对2000年人口普查出生性别比的分层模型分析

本文对以往出生性别比研究中的若干观点进行了学术评论,并讨论了个别经验统计分析中的方法问题。在此基础上,本文应用非线性分层模型将2000年全国人口普查1‰数据和1999年的地区级生育政策数据结合起来对出生性别比失调的影响因素进行了初步分析。结果表明,育龄妇女现有子女数量及性别和一些社会特征对出生性别比存在单独的影响,并且肯定了生育政策既存在对出生性别比的直接影响,也通过其与妇女以往生育结果以及其他社会特征之间的交互效应来影响出生性别比。     

Multiple mobilities in Mexico’s fertility industry

ABSTRACT

How can we conceptualize travel in search of fertility treatment? While current research on transnational reproduction mostly conceptualizes mobility as horizontal movement from A to B, this article shows how horizontal mobilities converge, contradict, and are interdependent with other forms of mobility; namely vertical mobilities in terms of social upward and downward mobility, representational mobilities in form of imaginative geographies, and the actual embodied experiences of mobility. Based on ethnographic research on the reproductive tourism industry in Mexico, the article explores the multiplicity of mobilities that constitute transnational reproduction. The article evaluates how the concept of multiple mobilities contributes to the study of medical tourism from a critical mobilities’ perspective.     

低生育水平下的甘肃人口特征

一个国家或地区如果在一定时期持续处于低生育水平,虽然对控制人口的绝对数量能起到很好的作用．但同时也会产生一系列的人口和社会问题,例如：对人口可持续发展的影响、对人口再生产的影响、对人口红利的影响、对人口老龄化的影响等．这些日益显露出来的问题．在某个领域某个阶段已经给社会经济发展造成了一些不利影响,伴随着生育水平的持续下降,可以预计将来还会出现新的社会问题。     

社会政策与日本人口的发展

社会政策已成为很多国家调整国内人口发展的重要手段。面对总和生育率多年来不断下降的趋势,日本政府自1994年开始出台各种有利于人们生儿育女的社会人口政策。这些政策在目标、影响人群、法律效力及涉及政府部门方面有所不同。就目前来看,一些改善育儿环境、间接提高受孕几率的政策是有效的,但这些政策对最终提高出生水平的效果却不理想。在任何人口和文化中,人们生育观念的转变,无论是多生还是少生,都是一个长期的过程。     

Is Fertility Behavior in Our Genes? Findings from a Danish Twin Study

This article investigates the fertility of Danish twins born during the periods 1870–1910 and 1953–64 in order to pursue two central questions for understanding human reproduction: Do genetic dispositions influence fertility and fertility-related behavior? Does the relevance of the “nature versus nurture” debate shift over time or with demographic regimes? The authors find that genetic influences on fertility exist, but that their relative magnitude and pattern are contingent on gender and on the socioeconomic environment experienced by cohorts. Among females born in 1880–90 and after 1955, about 30–50 percent of the variance in fertility is due to genetic influences; these influences are substantially smaller for earlier and for interim birth cohorts. Male fertility is generally subject to smaller genetic and larger shared-environment effects than female fertility. Because genetic effects are most prevalent in situations with deliberately controlled fertility and relatively egalitarian socioeconomic opportunities, the authors propose that the genetic dispositions affect primarily fertility behavior and motivations for having children. Analyses of fertility motivations, measured by age of first attempt to have a child, support this interpretation.     

A quantitative study of the determinants of fertility behavior

Recent literature shows great interest in the quantitative study of the determinants of fertility. In a similar way, this study takes an across-country approach to specify independent variables, to separate economic from social and political variables, to make distinct comparisons of fertility responses in developed and underdeveloped countries, and to examine a wide range of hypotheses. The key is empirical analysis by separate regressions. This permits direct comparisons of countries at different levels of development, increases the probability of obtaining statistically significant regression coefficients, and standardizes the analysis for factors which vary with level of development.In this way, the authors determine positive and statistically significant relations between fertility and illiteracy, child mortality, proportion of agricultural population, proportion of nonfarm selfemployment, and overcrowded housing and show a negative significant relationship between fertility and communism. The study does not establish statistically significant relations, however, for population density, social mobility, substitutes for sexual intercourse, achievement motivation, protein in the diet, and religion.In general, the signs of the regression coefficients for the separate levels of development are the same as those for all countries combined. Any failure to attain statistical significance may be explained by small sample size and insufficient variation in the variables for separate levels of development.     

