SQUEALER DEALERS: THE MARKET FOR INFORMATION IN FEDERAL DRUG TRAFFICKING PROSECUTIONS

Federal data on drug trafficking sentences are used to determine factors that affect market quantities of providing information against other defendants (i.e., defendant probabilities of receiving testimony‐related sentence reductions) and market prices of information (i.e., the sizes of such sentence reductions). Women and better‐educated defendants experience high demand (higher quantities and prices) for information. Blacks, Hispanics, and non‐U.S. citizens experience low demand. Defendants expecting longer sentences have higher supply of information. Conditional on expected sentence, crack dealers, high‐level dealers, and dealers with long criminal histories experience low demand, while low‐level dealers experience high demand. Women of all races experience high demand for information. (JEL K14, J15, J16)     

SOCIALLY OPTIMAL PLEA BARGAINING WITH COSTLY TRIALS AND BAYESIAN JURIES

This paper investigates optimal plea bargaining when trials are costly, defendant guilt is uncertain, and juries rationally respond to the plea bargaining policy employed. The model shows that when innocence rates among the arrested are low, it is optimal to offer all defendants pleas that are acceptable to guilty and innocent defendants. However, as the innocence rate becomes more significant, optimal plea policy switches to one in which plea offers are only acceptable to guilty defendants. However, even when optimal, the societal benefits to such separating policies are limited due to constraints on the frequency such offers can be made. (JEL D6, D8, K4)     

THE UNEMPLOYMENT VOLATILITY PUZZLE: THE ROLE OF MATCHING COSTS REVISITED

Pissarides has argued that the standard search model with sunk fixed matching costs increases unemployment volatility without introducing an unrealistic response of wages of new matches to productivity shocks. We revise the role of matching costs and show that when these costs are not sunk and, therefore, can be partially passed on to new hired workers in the form of lower wages, the amplification mechanism of fixed matching costs is considerably reduced. Finally, we observe that an empirical reasonable share of sunk costs is not able to match the volatility of unemployment without introducing unrealistic sensitivity to unemployment benefits. (JEL E32, J32, J64)     

FIRMS AND FLEXIBILITY

The United States and France have very similar labor productivity levels while there are considerable differences between the firm‐size distributions and firm dynamics in the two countries. To reconcile these observations we introduce a joint model of endogenous entrepreneurship and firm‐size dynamics with firing costs, unemployment benefits, entry costs, and a tax wedge between wages and labor costs. We use our model to analyze the role of these rigitidies in explaining firm dynamics and productivity patterns in the United States and France. We find that our model with all rigidities goes a long way in accounting for firm‐size differentials between the United States and France while generating similar labor productivity outcomes. (JEL C78, D21, E24, J6)     

NOMINAL WAGE CONTRACTS AND THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM

We introduce staggered and synchronized nominal wage contracts into a one‐sector monetary dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the importance of the monetary transmission mechanism. We find a stronger monetary propagation mechanism under a synchronized setting as compared to a staggered setting. This causes the economy under staggering to be less volatile, better matching the data, as well as bringing about lower welfare costs (measured in terms of consumption). However, our results are mixed when it comses to evaluating the contemporaneous correlations and cross‐correlations. We conclude that overall staggered contracts do better in matching the U.S. economy. (JEL E32, E51, J41)     

INFLATION DYNAMICS AND SUBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

We estimate a forward‐looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) for the United States using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as proxy for expected inflation. We obtain significant and plausible estimates for the structural parameters independently of whether we use the output gap or unit labor costs as a measure of marginal costs. Moreover, when estimating a Phillips curve where lagged inflation enters due to price indexation by nonreoptimizing firms, we obtain significant parameter estimates of the sign predicted by theory independently of the marginal cost measure used. (JEL E31)     

THE GENERALIZED ALCHIAN–ALLEN THEOREM: A SLUTSKY EQUATION FOR RELATIVE DEMAND

We generalize the Alchian–Allen theorem so as to account for income and endowment effects and provide two versions of a Generalized Alchian–Allen theorem: one for a unit cost component and one for a proportional cost component. Both versions provide a decomposition of an uncompensated change in the demand ratio of two goods into a substitution effect and an income‐endowment effect—and may thus be regarded as extensions of the familiar Slutsky equation for relative demand. Finally, we apply our results to the choice of real estates and to parental time allocation decisions, the latter providing implications for child care policies. (JEL D11, H21, J22, R21)     

