The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing

We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other.     

Endogenous Contracts in Unionized Oligopoly

We study the endogenous determination of contracts in a unionized oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. Alternative contracts specify the sequencing in the selection of R&D and wages. They can be classified as ‘fixed’ when the unions set wages before the firms make their R&D decisions or ‘floating’ when the sequencing of these choices is reversed. If the unions are highly employment‐oriented, we find that either all firm–union pairs choose floating‐wage contracts or both contract types may coexist depending on the degree of technological spillovers. However, when the unions have stronger preference over attaining a good wage deal, then it becomes very likely that fixed‐wage contracts will endogenously emerge because they can serve as an insurance device against oppor tunistic wage increases. Our welfare analysis suggests that welfare‐improving contracts may nevertheless not always arise in equilibrium.     

Union Power and (Un)Employment

Is the monopoly face of unions, i.e. their ability to enforce wages above what non-unionised firms would pay, harmful to employment and output? It is shown that a positive answer to this question is far less compelling than commonly held views based on a negatively sloped labour demand curve suggest. First, the labour demand curve may be irrelevant for the employment decision of unionised firms. Second, even if the labour demand curve is relevant, selfish union workers are likely to accept a system of wage discrimination which does away with discrepancies between the marginal product and the reservation wage. And third, the labour demand curve may have a positive slope.     

Unions,Firing Costs,and Unemployment

Abstract. We study the effects of firing costs in unionized economies with heterogeneous workers. We consider an overlapping generations model where workers participate in the labour market both when young and when old. All workers belong to the same union that sets wages unilaterally. We find that at given wages firing costs increase youth unemployment and decrease old‐age unemployment. However, once the wage response is considered, firing costs increase both youth and old‐age unemployment. Indeed, knowing that when firing costs are higher firms refrain from firing, the union increases the wage of old workers, and, therefore, old‐age unemployment increases.     

Does Immigration Raise Blue and White Collar Wages of Natives? The Case of Italy

This paper analyses both theoretically and empirically the effects of immigration on the wage rate of native workers. There is rare evidence in empirical literature that immigration generates a fall in the wages of manual workers. By hypothesizing an economic system where advanced firms buy an intermediate good from traditional firms, which employ manual workers in both clean and dirty tasks, the latter being more disliked by native workers, we present a theoretical model that justifies these results. We conclude that native skilled wages always increase whereas native unskilled wages can both increase or decrease with immigration. An empirical analysis of the Italian labour market follows, showing that native workers' wages always rise with immigration.     

Wage Flexibility for Skilled and Unskilled Workers: New Evidence on the Norwegian Wage Curve

Empirical evidence is provided in favour of a hypothesis that wages for unskilled workers are more responsive to unemployment than wages for skilled workers. The results imply vigorous wage responsiveness to low levels of unemployment for both groups, while the wage curves become almost entirely flat for unemployment rates above 1.7 percent. One interpretation of this result is that firms have strong incentives to increase wages in order to recruit and retain workers when unemployment is below some critical level. Since unemployed workers will certainly find work, the expected costs of a job loss are small, as are costs associated with an egalitarian wage policy.     

Knowledge Spillovers and Wage Inequality: An Empirical Analysis of Dutch Manufacturing

The introduction of new technologies and technical change is associated mainly with high‐skilled and high‐wage workers. In addition, many studies have found a positive correlation between the introduction of new technologies and technical change and skill upgrading. In these studies no attention has been paid to spillovers from one sector to the other. In this paper we not only use measures of technical change but also knowledge spillovers to explain wage inequality in Dutch manufacturing in the period 1986–95. Using this more elaborate measure of technical change, our findings are twofold. First, we confirm that workers employed in knowledge‐intensive manufacturing sectors receive a higher wage than workers in less knowledge‐intensive sectors. Secondly, the wages paid to high‐skilled workers relative to low‐skilled workers in knowledge‐intensive sectors are higher than those in less knowledge‐intensive sectors. However, the coefficients using the elaborate measure of technological advancement are much lower and sometimes even insignificant. This suggests a premium for high‐skilled labour in sectors both applying and developing technology. But the wage premium is highest in technology‐developing sectors, as suggested by the measures used in previous studies.     

Union–Firm Bargaining,Productivity Improvement and Endogenous Growth

This paper presents a growth model with two sectors. In the high‐tech sector, R&D increases productivity and union–firm bargaining determines wages, but in the traditional sector there are neither R&D nor labour unions. The government is able to regulate union bargaining power. The main results are as follows. Because firms try to escape wage increases through the improvement of productivity by R&D, the increase in union bargaining power boosts R&D and growth. It is welfare enhancing to strengthen (weaken) unions when the growth rate is below (above) some critical level. A specific rule is presented for when de‐unionization is socially desirable.     

