DIFFERENTIAL DEPOSIT GUARANTEES AND THE EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY ON BANK LENDING

This paper utilizes differences in de jure deposit insurance coverage across banks and changes in coverage over time to identify a bank‐lending channel in Poland. Banks with partial guarantees have a stronger loan response to monetary policy than banks with full guarantees. Furthermore, the weak response of the fully guaranteed banks is attributed to their ability to raise low‐reserve, uninsured time deposits relative to the partially covered banks. When differential coverage is eliminated, there is no disparity in the loan response between the two groups. This lending channel has implications for credit control and financial system development in emerging markets. (JEL E52, G21, G28)     

FOREIGN BANKS AND THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL

We provide new evidence on bank ownership and transmission of monetary policy using bank‐level data on 453 banks in Central and Eastern European economies between 1998 and 2012. Only domestic banks adjust loans to changes in monetary policy, while foreign banks do not. Conventional wisdom says that this is because foreign banks can rely on parent banks' funding to insulate against monetary policy shocks. In this paper we document an alternative explanation. Deposits in foreign banks do not react to monetary policy, hence the bank lending channel is only triggered in domestic banks. (JEL E50, F36, G21)     

A MONETARY BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL FOR INDIA

A New Keynesian monetary business cycle model is constructed to study why monetary transmission in India is weak. Our models feature banking and financial sector frictions as well as an informal sector. The predominant channel of monetary transmission is a credit channel. Our main finding is that base money shocks have a larger and more persistent effect on output than an interest rate shock, as in the data. The presence of an informal sector hinders monetary transmission. Contrary to the consensus view, financial repression in the form of a statutory liquidity ratio and administered interest rates, does not weaken monetary transmission. (JEL E31, E32, E44, E52, E63)     

INSTITUTIONS,HOUSEHOLD CREDIT COMPOSITION,AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

We show that the negative effect of household credit growth on subsequent economic growth documented in the recent literature is not the same across countries. The effect is stronger in countries with weak institutions where the fraction of consumer credit in total household credit is greater. That is an important nuance as consumer credit is a sizable part of household credit in many emerging markets and its rapid buildup should be observed with the same caution as a rapid buildup in housing credit. (JEL G21, E32, E44)     

MONETARY POLICY AND ANTI‐CYCLICAL BANK CAPITAL REGULATION

The financial crisis of 2008–2009 revived attention given to booms and busts in bank credit, and their effects on real activity. This interest sparked two different strands of research in macro. The first one focuses on monetary policy in the context of financial frictions. The second studies capital regulation in banking. To the best of our knowledge, so far these two topics have mostly been studied in isolation from each other. Thus, we still lack an understanding of how monetary policy and bank capital regulation interact in the presence of financial fragility. This paper aims to contribute to furthering this understanding. Specifically, we ask how the monetary policy rule should look like in the presence of cyclical capital requirements. We extend the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with bank capital in Aliaga‐Díaz and Olivero by introducing price rigidities in the spirit of the New‐Keynesian literature. We find that: First, anti‐cyclical requirements have important stabilization properties relative to the case of constant requirements. This is true for all types of fluctuations that we study, which include those caused by productivity, preference, fiscal, monetary, and financial shocks. Second, output and consumption volatilities present in the no regulation economy can be recovered with anti‐cyclical requirements as long as the policy rate responds only slightly to credit spreads. Third, monetary policy rules that respond to credit conditions also perform better in terms of welfare. (JEL E32, E44)     

INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON CONTEMPORARY BANKING RESEARCH: THE USE OF FIXED EFFECTS TO DISENTANGLE LOAN DEMAND FROM LOAN SUPPLY

With the onset of the financial crisis, disentangling the effects of loan demand and supply in contemporary banking research has become vital for a proper assessment of supply-related banking shocks. These shocks may negatively affect the real economy through many channels, such as the lending channel of monetary policy transmission, the bank risk-taking channel or the evaluation of macroprudential policy efficiency. All these rely on separating the two lending components. Empirical identification has largely relied on the use of demand-related fixed effects, which has also been applied in several analyses within this symposium. (JEL G21)     

SMALL‐ AND MEDIUM‐SIZED ENTERPRISE FINANCING AND SECURITIZATION: FIRM‐LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM THE EURO AREA

