THE JOINT DESIGN OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION: A FIRST PASS

Unemployment insurance and employment protection are typically discussed and studied in isolation. In this paper, we argue that they are tightly linked, and we focus on their joint optimal design in a simple model, with risk‐averse workers, risk‐neutral firms, and random shocks to productivity. We show that, in the “first best,”unemployment insurance comes with employment protection—in the form of layoff taxes; indeed, optimality requires that layoff taxes be equal to unemployment benefits. We then explore the implications of four broad categories of deviations from first best: limits on insurance, limits on layoff taxes, ex post wage bargaining, and ex ante heterogeneity of firms or workers. We show how the design must be modified in each case. Finally, we draw out the implications of our analysis for current policy debates and reform proposals, from the financing of unemployment insurance, to the respective roles of severance payments and unemployment benefits.     

失业保险给付期限差异下的失业持续时间研究

本文对享受不同失业保险给付期限的失业者的失业持续时间差异进行了实证研究。根据工作搜寻理论,应用存活分析方法建立了含有失业保险给付期限因素的失业持续时间模型,并对青岛市失业者登记数据进行了实证研究。结果表明:享受失业保险者的失业持续时间明显长于不享受失业保险者的失业持续时间,在失业保险给付额度相同的条件下,失业保险给付期限与失业持续时间成同向变动关系。     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN EUROPE: UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION AND SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT STABILITY

This paper provides evidence on the effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment and subsequent employment duration in Europe using individual data from the European Community Household Panel. Country‐specific estimates based on a multivariate discrete‐time duration model, which takes into account dynamic selection issues and the endogeneity of benefit receipt, suggest that although receiving benefits has an adverse effect in the sense of increasing unemployment duration, there is also a positive effect associated with the increased duration of subsequent employment. This beneficial effect of unemployment insurance on employment stability is pronounced in countries with relatively generous benefit systems, and for recipients who have remained unemployed for at least six months. These findings are in line with theories that suggest a matching effect of unemployment insurance. (JEL: J64, J65, C41)     

Unemployment and Employment Protection in a Unionized Economy with Search Frictions

Abstract. In the theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection reduces job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model in which a monopoly union sets wages, I show that employment protection can unambiguously increase unemployment. Interestingly, I find that tightening the restrictions on redundancies and dismissals may even increase the probability of dismissal.     

THE PRIVATE AND FISCAL RETURNS TO SCHOOLING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

We present estimates of the private and fiscal returns to schooling in 14 European Union countries. Estimates of the private returns to post‐compulsory formal education take into account the effects of schooling on wages and employment probabilities and allow for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of education, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions, and unemployment and pension benefits on lifetime earnings. Estimates of fiscal returns capture the long‐term effects of a marginal increase in average educational attainment on public finances under conditions that approximate general equilibrium. (JEL: I20, J31, H60).     

PAYROLL TAXES,SOCIAL INSURANCE,AND BUSINESS CYCLES

Payroll taxes represent a major distortionary influence of governments on labor markets. This paper examines the role of time‐varying payroll taxes and the social safety net for cyclical fluctuations in a nonmonetary economy with labor market frictions and unemployment insurance, when the latter is only imperfectly related to search effort. A balanced social insurance budget induces countercyclical payroll taxation, renders gross wages more rigid over the cycle and strengthens the model's endogenous propagation mechanism. For conventional calibrations, the model generates a negatively sloped Beveridge curve and countercyclical unemployment as well as substantial volatility and persistence of vacancies and unemployment.     

Do Interactions between Unemployment Insurance and Sickness Insurance Affect Transitions to Employment?

Previous research suggests that there are substantial interactions between the unemployment and sickness insurance in Sweden. Moral hazard arises in the interplay between these insurance systems, as by reporting sick an unemployed person can postpone unemployment insurance expiration and sometimes receive considerably higher benefits. I examine whether these interactions affect the transition rate to employment. To do this I use a reform that greatly reduced the incentives to transfer to sickness benefits. Although there is evidence that this reform effectively lowered the incidence of sick reports among the unemployed, I do not find that the reduced sick report rate in turn affected the transition rate to employment.     

Economic Growth and Welfare in a Neoclassical Overlapping Generations Growth Model with Minimum Wages and Consumption Taxes

We examine the effects of minimum wages on both the long‐run per worker GDP and welfare in the textbook Diamond style overlapping generations economy. In addition, we assume the existence of unemployment benefits financed at a balanced budget with consumption taxes. Under suitable conditions, it is shown that a regulated‐wage economy with unemployment performs better than a competitive‐wage economy with full employment in the long run. Moreover, a welfare‐maximizing minimum wage exists. Our findings may have interesting policy implications.     

