THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION,AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth. The model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries. The calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates, the corruption associated with public investment projects, and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue. The presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant, but not large, negative effects on economic growth. The relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross‐country data. The model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare. (JEL H3, O4)     

THE ROLE OF MONITORING OF CORRUPTION IN A SIMPLE ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL

This article analyzes the relationship between economic growth and the monitoring of corruption. In our theoretical model, we derive a nonlinear relationship between the level of monitoring and economic growth, as well as between corruption and economic growth. At low monitoring levels, the economy experiences widespread corruption and medium growth rates, whereas no corruption occurs at intermediate monitoring levels, but low growth rates are recorded. At high monitoring levels, no corruption takes place and high growth rates are observed. The model is estimated using a dynamic panel data approach for Italy. Empirical results support the theoretical model. (JEL C33, D73, K42)     

GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AND GROWTH

Using a simple stochastic growth model that nests both exogenous and endogenous growth, this paper shows that the growth rate should be mean stationary if growth is exogenous and difference stationary if growth is endogenous and any variable affecting investment is difference stationary. Permanent changes in the share of output devoted to government consumption should permanently affect the growth rate if and only if, growth is endogenous. I test these implications and find no evidence that growth is endogenous. Furthermore, even if growth is endogenous, the evidence indicates that its degree of endogeneity is likely to be small.     

POPULATION GROWTH AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

The role of population growth in the process of industrialization is studied in a general equilibrium model. It provides a formal presentation of Rostow's insight of the role of a leading sector in industrialization. Population growth may lead to a shortage of food and a breakdown of the industrialization process. However, population growth may benefit the manufacturing sector in the adoption of increasing returns to scale technologies. Elasticity of demand for agricultural goods plays an important role in determining whether an improvement of agricultural technology or an increase of population is beneficial to the manufacturing sector. A comparison of China and Britain before the Industrial Revolution shows that research and development are necessary for sustained growth. Achieving industrialization independently requires a combination of a sufficiently large market size from the demand side and a sufficiently large supply of technologies from the supply side . ( JEL O14, E10, N10, Q01)     

CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION AND THE ROLE OF WAGE INCENTIVES WITH ENDOGENOUS MONITORING TECHNOLOGY

The importance of high salaries to circumvent bureaucratic corruption has been widely recognized in the policy debate. Yet, there appears to be much reluctance when it comes to the implementation. In this paper, we argue that deterring corruption through wage incentives may become prohibitively expensive that the government finds it optimal to accept higher net revenues at the expense of honesty. Deviating from the existing literature, we set an endogenous monitoring technology that allows us to capture the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives to deter bribery. We find that the government is better‐off either completely eliminating corruption or accepting corruption by offering wages lower than the market wage. Offering public wage premium that does not deter bribery is suboptimal. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do it either through wage incentives or monitoring. The role of wage incentives decreases in societies with higher level of dishonesty. (JEL D73, H26, J33, J41)     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE GROWTH ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVE

A positive relationship between FDI and economic growth under two economic conditions has been estimated: a sufficient level of human capital and well-developed financial markets, respectively. However, these two conditions can be fundamentally different catalysts for FDI to promote economic growth in the perspective of growth accounting. Using data from 69 countries over 1970–1989, we find that FDI promotes productivity growth only when the host country reaches a threshold level of human capital; and FDI promotes capital growth only when a certain level of financial development is achieved. ( JEL F21)     

RISING R&D INTENSITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Over the past decades, private R&D spending in the United States and other developed countries has been growing faster than gross domestic product. At the same time, the growth rates of per-capita and aggregate output have been rather stable, possibly declining slightly. This article proposes a growth model that can account for the observed phenomenon by explicitly describing competition among technological leaders and followers in individual markets in a way that is consistent with existing studies on firms' motivation to invest in R&D. The model shows the possibility that the unsustainable trend of rising R&D intensity persists for a very long time. (JEL O3, O4, L1)     

UNANTICIPATED MONEY GROWTH AND OUTPUT FLUCTUATIONS

A rational expectations model is developed in which prices are fixed during a period. The implications of this model are that output fluctuations are correlated with unanticipated aggregate demand but not with unanticipated inflation. Empirical tests of the model indicate that the persistence of business cycles cannot be explained solely by unanticipated aggregate demand .     