This paper analyzes the impact of securitization on access to finance for small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in the euro area. Using firm‐level survey data on SME financing conditions, we show that an increase in securitization issuance reduces the probability of SMEs facing credit constraints and decreases the costs of bank financing for nonconstrained firms. Our results reveal that in addition to the volume of securitization, its type and quality matter for credit extension to SMEs. The paper thus provides empirical support for recent initiatives to revive securitization in Europe and for effective monetary policy transmission in the euro area. (JEL D22, E44, E51, E58, G21)     

LEANING AGAINST WINDY BANK LENDING

Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides evidence that monetary policy reacted to bank loan growth in the United States during the Great Moderation. It then shows that the optimized simple interest‐rate rule features no response to the growth of bank credit. However, the welfare loss associated to the empirical responsiveness is small. The sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial in determining whether a “leaning‐against‐the‐wind” policy is optimal or not. In fact, the predominant role of supply shocks in the model gives rise to a trade‐off between inflation and financial stabilization. (JEL E32, E44, E52)     

DO CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS MATTER FOR MONETARY POLICY?

Central bankers and financial supervisors can have conflicting goals. While monetary policymakers work to ensure sufficient lending activities as a foundation for high and stable economic growth, supervisors may limit banks’ lending capacities in order to prevent excessive risk taking. We show that, in theory, central bankers can avoid this potential conflict by adopting an interest rate strategy that takes accounts of capital adequacy requirements. Empirical evidence suggests that while policymakers at the Federal Reserve have adjusted their interest rate to neutralizing the procyclical impact of bank capital requirements, those in Germany and Japan have not. (JEL E52, E58, G21)     

LENDING RELATIONSHIPS AND MONETARY POLICY

Financial intermediation and bank spreads are the important elements in the analysis of business cycle transmission and monetary policy. We present a simple framework that introduces lending relationships, a relevant feature of financial intermediation that has been so far neglected in the monetary economics literature, into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with staggered prices and cost channels. Our main findings are (a) banking spreads move countercyclically generating amplified output responses, (b) spread movements are important for monetary policymaking even when a standard Taylor Rule is employed, (c) modifying the policy rule to include a banking spread adjustment improves stabilization of shocks and increases welfare when compared to rules that only respond to output gap and inflation, and finally (d) the presence of strong lending relationships in the banking sector can lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium forcing the Central Bank to react to spread movements. (JEL E44, E52, G21)     

FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AND THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES

This article provides a quantitative assessment of the role of financial frictions in the choice of exchange rate regimes. I use a two‐country model with sticky prices to compare different exchange rate arrangements. I simulate the model without and with borrowing constraints on investment, under monetary policy and technology shocks. I find that the stabilization properties of floating exchange rate regimes in face of foreign shocks are enhanced relative to fixed exchange rate in presence of credit frictions. In presence of symmetric and correlated shock, fixed exchange rates regimes can perform better than floating. This analysis can have important policy implications for accession countries joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II system and with high degrees of credit frictions. (JEL E3, E42, E44, E52, F41)     

THE CYCLICALITY OF PRICE‐COST MARGINS IN BANKING: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS DETERMINANTS

We study the determinants of the cyclical behavior of banks' price‐cost margins in the United States banking sector, using time series quarterly data for the period 1979–2005. We contribute to the literature by building an empirical model of the countercyclical behavior of these margins first documented by Aliaga‐Díaz and Olivero (2010a) . Doing so we are able to explore potential explanations for this behavior, and to show that margins are consistently countercyclical, even after controlling for the effects of credit risk and monetary policy. As a mechanism for the propagation of aggregate shocks, the countercyclical nature of margins in banking can provide additional support to stabilization policy. (JEL E32, E44, G21)     

LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION,STICKY WAGES,AND MONETARY POLICY

A small amount of nominal wage stickiness makes limited asset market participation (LAMP) irrelevant for the design of monetary policy. Recent research argues that LAMP could invert the slope of the IS curve in otherwise standard New Keynesian models. This, in turn, implies that optimal monetary policy rules should be passive. We show that the so‐called inverted aggregate demand logic (IADL) relies on nominal wage flexibility. Outside of extreme parameterizations, wage stickiness prevents the inversion of the slope of the IS curve. Hence, LAMP does not generally alter the trade‐offs faced by a welfare maximizing Central Bank, and for this reason it does not fundamentally affect the design of optimal simple rules and optimal monetary policy. (JEL E21, E52)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