贵州高原少数民族传统生育文化生成的地理背景——从地理环境与文化生成的角度阐述

由于贵州地理环境的特殊性,使民族传统生育文化积淀很深,影响和支配着人们的生育意愿和行为规范,导致了少数民族人口出现增长较快、生育水平偏高、早婚早育等问题,给贵州以及民族地区经济社会发展和生态环境带来较大压力。本文结合贵州高原地理环境的特征,从地理环境与文化生成的角度对少数民族传统生育文化的形成的地理因素进行初步探讨。     

The Impact of Migration on Fertility under China’s Underlying Restrictions: A Comparative Study Between Permanent and Temporary Migrants

Compared with that in other countries, the issue of fertility in China is more complicated because of its restriction policy or system. Several major hypotheses have been proposed to explain and predict the impact of migration on China’s fertility regardless of China’s real situation. Therefore, this paper analyzes the impact of migration on fertility considering China’s underlying restrictions using the data from the Chinese General Social Survey carried out in 2008. The social class in this study was divided into two, namely urban class and rural class. By building the 2 × 2 mobility tables and the diagonal mobility model, the study determined the impact of migration on fertility and analyzed the influence of some restrictions, such as family planning, traditional fertility concept, and household registration system. Results show that migration greatly affects fertility: upward migration (i.e., from rural to urban) may decrease the fertility, whereas downward migration (i.e., from urban to rural) may increase it. The degree of decline on fertility is greater than that of increase. Family planning still plays a role in fertility decline. Traditional concepts on fertility, for example, bringing up sons to take care of parents in their old age and preferring boys to girls, are anchored on the people’s mind, which is detrimental to the stability of the fertility rate. Moreover, the household registration system primarily influences the fertility behavior of temporary migration, with a negative relationship between them.     

Demographic Change and Immigration in Age-structured Epidemic Models

Immigration might be a remedy against the stress that low fertility causes to demographic and welfare systems. Sustained immigration, however, can alter both the demographic and epidemiological profiles of the receiving population. An age-structured SIR (susceptible-infective-recovered) model with realistic immigration under conditions of below replacement fertility is studied. Equilibria and threshold phenomena are characterized. The immigration profile and the epidemiological features of immigrants affect the reproduction number and the force of infection in the receiving population. Finally, an illustration is given, showing the potential effects of immigration for rubella control in Italy, by considering how the age profile of immigration influences the reproduction number of the disease.     

Why Is Fertility Lower in Wealthier Countries? The Role of Relaxed Fertility‐Selection

Lower fertility in wealthier countries can be explained in evolutionary terms by three key factors: (i) higher fertility in poorer countries—an evolutionary consequence of many generations of intense “fertility‐selection” favoring innate behaviors promoting high fertility, especially in males; (ii) the empowerment of women in wealthier countries that serves to reduce fertility directly—an evolutionary consequence of selection favoring an inherent preference for lower fertility in females, combined with release from the evolutionary effects of a long history of male control over female fertility; and (iii) offspring access in wealthy countries to public health care, welfare, and other social services, which combined with inherited wealth for offspring, virtually eliminates competition between families for the resource needs of offspring. The combined consequences of (ii) and (iii) mean that the fertility‐selection so prevalent in poor countries is relaxed in wealthy countries, thus allowing random genetic drift to produce an increased relative frequency of innate behaviors promoting low fertility and discontentment with high fertility.     

论计划生育政策对实现福利适度人口的意义

我国人口问题十分严重,人口因素很难自发地与社会其他要素相适应,不利于社会经济的全面协调与可持续发展,对社会福利目标的实现构成了一定阻碍。我国计划生育政策的实施,解决了生育率与死亡率不对称性的矛盾,解决了物质资料再生产与人类自身再生产不平衡性的矛盾,解决了家庭生育计划与社会适度人口不一致性的矛盾,促进了人口因素与其他社会因素的协调与可持续性发展。     

Fertility and social mobility among teachers

Social mobility is defined as the teacher's present position in the professional hierarchy relative to his father's occupation, and fertility as the average number of children per married male teacher after 10 years of marriage. A sample of all male teachers in gran-earning schools in England and Wales was used for the study. The hypothesis examined is that put forward and tested in one form or another by numerous authors, that upward mobility is associated with relatively low fertility; and Berent's finding, that among persons of equal social status social origin is negatively correlated with size of family of procreation.

