IMPOSED HEALTH INSURANCE IN MONOPOLISTIC MARKETS: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

The impact of public health insurance on price and output of medical care is analyzed within the context of monopolistic markets for health services. An important result, which is not obtained in competitive markets, is that indemnity benefits cause smaller price increases than service benefits, both directly and indirectly through the effect of benefit structure on the production of information. Various types of price regulation are considered, including limitation to "usual, customary, and prevailing" levels, a frequently used technique. With a simple dynamic model this type of regulation is shown to cause chronic price inflation.     

UNEMPLOYMENT AS A DRAMATURGICAL PROBLEM: TEACHING IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT IN A WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM

This article is an analysis of aspects of everyday life in a Work Incentive Program (WIN). It is intended to apply and extend Adam's (1978) political phenomenology of domination by analyzing inferiorization as a feature of contemporary human service work. The analysis focuses on dramaturgical instruction of unemployed welfare recipients as a process of inferiorization through which clients are cast as disadvantaged in their dealings with area employers. Clients were taught to strategically manipulate impressions of self in order to positively impress area employers and get jobs. The analysis addresses five primary questions: (1) How is the dramaturgical perspective organized as an ideology of inferiorization in WIN and other human service organizations; (2) What was the context within which dramaturgical instruction was defined by the WIN staff as a legitimate response to their clients' problems; (3) What were the assumptions and claims associated with the staff's dramaturgical framing of unemployment; (4) How was the dramaturgical frame used by the staff to identify concrete rules for proper job-seeking: and (5) How did the staff legitimate the perspective and rules associated with it in their interactions with clients?     

MANDATORY RETIREMENT AS A CLAUSE IN AN EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CONTRACT

This paper postulates the existence of an "employment insurance contract" in which firms insure the employment of workers, at a predetermined wage, against potential, age related declines in productivity. To limit its liability the firm establishes an age limit to its promise ––– the mandatory retirement age. It is demonstrated that Pareto-efficient contracts exist which involve mandatory retirement at a specific age. The existence of these contracts, including mandatory retirement, increases workers' life-time utility and encourages the accumulation of human capital. Empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.     

TAXPAYER WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM: A CONTINGENT VALUATION ANALYSIS

A key criterion for evaluating policies to expand health insurance coverage is weighing the costs of such policies against the willingness of the public to pay for coverage expansions. We use new panel survey data from New York State to estimate residents' willingness to pay (WTP) to expand public insurance coverage. Using a nonparametric double‐bounded contingent valuation (CV) approach, we specifically ask residents about their WTP to reduce the rate of uninsurance in the state. Our results imply an aggregate lower‐bound WTP of over $2,800 per year to cover one person. We also analyze heterogeneity in WTP by sub‐group and changes in individual WTP over time between 2008 and 2010. We find that a large majority of residents are willing to pay additional taxes to reduce the number of uninsured in the state, and that average WTP remained remarkably stable despite the economic downturn and the politically polarized discussions surrounding the Affordable Care Act. Decomposing the changes in individual WTP, we find that economic factors related to the recession, including changes in income and employment status, cannot explain changes in individual WTP, whereas individual changes in political opinions about health insurance reform between 2008 and 2010 are strongly correlated with changes in WTP. (JEL H20, H42, H51, H75, I13)     

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTING THEORETICAL VARIATIONS

Although resource mobilization theory has brought a number of advances to the field of social movements, it does not constitute a unified body of theory. The principal divisions exist between McCarthy and Zald's "professional organizer" model and McAdam's "political process" model. Their disagreements are centered mainly around their conceptualizations of the role that elites play in the formation and development of social movements. It is believed that these differences can be reconciled by returning to the original precepts of resource mobilization theory.     

