Breach Penalties in Labour Contracts: Advance Notice and Severance Pay

This paper analyses the determining factors of advance notice and severance pay provisions that appear in collective bargaining agreements. The theoretical model constructed is a simple bargaining model in which advance notice and severance pay play the role of breach penalties that the firm must pay for breaking the employment relationship. The hypotheses are tested on data gathered from collective bargaining agreements from different industries that were signed between 1970 and 1989.     

A Simple Model of Severance Pay Determination: The Case of Individual Dismissals in Spain

In this article we model the determinants of severance pay for individual dismissals in Spain, following an idea proposed by Jimeno and Toharia (Economistas 55: 243–255, 1993). We point out the importance of severance pay settled before judgment, since the legal framework creates a bargaining space to determine the amount paid by firms in cases of individual dismissal. The model is a simple pre‐trial bargaining game between the firm and the worker. It predicts a higher settled severance pay for dismissals on economic grounds than on disciplinary ones, which could explain the perceptions held about the wide use of disciplinary dismissals in Spain. In addition, this approach could be useful in designing labour market reforms aimed at changing dismissal costs, because it allows us to determine the key variables affecting settled severance pay. Our simple model predicts that the key variables for Spain are the severance pay for unfair dismissal and the probability of unfair dismissal.     

It’s Not What You Pay it’s the Way that You Pay it and that’s What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance

Management scholars and economists have recently set out the requirements of a system to elicit good performance when it is necessary to align the interests of the principal and agent. We analyse pay and performance in an occupation — jockeys — replete with moral hazard possibilities. We are able to do this because, most unusually, a measure of pure individual performance exists for an unbalanced panel of some 50 individuals for 8 years. Three hypotheses are tested. First, in line with classic agency theory, we expect monitoring mechanisms and incentive contracts to be used to align the interests of principals and agents. Second, pay and performance should be positively associated, subject to the first hypothesis being confirmed. Third, a limited number of jockeys were paid via an alternative mechanism involving very large non-contingent retainer fees. This serves as our counterfactual payment system. In line with agency theory we expect worse performance under such a system than under an incentive contract. The three hypotheses are confirmed: incentive contracts generate superior performance to non-contingent payment systems. Our evidence suggests that ‘it’s not what you pay it’s the way that you pay it … and that’s what gets results’. It is maddening that society confers its blessings on traditional academic pursuits but views the study of horseracing as utter frivolity (Beyer, 1983).     

TWO‐ AND THREE‐STAGE FLOWSHOP SCHEDULING WITH NO‐WAIT IN PROCESS

In this paper we study the time complexities of some two‐ and three‐stage no‐wait flowshop makespan scheduling problems where, in some stage, all the jobs require a constant processing time and the stage may consist of parallel identical machines. Polynomial time algorithms are presented for certain problems, while several others are proved to be strongly NP‐complete.     

绩效工资强度对员工薪酬满意度影响的实证研究

以14家企业的506份薪酬满意度问卷及其客观薪酬数据为样本,以SPSS13.0软件为工具,采用曲线估计和分层多元回归分析探讨绩效工资强度对员工薪酬满意度的影响,以及职位层次对这一关系的调节作用.研究结果表明,绩效工资强度与薪酬满意度之间呈倒U型关系,职位层次对这一关系具有调节作用.最后,讨论了对企业薪酬管理实践的指导意义以及该领域未来的研究方向.     

PRODUCT OFFERING,PRICING, AND MAKE‐TO‐STOCK/MAKE‐TO‐ORDER DECISIONS WITH SHARED CAPACITY

In an era of mass customization, many firms continue to expand their product lines to remain competitive. These broader product lines may help to increase market share and may allow higher prices to be charged, but they also cause challenges associated with diseconomies of scope. To investigate this tradeoff, we considered a monopolist who faces demand curves, which for each of its potential products, decline with both price and response time (time to deliver the product). The firm must decide which products to offer, how to price them, whether each should be make‐to‐stock (mts) or make‐to‐order (mto), and how often to produce them. The offered products share a single manufacturing facility. Setup times introduce disceonomies of scope and setup costs introduce economies of scale. We provide motivating problem scenarios, model the monopolist's problem as a non‐linear, integer programming problem, characterize of the optimal policy, develop near‐optimal procedures, and discuss managerial insights.     

Channel Coordination with a Risk‐Neutral Supplier and a Downside‐Risk‐Averse Retailer

We investigate how a supply chain involving a risk‐neutral supplier and a downside‐risk‐averse retailer can be coordinated with a supply contract. We show that the standard buy‐back or revenue‐sharing contracts may not coordinate such a channel. Using a definition of coordination of supply chains proposed earlier by the authors, we design a risk‐sharing contract that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides respective reservation profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination.     

