内在动机与外在激励

本文结合管理实践系统论述了内在动机对于个体行为的激励作用,探讨了个体的内在动机与外在激励之间的关系,明确了内在动机与外在激励在激励机制设计中的地位。通过模型分析发现,内在动机对于个体的行为具有显著的激励作用,它能够提高个体的努力水平。内在动机对于外在激励具有替代作用,内在动机是个体努力的根源,应该成为激励机制的核心,而外在激励则是对内在动机的补充。     

Discrete–Time Approximations of the Holmström–Milgrom Brownian–Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision

This paper studies the relation between discrete–time and continuous–time principal–agent models. We derive the continuous–time model as a limit of discrete–time models with ever shorter periods and show that optimal incentive schemes in the discrete–time models approximate the optimal incentive scheme in the continuous model, which is linear in accounts. Under the additional assumption that the principal observes only cumulative total profits at the end and the agent can destroy profits unnoticed, an incentive scheme that is linear in total profits is shown to be approximately optimal in the discrete–time model when the length of the period is small.     

公平偏好下的多任务目标与国企高管薪酬激励

通过将委托人和代理人公平偏好同时引入到多任务的委托代理模型中,研究国企高管和政府主管部门均具公平偏好下的国企高管最优薪酬机制。研究发现,在企业经营任务目标激励方面,当多任务成本函数为独立关系、互补关系或者替代性足够小的,国企委托人和代理人公平偏好将通过直接和间接的影响途径共同促进高管最优薪酬向公平工资回归,其中,间接影响表现为公平偏好先影响最优薪酬激励强度进而间接地影响总体薪酬水平;在此过程中,政府主管部门公平偏好和高管同情偏好对最优薪酬激励强度的影响,呈现出替代效应。在社会责任任务目标激励方面,显性薪酬激励不是有效的激励方式,因此政府应该借助于隐性激励方式来激励该任务目标的实现。研究还发现教育程度较高的高管具有更强的公平偏好心理。     

Measurement Error and Incentive Pay

Abstract. We will analyse the optimal incentive scheme when the risk‐neutral principal contracts with many risk‐averse agents. Each agent produces an individual contribution which jointly form a total output. Agents’ efforts are unobservable and the principal cannot observe individual outputs without an error. Neither the observed individual output of an agent nor the observed total output of the whole team are then sufficient statistics for the actual individual output in the sense of Blackwell. We show that the mixed contract of the pure piece‐rate contract and of the pure team contract then dominates the pure contracts from the principal's point of view.     

Impatience versus Incentives

This paper studies the dynamics of long‐term contracts in repeated principal–agent relationships with an impatient agent. Despite the absence of exogenous uncertainty, Pareto‐optimal dynamic contracts generically oscillate between favoring the principal and favoring the agent.     

存在主次委托人条件下的委托-代理问题:理论模型和实验研究

在传统委托-代理理论基础上, 根据主次委托人在委托-代理关系中的不同作用, 建立存在主次委托人条件下的委托-代理模型, 并利用实验数据对模型结果进行实验检验。研究结果表明, 当代理人为次委托人付出的努力水平对主委托人存在外部性时, 主委托人支付给代理人的最优激励性报酬和代理人为主委托人付出的最优努力水平都将高于单一委托人条件下的情况;当代理人为次委托人付出的努力水平对主委托人存在正(负)外部性时, 主委托人获得的预期收益将大于(小于)其在单一委托人条件下获得的预期收益;代理人在存在主次委托人条件下获得的预期总收益将高于其在单一委托人条件下获得的预期总收益。论文基于主次委托人在委托-代理关系中的不同地位拓展和深化了传统委托-代理理论。     

Shortcuts in complex engineering systems: a principal-agent approach to risk management

In this article, we examine the effects of shortcuts in the development of engineered systems through a principal-agent model. We find that occurrences of illicit shortcuts are closely related to the incentive structure and to the level of effort that the agent is willing to expend from the beginning of the project to remain on schedule. Using a probabilistic risk analysis to determine the risks of system failure from these shortcuts, we show how a principal can choose optimal settings (payments, penalties, and inspections) that can deter an agent from cutting corners and maximize the principal's value through increased agent effort. We analyze the problem for an agent with limited liability. We consider first the case where he is risk neutral; we then include the case where he is risk averse.     

