Prevailing wage laws and market recovery strategies of construction unions

This paper draws attention to the way prevailing wage laws serve as a market retention and recovery mechanism for unions, and how government is their active partner in this enterprise. It was not intended to provide counters to these efforts, although the traditional nonunion response of seeking repeal of the laws has had measurable success at the state level during the past dozen years.     

Have unions impeded growing wage dispersion among young workers?

Wage inequality is examined for young males over the period 1980–1993. While wage inequality increased substantially for nonunion workers over this period, wage inequality increased only modestly for union workers. In part, this difference results from divergent trends in skill prices—returns to skill rose in the nonunion sector but contracted slightly in the union sector. In particular, returns to education increased sharply in the nonunion sector while remaining stagnant in the union sector. At least for young workers, these findings suggest that unions have been largely successful in resisting market pressures for greater wage inequality. We also uncover evidence suggesting that, as relative returns to education decline in the union sector, highly educated young workers become less likely to choose union employment. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Dek Terrell, Steve Trejo, and Carol Horton Tremblay.     

农村土地承包经营权流转市场运行机制研究

本文以上海、山东、湖北等地的土地承包经营权流转先行试点地区为例,分别从法律法规和试点实践经验等层面研究探讨构建土地承包经营权流转市场运行机制的客观必然性,提出构建土地承包经营权流转市场运行机制的总体框架和运行机制,以促进农村土地承包经营权有序流转,加快形成农业适度规模经营。     

The labor market effects of minimum wage laws: A new perspective

Economists almost uniformly argue that minimum wage laws benefit some workers at the expense of other workers. This argument is implicitly founded on the assumption that money wages are the only form of labor compensation. Based on the more realistic assumption that labor is paid in many different ways, the analysis of this paper demonstrates that all laborers within a perfectly competitive labor market are adversely affected by minimum wages. Although employment opportunities are reduced by such laws, affected labor markets clear. Conventional analysis of the effect of minimum wages on monopsony markets is also upset by the model developed. The author is indebted to Rex Cottle, Benjamin Hawkins, Hugh Macaulay, Michael Maloney, Thomas Schaap, Gordon Tullock, Gene Uselton, and Karen Vaughn for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Labor market adjustments in the unionized contract construction industry

The unionized construction labor market reaches equilibrium by means of three adjustment mechanisms: wage changes, changes in the quality of workers hired, and the migration of workers in and out of the market. The relative importance of the three mechanisms in local labor markets depends on laws and institutional rules. This paper examines some of the important institutional rules and presents a model of market clearning where wage adjustments are infrequent.     

The class‐origin wage gap: heterogeneity in education and variations across market segments

This paper uses unique population‐level matched employer–employee data on monthly wages to analyse class‐origin wage gaps in the Swedish labour market. Education is the primary mediator of class origin advantages in the labour market, but mobility research often only considers the vertical dimension of education. When one uses an unusually detailed measure of education in a horizontal dimension, the wage gap between individuals of advantaged and disadvantaged class origin is found to be substantial (4–5 per cent), yet considerably smaller than when measures are used which only control for level of education and field of study. This is also the case for models with class or occupation as outcome. The class‐origin wage gap varies considerably across labour market segments, such as those defined by educational levels, fields of education, industries and occupations in both seemingly unsystematic and conspicuous ways. The gap is small in the public sector, suggesting that bureaucracy may act as a leveller.     

Industry racial employment by skill level: The effects of market structure and racial wage gaps

Theories of expense preference suggest that market power gives employers the latitude to engage in employment discrimination. Additionally, labor market theory indicates that discrimination should cause a larger decline in black employment for prevalent and easily replaced low-skill workers relative to scarce, high-skill workers. Using industry-level data, we examine the relationship between worker skill level, market structure, and racial employment and we find that noncompetitive market structure reduces black employment for low-skill workers. In general, our findings indicate that market structure has less influence on the racial composition of highly trained workers relative to easily replaced low-skill workers     

Labor market flexibility: An index approach to cross-country comparisons

Recently, researchers have used measures of economic freedom (Gwartney and Lawson, 2002) to quantify the relationship between various institutional factors and measures of economic performance. Using a subset of these data, we develop a labor market flexibility index. This measure should be useful to researchers who study labor market performance among countries.     

Contracts and contracting

The concept of the contract has been invoked with increasing frequency in the literature on social work practice in recent years. Since the process of negotiation that is present in all relationships takes many different forms, the idea of contracts is complex, and can be confusing. This paper outlines the different meanings associated with the term, and suggests that a complete understanding of contracts requires a developmental perspective. Further, contracting needs to be seen as an ongoing transaction as well as a series of static agreements. We promise according to our hopes, and perform according to our fears.-Duc de la Rochefoucauld     

Recent minimum wage increases and the minimum wage labor force

Coclusion  Recently Whaples (1996) reported that most labor economists believe that minimum wage laws decrease employment. Despite this, policy makers have continued to periodically raise the minimum, with the most recent increases occurring in October 1996 and September 1997. The various analyses done by Card, Katz, and Krueger, that showed little to no employment effect of past minimum wage increases, have provided additional ammunition for those who would seek further increases. However, using the estimates of Williams and Mills (1998), we demonstrate that the latest minimum wage increases substantially decreased employment for both sexes. We believe that future increases will do likewise.     

