缓解当前纺织企业资金紧缺的途径

近年来,不少工业企业负责人都感到办厂难,主要问题是资金紧张。要维持正常生产,供、产、销都需要资金作后盾。缺乏必要的资金,生产就不能进行,更谈不上技术革命、产品更新和扩大生产规模了。目前工业企业一般都有一定数额的固定资金和流动资金,为什么还要犯难呢?下面针对某针织厂作了一些调查。特别是对该厂资金难的问题进行了研究分析。     

基层组织决策两难困境的化解及风险规避——基于渐进决策理论视角的分析

随着政府职能部门“放管服”观念的贯彻和落实,基层组织发展变革过程中面临着发展的实然与应然间的冲突、多方利益相关者的干预与基层组织自主决策的矛盾、组织内部架构职能分割等现实困境。在这些两难困境中,合理的决策方式是破解难题的重要抓手。依据渐进决策理论,基层领导可以从以下方面着手规避决策制定、实施和执行过程中出现的风险:关注目标导向;留心不同的意见;善于总结归因;建立选择标准,增加备选方案;扩大参与决策的层级。     

资金结构对长期投资决策的影响

资金结构是长期投资决策中应考虑的一个重要因素,现行财务管理教材所介绍的长期投资决策理论与方法都是建立在全投资假设基础上的,由于没有考虑资金结构对决策的影响,故存在种种缺陷.资金结构会对投资项目的现金流量、投资方案的资金成本以及长期投资决策方法产生重要影响.     

企业资金紧缺的原因及对策

当前企业资金紧张的矛盾很突出,企业支付能力和偿债能力日益减弱,财务状况和抗御风险的能力逐渐下降。企业资金紧张,从表面上看是成本上升,贷款相互拖欠或产品滞销造成的,但进一步分析就不难发现,导致企业资金紧张的原因很多,也很复杂,其中既包括政策和市场变化的因素,也包括企     

资金约束下损失规避零售商的订购和广告协同策略

在损失规避下,探讨了零售商的订购和广告协同决策问题。零售商的初始资金状态存在三种情形：资金充足、资金相对短缺（不需融资）、资金短缺（对外融资）,分别在三种情形下刻画了零售商的最优运营策略,结果表明：零售商用于商品采购和广告的资金产生的边际效用与边际负效用之比相等,且介于1与单位融资资金的使用成本之间;用于两项活动的最后一单位资金产生的边际效用相等。探讨了损失规避、初始资金、融资利率、商品价格及广告促销的敏感性对运营策略的影响：在资金充足或资金短缺下,商品订购量和广告强度随影响因素的变动方向通常相同;在资金相对短缺下,商品订购量和广告强度随影响因素的变动方向则相反。讨论中揭示了一些管理启示。     

模糊需求信息条件下风险规避型分销商的库存决策研究

着重研究模糊需求信息条件下风险规避型分销商库存决策问题,利用模糊理论的基本运算规则、扩展原理及Markowitz提出的均值一方差模型建立两类模糊需求信息条件下风险规避型分销商库存决策模型风险规避型分销商在可接受的库存成本基础上追求库存成本方差最小的模型;风险规避型分销商在可接受的库存成本方差基础上追求库存成本最小的模型.并以数值分析的方式来分析模型内在涵义.     

企业经理风险决策行为的实证研究

本文报告的两项研究系统深入地探讨了中国企业经理的风险决策行为。在研究一中,214名企业经理填答了效用测量表;在研究二中,82名企业经理填答风险决策情景模拟表。结果发现,个人特征(如性别、职位、所在企业的性质与规模等)、决策任务特征(如结果值的符号与大小)以及决策环境特征(如企业文化、企业经营状况、上司的风险态度等)均是影响企业经理风险决策行为的关键变量。本文为建立风险决策行为的理论或模型提供了基本的参考资料。     

损失规避的性质探索——国家自然科学基金“特优”项目(70871110)回溯

国家自然科学基金资助项目"损失规避的性质探索"由国家自然科学基金委员会管理科学部于2009年1月立项,2011年12月完成,并于2014年在国家自然科学基金委员会管理科学部组织的结题项目绩效评估会上被评为"特优"。通过对项目研究的课题内容和创新性成果的剖析,回顾了项目研究的各项进展,并对项目的学术价值及成果应用进行介绍。     

