Is it All About Money? – Affective Commitment and the Difference Between Family and Non‐family Sellers in Buyouts

In this paper we investigate private equity firm perceptions of sellers’ affective deal commitment in buyout transactions. Using a sample of 174 buyouts, we test trust, goal congruence and private equity reputation as potential antecedents of perceived deal commitment. We also examine whether and how different types of sellers, family versus non‐family firms, moderate sources of perceived affective deal commitment. In sum, we find evidence that non‐financial factors play a role in buyouts, particularly for family firm sellers.     

A real options model of market entry: Endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty

We develop a real options model of market entry that focuses on the dueling growth and deferral options by differentiating between endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty. While exogenous uncertainty influences the growth option market value or price, it is endogenous uncertainty that influences the value of the growth option through the ability to create a competitive advantage from preemptive market entry. First, the firm can decrease the exercise price of the growth option (i.e., the cost of the follow-on investment) through experiential learning that reduces endogenous uncertainty. Second, the firm can increase the relative discounted cash flows of the follow-on investment due to its ability to influence market demand that reduces endogenous uncertainty. On the other hand, the value of the deferral option increases with exogenous uncertainty as firms cannot influence exogenous uncertainty, and therefore, should invest elsewhere while waiting for the exogenous uncertainty to subside. As such, we provide a solution to the conundrum that the value of both the growth option and the deferral option increase with uncertainty. Finally, we demonstrate how the model addresses sequential market entry; irreversibility and market entry mode; competition; scarce strategic resources; host country development level; and industry life cycle stage.     

Effects of Executive Characteristics and Venture Capital Involvement on Board Composition and Share Ownership in IPO Firms*

Combining the agency perspective, resource‐based view and upper echelon research, this paper examines factors affecting board selection and share ownership in initial public offerings (IPOs). In line with socio‐cognitive and behavioural research, it shows that board independence, cognitive capacity and the incentives of non‐executive directors are negatively associated with the experience and power of executive directors, and that large‐block share ownership is positively associated with the intensity and diversity of non‐executives' experience. However, the retained equity by venture capitalists negatively affects board independence and non‐executive directors' interests. The paper suggests a number of avenues for a future contextual analysis of the board development process in ‘threshold’ firms.     

The effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency: evidence using Japanese private firms

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of public involvement on firm inefficiency. Public involvement is defined as the actions taken by governments to control firm management, as expressed in regulation and public ownership. We make the following three contributions. First, we show public involvement is an important determinant of the inefficiency of private firms. Although public involvement has been shown to influence firm behavior in public or regulated sectors, existing studies in the private sector tend to ignore its effects. Second, we analyze firm inefficiency rather than firm performance by focusing on cost factors. Previous work tends to use performance measures such as return on assets or return on equity rather than inefficiency measures to judge a firm’s management level. Performance measures are problematic, however, in that they are affected by not only cost factors but also demand factors. Therefore, we must separate these factors when we analyze a firm’s management. Third, we use a stochastic cost frontier model for the estimation. Although this is a suitable approach for estimating firm inefficiency, it is rarely used for private firms. Our results suggest that public ownership increases firm inefficiency while regulation decreases firm inefficiency. It is also clear that the effect of public ownership is not significant in the manufacturing industry, while it is strongly significant in the nonmanufacturing industry. This shows the importance of studying the effect of public involvement in the private sector.     

DEEP FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND VOLATILITY

We investigate the relationship between foreign direct ownership of firms and firm‐ and region‐level output volatility using a novel panel data set for European countries. We document a positive, highly robust, relationship between firm‐level foreign ownership and volatility of value added. This relationship holds cross‐sectionally and in panels with firm fixed effects where the relationship captures within‐firm variation over time. Considering domestic firms with assets in foreign countries, we document that it is international diversification, rather than the nationality of the owner, that explains this positive correlation. Our results can also be found at the aggregate level, where we show that region‐level volatility is correlated positively with foreign investment in the region. We show that this positive relation between aggregate volatility and foreign investment can be explained by the granularity of the firm size distribution and the fact that foreign ownership is concentrated among the largest firms.     