Interfirm wage differentials in a local labor market: The case of the fast-food industry

We examine interfirm wage differentials among fast-food restaurants in Atlanta, Georgia to determine the degree to which these differentials correspond to the predictions of competitive theory. While no definitive test is possible, given our inability to control all sources of wage variation, the evidence nevertheless suggests that the wage structure is largely shaped by competitive forces, albeit in a relatively complex manner due to differences in a host of factors that the simple version of the theory holds constant. Evidence is also found, on the other hand, that the supply curve of labor to the individual firm slopes upward for experienced workers and that a small noncompensating wage differential may exist that is related to variation in each restaurant's ability to pay.     

Unions and wage inequality

Summary and Conclusions The impact of unions on the structure of wages has recently attracted renewed interest as analysts have struggled to explain the rise in earnings inequality in several industrialized countries. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States provide a potentially valuable set of countries for examining this question. All three countries now collect comparable data on wages and union status in their regular labor force surveys. Several features of the collective bargaining institutions of these countries make them suitable for studying the relationship between unions and wage inequality. Bargaining is highly decentralized; there are no general mechanisms for extending collective bargaining provisions beyond the “organized” sector; and the fraction of the work force covered by collective bargaining is relatively modest. Thus it is possible to compare the structure of wages for workers covered by union contracts to those who are not covered, and potentially infer the effect of unions on overall wage inequality.     

Segmentation and wage determination

Dans leurs écrits récents sur la segmentation socio-économique, les Américains ont utilise des données secondaires recueillies dans le secteur industriel, pour démontrer que les arguments qui veulent que les salaires soient fixés par la population active ou fonctionelle, étaient limités. A l'aide de données recueillies principalement dans des maisons de commerce canadiennes, cette étude explore les effets d'une notion alternative du fonctionnement de la segmentation, sur le processus d'établissement des salaires. En employant de nouvelles techniques de classification, on a identifié trois groupes économiques de base, et examiné les différents aspects de la fixation des salaires à l'intérieur de ces groupes économiques. On a particulièrement montré que la perspective de segmentation pouvait fournir une réinterprétation intéressante des profile réguliers de l'expérimentation des salaires.
Recent American literature on socioeconomic segmentation has employed secondary data gathered at the industrial level to demonstrate the limitations of functionalist or human capital explanations of earnings determination. In this paper, we utilize primary Canadian data collected from business establishments to explore the effects of an alternative operationalization of the segmentation notion on the wage determination process. Using some new classificatory techniques, we identify three basic economic clusters, or segments, and examine the distinctive aspects of wage determination within these economic groups. In particular, we show that the segmentation perspective can provide an interesting reinterpretation of standard experience-earning profiles.     

Nepotism and the minimum wage

That an increase in the minimum wage or minimum wage coverage results in an increase in the incidence of nepotism is empirically tested using 1972 data on job-seeking methods used by American workers. The elasticity of the incidence of nepotism with respect to the level of the minimum wage and minimum wage coverage in 1977 is estimated at between .38 and .68. I would like to thank Peter Montiel and Geoffrey Woglom for their helpful comments and suggestions and Bruce Chesebrough for providing the stimulus to write this paper; remaining errors are my own.     

Union dues and wage premiums

This study explores whether union wage premiums reflect compensating differences or noncompetitive rents. It is argued that if (1) there exists substantial dues variability, and (2) there is a positive wage-dues relation among union workers, at least part of the observed union premium is noncompetitive. Empirically, these two conditions are substantiated both within and across industries using the PSID microdata base. On average, 44 percent of the overall union premium is attributable to noncompetitive sources. Senior Economist, Office of Research and Evaluation, Bureau of Labor Statistics and Special Assistant for Policy, Evaluation and Research, U.S. Department of Labor. Comments are gratefully acknowledged from James Cunningham, H. Gregg Lewis, Wesley Mellow, William J. Moore, Jack E. Triplett and an anonymous referee. Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily reflect the official position or policy of the U.S. Department of Labor.     

On institutions and wage determination

This paper examines the difficulties encountered in incorporating necessary institutional features of the labor market in wage change analysis. A simple ‘institutional’ model is advanced to clarify the method and implications of the incorporation of the relevant institutional detail. Certain lacunae of the research literature are identified and the need for relations supplemental to those already identified in that literature emphasized. Further process in applied work necessitates,inter al., recognition of the endogeneity of contract length and mode.     

Unions and private wage supplements

Private wage supplements are an important part of total compensation. A model of workers’ supplement expenditures is developed which shows that, although the expenditure determinants sometimes differ between broad industry/occupation subsamples, earnings, price effects of preferential tax treatment and economies of group purchase, unionization, the product market power of the firm, and worker age are usually significant determinants of supplement expenditures. The firm’s goal of reducing turnover costs as well as demographic, locational, and industry variables also systematically affect supplement expenditures. Supplements usually increase progressively with wages, indicating that often made proportionality assumptions are invalid. This work is based on a portion of my doctoral dissertation “An Economic Analysis of the Determinants of Private Wage Supplements.” An anonymous referee made many useful suggestions and criticisms. The Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University provided some of the computer funding. The remaining errors are my responsibility.