The effect of voting procedures on union representation elections: The multi-union case

Public choice theorists have shown that choice of voting procedures may affect the outcome when more than two alternatives are on a ballot. The run-off election and the two-part ballot are two alternatives used in representation elections involving more than one union. A comparison of these alternatives under various voting strategies shows that the run-off election used by the NLRB results in fewer union wins if workers vote sincerely or if they engage in strategic behavior. The run-off procedure results in more union wins if workers seek to avoid their least-favored option or if they follow a second-best strategy.     

Multiple votes,ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment

Duverger’s law states that Plurality Voting tends to favor a two-party system. We conducted laboratory experiments to study whether voting procedures other than Plurality Voting could favor a two-party system as well. Plurality Voting is compared with Approval Voting and Dual Voting, both of which allow to vote for multiple candidates, but differ in whether voters are required to cast all their votes. We find that in most elections held under Plurality Voting and Approval Voting, at most two candidates are viable. By contrast, three candidates are viable in a sizable number of elections held under Dual Voting due to strategic voting. Our evidence suggests that Approval Voting may encourage a two-party system, whereas Dual Voting may encourage multipartism. The voters’ ability to truncate ballots (i.e., not cast all their votes) is essential for supporting the two-party system under Approval Voting.     

VOTING EXPRESSIVELY

We address a common criticism directed toward models of expressive voting that they are ad hoc in nature. To that end, we propose a foundation for expressive behavior that is based on a novel theory of social preferences under risk. Under our proposal, expressive considerations in behavior arise from the particular way in which risky social prospects are assessed by decision‐makers who want to interpret their choices as moral. To illustrate the scope of our framework, we use it to address some key questions in the literature on expressive voting: why, for expressive considerations, might voters vote against their self‐interest in large elections and why might such elections exhibit a moral bias. Specifically, we consider an electoral set‐up with two alternatives and explain why, when the size of the electorate is large, voters may want to vote for the alternative they deem morally superior even if this alternative happens to be strictly less preferred, in an all‐inclusive sense, than the other. (JEL D01, D03, D81, D72, A13)     

Is it ever safe to vote strategically?

There are many situations in which mis-coordinated strategic voting can leave strategic voters worse off than they would have been had they not tried to strategise. We analyse the simplest of such scenarios, in which a set of strategic voters all have the same sincere preferences and all contemplate casting the same strategic vote, while all other voters are not strategic. Most mis-coordinations in this framework can be classified as instances of either strategic overshooting (too many voted strategically) or strategic undershooting (too few). If mis-coordination can result in strategic voters ending up worse off than they would have been had they all just voted sincerely, we call the strategic vote unsafe. We show that under every onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule there exist circumstances where a voter has an incentive to cast a safe strategic vote. We extend the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem by proving that every onto and non-dictatorial social choice rule can be individually manipulated by a voter casting a safe strategic vote.     

Ambivalent citizenship and extraterritorial voting among Colombians in London and Madrid

In this article, we explore the nature of extraterritorial voting among Colombian migrants in the 2010 elections in London and Madrid. To address the neglected issue of why voter turnout from abroad has been so low, we take into account the views of voters and non‐voters alike to show that, while the external vote privileges the professional and well educated, this does not mean that migrants are not interested in politics back home. Drawing on Bauman (1991), we conceptualize ambivalent citizenship as the paradoxical manner in which, through the external vote, states impose hegemonic notions of citizenship from above, which people embrace in an ambivalent manner from below. We show that the workings of the state make voting a difficult process; they create structural ambivalence for migrants who, even if they practise their citizenship in other ways, exercise individual ambivalence because they find it difficult to engage with a political system back home that they do not trust. The conceptualization of ‘ambivalent citizenship’ therefore encompasses the contradictory complexities inherent in the provision of external voting rights that actively privilege and exclude migrants in mutually constitutive ways.     

Pre-election polling and third party candidates

I analyze voters’ incentives in responding to pre-election polls with a third party candidate. Third party supporters normally have an incentive to vote strategically in the election by voting for one of the major candidates. But these voters would vote third party if the third party candidate is doing surprisingly well in the polls. Because voters are more likely to vote third party if the third party candidate is doing well in polls, voters who like the third party candidate best have an incentive to claim they will vote third party in the polls so that more voters will ultimately vote third party in the election. The differing incentives faced during polls and elections accounts for why third party candidates do better in polls than in elections.     