Labour Market Regulation,Flexibility and Employment

ABSTRACT: Chronic unemployment and slow employment growth in some countries have led to calls for more labor-market “flexibility”. This paper defines the flexibility issue in terms of legally-mandated “severance”, a generalized employment cost linked to seniority. A mandated severance benefit can stand for a variety of programs including employer-provided employment guarantees, payments which must be made to laid-off workers, and compensation for wrongful discharge. Such a mandated cost can be seen as a payroll tax on the employer, raising the issue of tax incidence. Employers often take the view that labor costs are given and that mandated costs are simply add-ons to pre-existing cost levels. However, the literature on tax incidence suggests that a significant portion of “employer-paid” payroll taxes are shifted to labor in the form of lower wages. Such shifting should reduce the dis-employment effects attributed to severance. A model is provided of a firm upon which a severance mandate is imposed. Even at the micro level, the firm can shift some of the cost of severance to employees by lowering wages — although at the expense of higher turnover costs associated with increased quit rates. At the macro level, to the extent that firms reduce employment, there could be still further downward wage adjustments which would shift the severance burden to labor and mitigate the dis-employment effect. Ultimately, if the natural rate of unemployment is raised by severance mandates, the age-old question is raised of why wages do not fall in the face of labor surpluses. The true inflexibility to be explained, therefore, is in wage determination.     

Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous‐Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?

This paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous‐agent economy. Such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings, but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets. The resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored, both theoretically and quantitatively, in a model that yields complete analytical solutions. Progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers, but at the cost of lower insurance. Overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but, unlike a standard social welfare function, does not reward equality per se. Simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude, resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates. Aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff.     

Shocks,Stocks, and Socks: Smoothing Consumption Over a Temporary Income Loss

We investigate how households in temporarily straitened circumstances due to an unemployment spell cut back on expenditures and how they spend marginal dollars of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit. Our theoretical and empirical analyses emphasize the importance of allowing for the fact that households buy durable as well as non‐durable goods. The theoretical analysis shows that in the short run households can cut back significantly on total expenditures without a significant fall in welfare if they concentrate their budget reductions on durables. We then present an empirical analysis based on a Canadian survey of workers who experienced a job separation. Exploiting changes in the unemployment insurance system over our sample period we show that cuts in UI benefits lead to reductions in total expenditure with a stronger impact on clothing than on food expenditures. Our empirical strategy allows that these expenditures may be non‐separable from employment status. The effects we find are particularly strong for households with no liquid assets before the spell started. These qualitative findings are in precise agreement with the theoretical predictions. (JEL: D11, D12, D91, J65)     

Longitudinal Analysis of Employment and Unemployment Based on Matched Rotation Samples

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to provide methodology to fit longitudinal data on employment and unemployment generated by the rotation sampling schemes of national labour force surveys. The proposed methodology, referred to as infinite-lag Markov models, is a generalisation of autoregressive Markov models developed for application in stochastic reservoir theory (Pegram 1980, Raftery 1985). Infinite-lag Markov chains have infinite memory and, therefore, can usefully serve to model labour supply behaviour taking into account, in principle, the complete past work experience of individuals, and not just the most recent past or the most recent spell. After a brief review of the rotation sampling schemes of 20 national labour force surveys, the different types of longitudinal sequences that can be obtained from the rotation schemes are examined. A review of various models proposed in the literature for analysing longitudinal data on employment and unemployment, expressed under simplified assumptions and in discrete forms, set the stage for the formulation of the proposed infinite-lag Markov model. The method is illustrated using matched longitudinal data derived from the US Current Population Survey.     

The Pace of Job Creation and Destruction,Cyclical Shocks and Employment Dynamics

This paper investigates (un)employment dynamics in response to labour demand shocks using a small empirical flow model for the labour market in The Netherlands. The model explicitly takes account of the propagation of shocks through the various duration classes of unemployment and allows for duration dependence in the state of unemployment. A sensitivity analysis shows that 1. congestion in the matching process due to the increase in the pace of job creation and destruction may have substantial effects on (un)employment dynamics; 2. the effects depend very much on the initial pace of labour market dynamics and they are larger when the initial pace is low; 3. the labour market may be out of its equilibrium for quite a long time after a shock occurs; 4. fluctuations in the pace of job creation and destruction only lead to unemployment persistence in the model when the escape probability from long term unemployment is zero; otherwise, the economy returns to its original equilibrium, albeit with long adjustment lags in the case that the initial pace of structural change and/or the escape probability for long term unemployed is low.     

EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH UNEMPLOYMENT,ENDOGENOUS PARTICIPATION,AND LABOR MARKET FLOWS

The sustainability of welfare states requires high employment and high participation to raise the tax base. To analyze labor supply in a world with market frictions, we propose and solve a macro model of the labor market with unemployment and labor force participation as endogenous and distinct states. In our world, workers' decisions of participating are determined by an entry decision and an exit decision. A calibration of the model improves the usual representations of labor markets, since it quantitatively accounts for the observed flows between employment and nonparticipation. The paper investigates also the effect of payroll taxes and unemployment benefits on participation decisions. Taxes reduce entries and increase exits, whereas unemployment benefits, at a given job‐finding rate, raise entries and have ambiguous effects on exits. (JEL: J2, J6)     

Unemployment Components in the G7 Countries

The increase in unemployment rates in the G7 countries is broken down into both labour supply and labour demand components. In no case is there a dominant source. Real GDP generally ranks first but does not account for more than a third of the overall changes. This finding shows that unemployment cannot be equated to negative employment since the labour force is generally increasing and volatile, mostly because of rising participation rates. Another reason why unemployment is not a reliable indicator of macroeconomic performance is that labour hoarding reduces employment response to output changes; this is especially true for Japan and Europe.     

Self‐financing Unemployment Insurance and Bargaining Structure

Abstract. This study examines how the size of trade unions relative to the labor force impacts on the desirability of different organizational forms of self‐financing unemployment insurance (UI). For this purpose, we compare the outcome of a model with a uniform payroll tax to a model where workers pay taxes according to their systematic risk of unemployment. Our results highlight the importance of the bargaining structure for the assessment of a particular UI scheme. Most importantly, it depends on the relative size of the unions whether efficiency favors a uniform or a differentiated UI scheme.     

Unemployment Insurance and Entrepreneurship

Based on administrative registers from Norway, we examine how unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) affect the transition rates from unemployment to regular employment and entrepreneurship, as well as subsequent earnings levels. We find that both the employment and entrepreneurship hazards rise sharply in response to UI sanctions and UI exhaustion. On average, transitions to entrepreneurship are more profitable than transitions to regular employment. While employment transitions are highly pro‐cyclical, entrepreneurship transitions are weakly counter‐cyclical. ALMPs targeted at entrepreneurship are rare in Norway, but the few start‐up subsidies that are provided are successful in terms of generating paid work.     

SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS

This paper investigates the effects of stricter screening of disability insurance applications. A large‐scale experiment was set up wherein two of the 26 Dutch regions caseworkers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more stringently. The empirical results show that stricter screening reduces long‐term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. We find evidence for direct effects of stricter screening on work resumption during the period of sickness absence and for self‐screening by potential disability insurance applicants. Furthermore, stricter screening improves targeting efficiency without inducing negative spillover effects on the inflow into unemployment insurance.     

UNEMPLOYED BUT OPTIMISTIC: OPTIMAL INSURANCE DESIGN WITH BIASED BELIEFS

This paper analyzes how biased beliefs about employment prospects affect the optimal design of unemployment insurance. Empirically, I find that the unemployed greatly overestimate how quickly they will find work. As a consequence, they would search too little for work, save too little for unemployment and deplete their savings too rapidly when unemployed. I analyze the use of the “sufficient‐statistics” formula to characterize the optimal unemployment policy when beliefs are biased and revisit the desirability of providing liquidity to the unemployed. I also find that the optimal unemployment policy may involve increasing benefits during the unemployment spell.     

The Transition to Work for Italian University Graduates

This study is focused on the transition from university to first job, taking into account the graduates’ characteristics and the effects relating to degree subject. A large data set from a survey on job opportunities for the 1998 Italian graduates is used. The paper uses a non‐parametric discrete‐time single‐risk model to study employment hazard. Alternative mixing distributions have also been used to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The results obtained indicate that there is evidence of positive duration dependence after a short initial period of negative duration dependence. In addition, a competing‐risk model has been estimated to characterize transitions out of unemployment.