PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING GATE REVENUE SHARING IN SPORTS LEAGUES

In this article, I examine how sports leagues can use gate revenue sharing to coordinate talent investments and maximize club profits. Gate revenue sharing reduces incentives to invest in talent. Initially lower investments boost profits, because total costs go down, but investing less also shrinks revenues, which harms profits at higher levels of sharing. The league maximizes profits by setting a sharing rule, which balances these two effects. Gate revenue sharing decreases talent investments more strongly in leagues with heterogeneous rather than homogeneous local market sizes. As a result, the profit‐maximizing level of sharing is higher for relatively homogeneous leagues. This implies that more balanced leagues are expected to share more gate revenues than less balanced leagues. It also explains why gate revenue sharing is widely used in the U.S. major leagues, while it is largely absent in European soccer. (JEL L41, L83)     

THE COMBINED EFFECT OF SALARY RESTRICTIONS AND REVENUE SHARING IN SPORTS LEAGUES

Many major sports leagues are characterized by a combination of cross‐subsidization mechanisms like revenue‐sharing arrangements and payroll restrictions. Up to now, the effects of these policy tools have only been analyzed separately. This article provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue sharing. It shows that the effect on club profits, player salaries, and competitive balance crucially depends on the mix of these policy tools. Moreover, the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian‐conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with a salary cap or floor. (JEL L83, C72, L11)     

COMPETITIVE BALANCE MEASURES IN SPORTS LEAGUES: THE EFFECTS OF VARIATION IN SEASON LENGTH

Appropriate measurement of competitive balance is central to the economic analysis of professional sports leagues. We examine the distributional properties of the ratio of standard deviations (RSD) of points percentages, the most widely used measure of competitive balance in the sports economics literature, in comparison with other standard‐deviation‐based measures. Simulation methods are used to evaluate the effects of changes in season length on the distributions of competitive balance measures for different distributions of the strengths of teams in a league. The popular RSD measure performs as expected only in cases of perfect balance; if there is imbalance in team strengths, its distribution is sensitive to changes in season length. It is therefore not recommended for comparisons of competitive balance for different sports leagues with different numbers of teams and/or games played. (JEL L83, D63, C63)     

IF YOU DON'T LIKE THE OUTCOME,CHANGE THE CONTEST

This article analyzes contests when contestants derive heterogeneous benefits from winning and investments are seen as costs to the contest designer. An example of this is sports leagues maximizing league profits. For sports leagues, optimal contests depend upon the heterogeneity of market sizes and the impact of team investment on winning. Sports leagues have mechanisms to change the structure of contests, implying they have some control of the expected payoff of teams, the value of the athletes, and the balance of the league. Data from Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association are used to empirically estimate the model. (JEL C72, L10, L83)     

ENTRY COORDINATION AND AUCTION DESIGN WITH PRIVATE COSTS OF INFORMATION ACQUISITION

Auction design with endogenous entry is complicated by entry coordination among bidders due to multiple entry equilibria issue. This article studies auction design when information acquisition costs are private information of bidders. We show that this problem can be resolved by sufficient dispersion in these costs. First, we find that a simple second‐price auction with no entry fee and a reserve price equal to the seller's valuation is ex ante efficient, while a revenue‐maximizing auction involves personalized entry fees, which are determined by the hazard rates of their information acquisition cost distribution. Second, we show that sufficient dispersion in the information acquisition costs (more dispersion than a particular uniform distribution by the Bickel‐Lehman dispersive order) can coordinate bidders and implement uniquely the desirable entry. The dispersion in information acquisition costs is also necessary for this “unique implementation” result. (JEL D44, D82)     

LEAGUE‐LEVEL ATTENDANCE AND OUTCOME UNCERTAINTY IN U.S. PRO SPORTS LEAGUES

We extend the breakpoint literature regarding annual league‐level attendance and the impact of outcome uncertainty to the National Basketball Association, National Football League, and National Hockey League. As our measures are different than past work on baseball, we also apply our model to the American and National Leagues. Attendance series for each league under consideration are not stationary overall, but are stationary with break points. No form of outcome uncertainty (game, play‐off, or across seasons) matters for attendance in hockey or baseball regardless of which game uncertainty variable is used. Under the measure of game uncertainty that recommends itself for football, only play‐off uncertainty matters for attendance. Whether outcome uncertainty matters for basketball depends on the measure of game uncertainty. Situational similarities in the break points across leagues suggest general areas for future research. (JEL L83, C22)     

Communitas/Corporatas Tensions in Organizational Rhetoric: Finding a Balance in Sports Public Relations

Sports public relations always serves two masters—both corporatas and communitas. In this article, a close textual analysis of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA's) Stay in Bounds community relations program reveals that the NCAA is both a defender of amateur, communitas values, and a participant in professionalized, corporatas organizational rhetoric. This article offers a typology of the specific competing commitments of communitas and corporatas in sports rhetoric and argues that all sports rhetoric, from little league to big league, must negotiate with publics a balance between these extremes.     

