Task partitioning in new product development teams: A knowledge and learning perspective

R&D alliances and outsourcing elements of the new product development process are now commonplace practices among many firms. However, little previous work has examined how these organizational choices influence project knowledge and learning. Based on a comparison of three new product development projects in the software industry, this paper examines how task partitioning in the project influences learning and knowledge development within the firm. The paper suggests that internal development projects encourage synthetic learning and development of architectural and tacit knowledge; in contrast, outsourcing and joint ventures encourage analytic learning and development of component and explicit knowledge.     

关系契约治理与外包合作绩效——对日离岸软件外包项目的实证研究

对日离岸软件外包项目具有典型的关系契约特性,现有文献对软件外包中的关系契约治理及对合作绩效的影响还缺乏系统的理论分析和实证研究。信任、交流和相互适应调整作为重要的关系规范,在对日软件外包关系契约治理中具有重要意义。本研究根据访谈和110个项目的数据实证检验了关系规范对离岸软件外包项目绩效的影响。通过结构方程模型方法发现,交流的有效性对于项目质量和供应商成本控制绩效有积极影响,相互适应调整对于成本控制绩效也有积极影响。这个发现有助于构建有效的关系契约治理机制,促进软件外包产业发展。     

Determinants of Interoutsourcing: An Analytical Approach

Interoutsourcing is a round‐way process in which the vendor is its customer's customer and the customer is its vendor's vendor. While interoutsourcing is emerging as a prominent outsourcing strategy in many industries, there are no rigorous analytical studies focusing on this mechanism. In this article, we analytically demonstrate the efficacy of interoutsourcing by comparing it with normal outsourcing. Our results show that, compared with normal outsourcing, interoutsourcing acts as a self‐enforcer of vendor firms' behaviors toward increasing outsourcing service value. However, in situations where there is a mismatch of outsourcing activities, a high degree of incentive that is based on outsourcing service value, and a high cost of capital, interoutsourcing is not preferred to normal outsourcing. We discuss these results in detail and provide managerial implications for firms involved in interoutsourcing decisions.     

Strategic Maneuvers for Outsourcing Flexibility: An Empirical Assessment

Tan and Sia (2006) conceptualize outsourcing flexibility within a set of four dimensions: robustness, modifiability, new capability, and ease of exit, and propose a portfolio of preemptive, protective, exploitive, and corrective maneuvers to manage flexibility in outsourcing. In this article, we build upon their proposed framework by anchoring the strategic maneuvers through a multitheoretic lens and empirically validate the research propositions. A survey of 171 outsourcing projects in Singapore was conducted. The findings bear evidence that the four proposed dimensions of outsourcing flexibility are conceptually distinct and that different strategic maneuvers contribute differently to the various flexibility dimensions. The empirical findings also affirm the importance of structuring flexibility for outsourcing success, with some flexibility dimensions manifesting different intensity in enabling outsourcing success for IT outsourcing versus business process outsourcing. We conclude by proposing a more holistic approach for effective flexibility management in outsourcing and highlighting research gaps that may need deeper theorizing and empirical extension.     

工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析

针对业主与多标段承包商群体的一对多结构,考虑业主如何通过单价合同与收益共享合同所组成的菜单合同模式对承包商群体进行激励以优化工程质量。本文构建了单阶段群体激励模型以及考虑承包商个体存在公平感知的多阶段群体激励模型,通过计算实验方法探讨不同报酬结构下的激励效率及其演化。研究表明:业主实行同一报酬结构在多阶段工程建设中难以维持高效率;单阶段激励中较好的报酬结构并不适用于多阶段激励过程;个体的公平感知对激励绩效会产生负面影响;报酬结构中针对不同质量标准的激励力度均会对激励效率产生影响,仅针对单一激励力度进行调整或忽视激励力度间的协同均不能实现较好的激励效果。     

The coordination processes and dynamics within the inter-organizational context of contract-based outsourced engineering projects

This paper examines the coordination processes (CPs) in outsourced engineering projects by focusing on two questions: How are these processes shaped in contract-driven projects, and is there an alternative approach that improves inter-organizational control of CPs from the client perspective? In studying these questions, we compare two engineering projects, one of which implements the meetings-flow approach, abbreviated as MFA. The findings suggest that, for effective management of different organizations through various dependent project activities, the CPs require an integrated and institutionalized venue enabled by the client. CPs are shaped between clients and contractors, and they can be improved and sustained by this approach.     