Voting barriers and solutions: the experiences of people with disabilities during the Dutch national election in 2017

Exercising the right to vote at elections is frequently denied to people with disabilities. In this study, we examined the voting behaviour of individuals with physical or learning impairments and the barriers they encountered during the national elections in 2017 in the Netherlands. A survey design was chosen to allow large-scale questioning of both target groups. Over 90% of people with physical impairments voted and respondents found that voting was accessible. Voter turnout among people with learning impairments was much lower (46%). They experienced difficulty to prepare themselves and at the polling station. The Netherlands seems well on the way to achieving an inclusive environment for people with physical impairments. Recommendations are given about accessibility for all and for exploring alternative methods of voting such as proxy voting and tailoring information and procedures to the needs of people with learning impairments.     

Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting

Approval voting (AV) is a voting system in which voters can vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections. In 1987 and 1988, four scientific and engineering societies, collectively comprising several hundred thousand members, used AV for the first time. Since then, about half a dozen other societies have adopted AV. Usually its adoption was seriously debated, but other times pragmatic or political considerations proved decisive in its selection. While AV has an ancient pedigree, its recent history is the focus of this paper. Ballot data from some of the societies that adopted AV are used to compare theoretical results with experience, including the nature of voting under AV and the kinds of candidates that are elected. Although the use of AV is generally considered to have been successful in the societies—living up to the rhetoric of its proponents—AV has been a controversial reform. AV is not currently used in any public elections, despite efforts to institute it, so its success should be judged as mixed. The chief reason for its nonadoption in public elections, and by some societies, seems to be a lack of key “insider” support.     

Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model

We propose a generalization of the probabilistic voting model in two-candidate elections. We allow the candidates have general von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions defined over the voting outcomes. We show that the candidates will choose identical policy positions only if the electoral competition game is constant-sum, such as when both candidates are probability-of-win maximizers or vote share maximizers, or for a small set of functions that for each voter define the probability of voting for each candidate, given candidate policy positions. At the same time, a pure-strategy local Nash equilibrium (in which the candidates do not necessarily choose identical positions) exists for a large set of such functions. Hence, if the candidate payoffs are unrestricted, the “mean voter theorem” for probabilistic voting models is shown to hold only for a small set of probability of vote functions.     

Conditions for Exercising Residents’ Voting Rights in Long-Term Care Residences: A Prospective Multicenter Study

To assess voting conditions in long-term care settings, we conducted a multicenter survey after the 2009 European elections in France. A questionnaire about voting procedures and European elections was proposed in 146 out of 884 randomized facilities. Sixty-four percent of facilities answered the questionnaire. Four percent of residents voted (national turnout: 40%), by proxy (58%) or at polling places (42%). Abstention related to procedural issues was reported in 32% of facilities. Sixty-seven percent of establishments had voting procedures, and 53% declared that they assessed residents’ capacity to vote. Assistance was proposed to residents for voter registration, for proxy voting, and for voting at polling places, respectively, in 33%, 87%, and 80% of facilities. This survey suggests that residents may be disenfranchised and that more progress should be made to protect the voting rights of residents in long-term care facilities.     

Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.     

Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting

This paper focuses on the mean vote procedure for choosing the quantity of a public good, a social choice rule that selects the mean of the quantities voted for. The available theoretical models of mean voting give rise to conflicting predictions about the extent of the strategic bias that might arise in the individual vote. An experiment has been run in order to assess whether the participants disclose their (induced) preferences in voting or whether they strategically manipulate their vote, and in the latter case, which variables impact upon the likelihood of strategic bias and to what extent.     

Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives

We consider small committees which have to elect one of three alternatives using the simple plurality rule. Committee members have common, state-dependent preferences and receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior to the election. We are interested in whether the committee decision is efficient, that is whether the probability with which the committee elects the correct alternative is higher than the probability with which one single individual alone—on behalf of the others—would. It has been shown that there exists a unique efficient equilibrium in elections with two alternatives. We show that this result does not extend to elections with more alternatives. Multiple equilibria may exist for the same committee, and there may be both efficient and inefficient ones. Informative voting may or may not be an equilibrium. Also contrary to two-alternative elections, there exist responsive equilibria in which voters vote ‘against’ their signal. As a consequence, only two alternatives receive positive expected vote shares and the outcome is inefficient.     