EDUCATION'S GAMBLING PROBLEM: EARMARKED LOTTERY REVENUES AND CHARITABLE DONATIONS TO EDUCATION

I examine the impact that lotteries introduced to support education have on voluntary contributions to education. State lotteries, and the causes they are introduced to support, are highly publicized. This provides the opportunity to assess whether donors are crowded‐out by government spending of which they are almost certainly aware. Using donor‐level survey data and nonprofits' tax returns, I find that donations to education‐related organizations fall with the introduction of a lottery. This result is driven by donors' response to the new (highly publicized) government revenue source (rather than a decrease in nonprofit fundraising efforts). (JEL D64, H3, H75)     

DEBT BAILOUTS AND CONSTITUTIONS

A demand‐based theory of subnational debt bailouts is presented. It is shown that demand for bailouts among politicians with regional constituencies is affected by revenue sharing arrangements as a bailout implies a shift of taxation toward the federal tier. Automatic revenue sharing may lead to the formation of pro‐bailout coalitions formed by indebted states and states that are net recipients of the revenue sharing arrangement. The model shows that the state debt bailouts approved by the Brazilian Senate prior to the enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Act were consistent with politicians who maximize the proceeds accruing to their constituencies. (JEL H70, D70)     

FIXED REVENUE AUCTIONS: THEORY AND BEHAVIOR

In this paper, we study auctions in which the revenue is fixed but the quantity is determined by the auction mechanism. Specifically, we investigate the theory and behavior of English quantity clock, Dutch quantity clock, last‐quantity sealed bid, and penultimate‐quantity sealed bid auctions. For theoretically equivalent fixed quantity and fixed revenue auctions, we find that fixed revenue auctions are robust to all the previously observed empirical regularities in fixed quantity auctions. (JEL C9, D4, L2)     

MILITARY SPENDING AND THE GROWTH‐MAXIMIZING ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC CAPITAL: A CROSS‐COUNTRY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper we present an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public investment among N different types of public capital. Using this general model of public capital formation, we analyze the stability of the long‐run equilibrium and we derive the growth‐maximizing values of the shares of public investment allocated to the different types of public capital, as well as the growth‐maximizing tax rate (amount of total public investment as a share of GDP). Then we proceed with an empirical investigation of the theoretical implication of the model that both the effects of the shares of public investment and the tax rate on the long‐run growth rate are non‐linear, following an inverse U‐shaped pattern. Using data of public investment in infrastructure and military capital formation, we derive empirical estimations that confirm the theoretical implications of the model. (JEL E62, H56, O40).     

THE CHALLENGE OF REVENUE SHARING WITH BUNDLED PRICING: AN APPLICATION TO MUSIC

Although bundling can substantially increase profits relative to standalone pricing, particularly for zero‐marginal‐cost information products, it has one major problem: bundling produces revenue that is not readily attributable to particular pieces of intellectual property, creating a revenue division problem. We evaluate several possible solutions using unique song valuation survey data. We find the Shapley value, a well‐motivated theoretical solution, is universally incentive compatible (all bundle elements fare better inside the bundle than under standalone pricing), but revenue‐sharing schemes feasible with readily available consumption data are not. Among feasible schemes, Ginsburgh and Zang's modified Shapley value performs best. (JEL C71, D79, L14)     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPENDING VERSUS REVENUE DECENTRALIZATION

This article examines whether the efficiency gains accompanying fiscal decentralization generate higher growth in more decentralized economies, applying pooled‐mean group techniques to a panel dataset of 23 Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries, 1972–2005. We find that spending decentralization has tended to be associated with lower economic growth while revenue decentralization has been associated with higher growth. Since OECD countries are substantially more spending than revenue decentralized, this is consistent with Oates' (1972) hypothesis that maximum efficiency gains require a close match between spending and revenue decentralization. It suggests reducing expenditure decentralization, and simultaneously increasing the fraction financed locally, would be growth‐enhancing. (JEL E62, H71, H72)     

THE IMPACT OF A PUBLIC OPTION IN THE U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET

