DOES THE VAT TAX EXPORTS?

While a VAT should in principle be neutral with respect to international trade, it may in practice function as a tax on exporters' input purchases if firms receive incomplete VAT refunds. Using data for over 100 countries that span the majority of historical VAT adoption episodes, this paper finds that—consistent with this hypothesis—the VAT reduces the exports of an industry with a 10 percentage point higher intermediate goods share of output by over 8% relative to an industry with a lower share. This effect is driven by developing countries and is absent for high-income countries. (JEL F13, F14, H25, H87, O11)     

THE QUANTITATIVE IMPORTANCE OF OPENNESS IN DEVELOPMENT

This paper deals with a classic development question: how can the process of economic development—transition from stagnation in a traditional technology to industrialization and prosperity with a modern technology—be accelerated? Lewis (1954) and Rostow (1956) argue that the pace of industrialization is limited by the rate of capital formation which in turn is limited by the savings rate of workers close to subsistence. We argue that access to capital goods in the world market can be quantitatively important in speeding up the transition. We develop a parsimonious open‐economy model where traditional and modern technologies coexist (a dual economy in the sense of Lewis 1954). We show that a decline in the world price of capital goods in an open economy increases the rate of capital formation and speeds up the pace of industrialization relative to a closed economy that lacks access to cheaper capital goods. In the long run, the investment rate in the open economy is twice as high as in the closed economy and the per capita income is 23% higher. (JEL O11, F43, O14)     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND LABOR‐MARKET DISCRIMINATION

Discrimination reduces the matching probability and output in the skill‐intensive differentiated‐product sector so that discrimination‐induced comparative advantage may overshadow technological comparative advantage in determining the pattern of trade. Trade liberalization generates a decrease in the skilled‐worker wage gap in the country that is an exporter of goods from the simple sector but increases it in the country that is a net exporter of differentiated products. Trade liberalization has an opposite effect on firms. In the country that is an exporter of simple goods, trade liberalization reduces the profits of the nondiscriminatory firms by more than those of the discriminatory firms. (JEL F16, F66, J71)     

TRADE COSTS AND JOB FLOWS: EVIDENCE FROM ESTABLISHMENT‐LEVEL DATA

Changes in the costs of trading inputs or final goods affect establishment‐level job flows. Using a longitudinal database containing the universe of manufacturing establishments in California from 1992 to 2004, we find that a decline in input or final‐good trade costs is associated with job destruction in the least productive establishments, job creation in the most productive establishments, and an increase in the death likelihood of the least productive establishments. The evidence is consistent with predictions of models of trade with heterogeneous firms. Additionally, the evidence shows that the effects of input trade costs on establishment‐level job flows are larger than the effects of final‐good trade costs. (JEL F14, F16)     

PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: ELECTORAL DELEGATION AND COOPERATION

This study experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects one delegate who can freely decide on each group member's contribution to the global public goods. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions for our delegation mechanism, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the selfish benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by theory. It is driven by conditional cooperation of delegates across groups. Since one of the potential sources of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other‐regarding preferences, we use the term P‐inefficiency to describe our finding. (JEL C92, D72, H41)     

Game Theoretical Formulations of The Olson Problem*

Abstract This paper takes up one of the basic themes of Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press 1965). that is a group size as a cause of suboptimal provision of collective or public goods. A general framework is developed for classifying collective action situations involving public goods provisions. This framework focuses on the two characteristics: relations between contribution and provision, and rivalness or jointness in consumption of the collective goods. This framework distinguishes six types of collective actions, for each of which a game theoretical formulation is developed to obtain. models concerning social movements against (or for) new legislations, a petition for the recall of an official, a strike, lobbying, building a lighthouse, creation of a database, etc. These models, formulated either as an N-person chicken game or as an N-person prisoner's dilemma game. are examined with respect to how a group size affects non-cooperative equilibria and their Paretooptimality. There is no group size effect in the collective action situations formulated as an N-person chicken game, while large groups may suffer from suboptimal provision of the public goods in the collective action situations formulated as an N-person prisoner's dilemma game. Two types of the group size effect in N-person prisoner's dilemmas must be distinguished. In some cases. “no contribution” is the equilibrium regardless of the group size. but increase in the group size makes the equilibrium Pareto-deficient. In other cases, increase in the group size changes the equilibrium from the Pareto-efficient one with N contributors to the deficient one with no contributors.     