A Path to Successful IT Outsourcing: Interaction Between Service‐Level Agreements and Commitment

Although service‐level agreements (SLAs) are important for IT outsourcing management, appropriate mechanisms for constructing effective SLAs are still poorly understood, leading to inadequate or overcomplicated contracts that are ineffective. This study examines the associations among three distinct sets of SLA characteristics and outsourcing success, as well as the role of commitment in these relationships. Analyzing survey data based on a model theorizing the alignment of SLA characteristics with intended outsourcing objectives, we find that different types of benefits attained through IT outsourcing arrangements are associated with the use of specific contractual dimensions. We also find that commitment, in general, moderates the impact of SLAs on outsourcing success, although the nature of the moderation varies with the different benefits IT outsourcing engagement is intended to achieve. Interestingly, in certain cases—change characteristics for achieving technology benefits, in particular—commitment can be a barrier to the effective use of SLAs in achieving intended outsourcing benefits. As such, our study extends the literature on IT outsourcing, contracting and commitment, as well as provides a general guideline for practitioners to structure effective SLAs and to properly use commitment for managing IT outsourcing engagements to successfully achieve intended benefits.     

Development planning—An adaptive approach

The author argues that Adaptive Planning is necessary for managing development projects. Given the many interdependencies between the project and its environment, and between activities and stages of the Project Cycle, learning-by-doing is essential. The key tasks of planning and coordination cannot be managed in advance through the blueprint planning approach favoured thus far. The rationale and implications of following the Adaptive Planning approach are explored, and examples are given to illustrate the argument.     

Power and dependence perspectives on outsourcing decisions

Since the 1980s outsourcing has been a major topic in both economic and management literature. Economic literature tends to focus on the transaction cost perspective. In management literature the core competence approach prevails. An emerging alternative view on outsourcing is the power and dependence perspective. Aspects of power and dependence become visible in four case studies involving the maintenance of capital assets. In each instance both the buyer and supplier sides of the dyad are examined. The paper concludes with managerial implications and research opportunities.     

Logistics and procurement outsourcing in the healthcare sector: A comparative analysis

As outsourcing ventures become more complex, opportunities for synergies and efficiencies increase, but also create longer and more fragmented supply chains which could have disastrous consequences, particularly in a healthcare context. This study investigates the implications of outsourcing on healthcare supply chains by comparing two alternatives: outsourcing from public-to-private and outsourcing from public-to-public. A conceptual framework, adapted from previous literature, has been employed to provide a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon and consider the implications of logistics and procurement outsourcing on the healthcare supply chain structure and performance. The study presents a European cross-country comparison, analysing both the National Health Service (NHS) outsourcing in England (public-to-private outsourcing) and the Regional Health Service (RHS) outsourcing in the Tuscany region (Italy) (public-to-public outsourcing). Specificities and commonalities of the two outsourcing experiences provide suggestions for managers and policy-makers and enhance the current knowledge of outsourcing in the public healthcare sector.     

Performance management of suppliers in outsourcing project: case analysis from the financial services industry

This study investigates the characteristics of an effective performance management framework for outsourcing projects in a UK-based financial services organisation and how this may contribute to the success of the outsourcing arrangement. The analysis draws on outsourcing and performance management theory, and uses both primary and secondary data. Valuable information was found on objective setting, performance measurement and performance improvement in the outsourcing project. An adapted version of the Balanced Scorecard, termed a Logic Scorecard, is suggested as a measurement tool; a service credit system and a continuous improvement schedule used to enhance supplier performance. The performance management framework, which is one of the pillars of the supply chain operations reference (SCOR) model, was developed, and provides practitioners with step-by-step guidance for the implementation of performance management in outsourcing projects. This combines both suggestions for performance management before and after the outsourcing decision, thus considering the entire outsourcing lifecycle. The proposed 10-step framework for outsourcing not only incorporates strategic propositions but also shows its implementation at an operational level.     

