Income Distribution,Public Expenditure and Equality

Abstract. The increased role of public expenditure in industrialised countries involves new theoretical and empirical problems: general equilibrium models must be fully accommodated with the structural presence of the public sector and at the same time we need a better understanding of the redistributive impact of non-market rules. Therefore we suggest looking at our economies as a resource allocation mechanism. in which a Walrasian mechanism (without auctioneer) interacts with a political mechanism: we suggest that ex post resource equality is the driving force behind the increasing role of the public sector, and therefore it is also the crucial test against which to evaluate the impact of public expenditure. A stylised way to look at our economies therefore can be as follows: ex ante equality is the domain of market, whilst ex post equality is the domain of the public sector. This approach is compared with cross-section data of 16 countries and more detailed data, both cross-section and time-series, for the case of Italy: empirical results suggest that ex post equality is not a clearcut target, but rather it arises as the net outcome of contrasting forcas.     

The Impact of Revenue‐Maximizing Priority Pricing on Customer Delay Costs

Speed is an increasingly important determinant of which suppliers will be given customers' business and is defined as the time between when an order is placed by the customer and when the product is delivered, or as the amount of time customers must wait before they receive their desired service. In either case, the speed a customer experiences can be enhanced by giving priority to that particular customer. Such a prioritization scheme will necessarily reduce the speed experienced by lower‐priority customers, but this can lead to a better outcome when different customers place different values on speed. We model a single resource (e.g., a manufacturer) that processes jobs from customers who have heterogeneous waiting costs. We analyze the price that maximizes priority revenue for the resource owner (i.e., supplier, manufacturer) under different assumptions regarding customer behavior. We discover that a revenue‐maximizing supplier facing self‐interested customers (i.e., those that independently minimize their own expected costs) charges a price that also minimizes the expected total delay costs across all customers and that this outcome does not result when customers coordinate to submit priority orders at a level that seeks to minimize their aggregate costs of priority fees and delays. Thus, the customers are better off collectively (as is the supplier) when the supplier and customers act independently in their own best interests. Finally, as the number of priority classes increases, both the priority revenues and the overall customer delay costs improve, but at a decreasing rate.     

The Disintegrating Effects of Equality: A Study of a Failed International Merger

In the literature on M&A and social justice, equality is regarded as an important principle to facilitate social integration. This article debates what happens when the equality principle is operationalized; from intentions in the pre‐merger process to the distribution of resources and decision‐making rules in the post‐merger process. In a merger between two state‐owned telecoms corporations in the Scandinavian countries, we found that the principle of equality had the reverse effects on social integration to that predicted in the literature. Instead of facilitating the social integration process, the equality principle led to perceptual and structural fallacies negatively influencing social integration. We suggest that these disintegrating effects were particularly strong because this was an international merger between two state‐owned firms of unequal size.     

The Effects of Learning,Forgetting, and Relearning on Decision Rule Performance in Multiproject Scheduling

Product development occurs in multiproject environments where preemption is often allowed so that critical projects can be addressed immediately. Because product development is characterized by time-based competition, there is pressure to make decisions quickly using heuristics methods that yield fast project completion. Preemption heuristics are needed both to choose activities for preemption and then to determine which resources to use to restart preempted activities. Past research involving preemption has ignored any completion time penalty due to the forgetting experienced by project personnel during preemption and the resulting relearning time required to regain lost proficiency. The purpose of this research is to determine the impact of learning, forgetting, and relearning (LFR) on project completion time when preemption is allowed. We present a model for the LFR cycle in multiproject development environments. We test a number of priority rules for activity scheduling, activity preemption, and resource assignment subsequent to preemption, subject to the existence of the LFR cycle, for which a single type of knowledge worker resource is assigned among multiple projects. The results of the simulation experiments clearly demonstrate that LFR effects are significant. The tests of different scheduling, preemption, and resource reassignment rules show that the choice of rule is crucial in mitigating the completion time penalty effects of the LFR cycle, while maintaining high levels of resource utilization. Specifically, the worst performing rules tested for each performance measure are those that attempt to maintain high resource utilization. The best performing rules are based on activity criticality and resource learning.     