DETERMINANTS OF TRADE AND SPECIALIZATION IN THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO‐OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES

This paper empirically investigates the relative importance of productivity, factor endowments, trade costs, and tastes in determining the current pattern of trade and specialization. The results show that productivity and taste differences are the first and second most significant determinants of trade and specialization. Factor endowments are the least influential for the average country in the data set, but their effects are much greater in the poorer than richer countries. The results also show the substantial role of trade costs, which is amplified through interactions with other determinants of trade. Trade costs affect the relative costs of intermediate inputs and final goods, link preferences with specialization, and reduce the geographical range of comparative advantages. (JEL F1, F10)     

ON DISTANCE METRICS IN LOCATION PROBLEMS

Product space metrics reflect the complementarity of product attributes and lead to different geometries in multidimensional spaces. This matters for optimal product positioning. I consider how a planner should design two substitute public goods with multiple attributes to best serve different needs. Attribute complementarity affects whether a given menu dominates another (using an extension of the Pareto criterion). Distancing the goods proportionately in every attribute guarantees improvement when tastes are maximally diverse. The intuition is that the planner must minimize overlap in the populations the goods serve, since benefits are wasted in appealing to the same individual with two offerings. (JEL C65, D78, H41)     

Successful societies: Decision-making and the quality of attentiveness

Combining moral philosophy with sociological theory to build on themes introduced in Hall and Lamont’s Successful Societies (2009), the paper outlines a distinctive perspective. It holds that a necessary condition of successful societies is that decision-makers base their decisions on a high level of attentiveness (concern and comprehension) towards subjectively valued and morally legitimate forms of life. Late modern societies consist of a plurality of forms of life, each providing grounds for what Alasdair MacIntyre has called internal goods—valued and morally valuable practices. The status of such goods is examined, and distinctions are drawn between their manifest and latent, and transposable and situationally specific, characteristics. We integrate this refined idea of internal goods into a developed conception of habitus that is both morally informed and situationally embedded. The sociological approach of strong structuration theory (SST) is employed to demonstrate how this conception of habitus can guide the critique of decision-making that damages internal goods. We identify the most pervasive and invidious forms of damaging decision-making in contemporary societies as those involving excessive forms of instrumental reasoning. We argue that our developed conception of habitus, anchored in the collectively valued practices of specific worlds, can be a powerful focus for resistance. Accounts of scholarship in higher education and of the white working class in America illustrate the specificities of singular, particular, social worlds and illuminate critical challenges raised by the perspective we advocate.     

ENTRY AND EXIT,PRODUCT VARIETY,AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

We study the stochastic behavior of a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. Each seller sells his product in the consumption goods as well as the investment goods market and has market power in both. Consumers derive utility from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregate of all the consumption goods and augment their capital stock by a CES aggregate of all the investment goods. We analyze the equilibrium of this economy allowing for an endogenous determination of the number of firms and therefore of products. The principal effect we wish to highlight is the endogenous propagation and magnification of technology and preference disturbances through product space variations. (JEL E32, D43, L16)     

TRADE IN POLARIZED AMERICA: THE BORDER EFFECT BETWEEN RED STATES AND BLUE STATES

Political and cultural polarization in the United States is widely discussed, but does it relate to any economic disconnection among states? We estimate the “border” effect between Red and Blue states using the gravity equation with a nonlinear generalized method of moments estimator to simultaneously overcome the problems associated with endogeneity, cross‐state price differences, and zero‐trade flow. The border effect is robustly confirmed for the 2000s, while not so robustly detected for the 1990s. Notably, in 2007, the border reduces trade between Red and Blue states to approximately 75% of the trade within each set of states. This estimated border effect is much smaller than the United States–Canada national border effect estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and by Feenstra (2002), yet is comparable to the border effect that Nitsch and Wolf (2009) find for the former West and East Germanies approximately 10 years after reunification. While the border effect in Germany after reunification is decreasing, the border effect between the Red and Blue states is emerging. We also find the border effect is more significant for consumption, rather than intermediate, goods. The border effect is an important indicator for a potential dismantling of the economic connectivity in the United States. (JEL D72, F10, F15, R1)     

An informationally parsimonious impartial observer theorem

In Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem, an impartial observer determines a social ordering of the lotteries on the set of social alternatives based on a sympathetic but impartial concern for all individuals in society. This ordering is derived from a more primitive ordering on the set of all extended lotteries. An extended lottery is a lottery which determines both the observer's personal identity and the social alternative. We establish a version of Harsanyi's theorem in which the observer is only required to have preferences on the extended lotteries in which there is an equal chance of being any person in society. Received: 19 June 1996 / Accepted: 30 December 1996     

OFFSHORING AND THE POLARIZATION OF THE DEMAND FOR CAPITAL

In the past decades, the importance of different capital goods has gradually changed, which has led to a structural shift in the composition of the demand for capital at the expense of more traditional capital inputs such as machinery and equipment. In this paper, we focus on a novel driver of this development by analyzing the effect of offshoring on the demand for capital by asset class using a rich country-sector panel dataset. Estimating a system of factor demand equations, we document that offshoring reduces the relative demand for non-ICT capital, thereby polarizing the demand for capital. (JEL F14, F62, E22)     

Corporate corruption of the environment: sustainability as a process of compromise