LOST IN THE MAIL: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CRIME

Stealing, shirking, and opportunistic behavior in general can create barriers to the development of markets. The costs associated with such behavior are shared by both firms and individuals and can be large enough to even prevent the initiation of trade. Measurement of these costs is difficult because information is not available for transactions that fail to occur. We use a field experiment to identify opportunistic crime in a task that is important and relevant for trade: the delivery of mail. We subtly manipulate the content and information available in mail sent to households across neighborhoods that vary by income, and detected high levels of shirking and stealing. Eighteen percent of the mail never arrived at its destination, and significantly more was lost if there was even a slight hint of something additional inside the envelope. Our results demonstrate the importance of transaction costs created by crime and that not all populations are equally affected. Middle‐income neighborhoods suffer the most. (JEL C93, K42, H41, L87, O21)     

GONE FISHING! REPORTED SICKNESS ABSENTEEISM AND THE WEATHER

A fundamental challenge in informing employer–employee agency problems is measuring employee shirking activity. We identify the propensity of employees to misreport health in order to exploit favorable weather by linking Canadian weather data and survey data on short‐term spells of sickness absenteeism among indoor workers during the non‐winter months. The results point to a clear tendency for reported sickness absenteeism to rise with the recreational quality of the weather. Comparing across workers suggests larger marginal weather effects where shirking costs are higher, which we show is consistent with employees' marginal utility of outdoor leisure increasing in the interaction of their health and weather quality. We discuss the implications of our findings for flexible vacation policies and survey respondents' trust in the confidentiality guarantees of statistical agencies. (JEL D82, I10, J22)     

THE EARLY BIRD GETS THE WORM? BIRTH ORDER EFFECTS IN A DYNAMIC FAMILY MODEL

Birth order effects are found in empirical work but lack solid theoretical foundations in economics. Our new modeling approach to children provides this. Each child’s needs change as it grows, and births are sequential. Each child has the same genetic makeup and parents do not favor one child over the other. Parental childcare time lowers the caregiver’s current and future wages; this opportunity cost varies across time. Benefits also vary and when parental childcare is a public input, coresident children allow economies of scope in childcare. Birth order effects emerge from the changing benefits and costs. (JEL D13, D91, J13)     

NEW MEASURES OF THE COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE SUBJECTIVE WELL‐BEING OF 3.3 MILLION AMERICANS

Using two large U.S. surveys, we estimate the effects of unemployment on the subjective well‐being (SWB) of the unemployed and the rest of the population. For the unemployed, the nonpecuniary costs of unemployment are several times as large as those resulting from lower incomes, while the indirect effect at the population level is 15 times as large. For those who are still employed, a one percentage point increase in local unemployment has an impact on well‐being roughly equivalent to a 4% decline in household income. We also find evidence indicating that job security is an important channel for the indirect effects of unemployment. (JEL E24, H23, J64, J68)     

GENDER AND THE CONSULTING ACADEMIC ECONOMIST

We surveyed academic economists on their experiences and perceptions of legal consulting. Nearly two-thirds have consulting experience and 40% have consulted within the last 5 years. Base hourly rates average $244, with a median of $200. Women are less likely than men to have served as consultants and charge lower rates than comparable men, but there are few differences by gender in willingness to consult. Women report substantially more negative bias and are less likely to consult in complex cases or to have a high profile role in litigation. (JEL J44, J71, K41)     

THE BOOKER DECISION AND DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCES

I test how federal criminal sentences changed after the Supreme Court decision U.S. v. Booker changed the sentencing guidelines from “mandatory” to “advisory.” Conditional on final guideline cell, results show Booker significantly reduced sentences, especially for women and defendants with a terminal high school degree, but less so for college graduates. This suggests discrimination among federal judges. When accounting for judges' control over final offense level, evidence regarding high school graduates and college graduates is unchanged, but evidence that sentences fell for women and the default group weakens substantially. This latter result suggests, perhaps, a new methodology by which judges applied offense levels and guideline‐conditional sentences post‐Booker.     

