or 18; perhaps the younger girls continued to live with their parental family and remained in school while the slightly older girls left the parental family and dropped out of school. The negative economic effects at age 27 for black women who bore a child at an early age were less pronounced than for white women. Policy makers should be aware of these long-term negative economic effects of early childbirth and efforts should be made 1) to increase child care programs which enable young mothers to continue their schooling; 2) to provide family planning services to young mothers who are at greater risk of subsequently having large families; 3) to encourage young mothers to remain living with their parental family; and 4) to provide additional training and job counseling for young mothers. Tables depict 1) mean and standard deviations for 50 sociodemographic variables for women who were less than 19 at first birth and for women who were 19 or older at first birth; 2) estimated structural equations for the total sample, for whites only, for blacks only, for those 19 years or older at first birth, and for those less than 19 years of age at first birth; and 3) effect on economic well-being at age 27 of delaying birth by one year by age at first birth and by race.