THE EFFECT OF WELFARE PROGRAMS ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

A simple economic model of criminal behavior shows that welfare payments will reduce the time allocated to illegal activities under risk aversion and other reasonable assumptions. This theoretical prediction is confirmed by the empirical findings: using a set of cross-sectional U.S. state data for 1987, it is found that cash or in-kind welfare programs have a negative and often significant effect on property crime. More general programs such as public housing seem to have a larger effect than those aimed primarily at women (AFDC). Medicaid and school lunch programs apparently have little effect on property crime.     

SECTORAL SHIFTS and CYCLICAL UNEMPLOYMENT: A RECONSIDERATION

The debate over the relative importance of sectoral and aggregate shocks in explaining fluctuations in the aggregate unemployment rate has centered on the relationship between unemployment, job vacancies, and the dispersion of sectoral employment growth rates (which proxies for sectoral shocks). This paper examines some possible theoretical relationships between these variables, and, after decomposing unemployment into components attributable to sectoral and aggregate shocks, estimates the importance of each. It finds that fluctuations in unemployment are principally caused by aggregate shocks, but sectoral shifts explain a significant, albeit steady, amount of unemployment.     

EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT: A SECOND VIEW

Efficiency wage models, in which firms find it profitable to pay wages above workers' reservation wages, provide a promising explanation for unemployment and interindustry wage differentials. One criticism of such models is they imply firms should sell jobs by requiring up-front bonds from new workers. However, only some efficiency wage models imply this. Moreover, firms might not require bonds for many reasons. We show that moral hazard and adverse selection models together explain many labor market phenomena. The efficiency wage model conforms well to empirical finding, but certain anomalies suggest the need to consider rent-sharing models.     

SHOPPING HOURS AND PRICE LEVELS IN THE RETAILING INDUSTRY: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We explore the effect of extended shopping hours on the demand faced by small and large stores and on their prices. Our theoretical model predicts that prices at large stores will increase after opening hours are deregulated. We then test this prediction using a set of Quebec data collected before and after the deregulation of opening hours in July 1990. The results support our view that prices have increased at large stores since deregulation and that consumers pay for greater shopping flexibility.     

CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, LABOR MARKET DISEQUILIBRIUM AND MIGRATION: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Traditional analyses of the determinants of migration in less developed countries have focused on labor market conditions. This paper adapts a simple model to show that capital market conditions may be an important factor in individuals' migration decisions. Data from Ecuador are used to test this model, and the empirical results confirm the role of capital market imperfections—chiefly caused by financial repression—in shaping migration flows. Traditional labor market factors still matter, but the new finding may provide policy makers with new and lower-cost tools with which to affect migration outcomes.     

THE ECONOMICS OF JOB SEARCH: A SURVEY

Part I of this survey presents a comprehensive and inte- grated analysis of job search. The labor market is characterized by incomplete information and search is conducted in an optimal manner. A variety of job search models are studied in this microeconomic setting. The paper contains a number of new results. Part 11 of the survey [to appear in the September 1976 issue of Economic Inquiry] addresses the empirical and policy implications of search theory.     

THE ECONOMICS OF JOB SEARCH: A COMMENT

This paper expands the conventional model of job search by relaxing the assumption that uncertainty about the job offer disappears once search is completed. Instead, we hypothesize that uncertainty continues even after search since the job offer contains not only an observable money wage but also an unobservable job consumption component. We show that the reservation wage decision rule is robust even under these very general conditions. The paper also analyzes the effect of this type of residual uncertainty on the level of the reservation wage.     

SELECTING A SELLING INSTITUTION: AUCTIONS VERSUS SEQUENTIAL SEARCH

We consider the seller's choice between sequential search and an auction when selling n homogeneous units of a good in the presence of informational asymmetries, discounting, and transaction costs. Our analysis shows that the expected return per unit from sequential selling decreases in n, the number of units being sold. For the auction with suitable restrictions, the expected return per unit increases in n. Thus, sequential search is the preferred institution if n is small, whereas the auction is preferred if n is large. Historical details of the evolution of livestock markets closely fit our theoretical results.