The Econometrics of Ultra‐high‐frequency Data

Ultra‐high‐frequency data is defined to be a full record of transactions and their associated characteristics. The transaction arrival times and accompanying measures can be analyzed as marked point processes. The ACD point process developed by Engle and Russell (1998) is applied to IBM transactions arrival times to develop semiparametric hazard estimates and conditional intensities. Combining these intensities with a GARCH model of prices produces ultra‐high‐frequency measures of volatility. Both returns and variances are found to be negatively influenced by long durations as suggested by asymmetric information models of market micro‐structure.     

Reinforcement‐based vs. Belief‐based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric‐information Games

This paper examines the abilities of learning models to describe subject behavior in experiments. A new experiment involving multistage asymmetric‐information games is conducted, and the experimental data are compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium and two types of learning model: a reinforcement‐based model similar to that used by Roth and Erev (1995), and belief‐based models similar to the ‘cautious fictitious play’ of Fudenberg and Levine (1995, 1998) These models make predictions that are qualitatively similar cycling around the Nash equilibrium that is much more apparent than movement toward it. While subject behavior is not adequately described by Nash equilibrium, it is consistent with the qualitative predictions of the learning models. We examine several criteria for quantitatively comparing the predictions of alternative models. According to almost all of these criteria, both types of learning model outperform Nash equilibrium. According to some criteria, the reinforcement‐based model performs better than any version of the belief‐based model; according to others, there exist versions of the belief‐based model that outperform the reinforcement‐based model. The abilities of these models are further tested with respect to the results of other published experiments. The relative performance of the two learning models depends on the experiment, and varies according to which criterion of success is used. Again, both models perform better than equilibrium in most cases.     

TIME‐BASED PRICING AND LEADTIME POLICIES FOR A BUILD‐TO‐ORDER MANUFACTURER

We studied time‐based policies on pricing and leadtime for a build‐to‐order and direct sales manufacturer. It is assumed that the utility of the product varies among potential customers and decreases over time, and that a potential customer will place an order if his or her utility is higher than the manufacturer's posted price. Once an order is placed, it will be delivered to the customer after a length of time called “leadtime.” Because of the decrease in a customer's utility during leadtime, a customer will cancel the order if the utility falls below the ordering price before the order is received. The manufacturer may choose to offer discounted prices to customers who would otherwise cancel their orders. We discuss two price policies: common discounted price and customized discounted price. In the common discounted price policy, the manufacturer offers a single lower price to the customers; in the customized discounted price policy, the manufacturer offers the customers separately for individual new prices. Our analytical and numerical studies show that the discounted price policies results in higher revenue and that the customized discounted price policy significantly outperforms the common discounted price policy when product utility decreases rapidly. We also study two leadtime policies when production cost decreases over time. The first uses a fixed leadtime, and the second allows the leadtime to vary dynamically over time. We find that the dynamic leadtime policy significantly outperforms the fixed leadtime policy when the product cost decreases rapidly.     

Wage Bargaining with On‐the‐Job Search: Theory and Evidence

Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between‐employer competition for labor services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on‐the‐job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productivity, competition between employers resulting from on‐the‐job search, and the workers' bargaining power. We find that between‐firm competition matters a lot in the determination of wages, because it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining à la Nash in raising wages above the workers' “reservation wages,” defined as out‐of‐work income. In particular, we detect no significant bargaining power for intermediate‐ and low‐skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high‐skilled workers.     

Legislative Pay and Legislator Quality

This study extends previous work by Mixon and Wilkinson (1999, Public Finance Review 27: 418–433) and Palia (2000, RAND Journal of Economics 31: 165–179) suggesting that formal human capital attainment is lower in political and managerial roles wherein expected compensation is less. The present study constructs a cumulative probability distribution function for years of education attained for both branches of the 109th US Congress and finds that the distribution of years of education attainment in the US Senate second‐order dominates that in the US House due to differences in the expected compensation levels favoring the former congressional branch. The stochastic dominance test results are supported by findings of significant differences in education attainment (favoring senators) at different quantiles of the joint education attainment distribution. Finally, goodness‐of‐fit tests also indicate that the distribution of education attainment quality in the US Senate, as measured by various academic institution quality indicators, is significantly different from that in the US House, again owing to the differences in expected compensation.     