考虑风险规避的资金约束供应链最优信用契约设计

本文针对零售商的资金约束问题,研究了风险规避的供应商如何通过设计信用契约影响零售商的融资结构。构建了包含供应商、零售商以及银行在内的供应链融资模型,给出了供应商的最优信用契约决策、零售商的最优库存决策以及银行的最优利率决策。进一步分析了供应商的风险规避程度对最优信用契约决策的影响。研究表明：当供应商的风险规避程度低于某个临界值时,供应商偏好提供全额信用,从而零售商的融资结构为单一的交易信用融资;而当供应商的风险规避程度高于该临界值时,供应商偏好提供部分信用,从而零售商的融资结构为组合融资。最后,通过数值算例验证了本文的结论。本研究一定程度上丰富了现有供应链金融的理论研究,为供应链核心企业与银行的决策提供了依据与参考。     

基于预期的报童问题研究

Koszegi与Rabin认为参照点往往由决策者的理性预期确定,本文选取报童的预期作为参照点,利用参照依赖偏好理论对报童问题进行了研究。研究发现,基于预期的报童的最优订货量不仅与货物销售的概率分布、价格等有关还与报童的损失厌恶程度有关。如果报童是损失厌恶的,报童的订货量要小于经典报童问题的订货量;反之,报童的订货量则大于经典报童问题的订货量,该结论与大部分实证结果是一致的。最后,用算例来验证了文中有关结论的正确性。     

需求分布规律变化情况下的报童订货策略

在需求分布规律变化情况下,报童在进行订货决策时会因为错误判断需求分布规律而导致期望库存成本增加。为了解决这一问题,本文集成传统历史需求信息和非传统需求信息以正确地认知需求分布规律,在此基础上决策订货量。假设需求服从均值不同、方差相同的两种类型的正态分布,每一种正态分布的概率已知。利用信号检测理论构建基于历史需求信息与需求分布概率的报童最优订货策略,并与只基于需求分布概率的直觉规则订货策略进行对比。结果表明：只要排除需求分布概率很大或很小两种极端情况,最优订货策略比直觉规则订货策略在控制期望库存成本方面的作用更明显,即利用历史需求信息可以有效修正报童对实际需求分布的检测结果,从而提高实际订货决策的准确性。研究结果对传统历史需求信息和非传统需求信息的集成以及需求信息交换等有一定的管理学启示和应用价值。     

Decision Making and the Price Setting Newsvendor: Experimental Evidence

We present an experimental study of the price‐setting newsvendor problem, which extends the traditional framework by allowing the decision maker to determine both the selling price and the order quantity of a given item. We compare behavior under this model with two benchmark conditions where subjects have a single decision to make (price or quantity). We observe that subjects deviate from the theoretical benchmarks when they are tasked with a single decision. They also exhibit anchoring behavior, where their anchor is the expected demand when quantity is the decision variable and is the initial inventory level when price is the decision variable. When decision makers set quantity and price concurrently, we observe no significant difference between the normative (i.e., expected profit‐maximizing) prices and the decision makers’ price choices. Quantity decisions move further from the normative benchmarks (compared to when subjects have a single decision to make) when the ratio of cost to price is less than half. When this ratio is reversed, there is no significant difference between order levels in single‐ and multi‐task settings. In the multidecision framework, we also observe a tendency to match orders and expected demand levels, which subjects can control using prices.     

Modeling Strategic Behavior in The Competitive Newsvendor Problem: An Experimental Investigation

This study experimentally investigates ordering behavior in the competitive newsvendor problem. We consider a duopoly market setting with two identical newsvendors selling the same perishable goods in a common market. Our experimental results show that average observed orders systematically deviate from the Nash equilibrium, and exhibit a similar pull‐to‐center pattern as in the classic non‐competitive newsvendor experiments: average orders fall below the Nash equilibrium in the high‐margin condition, and above the Nash equilibrium in the low‐margin condition. More importantly, the observed orders in the duopoly market are significantly higher than that in the non‐competitive newsvendor market, even in situations where standard inventory models predict no difference. We explain the ordering behavior using a strategic experience‐weighted attraction (EWA) model, which captures players' propensities for strategic thinking in game settings. Our empirical analysis suggests that the strategic EWA model generates more accurate predictions of future ordering behavior than an existing linear adaptive model without concerning strategic thinking. Further analysis shows that individuals are heterogeneous in their propensities to be a strategic player. Our research indicates the importance of modeling strategic behavior when analyzing behavioral decisions in competitive (game) environments.     