Corporate governance effectiveness along the entrepreneurial process of a family firm: the role of private equity

This paper was motivated by the increasing interest in the corporate governance debate on how effective structure and processes may influence entrepreneurial transitions. Along the entrepreneurial process, little research to date has investigated the exit in the context of entrepreneurial family firms. Previous literature has considered the exit mainly as a failure for entrepreneurial families, but when uncertainties arise this choice may enable ownership transitions, thus facilitating survival and long term strategies. Among the exit options, a private equity buyout may balance the family’s wealth protection and the firm’s future growth. However, which family specific characteristics and strategic needs may affect the exit option still remains a neglected topic. Drawing on corporate governance literature and recent research addressing entrepreneurship in family firms, this paper investigates, by a single case study, the bridging role of private equity buyout for going through entrepreneurial transitions. Findings suggest that a private equity buyout is a governance mechanism that may sustain an entrepreneurial transition by realigning family interests and goals. It may also allow the family commitment for improving organizational capabilities required by an entrepreneurial transition.     

The Impact of Costliness,Competitive Importance,and Modularity of Investments on Outsourcing

This study is motivated by examples of outsourcing that are not readily explained by widely established economic theories. We extend recent literature that develops the idea that outsourcing can help firms avoid overinvestment by specifying more precisely the conditions under which this thesis is likely to apply. Our extension is realized through a two‐period game theoretic model in which the outsourcing and in‐house investments are driven by (1) the cost required to develop a product or process module, (2) competitive relevance, defined as the module's share in the production cost or the module's importance to the customer, and (3) modularity, defined as the extent to which generic investments in the module can approach firm‐specific investments in terms of the overall product/process performance. The analysis generates predictions about what types of insourcing, outsourcing, and non‐sourcing behaviors are likely to emerge in different parts of the parameter space. Outsourcing to a more concentrated industry upstream emerges at equilibrium when modularity is high, relevance low to medium, and development cost high enough that none or only a subset of focal firms wants to invest. While firms are forced to insource and overinvest due to a prisoner's dilemma when the development cost is sufficiently high relative to the module's relevance, we do not find outsourcing equilibria that solve this problem in a two‐period game with no commitment. This result implies that some form of tacit coordination in a multi‐period game may be necessary. We conclude the study with a discussion of empirical implications.     

How do CEOs matter? The moderating effects of CEO compensation and tenure on equity ownership in international joint ventures

We propose that CEO compensation and tenure moderate the relationship between multinational corporations' (MNCs) R&D intensities and their percentages of equity ownership in international joint ventures (IJVs). Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests a positive relationship between MNC R&D intensity and IJV equity ownership, but this relationship has not been confirmed consistently in prior research. We examine the moderating effects of CEO compensation and tenure on the relationship between MNC R&D intensity and IJV equity ownership, thereby bringing more nuanced explanations from agency theory and upper echelons theory into the discussion. Our proposed relationships were tested using a sample of 202 IJVs formed between U.S. MNCs and foreign partners in high-tech industries for the period 1993 to 2003. We found an overall positive relationship between MNC R&D intensity and the percentage of equity ownership in IJVs. Moreover, CEO tenure and bonus compensation each weaken the positive R&D intensity-equity ownership relationship in our sample, while CEO stock options compensation amplifies it. These findings indicate that CEO compensation and tenure influence decision making about equity ownership in IJVs, suggesting that scholars and boards of directors should consider these CEO-related factors when evaluating strategic decisions regarding IJVs.     

Multinational enterprises' Entry Mode Strategies and Uncertainty: A Review and Extension

The issue of uncertainty has been one of the most important topics in the research on multinational enterprises' foreign market entry modes. This paper provides a conceptual review of the literature on the role of uncertainty in entry‐mode strategies. It is found that transaction cost theory has focused primarily on entry modes as a way of minimizing behavioural uncertainty, while research using the more recent real options approach has distinguished between endogenous and exogenous types of uncertainty and provided evidence that managing uncertainty through appropriate entry modes may lead to competitive advantage. By synthesizing the relevant literature, this paper provides some new perspectives and avenues for future research on uncertainty and entry‐mode choices by considering the impact of firm learning, prior experience and host market attractiveness.     