A MODEL FOR BATCH ADVANCED AVAILABLE‐TO‐PROMISE

The available‐to‐promise (atp) function is becoming increasingly important in supply chain management since it directly links production resources with customer orders. In this paper, a mixed integer programming (mip) ATP model is presented. This model can provide an order‐promising and ‐fulfillment solution for a batch of orders that arrive within a predefined batching interval. A variety of constraints, such as raw material availability, production capacity, material compatibility, and customer preferences, are considered. Simulation experiments using the model investigate the sensitivity of supply chain performance to changes in certain parameters, such as batching interval size and customer order flexibility.     

Pay for performance--a clash of cultures

Implementation of pay for performance is being widely heralded as a new paradigm. However, the concept is not only alien to physicians, but may be ethically abhorrent, as well.     

关注沉默的大多数

在一个单位中,应该说,每个人都有对单位、对工作发表意见的权利和义务,但实际上,我们经常听到的只是少数人的声音。领导无疑是说话机会最多、声音最大的人。还有个别人,虽不是领导,却深得领导信任,同级听不到他们的声音,但领导能听到,他们的意见可以通过领导讲出来。从这个意义上说,这些少数人也获得了说话的权利,除此之外的大部分下属则习惯性地保持着沉默。选择沉默,并不代表他们对单位和工作漠不关心,事实上,正是“沉默的大多数”在承担着单位中的大部分工作;选择沉默,也并不代表他们没有讲话的欲望和能力,事实上,他们…     

绩效评估公平、工资系统认知与绩效工资公平关系研究:兼论绩效工具性感知的中介效应

通过对528名企业员工采用自我报告式问卷调查,本研究考察了绩效评估公平、工资系统认知和绩效工具性感知对绩效工资公平的直接或间接影响.对调查数据进行回归分析和结构方程模型分析,结果显示绩效工具性感知在绩效工资公平前因变量影响机制中起部分中介作用;绩效评估公平对绩效工资公平有显著的直接正向影响,也通过绩效工具性感知预测了绩效工资公平;工资系统认知对绩效工资公平有显著的直接正向影响,也通过绩效工具性感知预测了绩效工资公平.绩效评估公平、工资系统认知和绩效工具性感知是绩效工资公平的重要前因变量,三个变量联合解释了绩效工资公平60％的变异量.最后对基于研究结论的启示进行了讨论.     

Estimating Willingness‐to‐pay with Choice‐based Conjoint Analysis – Can Consumer Characteristics Explain Variations in Accuracy?

Knowing consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) is crucial for making effective pricing decisions. We assess the accuracy of choice‐based conjoint analysis (CBCA), a method strongly supported by behavioural theory, in the context of WTP measurement at the individual level. Furthermore, we analyse whether variations in the accuracy of WTP estimates derived by CBCA can be explained by consumers' involvement, brand awareness and the strength of consumer preferences. The results show that CBCA does not provide accurate WTP estimates and, on average, grossly overestimates the true WTP of consumers. No empirical evidence can be found that consideration of the above‐mentioned consumer characteristics results in more accurate WTP values.     

Branch‐and‐Price Methods for Prescribing Profitable Upgrades of High‐Technology Products with Stochastic Demands*

This paper develops a model that can be used as a decision support aid, helping manufacturers make profitable decisions in upgrading the features of a family of high‐technology products over its life cycle. The model integrates various organizations in the enterprise: product design, marketing, manufacturing, production planning, and supply chain management. Customer demand is assumed random and this uncertainty is addressed using scenario analysis. A branch‐and‐price (B&P) solution approach is devised to optimize the stochastic problem effectively. Sets of random instances are generated to evaluate the effectiveness of our solution approach in comparison with that of commercial software on the basis of run time. Computational results indicate that our approach outperforms commercial software on all of our test problems and is capable of solving practical problems in reasonable run time. We present several examples to demonstrate how managers can use our models to answer “what if” questions.     

Measuring Market Power in the Ready‐to‐Eat Cereal Industry

The ready‐to‐eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration, high price‐cost margins, large advertising‐to‐sales ratios, and numerous introductions of new products. Previous researchers have concluded that the ready‐to‐eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition. This paper empirically examines this conclusion. In particular, I estimate price‐cost margins, but more importantly I am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources: (i) that which is due to product differentiation; (ii) that which is due to multi‐product firm pricing; and (iii) that due to potential price collusion. The results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal, the first two effects explain most of the observed price‐cost margins. I conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior, despite the high price‐cost margins. Leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality. It is these two factors that lead to high price‐cost margins.