DEFICITS, POLITICS AND MONEY GROWTH

We examine the linkage between Federal deficits and money growth by allowing the Fed's response to any given deficit to vary systematically according to how the deficit is generated and the Party affiliation of the current president. In equations for Ml and monetary base growth, the structural deficit is consistently significant and invariant across political changes, while the cyclical component of the deficit (or a direct measure of the business cycle) is significant only during the tenure of Democratic presidents.     

RECIPROCITY UNDER BRIEF AND LONG-TIME DELAYS

We report the results from three experiments embedded in the same overarching design, which extends the Gift Exchange paradigm for the study of worker–employer relationships. We focus on the effect of the length of the delay, between the time at which workers learn their wage and when they choose an effort level, on the relationship between wage and effort. We compare effort choices made within a few hours with those made several weeks afterward. We find that the strength of the wage-effort relationship decreases over time, and this change appears to be driven by workers who receive low wages. (JEL C91, J33, M52)     

CORRUPTION: TOP DOWN OR BOTTOM UP?

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.     

WHAT DETERMINES CORRUPTION? INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE FROM MICRODATA

This paper uses a microlevel data set from 49 countries to create a direct measure of corruption, which portrays the extent of bribery as revealed by individuals who live in those countries. In addition, it investigates the determinants of being asked for a bribe at the individual level. The results show that both personal and country characteristics determine the risk of exposure to bribery. Examples are gender, income, education, marital status, the city size, the country’s unemployment rate, average education, and the strength of the institutions in the country. (JEL K4, D73 P16)     

SPECULATIVE PROFITS,INNOVATION, AND GROWTH

When technological change affects the prices of tradeable assets, innovators can obtain speculative profits by exploiting their inside information as to the occurrence of innovations. We propose a tractable model of endogenous growth that formalizes this argument, originally due to Hirshleifer (1971). We then use the model to assess two claims advanced by Hirshleifer, namely, that speculative profits can generate excessive investment in R&D when they add to monopoly rents guaranteed by patent protection, or else even in a perfectly competitive economy. The analysis confirms the first claim, but casts doubts on the second one. (JEL O30, O40)     

GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE WHEN TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN CAPITAL ARE COMPLEMENTS

This article presents a model of endogenous growth, in which a firm's technology and a country's human capital stock are complementary in the production of output. Production technologies are created by costly research and development (R&D) and are owned by firms that can freely choose where in the world to produce. Both production and R&D have a positive effect on a country's human capital stock. While all countries typically grow at the same rate in the long run, they differ in their levels of human capital, per capita output, and the quality of the technologies that are used in production. A country's relative position in terms of productivity is history dependent. Countries that start out with a lower human capital stock or industrialize later end up with a lower per capita GDP in long‐term equilibrium. (JEL O4, O33, O47)     

INSTITUTIONS, TRANSACTION COSTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This essay develops a theoretical framework which explores the historical obstacles to economic growth. These obstacles are examined in the context of the political/economic institutional framework of economies in history and consequent transaction costs that determine economic performance and growth. The essay concludes with specific suggestions for the study of economic growth.     

CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE ON LONG-RUN GROWTH AND INFLATION

While inflation is generally inversely related to growth, I show that estimates of the relationship seer two robustness problems which plague a variety of model specifications. First, growth-inflation results are highly sensitive to modifications to the country sample, limited from the start to low- and moderate-inflation countries. Second, results are also sensitive to modifications in the time period of analysis. In conjunction with the regression specification sensitivity documented by Levine and Renelt [1992], these results should further discourage the practice cf quantifying inflation's effects with cross-county growth regressions.