我国上市公司配股前后业绩变化及其影响因素的实证研究

本文首次系统考查了我国上市公司配股融资后的业绩表现及其影响因素。实证研究表明,我国上市公司配股融资后业绩出现显著的下降,和没有配股的配比公司相比,配股公司的业绩要好于配比公司,但在配股后第3年,开始逊色于配比公司,并且,公司配股后业绩的下降幅度大于配比公司。本文首次发现,自由现金流假说能很好解释我国上市公司配股后长期业绩下滑的影响因素,公司配股前的自由现金流量越多,公司配股后的业绩下降得越快,公司的股权集中度低与投资水平低的上市公司,配股后业绩下降得越快。另外,公司的成长性越高,资产规模越大,公司配股后业绩下降的更快。     

Operational Hedging and Diversification under Correlated Supply and Demand Uncertainty

When facing supply uncertainty caused by exogenous factors such as adverse weather conditions, firms diversify their supply sources following the wisdom of “not holding all eggs in one basket.” We study a firm that decides on investment and production levels of two unreliable but substitutable resources. Applying real options thinking, production decisions account for actual supply capabilities, whereas investment decisions are made in advance. To model triangular supply and demand correlations, we adapt the concepts of random capacity and stochastic proportional yield while using concordant ordered random variables. Optimal profit decreases monotonically in supply correlation and increases monotonically in supply–demand correlation. Optimal resource selection, however, depends on the trivariate interplay of supply and demand and responds non‐monotonically to changing correlations. Moreover, supply hedges (i.e., excess capacity at alternative sources) can be optimal even if supply resources are perfectly positively correlated. To accommodate changing degrees of correlation, the firm adjusts the lower margin capacities under random capacity; but under stochastic proportional production capability, it uses either low‐ or high‐margin capacities to create tailored “scale hedges” (i.e., excess capacity at one source which can partially substitute for diversification).     

Forgoing the Flexibility of Real Options: When and Why Firms Commit to Investment Decisions*

Real option investments benefit from the flexibility associated with the possibility of abandonment should investment returns prove insufficient. But a firm also benefits from making commitments that engender reciprocal commitments on the part of employees and partner firms, and that allow the firm to address markets that exhibit increasing returns with the speed and scale required for success. I investigate the conditions under which large firms commit to investments in small firm equity alliances and acquisitions, and find that large firms commit to relationships that they initiate and that are subject to a high degree of rivalry. Uncertainty was not a significant predictor of the choice to commit. My findings point to the discretionary nature of the choice to commit and to firms' willingness to commit to investment decisions, despite high uncertainty, during periods of strong growth.     

布莱克─肖尔斯期权定价模型在公司价值评估中的应用

公司股票、债券在本质上可看成是基于公司资产的期权,因而可用期权定价方法对其价值进行评估。本文介绍了最典型的期权定价模型─布莱克一肖尔斯期权定价模型,分析了该模型在公司证券价值评估中的应用。     

Firm Size and Ownership Structure: Effects on Motivations for Use of Business Community Involvement Practices

This study presents an empirical investigation of the effects of size and ownership structure of the firm on the motivations for use of business community involvement practices. The “motivation‐mix” conceptual framework composed by commitment, calculation, conformance and caring motivational mechanisms is used for the conduction of eight comparative case studies. Results indicate that (1) size and ownership structure, per se, do not affect the motivations, and (2) high levels of calculation and low levels of caring are observed in one particular combination of size‐ownership structure: large, publicly held firms.     

Supplier competition and its impact on firm׳s sourcing strategy

Most research on firms׳ sourcing strategies assumes that wholesale prices and reliability of suppliers are exogenous. It is of our interest to study suppliers׳ competition on both wholesale price and reliability and firms׳ corresponding optimal sourcing strategy under complete information. In particular, we study a problem in which a firm procures a single product from two suppliers, taking into account suppliers׳ price and reliability differences. This motivates the suppliers to compete on these two factors. We investigate the equilibria of this supplier game and the firm׳s corresponding sourcing decisions. Our study shows that suppliers׳ reliability often plays a more important role than wholesale price in supplier competition and that maintaining high reliability and a high wholesale price is the ideal strategy for suppliers if multiple options exist. The conventional wisdom implies that low supply reliability and high demand uncertainty motivate dual-sourcing. We notice that when the suppliers׳ shared market/transportation network is often disrupted and demand uncertainty is high, suppliers׳ competition on both price and reliability may render the sole-sourcing strategy to be optimal in some cases that depend on the format of suppliers׳ cost functions. Moreover, numerical study shows that when the cost or vulnerability (to market disruptions) of one supplier increases, its profit and that of the firm may not necessarily decrease under supplier competition.     