New Firms as Employers: The Wage Penalty for Voluntary and Involuntary Job Switchers

According to previous research, new firms pay lower wages. However, previous studies have been unable to control for the possibility that the opportunity costs of accepting employment at new firms may differ across individuals. In this paper, we investigate whether a wage penalty for being employed at a new firm exists if we take the individual employee's experience and status in the labour market into consideration. We focus on individuals who decide to switch jobs and use matched employee–employer data about all firms and employees in Sweden for the period 1998–2010. Our results show that the share of job transitions into lower wages are higher for those who switch to new firms compared with incumbent firms (40 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively). Our endogenous wage equation estimates indicate that being an involuntary job switcher has an equally negative effect on wages at both new and incumbent firms. However, the positive effect of education on wages is more pronounced for job switchers selecting into incumbent firms.     

Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage–Tenure Contracts

I construct a theoretical framework in which firms offer wage–tenure contracts to direct the search by risk‐averse workers. All workers can search, on or off the job. I characterize an equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a nondegenerate, continuous distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are identical and workers observe all offers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block recursive; that is, individuals' optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent with stylized facts, the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job‐to‐job transitions decrease with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense that the lower the worker's wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next job transition. Moreover, block recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment benefit and the minimum wage have no effect on an employed worker's job‐to‐job transitions and contracts.     

The Skilled Wage Premium and the Growth of Small Firms in UK Manufacturing

We document the role of small firms in explaining the growth of the skilled/unskilled wage premium in UK manufacturing over the 1980s. Our major findings are (i) the share of manufacturing employment in small firms' (0–99) employees has risen by 35 percent over this period; (ii) small firms pay more unequal wages than do large firms: the non-manual/manual wage premium is 1.53 in small firms and 1.50 in firms of over 1,500 workers; (iii) the growth in small firms over the period explains about 20 percent of the rise in the skilled/unskilled wage premium.     

Efficient Labour Contracts: Impediments and How to Circumvent Them

Efficient labour contracts on wages and employment could contribute to a reduction in unemployment in Europe. Their implementation is hindered by institutional settings and asymmetric incentives at different levels of the bargaining process. Employed workers have no incentives to forego wage increases at the firm level for potential employment gains, while employers’ federations possess no means to guarantee an employment increase for the sector covered by a wage agreement. Decentralization of wage bargaining does not solve this incentive problem. It is demonstrated that the introduction of marketable certificates may reduce the asymmetric incentive effects enabling contracts with higher employment.     

A Note on Job Tenure and Collective Contracts

Abstract. This paper analyses the relationship between individual tenure and the application of collective contracts at the firm level under the specific institutional settings in Germany. The empirical approach is based on a multilevel model and a linked employer–employee data set for the years 1990, 1995, and 2001. The main result is that elapsed tenure is longer in firms applying collective contracts than in companies with individual wage setting: workers in firms with collective contracts benefit not only from higher wages, but also from higher job stability. Furthermore, we find no significant changes in mean tenure during the 1990s as well as stable differences across wage‐setting regimes.     

European Integration and the Integration of European Labour Markets1

Abstract. Will European economic and monetary union bring about a unification of European labour markets, and is there likely to be a convergence of patterns of labour market organisation among Community countries? The evidence discussed suggests that a major increase in unskilled mobility across the EC is unlikely, at least concerning EC citizens. Among skilled labour, a major increase in international mobility is also unlikely on account of differences in skill organisation among countries. In contrast, the integration of European capital is causing some integration of enterprise internal labour markets across national borders as firms seek to integrate their managerial and technical workforces. In the “high-tech” area, skills are in a state of flux, and the possibility that European labour markets will emerge is much stronger than for other categories.     

Short-Run Wage Flexibility and Labour Market Adaptation in Western Europe

ABSTRACT: This paper starts by reviewing some of the evidence relating to movements in relative wages, asking what have been their causes and whether they serve to allocate labour across labour markets. Much of the research has tended to focus on the statistical sources available, and therefore to focus on movements of pay between industries rather than firms, between occupations, and between workers with different levels of qualification. This has greatly constrained the possibility of linking these different dimensions to look at the ideal question, namely to what extent do relative wages respond to labour supply and demand pressures, and to what extent do they help to reconcile these two pressures. In addition, evidence from studies based on data obtained from individual firms also broadly supports the view that wage differentials are not very responsive to supply and demand pressures, and also that they are mostly not very effective in promoting the adaptation of labour supply and demand across labour markets. The paper ends by considering briefly some recent policy ideas for increasing the responsiveness of relative wages to demand changes.     

