The role of income in marriage and divorce transitions among young Americans

The paper investigates the importance of income in young Americans decisions to form and dissolve households. Using data on young American men and women from the NLSY, an important role for income in both these transitions is found. There are significant differences between young men and women. High earnings capacity increases the probability of marriage and decreases the probability of divorce for young men. High earnings capacity decreases the probability of marriage for young women, and has no impact on divorce.Thanks are due to seminar audiences at Bristol and the Royal Economic Society, two anonymous referees and the Editor for useful comments, and to Matt Dickson for preparation of the tables. Any errors are those of the authors. Responsible editor: John F. Ermisch.     

The Retrenchment of Marriage: Results from Marital Status Life Tables for the United States, 1995

Marital status life tables were calculated using 1995 US rates of marriage, divorce, and mortality. Compared to figures for 1988, the proportion of persons surviving to age 15 who ever marry remained fairly steady at about five‐sixths of all men and seven‐eighths of all women. The average age at first marriage rose substantially: to 28.6 years for men and 26.6 years for women. The probability of a marriage ending in divorce changed little and was .437 for men and .425 for women. It is likely that no US period or cohort will ever have half of all marriages end in legal divorce, though the highest cohort may reach 47 percent. Patterns of marriage and divorce observed since 1970 show the effect that cohabitation continues to have on the American family, where it is delaying, but not replacing, marriage.     

Gray divorce: Explaining midlife marital splits

Recent research suggests that one out of every four divorces in the United States is now “gray,” meaning that at least one half of the couple has reached the age of 50 when the marriage breaks down. To understand why this age group—the Baby Boomer generation—is splitting up, this study conducted 40 in-depth, semistructured interviews with men and 40 with women who have experienced a gray divorce in their lifetimes. Respondents’ beliefs in an expressive individualistic model of marriage, where partnerships are only valuable if they help individuals achieve personal growth, were compared against their potential adherence to what I call a commitment-based model of marriage, where binding, romantic love holds couples together unless there is severe relationship strain. The results demonstrated that the commitment-based model most strongly governs marriage and the decision to divorce among Baby Boomers for both sexes, although some specific reasons for divorce differ for men and women.     

The effect of divorce costs on marriage formation and dissolution

Exploiting the theoretical parallels between the matching of workers to jobs in the labour market and the matching of individuals in the marriage market, we use a search theoretic model of marriage formation and dissolution to examine the effect of divorce costs on both decisions. By introducing learning at both stages of the marital decision process, we show that divorce costs not only affect the probability of divorce but also the probability of marriage. Interestingly, to what extent divorce costs affect the marital status distribution depends on the information regarding the quality of the potential marriage that individuals receive while encountering marital offers. Received: 30 July 1996/Accepted: 7 December 1998     

The relationship between cohabitation and divorce: Selectivity or causal influence?

Recent evidence linking premarital cohabitation to high rates of divorce poses a complex theoretical and empirical puzzle. We develop hypotheses predicting that premarital cohabitation is selective of those who are prone to divorce as well as hypotheses predicting that the experience of premarital cohabitation produces attitudes and values which increase the probability of divorce. Using multiwave panel data from a recent cohort of young men and women in the United States, we specify and test models of these predictions. The results are consistent with hypotheses suggesting that cohabitation is selective of men and women who are less committed to marriage and more approving of divorce. The results also are consistent with the conclusion that cohabiting experiences significantly increase young people's acceptance of divorce.     

Effect of family structure on life satisfaction: australian evidence

How do family arrangements affect subjective well-being? We investigate this issue using data pooled from the IsssA and HILDA, both large, representative national samples of Australia (pooled n=38 447). Our regression analysis of cross-sectional and panel data examines how large are the differences in life satisfaction according to marital status and cohabitation. We find that women and men in formal marriages experience higher levels of life satisfaction than do people in other family arrangements. Moreover, both multiple tests in the cross-section, and tests controlling for prior happiness in the panel analysis, suggest that this is a causal relationship. Aggregating up the levels of life satisfaction generated by different marriage and cohabitation arrangements across a lifetime, suggests that a life-long marriage is the most satisfying. Early divorce followed by an enduring second marriage is little worse (because little time is spent outside the married state). But divorce without remarriage, or long lasting cohabitation without formal marriage, reduce the lifetime sum of subjective well-being by 4–12% for both women and men.     