内在激励对企业外在激励供给策略的影响研究

在员工拥有内在激励的情形下,探讨企业对于外在激励的最优供给策略。研究表明:随着员工内在激励水平的提高,企业对于外在激励的最优供给水平并不一定因此而降低;在员工内在激励发生变化的情形下,企业是否增加、减少或维持其外在激励的供给水平,实际上取决于收益函数对员工努力水平的二阶导数;随着员工内在激励的提高,无论企业所提供的最优外在激励是增加、减少或不变,员工的总激励总会提高;且企业利润是员工内在激励的增函数。     

An economic theory of leadership styles

This paper studies the role of leadership style in providing incentives to subordinates. A leadership style is characterized by its degree of decentralization of tasks and its degree of empathy towards subordinates’ interests. I analyze the optimal leadership style in an incomplete contract framework in which the agent as well as the principal jointly have to solve decision problems and implement their solutions. I show that the optimal leadership style crucially depends on the environment (structure of decision problems and associated payoffs) as well as on the agent’s personality (incentive alignment and competence). Moreover, I examine how monetary incentives influence the optimal leadership style.     

成本控制、棘轮效应与最优激励契约

国企总部（委托人）授权生产单元（代理人）进行的成本控制通常在不对称信息下实施，不对称信息导致激励方案的使用。随着时间的推移，委托人将代理人成本控制绩效提供的信息考虑进去修订方案，促使后者以低努力来避免未来更严格的方案，棘轮效应出现。本文探讨无跨期承诺合理假设下的这一现象，研究发现，为最大化效用，实现分离均衡的激励方案更为理想。最优值处，分离均衡状态下，信息租金和努力程度得到较好的权衡，而准分离均衡或混同均衡，棘轮效应产生了比静态模型中更强的激励。委托人需要支付高额租金诱使代理人揭示其真实类型，但国企实施的"限薪令"可能会阻止这一行为，从而无法实现分离均衡。     

Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation

In a public good environment with positively correlated types, we characterize optimal mechanisms when agents have private information and can enter collusive agreements. First, we prove a weak‐collusion‐proof principle according to which there is no restriction for the principal in offering weak‐collusion‐proof mechanisms. Second, with this principle, we characterize the set of allocations that satisfy individual and coalitional incentive constraints. The optimal weakly collusion‐proof mechanism calls for distortions away from first‐best efficiency obtained without collusion. Allowing collusion restores continuity between the correlated and the uncorrelated environments. When the correlation becomes almost perfect, first‐best efficiency is approached. Finally, the optimal collusion‐proof mechanism is strongly ratifiable.     

Robust Contracts in Continuous Time

We study a continuous‐time contracting problem under hidden action, where the principal has ambiguous beliefs about the project cash flows. The principal designs a robust contract that maximizes his utility under the worst‐case scenario subject to the agent's incentive and participation constraints. Robustness generates endogenous belief heterogeneity and induces a tradeoff between incentives and ambiguity sharing so that the incentive constraint does not always bind. We implement the optimal contract by cash reserves, debt, and equity. In addition to receiving ordinary dividends when cash reserves reach a threshold, outside equity holders also receive special dividends or inject cash in the cash reserves to hedge against model uncertainty and smooth dividends. The equity premium and the credit yield spread generated by ambiguity aversion are state dependent and high for distressed firms with low cash reserves.     

基于质量意识的复杂产品质量控制激励策略

激励在复杂产品供应链中对主供协同合作关系及质量控制发挥了重要作用。本文研究基于主制造商在复杂产品生产研发前按照客户要求形成的质量意识的激励策略是否可以实现复杂产品质量控制问题。考虑具有质量意识的主制造商和其系统供应商组成的两级供应链,建立以主制造商为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别讨论无激励和存在激励时的主供生产最优决策。基于激励方式的不同,将激励策略分为根据供应商产品质量水平激励以及根据主制造商质量意识水平激励两种方式。研究结果表明激励是供应商加强协同合作、改进产品质量的内在动力,主制造商根据质量意识激励供应商可以进一步促使双方协同合作,提高产品质量,使双方获得更高的利润从而实现供应链整体利润最大化。此外用灵敏度分析发现提高主制造商质量意识水平可以增加双方协同合作努力程度,有效提升产品质量水平并实现帕累托改进。     

Commitment vs. Flexibility

We study the optimal trade‐off between commitment and flexibility in a consump‐ tion–savings model. Individuals expect to receive relevant information regarding tastes and thus they value the flexibility provided by larger choice sets. On the other hand, they also expect to suffer from temptation, with or without self‐control, and thus they value the commitment afforded by smaller choice sets. The optimal commitment problem we study is to find the best subset of the individual's budget set. This problem leads to a principal–agent formulation. We find that imposing a minimum level of savings is always a feature of the solution. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for minimum‐savings policies to completely characterize the solution. We also discuss other applications, such as the design of fiscal constitutions, the problem faced by a paternalist, and externalities.     

