LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION AND THE EURO AREA CRISIS: AN EMPIRICAL DSGE MODEL

We estimate a medium‐scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the Euro area with limited asset market participation (LAMP). Our results suggest that in the recent European Monetary Union years LAMP is particularly sizable (39% during 1993–2012) and important to understand business cycle features. The Bayes factor and the forecasting performance show that the LAMP model is preferred to its representative household counterpart. In the representative agent model the risk premium shock is the main driver of output volatility in order to match consumption correlation with output. In the LAMP model this role is played by the investment‐specific shock, because non‐Ricardian households introduce a Keynesian multiplier effect and raise the correlation between consumption and investments. We also detect the contractionary role of monetary policy shocks during the post‐2007 years. In this period consumption of non‐Ricardian households fell dramatically, but this outcome might have been avoided by a more aggressive policy stance. (JEL C11, C13, C32, E21, E32, E37)     

LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION,STICKY WAGES,AND MONETARY POLICY

A small amount of nominal wage stickiness makes limited asset market participation (LAMP) irrelevant for the design of monetary policy. Recent research argues that LAMP could invert the slope of the IS curve in otherwise standard New Keynesian models. This, in turn, implies that optimal monetary policy rules should be passive. We show that the so‐called inverted aggregate demand logic (IADL) relies on nominal wage flexibility. Outside of extreme parameterizations, wage stickiness prevents the inversion of the slope of the IS curve. Hence, LAMP does not generally alter the trade‐offs faced by a welfare maximizing Central Bank, and for this reason it does not fundamentally affect the design of optimal simple rules and optimal monetary policy. (JEL E21, E52)     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN BANKING,INDETERMINACY, AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper investigates economies of scale (ES) in financial intermediation as a source of equilibrium indeterminacy. Financial intermediation is embedded into a standard flexible‐price monetary model, and provides deposits (inside money) that substitute with currency to purchase consumption. The results indicate that equilibrium indeterminacy does not depend on a large degree of ES in intermediation nor a large intermediation sector, but on monetary policy and the determination of nominal interest rates. Monetary policies not targeting nominal rates allow for indeterminacy to arise for any positive degree of ES, while policies targeting nominal rates eliminate indeterminacy for all degrees of ES. (JEL C62, E44, E52)     

TO LEAN OR NOT TO LEAN AGAINST AN ASSET PRICE BUBBLE? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, economists are reconsidering the appropriate role of monetary policy towards equity bubbles. This paper contributes to these deliberations by estimating the response of the stock market to monetary policy tightening by using a Bayesian time-varying VAR model. By introducing the cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio, we propose a method that estimates its fundamental and bubble components. We find that asset prices will initially fall and eventually rise again but without the risk of feeding the bubble. Counterfactual policy experiments provide additional evidence that monetary policy can lean against equity and housing prices. (JEL E50, E52, E58)     

A NEW MONETARIST MODEL OF FIAT AND E‐MONEY

We develop a dual payment New Monetarist model, where an electronic money (e‐purse) competes with fiat money (cash). The two payment instruments differ in terms of security, cost, and acceptability. Strategic complementarities lead to multiple monetary equilibria. We establish the conditions under which e‐money can coexist with, or replace fiat money, and explain the reasons for the e‐purse failure/success in a few countries. We also compare welfare when one currency or both circulate. When the risk of theft of cash is endogenous, e‐money cannot replace cash entirely; however, low inflation can facilitate the adoption of e‐money in parallel with fiat money. (JEL D83, E40, E50)     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE,MONETARY POLICY,AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM A FAVAR MODEL

This paper examines the effects of exchange rate depreciation to the U.S. economy in a factor‐augmented vector autoregression model using monthly data of 148 variables for the post–Bretton Woods period of 1973–2017. Exchange rate shock is identified to reflect exogenous disturbances to the foreign exchange market, and movements in exchange rate that are not accounted for by changes in the U.S. monetary policy. We find that depreciation is expansionary and inflationary to the broad U.S. economy, the current account improves over time conforming to the J‐curve theory, and monetary policy is leaning against the wind. (JEL E3, E5, F31, F32, F41)     