Gender-specific labor market conditions and family formation

Slack labor market conditions for women relative to men increase the marriage rate in the USA. This paper examines the long-term consequences of such marriages. Despite the significant effect on marriage timing, labor market conditions experienced in youth do not affect the probability that a woman will marry by the age of 30. Further, labor market conditions at the time of marriage are uncorrelated with the probability of divorce, spouses?? characteristics, or the number of children. These findings suggest that labor market fluctuations induce only intertemporal adjustments for marriage timing without affecting reservation match quality or total fertility.     

No trend in the intergenerational transmission of divorce

Previous studies on trends in the intergenerational transmission of divorce have produced mixed findings, with two studies (McLanahan and Bumpass 1988; Teachman 2002) reporting no trend in divorce transmission and one study (Wolfinger 1999) finding that divorce transmission has weakened substantially. Using a stratified Cox proportional hazard model, we analyze data from the National Survey of Families and Households and find no evidence for any trend in divorce transmission. To reconcile apparent differences in results, we note that the General Social Survey data used by Wolfinger lack information on marital duration, permitting analysis only for whether respondents have divorced by interview. As a result, an apparent decline in divorce transmission could be due to inadequate adjustments for the longer exposures to risk by earlier marriage cohorts, yielding a higher probability of divorce by interview for earlier cohorts relative to more recent cohorts even if divorce risks are identical across all marriage cohorts. We confirm this possibility by using a series of discrete-time hazard logistic regressions to investigate the sensitivity of estimates of trends in divorce transmission to different adjustments for exposure to risk. We conclude that there has been no trend in the intergenerational transmission of divorce.     

The Association Between Individual Income and Remaining Life Expectancy at the Age of 65 in the Netherlands

This article quantifies the association between individual income and remaining life expectancy at the statutory retirement age (65) in the Netherlands. For this purpose, we estimate a mortality risk model using a large administrative data set that covers the 1996–2007 period. Besides age and marital status, the model includes as covariates individual and spouse’s income as well as a random individual specific effect. It thus allows for dynamic selection based on both observed and unobserved characteristics. We find that conditional on marital status, individual income is about equally strong and negatively associated with mortality risk for men and women and that spouse’s income is only weakly associated with mortality risk for women. For both men and women, we quantify remaining life expectancy at age 65 for low-income individuals as approximately 2.5 years less than that for high-income individuals.     

A decomposition of immigrant divorce rates in Australia

Crude divorce rates of overseas-born Australians by birthplace are not comparable because different birthplace groups have different age structures and marriage patterns that affect the rates. This paper decomposes the crude rates into components due to the effects of age structrue, marriage patterns and the divorce rate of married men and women. This allows for a better comparison of the level of divorce by birthplace. The range in the standardized divorce rates by birthplace is smaller than that indicated by the crude rates. Nonetheless, there remains considerable variation in immigrant divorce rates in Australia.     

Catholicism and marriage in the united states

This study examines the effects of a Catholic background on age at first marriage, the odds of never marrying, and the odds of ever divorcing. Estimates using Catholic upbringing are compared with estimates using Catholic at the time of the survey. A case is made that if the latter measure of Catholicism is used, serious selection bias problems occur in some cases because this measure excludes defectors and includes converts. Further, it is shown that a Catholic upbringing generally has no effect on men’s age at first marriage and has a positive effect on the age when women marry. It is also shown that older Baptist men are substantially more likely than Catholic men to experience a divorce. Older Catholic women are somewhat less likely to experience a divorce than non-Baptist Protestant women. There is no Catholic effect on the odds that younger men and women will divorce.     

The reversal of the gender gap in education and relative divorce risks: A matter of alternatives in partner choice?

Recent evidence from the United States suggests that the reversal of the gender gap in education was associated with changes in relative divorce risks: hypogamous marriages, where the wife was more educated than the husband, used to have a higher divorce risk than hypergamous marriages, where the husband was more educated, but this difference has disappeared. One interpretation holds that this may result from cultural change, involving increasing social acceptance of hypogamy. We propose an alternative mechanism that need not presuppose cultural change: the gender-gap reversal in education has changed the availability of alternatives from which highly educated women and men can choose new partners. This may have lowered the likelihood of women leaving husbands with less education and encouraged men to leave less educated spouses. We applied an agent-based model to twelve European national marriage markets to illustrate that this could be sufficient to create a convergence in divorce risks.     