CAN MONETARY POLICY INFLUENCE LONG‐TERM INTEREST RATES? IT DEPENDS

Can monetary policy influence long‐term interest rates? Studies that have tackled this question using vector autoregressions (VARs) generally find that monetary policy's influence on long‐term interest rates is small and often statistically insignificant. Other studies, however, using a single‐equation approach, have found a robust relationship. Our study sheds new light on this question by estimating the effect of monetary policy shocks on long‐term interest rates in a VAR with long‐run monetary neutrality restrictions. We find that U.S. monetary policy can strongly influence long‐term interest rates, but only when the Federal Reserve has inflation‐fighting credibility and is able to firmly anchor inflationary expectations. (JEL E43, E51, E52)     

U.S. COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING THROUGH 2008:Q4: NEW EVIDENCE FROM GROSS CREDIT FLOWS

What was hiding behind the aggregate commercial bank loans through the end of 2008? We use balance sheet data for every insured U.S. commercial bank from 1999:Q1 to 2008:Q4 to construct credit expansion and credit contraction series and provide new evidence on changes in lending. Until 2008:Q3 net credit growth was not dissimilar to the 1980 and 2001 recessions. However, between the third and fourth quarter credit contraction grew larger than credit expansion across all types of loans and for the largest banks. With the inclusion of 2008:Q4 data our series most resemble the intensification of the Savings and Loan crisis. (JEL E44, E51, G21)     

COMMODITY PRICES AND BANK LENDING

We analyze the transmission of changes in commodity prices to bank lending in a large sample of developing countries. A bank-level analysis shows that a fall in commodity net export prices is associated with a reduction of bank lending, particularly for commodity exporters and during episodes of terms-of-trade decline. We complement this analysis with loan-level data from a credit register, which allows us to identify the effect of a commodity price shock on the supply of credit, controlling for unobserved factors that could drive borrowers' credit demand. Results show that banks with relatively lower deposits and poor asset quality transmit the changes in commodity prices to lending more aggressively. (JEL F30, F34, G21, Q02)     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN BANKING,INDETERMINACY, AND MONETARY POLICY

This paper investigates economies of scale (ES) in financial intermediation as a source of equilibrium indeterminacy. Financial intermediation is embedded into a standard flexible‐price monetary model, and provides deposits (inside money) that substitute with currency to purchase consumption. The results indicate that equilibrium indeterminacy does not depend on a large degree of ES in intermediation nor a large intermediation sector, but on monetary policy and the determination of nominal interest rates. Monetary policies not targeting nominal rates allow for indeterminacy to arise for any positive degree of ES, while policies targeting nominal rates eliminate indeterminacy for all degrees of ES. (JEL C62, E44, E52)     

MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS,EXPECTATIONS, AND INFORMATION RIGIDITIES

This paper contributes to the literature by assessing expectation effects from monetary policy for G7 economies. We rely on expectation data from Consensus Economics and a panel vector autoregression framework, which accounts for international spillovers and time‐variation. We analyze whether monetary policy has changed the degree of information rigidity after the emergence of the subprime crisis and estimate effects of interest rate changes on expectations, disagreements, and forecast errors. We find strong evidence for information rigidities and identify higher forecast errors by professionals after monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that the international transmission of monetary policy shocks introduces noisy information and partly increases disagreement among forecasters. (JEL E31, E52)     

MORE MORTGAGES,LOWER GROWTH?

In newly collected data on 46 economies over 1990–2011, we show that financial development since 1990 was mostly due to growth in credit to real estate and other asset markets, which has a negative growth coefficient. We also distinguish between growth effects of stocks and flows of credit. We find positive growth effects for credit flows to nonfinancial business but not for mortgage and other asset market credit flows. By accounting for the composition of credit stocks and for the effect of credit flows, we explain the insignificant or negative growth effects of financial development in recent times. What was true in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s when the field of empirical credit‐growth studies blossomed, is no longer true in the 1990s and 2000s. New bank lending is not primarily to nonfinancial business and financial development may no longer be good for growth. These trends predate the 2008 crisis. They prompt a rethink of the role of banks in the process of economic growth. (JEL E44, O16, O40, C33)