Size,Skill and Sorting

Abstract. The rise in inequality between the 1970s and the 1990s and the persistent gap in pay between large and small employers are two of the most robust findings in the study of labor markets. Mainstream economists focus on differences in observable and unobservable skills to explain both the overall rising inequality and the size–wage gap. In this paper we model how increasing returns to skill can affect the size–wage gap both with constant sorting and with size‐biased, skill‐biased technological change (e.g. if large firms always had access to computers, but small firms gained access to computers with the rise of affordable personal computers). We analyze the Current Population Surveys from 1979 to 1993 to determine whether large and small employers are converging in terms of mean wages (the employer size–wage effect), wage structures by occupation and education, characteristics of employees, and wage structures by region. We find mixed evidence of convergence and no consistent support for any single version of human capital theory.     

Revisiting the Impact of Union Structures on Wages: Integrating Different Dimensions of Centralization

Abstract. In a framework of a unionized oligopoly, this paper reconsiders the impact of the bargaining structure on union wages. In particular, two dimensions along which centralization may occur, namely the professional and firm line, are integrated into one modelling framework. It will be shown that, when taking into account different centralization dimensions, wage outcomes of different bargaining regimes cannot simply be ranked according to the degree of bargaining centralization. The argument will be that negotiated wages rather depend on the technical relationship between different groups of labour and goods as well as upon the dimension along which centralization takes place.     

Descrepancies between Supply and Demand and Adjustment Processes in the Labour Market

Changes in demand and supply in segments of the labour market will affect the labour market position of workers with an educational background in a related field of study. In one economic tradition such discrepancies between supply and demand are thought to lead to unemployment in the case of excess supply and to unfilled vacancies or skill shortages in the case of excess demand. The other neo‐classical oriented tradition expects wage adjustments to take fully account of these labour market imbalances, leading to higher wages for studies with excess demand and lower wages in case of excess supply. In practice the labour market might, on the one hand, be more flexible than suggested by the first approach, but on the other hand adjustment might be incomplete and not only wages but also other aspects of the employment relationship might be affected by a friction between supply and demand. This study examines the relationship between discrepancies between labour demand and supply on the one hand and manifestations of these tensions in the labour market experience of school‐leavers on the other hand. To investigate this relationship, a random coefficient model has been used, which allows for different adjustment processes for the various educational types, but still makes full use of all the information available in the data. The analyses provide insights about the importance of different adjustment processes and their complementarity and substitutability. We show that on average, supply surpluses lead to pressure to accept jobs at a level which is lower than the school‐leavers educational level, jobs with relatively low wages, and jobs with part‐time contracts. A direct link between supply surpluses and unemployment is only found for a few specific fields of study. Unemployment seems to occur mostly when school‐leavers do not take temporary jobs or jobs below their educational level in case of excess supply.     

Efficiency Wage,Fixed Employment Costs,and Dual Labour Markets

The standard efficiency wage‐based explanation of labour market dualism hinges on the existence of differences in monitoring across sectors. The paper proposes fixed employment costs as an alternative source of wage differentials for homogeneous workers. It shows that firms with larger fixed costs pay higher wages in order to elicit more effort from their workers, and tend to have higher capital/labour ratio and labour productivity. The model generates both involuntary unemployment and involuntary confinement in the secondary sector: high effort–high wage jobs are preferred to low effort–low wage jobs and either are preferred to unemployment. The proposed framework can also account for the various types of treatment of marginal jobs in primary sector firms envisaged by Doeringer and Piore (Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis, 1971). In particular, an increase in fixed costs beyond a certain level may induce primary sector firms to restructure, segment production, and enter the secondary sector, thus converting their jobs into secondary jobs. From a welfare point of view, we cannot state in general the desirability of subsidizing fixed employment costs; however, we show that an employment subsidy financed by a wage tax is able to increase employment with no loss in terms of production.     

Heterogeneous Firm Responses to Rising Teenage Wages

Substantial youth minimum wage changes in New Zealand between 2000 and 2007 raised teenage average wages by 5–10 per cent relative to those for adults. We use Statistics New Zealand's Linked Employer–Employee Database (LEED) to examine whether firms' teenage labour demand responses to these changes are greater for firms with higher teenage‐employment share. We find evidence that high teen‐employers reduced their teen employment relative to other firms and had lower survival rates over the period. However, firms that entered the main teen‐employment industries had higher teen‐employment shares than continuing firms. The results are consistent with endogenous technology adoption in response to non‐marginal changes in relative wages.