Income dynamics in couples and the dissolution of marriage and cohabitation

Several studies have shown that a wife's strong (socio)economic position is associated with an increase in the risk of divorce. Less is known about such effects for cohabiting relationships. Using a unique and large-scale sample of administrative records from The Netherlands, we analyze the link between couples' income dynamics and union dissolution for married and cohabiting unions over a 10-year period. We find negative effects of household income on separation and positive effects of the woman's relative income, in line with earlier studies. The shape of the effect of the woman's relative income, however, depends on the type of union. Movements away from income equality toward a male-dominant pattern tend to increase the dissolution risk for cohabiting couples, whereas they reduce the dissolution risk for married couples. Movements away from income equality toward a female-dominant pattern (reverse specialization) increase the dissolution risks for both marriage and cohabitation. The findings suggest that equality is more protective for cohabitation, whereas specialization is more protective for marriage, although only when it fits a traditional pattern. Finally, we find that the stabilizing effects of income equality are more pronounced early in the marriage and that income equality also reduces the dissolution risk for same-sex couples.     

Marriage Duration and Divorce: The Seven-Year Itch or a Lifelong Itch?

Previous studies have shown that the risk of divorce is low during the first months of marriage; it then increases, reaches a maximum, and thereafter begins to decline. Some researchers consider this pattern consistent with the notion of a “seven-year itch,” while others argue that the rising-falling pattern of divorce risk is a consequence of misspecification of longitudinal models because of omitted covariates or unobserved heterogeneity. The aim of this study is to investigate the causes of the rising-falling pattern of divorce risk. Using register data from Finland and applying multilevel hazard models, the analysis supports the rising-falling pattern of divorce by marriage duration: the risk of marital dissolution increases, reaches its peak, and then gradually declines. This pattern persists when I control for the sociodemographic characteristics of women and their partners. The inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in the model leads to some changes in the shape of the baseline risk; however, the rising-falling pattern of the divorce risk persists.     

Economic opportunities,marriage squeezes and the propensity to marry: An economic analysis of period marriage rates in England and Wales

An economic model of the decision to marry has been developed by Gary Becker and is now part of the ‘new home economics’. From it one can deduce that the propensity to marry is a function of the relative earning capacities of men and women, the relative scarcity of unmarried persons of the opposite sex and real income. The effects of changes in these variables on the annual first marriage rates of men aged 16–19, 20–24 and 25–29 and women aged 16–19 and 20–24 respectively are estimated over the post-war period. It is found that women's earning capacity relative to men's has a particularly strong negative effect on marriage rates, and that the decline in first marriage rates during the 1970s was primarily attributable to the growing economic opportunities for women. As demographic studies have suggested, the relative numbers of bachelors and spinsters of particular ages (‘marriage squeezes’) also have a significant impact, and there is evidence of substitution in the ages of marriage partners in response to such ‘squeezes’. The income elasticity of marriage is only found to be significant among men below age 25 and women below age 20, and it increases as we move down the age distribution. This suggests the ‘liquidity constraints’ influence the timing of marriage among young people. In sum, this economic model is able to account for over 90 per cent of the post-war variation in young persons' marriage rates.     

Midpregnancy Marriage and Divorce: Why the Death of Shotgun Marriage Has Been Greatly Exaggerated

Conventional wisdom holds that births following the colloquially termed “shotgun marriage”—that is, births to parents who married between conception and the birth—are nearing obsolescence. To investigate trends in shotgun marriage, we matched North Carolina administrative data on nearly 800,000 first births among white and black mothers to marriage and divorce records. We found that among married births, midpregnancy-married births (our preferred term for shotgun-married births) have been relatively stable at about 10 % over the past quarter-century while increasing substantially for vulnerable population subgroups. In 2012, among black and white less-educated and younger women, midpregnancy-married births accounted for approximately 20 % to 25 % of married first births. The increasing representation of midpregnancy-married births among married births raises concerns about well-being among at-risk families because midpregnancy marriages may be quite fragile. Our analysis revealed, however, that midpregnancy marriages were more likely to dissolve only among more advantaged groups. Of those groups considered to be most at risk of divorce—namely, black women with lower levels of education and who were younger—midpregnancy marriages had the same or lower likelihood of divorce as preconception marriages. Our results suggest an overlooked resiliency in a type of marriage that has only increased in salience.     