THE MORAL COSTS OF NASTINESS

We introduce two variants of the one‐shot joy‐of‐destruction minigame (mini‐JOD). Two players are endowed with the same amount of money. They simultaneously decide whether or not to reduce the other player's payoff at an own cost. In one treatment there was a probability that nature would destroy the opponent's money anyway. We test whether this feature reduces the moral costs of nastiness, and find that destruction rates rise significantly, despite the absence of strategic reasons. (JEL C72, C91, D03)     

EMPLOYMENT AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS EFFECTS OF OBSERVED NONWAGE LABOR COSTS

To assess the employment effects of labor costs, it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm‐worker data set, we estimate a long‐run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss effects of observed employers' contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers' deductions (social security and income tax). We find that nonwage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white collars and by 53% for blue collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers' and workers' contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white collars and 12% for blue collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%. (JEL J23, J32)     

ON THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S SERVICE AND ENFORCEMENT

Built on the seminal work of Graetz et al. (1986), this study considers a model of tax compliance in which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) services as well as audits taxpayers as in the real world. Taxpayers are uncertain about whether their incomes are eligible for deduction/exemption, and may seek advice from the taxpayer service provided by the IRS to mitigate the uncertainty. We show: (1) while the society's preferred quality of taxpayer service is likely to be sufficiently high, the IRS's preferred quality of taxpayer service is only at an intermediate level; and (2) the conflict between the society and the IRS tends to be intensified as the cost of tax audits becomes lower. Evidence in support of our results is addressed. We also extend our model to addressing the issue of corruption in tax administration and to considering a dynamic model. (JEL D82, H26, K42)     

ON FRUITFUL AND FUTILE TESTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEARCH AND PRICE DISPERSION

We exploit cross‐sectional and temporal differences in search intensity in order to examine the relationship between search costs and price dispersion using a hand‐collected panel data set from Jerusalem's Shuk Mahane Yehuda outdoor market. We present empirical evidence that price dispersion increases with the cost of search using several different measures of price dispersion; however, our interpretation of this finding is sensitive to the search proxy in question. We also address several acute difficulties facing empiricists seeking to test theoretical price‐dispersion models in which consumers are heterogeneous in their search behavior. (JEL L11, L13)     

DESIGNED TO FAIL: THE MEDICARE AUCTION FOR DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

We examine the theoretical properties of the auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment. Two unique features of the Medicare auction are (1) winners are paid the median winning bid and (2) bids are nonbinding. We show that median pricing results in allocation inefficiencies as some high‐cost firms potentially displace low‐cost firms as winners. Further, the auction may leave demand unfulfilled as some winners refuse to supply because the price is set below their cost. We also introduce a model of nonbinding bids that establishes the rationality of a lowball bid strategy employed by many bidders in the actual Medicare auctions and recently replicated in Caltech experiments. We contrast the median‐price auction with the standard clearing‐price auction where each firm bids true costs as a dominant strategy, resulting in competitive equilibrium prices and full efficiency. (JEL D44, I11, H57)     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS: THE CASE OF THE MELTZER‐RICHARD ECONOMY

In previous studies on the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF), the existing tax system has been assumed to be either arbitrary or optimal. This note explores another possibility: the existing tax system itself represents a political equilibrium. Our exploration proceeds in Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) political economy of redistributive taxation. An interesting feature of our finding is that the degree of income inequality as measured by the ratio of mean to median income can play an important role in estimating the SMCF and judging whether the level of redistribution is excessive or inadequate. (JEL D61, D72, H21)     

QUANTIFYING BIAS IN DRIVING‐UNDER‐THE‐INFLUENCE ENFORCEMENT

As the marginal suspect and propensity to commit crime are unobserved across racial categories, it is difficult to quantify racial bias with law enforcement outcomes data. We test for racial bias in driving‐under‐the‐influence of alcohol enforcement. The assessment outcome variable, blood alcohol content (BAC), provides information about motorist's choices and allows for a more refined test for racial bias compared with other law enforcement outcome data. We find no evidence of racial bias in the relevant range where our model applies. However, we do find differences in find rates at the lowest levels of BAC, where there should be no impairment. (JEL J7, K42)