可持续发展管理:从指标体系到政策

本文提出可持续发展指标与政策的构成基础,强调对可持续发展管理来说,政策比指标更为需要。     

A Cooperative Savings Game Approach to a Time Sensitive Capacity Allocation and Scheduling Problem

We consider a competitive scheduling setting with arbitrary number of agents each having the option to utilize two parallel resources to satisfy its demand: (i) an in‐house resource dedicated to process only the tasks of each specific agent, and (ii) a flexible resource capable of processing all agents' workloads. In a noncooperative setting, each agent would determine how much of its demand it will subcontract to the flexible resource with the objective to deliver its entire demand as quickly as possible subject to the priority rules set by the owner of the flexible resource (i.e., third‐party). In this study, we also allow for agents to coalesce with other agents and update their initial subcontracting decisions to attain rescheduling savings. Evidently, a grand coalition of all agents can coordinate to achieve the maximum savings possible, but the resulting schedule may yield individual losses for a subset of agents (which we refer to as “losers”), thus necessitating a transfer payment scheme to distribute the rescheduling savings among the agents in an equitable way. We model the rescheduling interactions among the agents as a cooperative savings game, and propose savings distribution schemes that invoke the core allocation concept.     

Inventory Commitment and Prioritized Backlogging Clearance with Alternative Delivery Lead Times

We propose a model where customers are classified into two groups: short lead‐time customers who require the product immediately and long lead‐time customers to whom the supplier may deliver either immediately or in the next cycle. Unmet orders are backlogged with associated costs. Specifically, the supplier faces two problems: how the on‐hand inventories should be allocated between the two classes of customers and how the backlogged orders should be cleared when replenishments arrive. We treat the former as an inventory commitment problem and handle the latter with priority rules. We characterize and compare the inventory commitment policies with three priority rules in clearing backlogs. We also explore the optimal inventory replenishment decision and evaluate the performance of each priority rule.     

The Fairness of Decision Rules

Prior work on resource allocation has generally considered only a small number of allocation rules, usually reflecting equity or equality. We use a scenario study to examine the effect of eight different allocation rules (past performance, future performance, rank, random draw, chance meetings, business need, personal need, and political reasons) on recipient reactions to the gain or loss of three different kinds of resources in an organizational setting. We find evidence that allocations based on past performance and random draw rules lead to the highest fairness perceptions and the lowest expectations that the decisions made will lead to intragroup conflict. However, fairness judgments are also influenced by a variety of other factors, such as the type of resource being allocated and whether the recipient is advantaged or disadvantaged relative to others in the workgroup (what we term the “egocentric interaction”). We discuss how our results might influence managers’ allocation decisions.     

Axioms for Deferred Acceptance

The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent‐proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent‐proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non‐wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non‐wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferred acceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. We apply our results to characterize efficient deferred acceptance rules.     

基于图的广度搜索的进度生成机制

启发式算法是解决资源受限的项目调度问题的经典方法之一，通常用来生成元启发算法初始解，传统的串行（SSGS）和并行（PSGS）是生成项目调度方案的经典机制，本文基于图的广度优先搜索算法，提出了一种考虑任务节点位置因素的广度生成机制（BSSGS），并验证了算法的效果。借鉴广度搜索算法定义进度生成机制中的当前任务集合C、候选任务集合D以及阶段变量g等，对各任务节点进行层次划分并定义任务调度秩序；结合优先规则选择候选任务j^*并进行资源R_k（t）调度更新，进而生成完整的调度方案；案例分析表明新机制在满足优先规则和资源约束的同时兼顾了任务节点在网络中位置因素，拥有对于局部复杂网络不回避，对关键节点及时调度等明显优势；选择PSPLIB中算例，在不同优先规则下对新机制进行了测试，测试结果表明新的进度生成机制在LPT、SPT、MTS和MIS等优先规则下，在平均最短工期、平均资源利用率及最优调度方案率等方面优于串行和并行进度生成机制，且算法时间复杂度与传统机制相比并未增加，仍为O（J²，K）。     