Gender Differences in the Consequences of Divorce: A Study of Multiple Outcomes

In this study, I examined gender differences in the consequences of divorce by tracing annual change in 20 outcome measures covering four domains: economic, housing and domestic, health and well-being, and social. I used data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and fixed-effects panel regression models on a sample of N = 18,030 individuals initially observed in a marital union, N = 1,220 of whom divorced across the observation period (1984–2015). Three main findings emerged from the analysis. First, men were more vulnerable to short-term consequences of divorce for subjective measures of well-being, but postdivorce adaptation alleviated gender differences in these outcomes. Second, a medium-term view on multiple outcomes showed more similarity than differences between women and men. The medium-term consequences of divorce were similar in terms of subjective economic well-being; mental health, physical health, and psychological well-being; residential moves, homeownership, and satisfaction with housework; and chances of repartnering, social integration with friends and relatives, and feelings of loneliness. Third, the key domain in which large and persistent gender differences emerged were women’s disproportionate losses in household income and associated increases in their risk of poverty and single parenting. Taken together, these findings suggest that men’s disproportionate strain of divorce is transient, whereas women’s is chronic.     

American families: trends and correlates

Discussion focused on the nature of the roles of the family, a review of the major demographic changes (marriage, cohabitation, nonfamily households, remarriage, fertility, teenage pregnancy, and female employment) affecting the American family in the past decades, and the nature of the impact on women, men, and children. There were four major trends identified: 1) increased proportions of children living in single-parent families due to high rates of divorce and increased childbearing outside of marriage; 2) increased proportions of adults in nontraditional living arrangements; 3) increased female labor force participation during all stages of the life cycle; and 4) decreased proportions of children and increased proportions of older people out of total population due to declining mortality and fertility rates. Family formation arises out of childbearing and childrearing roles, the need for companionship and emotional support, and the opportunities for specialization and trade, and the economies of scale. The costs of family living may include the potential for disagreement, conflict, loss of privacy, and time and money. There were a number of reasons identified for not maintaining traditional families consisting of a married couple with children. The trends were for later age at marriage: 24.4 years in 1992 for women, increased cohabitation (almost 50% cohabiting prior to first marriage in 1985-86), decreased number of married couple households, and increased number of adults in non-family households. The divorce rate has risen over the past 100 years with peaks in the 1970s; the reasons were identified as increased baby boomers and new marriages, increased labor participation of women, and changes in gender roles. The stabilization and slight decline in rates may be due to a natural leveling, the likelihood of greater stability within new marriages, and the aging of the baby boomers. An anticipated increase in divorce rates in the future was also justified. Remarriage rates varied by gender, age at separation/divorce, presence of children, race/ethnicity, and education. Fertility remained stable at 1.8 during the late 1970s and early 1980s and increased slightly to 2.0 in 1989. IN 1990, there were 25% out-of-wedlock births compared to 5% in 1960. About 12% of births in 1989 were to teenagers. There has been an increase in female-headed households, the median income of which in 1992 was $13,012, or 33% of married couple income.     

Simulating the effect of demographic events on the household composition

The aim of this paper is to measure the effects on household composition of changes in demographic events, e.g. mortality, fertility, marriage, divorce. British household data are taken from the General Household Survey and aged by simulation to 2001 using a ‘Most Likely’ model. Subsequently different assumptions of each demographic event are taken from 1991 so that the effects of perturbations within each event can be studied. Special features of the simulation model are the differentiations between cohabitation and marriage and separation and divorce, and the detailed breakdowns of household types such as lone parents into single and previously married women and men with children aged 0–4, 5–15 and 16 and over.     

Sibship Characteristics and Transition to First Marriage in Taiwan: Explaining Gender Asymmetries

Sociologists have long been interested in the effects of sibship structures. Although previous research generally focuses on the impacts of sibship characteristics on educational outcomes, these characteristics may also affect individuals?? decisions about marriage by shaping their resource availability, parental expectations, or social skills and contacts. Using a nationally representative sample from Taiwan, we examine how sibship size, birth-order rank, and sibship sex composition are associated with men??s and women??s transitions to first marriage. The analysis shows that men who have no male siblings tend to accelerate their rates of entering marriage. By contrast, women with more siblings or in earlier birth positions are likely to do the same. We argue that the findings for women reflect the influences of sibship structures on household resource allocation, whereas those for men have to do with the cultural emphasis on sons?? responsibility for carrying on the family lineage. Moreover, Chinese cultural norms that prescribe different roles for married sons and daughters account for the asymmetrical mechanisms revealed for men and women in Taiwan. Results from this study thus underscore the need to consider family norms and cultural contexts in explaining the transition to marriage.