The study of teachers fails to reveal any relation for either of the hypotheses. This also holds when account is taken of the wife's social origin and size of family of origin of the teacher. The latter analysis suggests, however, that this was a factor in the teacher's own rise in the social scale. The question remaines why teachers do not conform to the national pattern shown to exist by Berent. It is argued that while teachers' socal origin still affects their choice of marriage partner, its influence is gradually obliterated by the overriding and homogenising influence pattern of the teacher's life. This suggests that care must be exercised in applying a general finding to selected populations and calls for more detailed study of other occupational groups to explain the forces at work in the process of social mobility.     

Population dynamics of humans and other animals

Human population dynamics, at least until the past century, have probably been governed by homeostasis and in this resembled those of other animals. Because human population homeostasis was probably substantially weaker than among large mammals, its operation has been less obvious. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence for advanced agriculturalists is compelling. Unlike animals, the human population has tended toward equilibria that have been tending upward at an accelerating rate. The acceleration might reflect long-run positive feedback between density and technological progress, as Boserup has suggested. Because homeostasis was weak, its role in shorter run historical explantation is limited; its force was gentle and easily overwhelmed by other particular influences. Malthusian oscillation, in the sense of distinctive medium-run dynamics arising from homeostasis, probably did not occur. And because homeostasis was weak, density dependence can in principle explain only a minute proportion of the annual variation in population growth rates. Yet homeostasis plays an essential role in demographic theory. Without it, we are incapable of explaining population size and change over time except by recounting a mindless chronology of events back to the beginning of humanity--whenever that was. Without it, we cannot explain the response of population growth to economic growth. Without it, we cannot explain recovery from catastrophe or the rapid natural increase in many frontier regions. Without it, we cannot properly analyze the influence of climatic variation and other partially density-independent factors. Our basic understanding of human history requires a grasp of what homeostasis can explain and what it cannot. A homeostatic approach to population dynamics also leads to questions about the roles of reproductive norms and institutions, not just whether they encourage high or low fertility, but whether they make natural increase responsive to resource abundance. And if they do, whether they strike the balance of population and the means of subsistence at a relatively prosperous or impoverished level. Such considerations may contribute to an understanding of broad preindustrial differences among the regions of the world in densities, average levels of vital rates, and living standards--which was very much how Malthus viewed the matter. Ordinary homeostatic tendencies essentially vanish in the course of economic development, and they were probably all but gone from much of Europe by the end of the 19th century.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Socioeconomic determinants of China's urban fertility

This paper examines socioeconomic forces other than population policies and family planning programs that have affected the fertility transition in urban China. The authors argue that before and since the intensification of population planning activities, the government influenced fertility directly and indirectly through socialization of the economy, the transformation of the Chinese family, and the provision of education, employment, health, medical, welfare, cultural, and related services in urban areas. The various social institutions and subsystems of society have greatly weakened the motivation for large families. The byproducts of the slow urbanization process in urban China including housing shortages, unemployment, rising living standards, changes in the cost of raising a child, and urban-rural downward mobility have affected the social and economic costs of childbearing, which in turn have affected the postponement of childbearing. Thus, our considerations of urban China's fertility transition must be broadened to include the issues of social development strategy in Chinese urban experience.     

Differential fertility and intergenerational mobility under private versus public education

We study differential fertility and intergenerational mobility in an overlapping-generations framework with skilled and unskilled individuals. Assuming unskilled parents are less productive in educating children, we show that they choose higher fertility but less investment for child education than skilled parents. Public education reduces the fertility gap but may increase intergenerational mobility under certain conditions. We also find very different responses of fertility differential and intergenerational mobility to a variation in a preference or technology parameter. As the ratio of skilled to working population rises towards its steady state, average income rises, average fertility falls, but income inequality first rises and then falls.     