Voting here and there: political integration and transnational political engagement among immigrants in Europe

In this article, I examine voting patterns in origin and receiving country national elections among immigrants in Europe. The existing scholarship on transnational political engagement offers two competing interpretations of the relationship between immigrant integration and transnational engagement, which I classify as the resocialization and complementarity perspectives. The resocialization perspective assumes that transnational political engagement gradually declines as immigrants become socialized into the new receiving society. Conversely, the complementarity perspective assumes that immigrant integration increases transnational political engagement. I test these competing perspectives with survey data collected between 2004 and 2008 for 12 different immigrant groups residing in seven European cities. The analysis examines how immigrant political and civic participation in receiving countries affect their proclivities to vote in homeland elections. I also analyse the effects of receiving and origin country contexts on immigrant voting behaviour in homeland elections. While my findings support both the resocialization and complementarity perspectives, they also highlight the ways in which a set of origin‐country contexts shape immigrant propensities to engage in transnational electoral politics. I observe a degree of complementarity among immigrants with resources who are motivated and eligible to participate in both receiving and origin‐country elections.     

Choosing an electoral rule: Values and self-interest in the lab

We study the choice of multi-person bargaining protocols in the context of politics. In politics, citizens are increasingly involved in the design of democratic rules, for instance via referendums. If they support the rule that best serves their self-interest, the outcome inevitably advantages the largest group. In this paper, we challenge this pessimistic view with an original lab experiment, in which 252 subjects participated. In the first stage, these subjects experience elections under plurality and approval voting. In the second stage, they decide which rule they want to use for extra elections. We find that egalitarian values that subjects hold outside of the lab shape their choice of electoral rule in the second stage when a rule led to a fairer distribution of payoffs compared to the other one in the first stage. The implication is that people have consistent ‘value-driven preferences’ for decision rules.     

How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?

We estimate the frequencies with which ten voting anomalies (ties and nine voting paradoxes) occur under 14 voting rules, using a statistical model that simulates voting situations that follow the same distribution as voting situations in actual elections. Thus the frequencies that we estimate from our simulated data are likely to be very close to the frequencies that would be observed in actual three-candidate elections. We find that two Condorcet-consistent voting rules do, the Black rule and the Nanson rule, encounter most paradoxes and ties less frequently than the other rules do, especially in elections with few voters. The Bucklin rule, the Plurality rule, and the Anti-plurality rule tend to perform worse than the other eleven rules, especially when the number of voters becomes large.     

Electoral turnout of foreign-born residents in Chile: an analysis with data from the administrative census and opinion polls

Based on an administrative census of the 267,116 migrants registered for the 2017 presidential elections and a survey applied to 4771 migrants, we conclude that (1) the electoral participation of migrants shows a significant gender gap, with women participating in a higher proportion; (2) migrants who registered earlier in the electoral registers, are more likely to vote compared to the rest; (3) when migrants come from countries that implement compulsory voting, they increase their likelihood of voting in the receiving country; (4) the declaration of wanting to remain in Chile and not return to their countries of origin or migrate to another country increases the probability of voting, and the same happens with married migrants, with Chilean children, with a Chilean partner, and with a better economic situation; (5) social capital has a positive influence on electoral participation.     

When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model

It is well known that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in the standard three-candidate spatial voting model when candidates maximize their share of the vote. When all that matters to the candidates is winning the election, however, we show that PSNE do exist. We provide a complete characterization of such equilibria and then extend our results to elections with an arbitrary number of candidates.     

Union campaign activities and voter preferences

The impact of campaign activity on voting preferences in union representation elections is investigated using a panel study approach. The context of this study is a four-year, multicampus, university system, in which two faculty unions competed vigorously for representation rights for several years. We propose a multivariate model of individual voting intentions which, we argue, depend on the precampaign expected consequences of collective bargaining, recent changes in institutional conditions, various normative and value constraints, and union campaign activity. Both self-reports of exposure to campaign activity and exogenous measures of campus-specific organizing efforts are used in the analysis. The use of exogenous indicators of campaign activity, which we argue is more appropriate, suggests that campaign activity exerts no appreciable effect on the manner in which individuals vote in such elections. Policy implications of these findings are discussed. The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier version.