Impulse Balance and Multiple‐Period Feedback in the Newsvendor Game

Human subjects in the newsvendor game place suboptimal orders: orders are typically between the expected profit‐maximizing quantity and mean demand (“pull‐to‐center bias”). In previous work, we have shown that impulse balance equilibrium (IBE), which is based on a simple ex post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition, can predict ordering decisions in the laboratory. In this study, we extend IBE to standing orders and multiple‐period feedback and show that it predicts—in line with previous findings—that constraining newsvendors to make a standing order for a sequence of periods moves the average of submitted orders toward the optimum.     

经理行为偏差与企业绩效激励指标的确定

股东在面对具有行为偏差的经理时,如何设计剩余收益作为激励指标,以促使双方的目标一致,一直是学界和实务界关注的一个问题。如果股东继续沿用传统的基于公司资本成本率计算得到的剩余收益,将使得损失厌恶的经理投资不足,过度自信的经理投资过度。为了改进投资决策,股东需要针对不同行为特征类型的经理设计较公司资本成本率更低或更高的激励相容资本成本率,以有效激励经理做出符合股东利益的投资决策。     

Overcoming Learning Aversion in Evaluating and Managing Uncertain Risks

Decision biases can distort cost‐benefit evaluations of uncertain risks, leading to risk management policy decisions with predictably high retrospective regret. We argue that well‐documented decision biases encourage learning aversion, or predictably suboptimal learning and premature decision making in the face of high uncertainty about the costs, risks, and benefits of proposed changes. Biases such as narrow framing, overconfidence, confirmation bias, optimism bias, ambiguity aversion, and hyperbolic discounting of the immediate costs and delayed benefits of learning, contribute to deficient individual and group learning, avoidance of information seeking, underestimation of the value of further information, and hence needlessly inaccurate risk‐cost‐benefit estimates and suboptimal risk management decisions. In practice, such biases can create predictable regret in selection of potential risk‐reducing regulations. Low‐regret learning strategies based on computational reinforcement learning models can potentially overcome some of these suboptimal decision processes by replacing aversion to uncertain probabilities with actions calculated to balance exploration (deliberate experimentation and uncertainty reduction) and exploitation (taking actions to maximize the sum of expected immediate reward, expected discounted future reward, and value of information). We discuss the proposed framework for understanding and overcoming learning aversion and for implementing low‐regret learning strategies using regulation of air pollutants with uncertain health effects as an example.     

On the Unimodality of the Profit Function of the Pricing Newsvendor

In this note, we study the price‐setting newsvendor problem. We use three conditions, the log‐convexity of the coefficient of variation, the log‐concavity of the deterministic profit function, and the log‐convexity of the random noise's expectation conditional on having leftover inventory to establish the log‐concavity of the retailer's expected profit function. This new result is complementary to existing results and removes some assumptions in the pricing and inventory coordination literature. It also addresses the conjecture made by Petruzzi and Dada (1999), and can be applied in the pricing game.     

消费者导向类型与电商全渠道决策研究

从现实出发,基于不同消费者导向类型研究了电商的全渠道决策问题。首先建立电商单渠道销售的基础模型,并得出最优产品组合、价格和交付时间。在此基础上,给出了消费者为产品导向型和渠道导向型情况下电商采取全渠道决策的条件,得出双渠道产品组合、价格及交付时间的最优决策;并进行了数值验证。研究发现,同一渠道提供的产品其最优价格相同,最优交付时间只和消费者耐心程度及交付成本函数有关。若消费者为产品导向型,仅当双渠道运营成本之差较小且消费者耐心程度较低时,电商进入线下渠道才有利可图,且在线下渠道提供最受欢迎的产品,线上渠道提供剩余产品。若消费者为渠道导向型,电商进入线下渠道必然有利可图,且在线下渠道提供最受欢迎的产品,线上渠道提供所有产品。