Computerized analysis of capital projects by DCF techniques

A program for the financial and economic analysis of capital projects is outlined in this article. The program is structured on three variants, which enable management among other things, to examine the influence of various financing methods on the rate of return on the equity capital (leverage). The program can provide a complete sensitivity analysis, to test how the project profitability is affected by changes in input data.     

Contractors’ and Agency Decisions and Policy Implications in A+B Bidding

The focus of this study is on the A+B transportation procurement mechanism, which uses the proposed cost (A component) and the proposed time (B component) to score contractors’ bids. Empirical studies have shown that this mechanism shortens project durations. We use normative models to study the effect of certain discretionary parameters set by state transportation agencies on contractors’ equilibrium bidding strategies, winner selection, and actual completion times. We model the bidding environment in detail including multi‐dimensional bids, contractors’ uncertainty about completion times, and reputation cost. The latter refers to a private penalty that accrues to tardy contractors from increased cost of posting bonds and reduced prospects of winning future projects. Our model explains why contractors may skew line‐item bids and why winners frequently finish earlier than bid. It has several policy implications as well. For example, we recommend that agencies set the daily incentive, disincentive, and road user cost to be equal and not cap incentives. This is a departure from current practice, where incentives are often capped and weaker than penalties. Furthermore, we show that agencies may be justified in setting daily road user cost strictly smaller than the true cost of traffic disruption during construction.     

Work Design and Integration Glitches in Globally Distributed Technology Projects

In a technology project, project integration represents the pooling together of complete, interdependent task modules to form a physical product or software delivering a desired functionality. This study develops and tests a conceptual framework that examines the interrelationships between the elements of work design, project integration challenges, and project performance. We identify two distinct elements of work design in technology projects: (i) the type of project organization based on whether a technology project spans a firm boundary (Domestic‐Outsourcing) or a country boundary (Offshore‐Insourcing) or both boundaries (Offshore‐Outsourcing) or no boundaries (Domestic‐Insourcing), and (ii) the joint coordination practices among key stakeholders in a technology project—namely, Onsite Ratio and Joint‐Task Ownership. Next, we measure the effectiveness of project integration using integration glitches that capture the incompatibility among interdependent task modules during project integration. Based on analysis of data from 830 technology projects, the results highlight the differential effects of distributed project organizations on integration glitches. Specifically, we find that project organizations that span both firm and country boundaries (Offshore‐Outsourcing) experience significantly higher levels of integration glitches compared to domestic project organizations (Domestic‐Outsourcing and Domestic‐Insourcing). The results further indicate that the relationship between project organization type and integration glitches is moderated by the extent of joint coordination practices in a project. That is, managers can actively lower integration glitches by increasing the levels of onsite ratio and by promoting higher levels of joint‐task ownership, particularly in project organization types that span both firm and country boundaries (Offshore‐Outsourcing). Finally, the results demonstrate the practical significance of studying integration glitches by highlighting its significant negative effect on project performance.     

Governance Choice,Sourcing Relationship Characteristics,and Relationship Performance

Past work on exchange relationships has debated the efficacy of partnership versus arm's‐length governance on performance of a buyer–supplier relationship. However, how these governance approaches leverage key supplier specific relationship characteristics has not been examined. In this study, we examine the moderating role of governance choice (arm's‐length versus partnership governance) in leveraging key supplier specific characteristics to achieve superior performance for the buyer in a relationship. Specifically, drawing from residual rights theory, we argue that the governance choice buyers make moderates the impact of supplier flexibility, supplier human capital and relationship dependency on performance. Our findings suggest that, for a buyer, the benefits of supplier flexibility and relationship dependency are better realized in partnership governance as opposed to arm's‐length governance. Further, our findings suggest that although buyers choose a specific governance approach consistent with their outsourcing motivation, the choice of governance is critical to leveraging the impact of supplier characteristics due to the moderation effects studied. We elaborate on these effects and discuss the implications of our findings.     