An Analysis of Dual‐Kanban Just‐In‐Time Systems in a Non‐Repetitive Environment

Recent advances in approaches and production technologies for the production of goods and services have made just‐in‐time (JIT) a strong alternative for use in intermittent and small batch production systems, especially when time‐based competition is the norm and a low inventory is a must. However, the conventional JIT system is designed for mass production with a stable master production schedule. This paper suggests supplementing the information provided by production kanbans with information about customer waiting lines to be used by operators to schedule production in each work‐station of intermittent and small batch production systems. This paper uses simulation to analyze the effect of four scheduling policy variables—number of kanbans, length of the withdrawal cycle, information about customer waiting lines, and priority rules on two performance measures—customer wait‐time and inventory. The results show that using information about customer waiting lines reduces customer wait‐time by about 30% while also reducing inventory by about 2%. In addition, the effect of information about customer waiting lines overshadows the effect of priority rules on customer wait‐time and inventory.     

Release of maintenance jobs in a decentralized multi-stage production/maintenance system with continuous condition monitoring

Condition-based maintenance is analyzed for multi-stage production with a separate maintenance department. It is assumed that the conditions of the machines deteriorate as a function of multiple production parameters and that the task of maintenance is to keep up predefined operational availabilities of the individual machines. In this context the problem of determining the optimal machine condition that triggers the release of a preventive maintenance job and the problem of scheduling maintenance jobs at the maintenance department arise. Existing approaches to solve these problems either assume a monolithic production/maintenance system or concentrate on a decentralized system in which the information flow and resource transfer do not cause delays. With our paper we aim at (1) deriving a triggering mechanism that is able to cope with relaxed assumptions and at (2) developing specific priority rules for scheduling maintenance jobs. Therefore, in this paper a specific continuous condition monitoring and a suitable information exchange protocol are developed, factors determining the release situation are operationalized, impacts of choosing the triggering conditions are identified and the components of specific priority rules for scheduling maintenance jobs are clearly elaborated. Finally the performance of the resulting solution approach is analyzed by simulations. Thereby, relevant characteristics of the production/maintenance system, the maintenance task and relevant priority rules are varied systematically. This research contributes answers to the questions on how the exchange of local information can be structured, the parameters of condition-based maintenance can be set and on what maintenance-specific priority rules can be applied in case of incomplete information about deterioration in a decentralized multistage production/maintenance system.     

Managing a Portfolio of Product Development Projects under Resource Constraints

Managers of product development (PD) project portfolios face difficult decisions in allocating limited resources to minimize project or portfolio delay. Although PD projects are highly iterative (cyclical), almost all of the vast literature on project scheduling assumes that projects are acyclical. This article addresses this gap with a comprehensive analysis of 31 priority rules (PRs) on 18,480 portfolios containing 55,440 iterative projects. We find that the best PRs for iterative project portfolios differ significantly from those for acyclical ones, and that the best PRs at the project level differ from those at the portfolio level. The best PR depends on project and portfolio characteristics such as network density, iteration intensity, resource loading profile, and amount of resource contention. In particular, by amplifying the effects of iteration, high‐density networks hold dramatically different implications for iterative projects. Moreover, the best PR also differs depending on whether the objective is to minimize the average delay to all projects or to minimize delay to the overall portfolio. Thus, a project or portfolio manager who uses the same PR on all occasions will exhibit unnecessarily poor performance in most cases.     

资源约束下多项目调度的改进遗传算法

针对资源约束下的多项目调度问题,在前人提出的有效的启发式算法研究路径基础上,本文利用遗传算法,结合进度生成机制,提出了多项目调度的改进遗传算法。与其他多项目调度启发式算法相比,该算法在平均项目延迟和最佳解比例方面都表现较好,综合利用优化后的优先规则也使得该算法更适用于不同网络复杂度和不同资源约束程度的多项目调度问题中。     

Complexity and Competition

Extensive‐form market games typically have a large number of noncompetitive equilibria. In this paper, we argue that the complexity of noncompetitive behavior provides a justification for competitive equilibrium in the sense that if rational agents have an aversion to complexity (at the margin), then maximizing behavior will result in simple behavioral rules and hence in a competitive outcome. For this purpose, we use a class of extensive‐form dynamic matching and bargaining games with a finite number of agents. In particular, we consider markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers and deterministic, exogenous, sequential matching rules, although the results can be extended to other matching processes. If the complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences lexicographically with the standard payoff, then every equilibrium strategy profile induces a competitive outcome.     