CAN MONETARY POLICY INFLUENCE LONG‐TERM INTEREST RATES? IT DEPENDS

Can monetary policy influence long‐term interest rates? Studies that have tackled this question using vector autoregressions (VARs) generally find that monetary policy's influence on long‐term interest rates is small and often statistically insignificant. Other studies, however, using a single‐equation approach, have found a robust relationship. Our study sheds new light on this question by estimating the effect of monetary policy shocks on long‐term interest rates in a VAR with long‐run monetary neutrality restrictions. We find that U.S. monetary policy can strongly influence long‐term interest rates, but only when the Federal Reserve has inflation‐fighting credibility and is able to firmly anchor inflationary expectations. (JEL E43, E51, E52)     

IS THE PRICE ELASTICITY OF MONEY DEMAND ALWAYS UNITY?

Including both monetary gold and nonmonetary gold in a standard money‐in‐utility model, we establish a presumption that the price elasticity of money demand should be less than 1 under commodity standards. Applying cointegration methods to data of the world, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we find support for the new theory. (JEL E41, E42)     

FOREIGN BANKS AND THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL

We provide new evidence on bank ownership and transmission of monetary policy using bank‐level data on 453 banks in Central and Eastern European economies between 1998 and 2012. Only domestic banks adjust loans to changes in monetary policy, while foreign banks do not. Conventional wisdom says that this is because foreign banks can rely on parent banks' funding to insulate against monetary policy shocks. In this paper we document an alternative explanation. Deposits in foreign banks do not react to monetary policy, hence the bank lending channel is only triggered in domestic banks. (JEL E50, F36, G21)     

A MONETARY BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL FOR INDIA

A New Keynesian monetary business cycle model is constructed to study why monetary transmission in India is weak. Our models feature banking and financial sector frictions as well as an informal sector. The predominant channel of monetary transmission is a credit channel. Our main finding is that base money shocks have a larger and more persistent effect on output than an interest rate shock, as in the data. The presence of an informal sector hinders monetary transmission. Contrary to the consensus view, financial repression in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, does not weaken monetary transmission. (JEL E31, E32, E44, E52, E63)     

CONSUMER CREDIT,LIQUIDITY, AND THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF MONETARY POLICY

That the lending channel is alive and well for consumer lending is at first glance a compelling notion given the growth in consumer credit. However, this paper demonstrates with disaggregated monthly consumer credit data that the consumer loan‐supply effect has diminished over time. Contrary to assumptions motivating the lending channel, after the mid‐1980s, households are not constrained in accessing nonrevolving or revolving bank loans in response to a monetary shock. The findings of this paper have important implications for research on the monetary transmission mechanism beyond the lending channel and for business cycle research in general. (JEL E44, E50, E60, C32)     

THE IMPACT OF RETURN ON COLLATERAL IN A CHANNEL SYSTEM

We empirically investigate the relationship between the return on collateral and monetary policy implementation in the channel system. Recent developments in monetary theory suggest that the return on government assets which measures the opportunity cost of holding collateral should have negative impacts on the interest-rate spread and the interbank market rate. The central bank should set a higher spread when the return on collateral is below a cutoff but implements a lower spread when the return on collateral is higher than the cutoff. The interbank market rate tends to lie above the policy target rate when the return on collateral is low and vice versa. We use data from Eurozone area and six industrialized countries to test these theoretical implications. We propose two econometric models: one is more structural and closely related to the monetary model to test the negative relationships, and the other is based on the threshold autoregression model to detect the potential cutoffs. Our findings provide conditional support for the negative impact of return on collateral. (JEL E40, E52, E58)     

FORWARD GUIDANCE AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY

This paper analyzes forward guidance in a nonlinear model with a zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate. Forward guidance is modeled with news shocks to the monetary policy rule, which capture innovations in expectations from central bank communication about future policy rates. Whereas most studies use quasi‐linear models that disregard the expectational effects of hitting the ZLB, we show how the effectiveness of forward guidance nonlinearly depends on the state of the economy, the speed of the recovery, the degree of uncertainty, the policy shock size, and the forward guidance horizon when households account for the ZLB. (JEL E43, E58, E61)     

THE SWINGS OF U.S. INFLATION AND THE GIBSON PARADOX

In recent business cycles, U.S. inflation has experienced a reduction of volatility and a severe weakening in the correlation to the nominal interest rate (Gibson paradox). We examine these facts in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with money. Our findings point at a flatter New Keynesian Phillips Curve (higher price stickiness) and a lower persistence of markup shocks as the main explanatory factors. In addition, a higher interest‐rate elasticity of money demand, an increasing role of demand‐side shocks, and a less systematic behavior of Fed's monetary policy also account for the recent patterns of U.S. inflation dynamics. (JEL E32, E47)     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND IMPERFECT FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CASE FOR NEGATIVE NOMINAL INTEREST RATES?