Corporate control and underinvestment

This paper reports a study of how the benefits that large shareholders derive from their control of a firm affect the equity issue and investment decisions of the firm. I introduce an explicit agency cost structure based on the benefits of control of the largest shareholder. In a simple extension of the model developed by Myers and Majluf (J Financial Econ 13:187–221, 1984), I show that underinvestment is aggravated when there are benefits of being in control and these benefits are diluted if equity is issued to finance an investment project. Using a large panel of US data, I find that the concerns of large shareholders about the dilution of ownership and control cause firms to issue less equity and to invest less than would otherwise be the case. I also find that it makes no significant difference whether new shares are issued to old shareholders or new shareholders.     

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

We consider a dynamic Bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first‐order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game. In general, there is a trade‐off between productive efficiency, whereby the low‐cost firm serves the market in a given period, and high prices. We show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm, if the distribution of costs is log‐concave and firms are sufficiently patient, then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity: firms set the same price and share the market equally, regardless of their respective costs. When serial correlation of costs is imperfect, partial productive efficiency is optimal. For the case of two cost types, first‐best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks, but not otherwise. We present numerical examples of first‐best collusive schemes.     

Technological Diversification and Organizational Divisionalization: The Moderating Role of Complementary Assets

This study uses data on 582 electronics and information technology firms in Taiwan for the period 1997–2005 to investigate the hypothesis that technological diversification increases the extent of organizational divisionalization under firm growth. This study applies competence‐based theory to argue that firms spread the technological competence base to achieve firm growth. However, in the face of firm growth, managers of multi‐technology firms often utilize a multi‐division structure to manage their various technologies based on their operating characteristics or needs. Furthermore, the findings of this study indicate that complementary assets moderate the negative relationship between technological diversification and organizational divisionalization. For firms with specialized complementary assets, multi‐technology firms may be observed to consolidate related‐technology activities into fewer divisions, facilitating the utilization of these complementary assets in conjunction with other divisions.     

Location-boundedness,investment irreversibility,and divestment of international joint ventures under host market demand uncertainty

We employ the real options perspective to examine how the irreversibility of location-bound assets and resources affects the divestment of international joint ventures (IJVs) under exogenous uncertainty in host countries. Utilizing a large sample of Korean IJVs and addressing a sample selection of IJVs and the endogeneity of firms’ choice of location-bound investments, we find that high host market demand uncertainty interacts with localized products or local sales forces and reduces divestment rates of IJVs. We also find that the deterrent effects of these two country-specific investments are more salient for IJVs with local sourcing and sales. These findings imply that the deterrent effect of location-boundedness is congruent with the uncertainty-based real options theory when explaining IJV divestment.     

Transnational Board Interlocks as a Source of Non‐experiential Knowledge for the Firm in Foreign Markets

Board interlocks between firms headquartered in different countries are increasing. We contribute to the understanding of this practice by investigating the transnational interlocks formed by the 100 largest British firms between 2011 and 2014. We explore the association between different attributes of a firm's internationalization process, namely performance, structural and attitudinal, and the extent of the firm's engagement in transnational interlocks. We posit that the value of transnational interlocks as a non‐experiential source of knowledge will vary according to which of these three attributes becomes more prominent as the firm internationalizes. We do not find a significant relationship between the performance and structural attributes of internationalization, as measured by the firm's percentage of foreign sales and assets, respectively, and increased engagement in transnational interlocks. We do, however, find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the attitudinal attribute of internationalization, represented by the psychic dispersion of the firm's foreign operations, and the firm's number of transnational interlocks. This non‐linear relationship reveals both a natural boundary for the firm's capacity to engage in transnational interlocks and a reduced willingness to engage in such ties once a certain degree of attitudinal internationalization has been reached.