基于实物期权的研发项目动态投资决策模型

本文基于实物期权理论,针对研发项目阶段性特点,结合博弈论的思想,分析了多个研发项目组成的投资状态组合,构建了研发项目动态选择模型。首先,根据研发项目多阶段的特征,利用孪生证券的思想,基于实物期权理论,建立了项目中止决策准则;在此基础上分析研发项目的投资决策状态,建立了二十五个状态的切换场景;然后通过实际算例对模型进行验证和分析,得出了研发项目投资的影响范围概念图,最终实现两个项目的最优投资决策目标。     

考虑决策者后悔规避的风险投资项目选择方法

在风险投资项目选择过程中,决策者通常是有限理性的,会尽量避免选择可能会令其感到后悔的风险投资项目,而在涉及多个行业的风险投资项目选择过程中如何考虑决策者后悔规避的心理行为因素,这方面的研究特别需要关注。本文提出了一种涉及多个行业的考虑决策者后悔规避的风险投资项目选择方法。在该方法中,首先计算各风险投资项目在不同市场状态下的项目价值;然后,计算各组合市场状态发生的概率;进一步地,构建后悔函数刻画决策者后悔的心理感知,并通过计算不同行业的各风险投资项目的综合效用值得到风险投资项目的排序结果。最后,通过一个算例说明了本文提出方法的可行性与有效性。     

Breaking the outsourcing path: Backsourcing process and outsourcing lock-in

The objective of this paper is to develop research on backsourcing, which consists in recalling outsourced activities back in-house. We focus on the processes that firms follow to backsource these activities, particularly when they are locked into outsourcing. We refer to path dependence and path creation concepts to conduct this research. Using a case study methodology, we analyze the process related to the backsourcing of information technology activities in a telecommunications company. This paper highlights the negative effects of the need to control outsourced activities as it maintains outsourcing lock-in. Organizational crises and the perception of backsourcing as a success are two elements that enable significant mindful deviations from outsourcing practices and the development of a backsourcing path. The decision to backsource and its implementation can be facilitated by past successful integration experiences, internal productive capabilities, and capabilities to control activities. Changes in power relations within the firm can sustain the development of a backsourcing path. Our research contributes to research on organizational path breaking by studying the backsourcing process as an outsourcing path breaker. This paper complements studies on organizational practices such as outsourcing and backsourcing and their interplay.     

Information systems outsourcing projects as a double moral hazard problem

In the past two decades many organizations have turned to other organizations to satisfy their information systems needs. Information systems outsourcing arrangements cover the spectrum from agreements involving the delivery of all information services to those providing specific services such as systems development, communications management, desktop computing provision and maintenance, and so on.In this paper we model information systems outsourcing arrangements as a non-cooperative game with two players: a company and an outsourcing vendor. The game between the two players has an inherent double moral hazard problem as the success of the information system outsourcing project depends on the actions of both players, which are costly for them and are not directly contractible. Both parties make their decisions taking into account the effects that these decisions have on the other player's actions. In our analysis, we compare the solution obtained without a moral hazard problem (the first-best solution) to the one obtained under a double moral hazard setting (the second-best solution). We demonstrate some results based on the assumption that increases in the productivity of the vendor lead to increases in the productivity of the company. Further we establish that outsourcing contracts should provide no separate payment for failure to the outsourcing vendor although effectively many of them do. We also provide a sharing rule for providing appropriate incentives for the vendor and examine the dynamics associated with this sharing rule. Finally, we further provide for the characterization of response functions and the ensuing Nash solution including the optimal outsourcing fee. This allows for the nuanced consideration of the degree of interaction between the effort of one party and the productivity of the effort of the other party. This particular interaction has not been explored formally in the extant research literature.     

Outsourcing Decisions and Managerial Incentives*

An agency model is presented in which outsourcing strictly dominates in-house production. We argue that firms outsource in order to improve managerial incentives. Conditions are established under which the firm is strictly better off with outsourcing. The benefit of outsourcing, however, is constrained by the trade-off between the incremental coordination costs of outsourcing and the improved incentive structure. The optimal contract is also shown to be a function of whether or not the firm is publicly held. For a publicly held firm, the contract is constant. For a privately held supplier, the contract is likely to be of a cost-sharing type. These findings offer preliminary incentive explanations for commonly observed outsourcing practices.