This article studies optimal monetary policy in a model with credit frictions and money demand. We show that augmenting a standard New Keynesian model with money demand and financial frictions generates a mechanism that, in equilibrium, gives rise to optimal negative nominal interest rates. In addition, we find that the tighter credit markets are, the lower the optimal nominal policy interest rate and the more likely it is to be negative. Quantitatively, when credit constraints are binding, a standard calibration of the model generates an optimal nominal policy interest rate that is roughly ?4% annually. (JEL E31, E41, E43, E44, E52, E58)     

STOP‐GO MONETARY POLICY

We propose and estimate several discrete choice models of monetary policy decision‐making that feature time‐varying inertia. The models permit us to account for three stylized facts characterizing monetary policymaking in the United States: (1) target interest rates are gradually adjusted in small discrete movements, (2) there are some long stretches of time in which rates are repeatedly moved, and (3) there are other long stretches in which the policy rate does not change. The models are used to account for delayed monetary policy responses to the recession of 2001 and to the housing‐driven expansion of 2003–2006. (JEL E52, E58, E65)     

GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES,STRATEGIC SAVINGS,AND THE DOT‐COM BOOM AND BUST

Data from the dot‐com boom‐bust episode suggest that growth opportunities played an important role in explaining firms' financing strategy during this understudied episode. The low leverage of this sector was mainly driven by high growth firms which increased their leverage following the crash despite suffering a much larger fall in their market value. We present a parsimonious dynamic firm financing model where growth opportunities alone can generate the heterogeneous patterns in the financing and performance between high and low growth information technology firms prior to and following the market crash. The calibrated model also sheds light on the role played by monetary policy during that episode. (JEL G32, E22, E5)     

FISCAL STABILIZATION WITH PARTIAL EXCHANGE RATE PASS‐THROUGH

This article examines the role of fiscal stabilization policy in a two‐country framework that allows for partial exchange rate pass‐through. Analytical solutions for optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules depend on the degree of pass‐through. Each country unilaterally uses its fiscal instrument to stabilize the costs facing exporters. The welfare effects differ strongly depending on the degree of pass‐through. For high levels, both countries are better off with the fiscal instrument and welfare is closer to the benchmark flex‐price level. For low levels, however, the unilateral equilibrium policy rules lead to high volatility in taxes, and fiscal policy ends up being destabilizing by transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. Because these results stem from strategic considerations by the two countries, the fiscal instrument is not used under policy coordination. In addition, imposing a monetary union increases welfare when pass‐through is low, including the case of local currency pricing. (JEL E52, E63, F41, F42)     

Production Inflexibilities and the Cost Channel of Monetary Policy

This article shows how the existence of production inflexibilities in the form of capacity utilization constraints conditions the magnitude of the response of macroeconomic variables to a money supply stimulus. Capacity is modeled under explicit microfoundations, where the existence of idiosyncratic demand uncertainty generates variable utilization rates across firms. In this context, money has real effects due to non-Fisherian effects stemming from limitations in households' access to the financial market. Firms' capacity constraints generate a convex aggregate supply curve, which is a feature of the economy that has important implications for the conduct of monetary policy.     

INTEREST RATE PROMINENCE IN CONSUMER DECISION‐MAKING

Variations in consumers' responsiveness to interest rates across households and over time have important implications for monetary transmission. Responses from the Michigan Survey of Consumers provide an indication of the degree to which interest rates are a prominent consideration in spending decisions, news recollection, and financial situations. Prominence is strongest in housing attitudes, increases with income, education, and homeownership, and declined in the Great Recession. Rate prominence is associated with stronger responsiveness of consumption attitudes to monetary policy. (JEL D84, D91, E21, E40, E50)