A Queueing Theoretic Approach to Set Staffing Levels in Time‐Dependent Dual‐Class Service Systems*

This article addresses the optimal staffing problem for a nonpreemptive priority queue with two customer classes and a time‐dependent arrival rate. The problem is related to several important service settings such as call centers and emergency departments where the customers are grouped into two classes of “high priority” and “low priority,” and the services are typically evaluated according to the proportion of customers who are responded to within targeted response times. To date, only approximation methods have been explored to generate staffing requirements for time‐dependent dual‐class services, but we propose a tractable numerical approach to evaluate system behavior and generate safe minimum staffing levels using mixed discrete‐continuous time Markov chains (MDCTMCs). Our approach is delicate in that it accounts for the behavior of the system under a number of different rules that may be imposed on staff if they are busy when due to leave and involves explicitly calculating delay distributions for two customer classes. Ultimately, we embed our methodology in a proposed extension of the Euler method, coined Euler Pri, that can cope with two customer classes, and use it to recommend staffing levels for the Welsh Ambulance Service Trust (WAST).     

Status,Intertemporal Choice,and Risk‐Taking

This paper studies endogenous risk‐taking by embedding a concern for status (relative consumption) into an otherwise conventional model of economic growth. We prove that if the intertemporal production function is strictly concave, an equilibrium must converge to a unique steady state in which there is recurrent endogenous risk‐taking. (The role played by concavity is clarified by considering a special case in which the production function is instead convex, in which there is no persistent risk‐taking.) The steady state is fully characterized. It displays features that are consistent with the stylized facts that individuals both insure downside risk and gamble over upside risk, and it generates similar patterns of risk‐taking and avoidance across environments with quite different overall wealth levels. Endogenous risk‐taking here is generally Pareto‐inefficient. A concern for status thus implies that persistent and inefficient risk‐taking hinders the attainment of full equality.     

A comparative analysis of due date based job sequencing rules in a flow shop with multiple processors

The literature on job scheduling recognizes the importance of due date performance criteria such as mean tardiness and maximum tardiness. A number of studies test a large number of sequencing rules for these criteria in job shop and flow shop settings. The object of this present research is to examine the performance of some well-known priority rules in a flow shop with multiple processors. This study investigates the performance of ten priority rules in terms of mean and maximum tardiness. It examines the effects of problem characteristics, such as number of jobs, number of machines stages and number of parallel processors at each stage, and the performance of priority rules using regression analysis. The findings of the study suggest that the primary determinants of tardiness-based criteria are problem characteristics. In addition, both the regression analysis and the analysis of variance provide strong evidence of the strategy-effect. Finally, a detailed performance review of examined priority rules for various problem characteristics is presented.     

A heuristic approach to n/ m job shop scheduling: fuzzy dynamic scheduling algorithms

n/m shop scheduling is a ‘ NP-Hard’ problem. Using conventional heuristic algorithms ( priority rules) only, it is almost impossible to achieve an optimal solution. Research has been carried out to improve the heuristic algorithms to give a near-optimal solution. This paper advocates a fuzzy logic based, dynamic scheduling algoridim aimed at achieving this goal. The concept of new membership functions is discussed in die algorithm as a link to connect several priority rules. The constraints to determine the membership function of jobs for a particular priority rule are established, and three membership functions are developed. In order to decide the weight vector of priority rules, an aggregate performance measure is suggested. The methodology for constructing the weight vector is discussed in detail. Experiments have been carried out using a simulation technique to validate the proposed scheduling algorithm.     

How Incentives Increase Inequality

Abstract. We determine the optimal level of bonuses in the case of Co‐production between an agent and multiusers. There is Co‐production when the outcome is the result of both the agent's effort and the user's effort and type. Paying bonuses to the agent encourages him to vary his effort according to the user he meets. This variety in the agent's effort results in an increase in inequality. Hence, the optimal level of bonuses is muted when the principal cares about equality among users. This is typically the case in education or health.