We develop a game‐theoretical framework to examine the implications of the introduction of a nonprofit “public option” in the U.S. health insurance market. In this model, heterogeneous consumers have to choose between two competing insurance plans. One plan is offered by a profit‐maximizing private insurer; the other by social‐welfare‐maximizing public option. In equilibrium, the distinct objectives of the two insurers induce adverse selection in consumer choice: the public option covers the less healthy consumers, yielding the more profitable segment of market to the private insurer. However, our empirical results suggest that both insurers will capture significant parts of the health insurance market. (JEL I11, L10, L21, L32)     

WINNING IN PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS: HISTORICAL MOMENTS

Our aims in this paper are to (1) examine the higher moments of the distribution of winning percentages and (2) discover economic implications of such an examination. The results prove useful to both current sports league policy questions and future research. We speculate that the institutional differences between North American pro leagues and European soccer leagues will prove fruitful areas for future research on the determination of competitive balance. (JEL C1, L83, Z20)     

Structural Change in MLB Competitive Balance: The Depression, Team Location, and Integration

No detectable break points in within-season competitive balance (1901–99) occur after 1937 in the National League or after 1962 in the American League, despite expansion, free agency, and the growth of local TV revenue disparity since then. Instead, a continual improvement in competitive balance has occurred since those years. Associated with break points prior to these years, (1) the AL emerged from the depression much more unbalanced than the NL, (2) team movement and league expansion alter balance in well-known ways, and (3) discriminatory preferences were stronger in larger-revenue markets than in smaller-revenue markets in both leagues.     

DETERMINANTS OF REVENUE IN SPORTS LEAGUES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

This study investigates determinants of revenue in North America's four major professional sports leagues. Revenue is positively associated with on‐field success in baseball (MLB), basketball (NBA), and hockey (NHL), but not in football (NFL). The returns to success are not diminishing as commonly assumed, which casts doubt on the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, and differences across leagues are consistent with revenue sharing arrangements. Estimates indicate a strong negative but diminishing relationship between stadium age and revenue. Teams in larger markets generate more revenue than smaller markets, but the returns to success do not differ according to market size. (JEL Z21)     

Interorganizational network portfolios of nonprofit organizations: Implications for collaboration management

Increasingly, nonprofit organizations engage in interorganizational collaboration to address large‐scale social problems. Scholarship typically focuses on the characteristics of both within‐sector and cross‐sector partnerships of two collaborating organizations or all partnering organizations involved in a collaboration, but we know little about the patterns of interorganizational relationships that single nonprofit organizations maintain. This research draws upon surveys from 452 nonprofits and introduces nonprofit network portfolios, which we define as the number, integration, intensity, and duration of relationships that nonprofits purposefully develop with other organizations. Using 12 network measures, Ward cluster analysis revealed three distinct network portfolios: restricted within‐sector (n = 319, 70.58%), which included limited collaboration and prioritized within‐sector partnerships; robust within‐sector (n = 80, 17.70%), which included more nonprofit partnerships than restricted within‐sector portfolios; and cross‐sector (n = 53, 11.72%), which had a rich assemblage of integrative partnerships with nonprofits, businesses, and government agencies. Further, nonprofits that maintained each type of portfolio differed in their revenue and social mission, suggesting these factors are related to the types of collaboration that nonprofits maintain. This study makes contributions to existing research on interorganizational networks and cross‐sector collaboration and suggests practical and policy implications for nonprofit network management.     

HIERARCHICAL TRADE

Commodity trading is typically organized hierarchically: Large‐scale trade takes place at the global price system while individuals trade at local price systems within their countries. Agencies or trading houses establish the link between these different market places. In this paper, we devise a framework to study this type of hierarchical trade. We identify the free trade and the autarky equilibrium as polar cases. We show that no other two‐stage market equilibria exist if the commodity space is two‐dimensional. An example demonstrates that other, so‐called intermediate equilibria exist for three‐dimensional commodity spaces. We then provide an explicit construction of special classes of intermediate equilibria. Moreover, we study the consequences when some countries control the agency that organizes trade at the global level and we analyze the role of international goods arbitrage. Finally, we show that profit‐maximizing agencies may not promote free trade outcomes. (JEL D43, D50, F10)     

DOES DELEGATION INCREASE WORKER TRAINING?

We model a principal‐firm offering training to its agent‐worker under two alternative organizational structures: integration, where the principal retains authority to overrule the investment project recommended by the worker; and delegation, where the principal cannot overrule the worker's preferred investment project. We assume that training reduces the worker's effort cost of assembling information about alternative projects' payoffs and identify the conditions under which delegation increases the profit‐maximizing intensity of training. Empirical estimates from matched employer–employee data show that workplaces delegating authority do provide more worker training. This result persists in two cross sections, in panel fixed‐effect estimates and, critically, in an instrumental variable exercise that also controls for establishment fixed effects. (JEL D21, D22, D23, M53, M54)