Transition of the population reproduction pattern in China]

In the past 30 years, great changes have taken place in the reproduction pattern of the population in China. A historical pattern of a high birth rate and high death rate no longer exists. A new low birth rate and low death rate pattern has now become a reality. It is especially notable that China has realized this transition under the condition of a backward economy. Since 1949, the death rate has dropped rapidly because of advancements in medical care, a rise in the standard of living, and an improvement in public health. The change in fertility, however, is determined by the developing level of social productivity. As mankind has moved forward, population reproduction has gradually become a self-conscious activity. Fertility is increasingly determined by views on marriage and concepts of birth. China has successfully achieved a transition in fertility, and this has to be credited to China's progressive relations in social production and an excellent social system. In addition, practical efforts made by the political leadership, cooperation from the people, and popularization of ideological education on family planning have all contributed to a transition in China's fertility rate.     

Sweden faces zero population growth

In this discussion of Sweden as it approaches zero population growth, focus is on the following: population growth in perspective, fertility trends (childbearing concentrated and cohort versus period fertility), marital status (non-marital cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, and divorce), women's changing status (increasing education and increasing employment), constraints and supports for women's dual role (family allowances and housing), birth control (contraceptive methods and practice and abortion), mortality trends, changing age structure and the elderly (average population age and proportion of elderly and cost of elderly support), international migration (from emigration to immigration and demographic impact of immigration), immigration policy, recent population debate (immigration issues and facing zero population growth). Since 1900 the primary features of Sweden's demographic history are a continuing decline in the birth rate to very low levels -- relieved by some upward movement in the 1940s and 1960s -- and a marked shift in the migration balance from emigration to immigration. It is almost entirely because of immigration that Sweden's population growth rate has not yet turned negative. If Swedish women were to continue to bear children at the rate that all women in the reproductive ages actually did in 1978, each women would end up with an average well below the level necessary to exactly replace each adult in the population leaving migration out, an annual total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman would have to be sustained for births and deaths to be in balance under the low mortality conditions prevaling in Sweden.     

2011:中国人口学研究的回顾与评述

通过检索与回顾2011年刊发在国内主要人口学刊物上较有代表性的文章以及人口学相关著作或科研文集,从中国人口国情、人口与社会、流动人口、人口老龄化、生育、人口与经济、其他领域等学界关注的领域系统性地评述2011年中国人口学研究的现状与进展。总体来看,2011年学界加强了对中国人口发展总体形势的判断,更多地关注人口与社会管理、人口与公共政策、人口与教育等与社会现实息息相关的领域。此外,对流动人口、人口老龄化、生育、人口与经济等以往人口学传统主题也进行了更为深刻和细致的研究。     

The Marxist outlook on population]

Marxist population theory and world population are discussed. From his study of capitalist population theory Marx concluded, "In capitalist reproduction, poverty produces population," thus rejecting Malthusian population determinism theory and developing economic determinism. According to UN statistics, world population has stabilized since the middle of this century after having doubled every hundred years for the last 300; population in the developed countries showed a positive decrease and average net population growth of the developing countries also decreased. The premise of this paper is that population grows according to social economy development. During the last several hundred years, world wealth increased much faster than population; in the last 200 years alone, the population has increased fivefold, but wealth fortyfold. In addition, world population analysis reveals an inverse relationship between wealth and population in the developed and developing countries: the poorer the country, the greater the population. From this perspective, the study of population must begin with surplus labor. Accumulation of surplus production is the foundation of continuous social development and the basis for population growth. The major difference in methods between capitalist countries and China is that the capitalist-planned fertility affects the individual family while Chinese-planned fertility has the whole nation in mind. Human fertility is determined by the economic system. Private ownership determines the private nature of fertility and public ownership determines the public nature of fertility. Thus population development is determined by the accumulation of social wealth.     

Family Policies and the Western European Fertility Divide: Insights from a Natural Experiment in Belgium

Countries in Northwestern Europe, including Belgium, report cohort fertility levels of close to two children per woman; whereas Central European countries, such as Germany, have levels of around 1.6 children. In seeking to explain these differences, some scholars have stressed the role of the social policy context, while others have pointed to variation in fertility‐related social norms. But because these influences are interdependent, it is difficult to isolate their effects on fertility trends. This study attempts to disentangle these two factors by drawing on a quasi‐natural experiment. After World War I Germany was compelled to cede the Eupen–Malmedy territory to Belgium. The population of this region has retained its German linguistic identity, but has been subject to Belgian social policies. We examine whether the fertility trends in this German‐speaking region of Belgium follow the Belgian or the German pattern. Our findings indicate that they generally resemble the Belgian pattern. This suggests that institutional factors are important for understanding the current fertility differences in Western Europe.