A key response to environmental degradation, climate change and declining biodiversity has been the growing adoption of market principles in an effort to better value the social good of nature. Through concepts such as ‘natural capitalism’ and ‘corporate environmentalism’, nature is increasingly viewed as a domain of capitalist endeavour. In this article, we use convention theory and a pluralist understanding of social goods to investigate how the social good of the environment is usurped by the alternate social good of the market. Through analysis of interviews with sustainability managers and corporate documentation, we highlight how organizational actors employ compromise to temporally settle disputes between competing claims about environmental activities. Our findings contribute to an understanding of the processes of empirically grounded critique and the under‐theorized concept of compromise between social goods. Rather than protecting the environment, the corporate promotion of sustainability facilitates the corruption of the social good of the environment and its conversion into a market commodity.     

AN OPEN‐ECONOMY MODEL WITH MONEY,ENDOGENOUS SEARCH,AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper describes a new monetary open‐economy model where firms have market power due to search frictions in the goods market, and endogenous search effort by consumers mitigates this market power. The optimal inflation rate generally depends positively on the cost of search effort, the cost of firm entry, and the cost of trade. Higher inflation always improves a country's terms‐of‐trade against its trading partners. I also characterize a general class of matching processes which offer a novel approach to modeling firm sales. (JEL D43, E40, F12)     

THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE: ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND PREFERENCES

This paper examines the question of why the composition of government expenditure differs among democratic countries and to what extent it may be explained by differences in economic conditions or preferences. A simple overlapping generations model, which allows for a range of relevant factors, is constructed to examine the division of expenditure on public goods and a transfer payment under majority voting. The model yields a closed‐form solution for the majority choice of the expenditure ratio. An empirical examination suggests that income inequalities play a minor role while different preferences for public goods reflecting cultural differences across countries may play an important role in accounting for the substantial variations in expenditure patterns. (JEL D72, H41, H53, H11)     

The willingness to pay–willingness to accept gap revisited: The role of emotions and moral satisfaction

While many earlier studies have found that people’s maximum willingness to pay for having a good is often substantially lower than their minimum willingness to accept not having it, more recent experimental evidence suggests that this discrepancy vanishes for standard consumption goods when an incentive-compatible design without misconceptions is used. This paper hypothesises that there is nevertheless a discrepancy for goods with a perceived moral character, such as contributions to a good cause, and moreover that the reason for this discrepancy can largely be explained by differences in emotions and moral perceptions. The results from a real-money dichotomous-choice experiment, combined with measurements of emotions and morality, are consistent with these hypotheses.     

Enforcement of property rights in a barter economy

If property rights to consumption goods are insecure, the incentives to trade in a barter economy are reshaped. In a pure exchange economy, we examine the case where two contestable consumption goods are vital to two agents and initial endowments follow a binary distribution. In line with the existing literature, we examine in a two-stage game how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. We find that, depending on the exogenous preference and appropriation-effectiveness parameters, two different regimes emerge in equilibrium: trade and appropriation, and peaceful coexistence, with the latter regime exhibiting efficiency with respect to the goods traded. However, inefficiencies arise due to the investment in defensive activities necessary to deter appropriation. Thus, we have found an endogenously determined measure for the transaction cost underlying a market which replicates the outcome of a Walrasian market.     

SKILLED‐UNSKILLED WAGE INEQUALITY AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT

The impact of trade liberalization on the labor market in the North has drawn tremendous attention in the face of the growing skilled‐unskilled wage gap but in the South it has been somewhat neglected. One of the key structural differences between the North and the South is that the South experiences a pronounced rural‐urban migration in the presence of urban unemployment. We introduce this feature in the structure of a simple general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of trade liberalization and fragmentation on employment and the skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the South. In particular, we show that while fragmentation necessarily improves the unskilled wage and the skilled wage, more lucrative global opportunities for the skilled final product, in the absence of fragmentation, can reduce the rural wage and increase urban unemployment. The effect of fragmentation, ceteris paribus, on the skilled‐unskilled wage gap is sensitive to the degree of substitutability between land and unskilled labor. As such, fragmentation can magnify the increase in the skilled‐unskilled wage gap resulting from an improvement in the terms of trade. It is also shown that a technological progress in the intermediate goods sector increases the skilled‐unskilled wage gap and raises urban unemployment. (JEL F1, O1, F11, F12)     

SALIENCE AND THE GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

This paper examines how behavioral biases caused by salient events affect the government provision of public goods. We develop a theory in which competing communities lobby the government for allocations of a local public good. Salient events bias community demands for the good, which results in inefficient allocations. We empirically test this theory using salient wildfires and government projects to reduce wildfire risk. Wildfires reduce risk to nearby communities, but may increase demand for fuels management projects because of biases induced by salient wildfires. We find that communities experiencing recent nearby fires are more likely to receive fuels management projects. (JEL D03, H41, Q24)