INFORMATION SHARING IN COMMON AGENCY: WHEN IS TRANSPARENCY GOOD?

When should principals dealing with a common agent share their individual performance measures about the agent's unobservable effort for producing a public good? In a model with two principals who offer linear incentive schemes, we show that information sharing always increases total expected welfare if the principal who is less informed about the agent's effort also cares more about the agent's output. If the less‐informed principal cares somewhat (but not too much) less than the other principal about the agent's output, information sharing reduces total expected welfare. In our model the efficient information regime emerges as an equilibrium outcome. (JEL: D82, D86, M52)     

Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets

This paper studies the impact of credit markets on optimal contracting, when the agent's “interim preference” over upcoming contracts is private information because personal financial decisions affect it via the wealth effect. The main result is a severe loss of incentive provision: equilibrium contracts invariably cause the agent to shirk (i.e., exert minimal effort) if the agent's private financial decision precedes moral hazard contracting. The basic intuition is that committing on another private variable, other than the effort level, exposes the parties to further exploitation of efficient risk‐sharing by relaxing the incentive constraint that was binding ex ante, unless the risk‐sharing was fully efficient to begin with.     

Large Risks,Limited Liability,and Dynamic Moral Hazard

We study a continuous‐time principal–agent model in which a risk‐neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses. Firm size can be decreased at no cost or increased subject to adjustment costs. In the optimal contract, investment takes place only if a long enough period of time elapses with no losses occurring. Then, if good performance continues, the agent is paid. As soon as a loss occurs, payments to the agent are suspended, and so is investment if further losses occur. Accumulated bad performance leads to downsizing. We derive explicit formulae for the dynamics of firm size and its asymptotic growth rate, and we provide conditions under which firm size eventually goes to zero or grows without bounds.     

委托代理框架下项目投资的最优合同设计

在不确定的市场环境下,企业的投资机会具有期权特点。本文在委托代理框架下,研究实物期权投资中的最优合同设计问题。考虑一个委托代理制的企业,委托人拥有推迟项目投资的期权,授予代理人执行该投资期权。信息不对称下,代理人有隐藏信息转移现金流的动机。为了实现自身利益的最大化,委托人设计合同,在该合同下,代理人将揭示真实的信息。在信息对称与信息不对称的情形下,分别建立实物期权模型,得到了委托人设计的最优合同。并通过数值分析,得到了如下的主要结论,信息不对称下,与信息对称相比,高成本的项目投资时机推迟,低成本的项目时机提前,投资期权价值减少。委托人的期权价值随着审核效率的提高而增大。当代理人越没有耐心时,委托人的期权价值越大。本文的研究为现实中的委托代理框架下的实物期权投资决策提供了一定的指导意义。     

基于累积前景理论的报酬契约模型设计与分析

传统报酬契约的机制设计以委托代理模型为依据,并基于期望效用理论加以分析、讨论。实证研究认为,委托代理模型中决策者的行为偏好更符合累积前景理论假设,即委托人与代理人均会依据不同预期收益呈现相应的风险偏好,并对收益的概率估计赋以非线性的决策权重。本文引入累积前景理论重构报酬契约模型,通过构建价值函数、决策权重函数,设置参照点,研究委托人、代理人均无明显风险偏好表征下的决策行为。模型结果表明,在参照点为0的情况下,代理人的最优努力水平与自身风险态度系数或决策权重系数无关;在信息透明情形下,委托人制定的最优利润分享系数,完全由自身的风险态度系数与决策权重系数决定。据此,本文提出系列激励机制优化对策。     

DRIVE AND TALENT

We analyze ways in which heterogeneity in responsiveness to incentives (“drive”) affects employees' incentives and firms' incentive systems in a career concerns model. On the one hand, because more driven agents work harder in response to existing incentives than less driven ones—and therefore pay is increasing in perceived drive—there is a motive to increase effort to signal high drive. These “drive‐signaling incentives” are strongest with intermediate levels of existing incentives. On the other hand, because past output of a more driven agent will seem to the principal to reflect lower ability, there is an incentive to decrease effort to signal low drive. The former effect dominates early in the career, and the latter effect dominates towards the end. To maximize incentives, the principal wants to observe a noisy measure of the agent's effort—such as the number of hours he works—early but not late in his career. (JEL: C70, D82, D23)