逆向选择下供应链业务外包中的最优合约配置

研究了委托人(业务购买方)对于承包人(业务供应方)生产成本具有非对称信息时的最优合约设计问题.基于委托人视角,给出了委托人如何诱导代理人报告自己真实成本信息的逆向选择模型,并刻画了最优合约的特征.结果表明:给出的合约能够达到诱导代理人讲真话的目的;在信息非对称条件下,委托人由于信息缺乏受到了损失,而低成本类型的代理人获得了额外的信息租金;在非对称信息条件下,最优合约的参数配置受到委托人事前信念的影响.     

一种基于期权的供应商能力预订模型

在供应链中,合作企业实现风险共担,利益共享是供应链管理的基本目标。本文通过引入期权机制,提出了制造商预订上游供应商的生产能力的数学模型,使之能以较低的风险获取外部资源,以保证经营目标的实现。同时,也能使供应商通过期权降低自身的经营风险,增强收益的能力,最终实现供应链利益的整体协调。     

基于提前订购策略的供需双方动态博弈模型研究

在两级供应链环境下,相对于传统的即时订购策略,通过以较低批发价提供一个提前订购的机会,给予购买商两次订货机会,那么供应商和购买商的利润可以实现帕累托改进.同时如果供应商在提供提前订购机会的同时收取一个固定费用,则可以进一步优化模型.建立了一个具体的模型,用逆向归纳法计算出了均衡解,并对不同策略下的均衡结果进行了对比分析.     

价格柔性合同下的原材料采购策略及风险分析

为了降低原材料价格波动给采购-供应双方企业带来的风险,供应链企业通常采用签订价格合同的方式来共同分担原材料价格波动的风险。本文通过设计价格柔性合同,利用Stackelberg主从博弈模型研究了由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的采购系统的最优采购策略及原材料价格波动风险的分担机制。研究表明,通过实施价格柔性合同可以降低供应双方的风险,且通过设置合理的价格柔性系数可以提高双方的收益。     

具有高投标成本的多属性逆向拍卖博弈模型

越来越多像GE这样的大型企业在利用多属性逆向拍卖选择新的供应商采购产品时,通常会设定较高的固定投标成本。针对此情况,建立了三阶段的非合作博弈模型,并利用求解子博弈纳什均衡策略的方法,推导出了供应商的最优投标价格。并得到以下两个主要结论:一是供应商的最优投标策略是按照生产产品真实的质量和交货期进行投标,且投标价格为最优投标价格;二是采购商的最优策略是选择投标价格最高的供应商作为拍卖获胜者,这一违反直觉的结论。这是合理的,因为投标价格最高的供应商也是类型最优的供应商,也即投标质量和投标交货期组合最优的供应商。最后,利用数值实验验证了模型的有效性,并显示出设定相对较高的固定投标成本对采购商来说是有利的。     

Supply Disruptions,Heterogeneous Beliefs,and Production Efficiencies

Recent years have witnessed the pervasive supply disruptions and their impacts on supply chain performance. In this study, we investigate the optimal procurement design with supply disruptions and heterogeneous beliefs between the buyer and the supplier. We examine the impact of information asymmetry on the supplier's belief, the control right of the backup production, and the verifiability of supply disruption. The belief heterogeneity creates speculative gains and losses because the buyer and the supplier hold different estimates of the disruption probability. We demonstrate that the buyer's incentive to exploit this belief heterogeneity leads to real production inefficiencies in different scenarios. The production efficiency is not necessarily improved with more transparent information. Moreover, a very pessimistic supplier may have no incentive to invest in improving the reliability even if this is costless, and the supplier may produce more when the expected production cost becomes higher. When the buyer sees some value in using the supplier's estimate to update his own belief, we find that the main results hold unless the buyer completely abandons his belief.     

Flexibility or Cost Saving? Sourcing Decisions with Two Suppliers

This article studies a decentralized supply chain in which there are two suppliers and a single buyer. One supplier offers the quantity flexibility (QF) contract to the buyer, while the other offers the cheaper price. Under the QF contract, the buyer does not assume full responsibility for the forecast, yet the supplier guarantees the availability of the forecasted quantity with additional buffer inventory. On the other hand, the price‐only contract places full inventory burden on the buyer, but with a cheaper price. We study this problem from the buyer's perspective and solve for the buyer's optimal procurement and forecasting decisions. We identify areas where flexibility and cheaper price have an advantage, one over the other. Our results indicate that the buyer significantly benefits from having multiple sources of supply. We also find that, from the system's standpoint, a multisupplier system may outperform a single‐supplier supply chain under certain conditions. Interestingly, we observe that providing too much flexibility may benefit the low‐price supplier rather than benefiting the QF supplier. We discuss the managerial implications and provide directions for future research opportunities.     

供应链应收账款融资的决策分析与价值研究

根据供应链应收账款融资交易模型,建立了包含供应商、下游厂商和金融机构的多阶段供应链决策模型,研究了包含和不包含融资情况下相关企业的决策问题,得到供应链中各参与方在各阶段的期望收益,并通过数值分析研究了供应链应收账款融资对供应链成员和整个供应链的价值.分析发现:没有其他融资的情况下,中小供应商有可能出现生产不连续的情况,而供应链应收账款融资能够使其进行连续生产,并在快速增长的市场中能在较短的周期内达到最优产量;应收账款融资也能使厂商得到连续供货,收益持续增长,供应商的初始现金越多,厂商的期望收益越高;当供应商的实力较弱时,金融机构能够得到较大融资总收益,当供应商的实力达到一定程度后,金融机构得到的总收益呈下降趋势.供应链应收账款融资对中小供应商、厂商和金融机构都具有很大的应用价值.     

A decision support system for a third-party coordinator managing supply chain with demand uncertainty

Global supply chains reduce cost but increase lead times, complexities and uncertainties. Retailers in consumer products industry are getting shorter lead time to respond to market demand. To meet this challenge, many rely on third party supply chain managers (SCMs) for economically supplying required quantities of finished products quickly. However, due to shorter ‘time to market’, the SCM has to procure raw materials and start production process based on expected demand. Since SCM absorbs financial penalties associated with under- and over-estimation of demand from retailer, finding an optimal production lot size and product customisation strategy are essential to an SCM's operation. We develop a profit maximisation model and provide a close-form solution that allows an SCM to calculate optimal production lot size. The model is used to examine profitability of postponing product customisation. Finally, the effect of demand variation on SCM's profitability is explored.     

Failure Risk and Quality Cost Management in Single versus Multiple Sourcing Decision

The advantage of multiple sourcing to protect against supplier failures arising from undependable products due to latent defects is examined using a model with nonlinear external failure costs. Prior research has focused only on supplier failures arising from unreliable supply, such as late, insufficient, or no delivery. I derive a closed‐form characterization of the optimal production quota allocation for the LUX (Latent defect‐Undependable product‐eXternal failure) setting. The allocation determines the optimal supply base, with intuitive properties that hold under a mild requirement. The requirement includes the special case of equal procurement costs charged by suppliers but also allows unequal costs without any particular order. The key result of the article is a necessary and sufficient condition determining whether single or multiple sourcing is optimal. Another condition is obtained to determine the exact size of the optimal supply base, provided the mild requirement holds. With minor modifications, the results also hold when a buyer‐initiated procurement contract can be used to elicit private information on the suppliers’ unit variable production costs.     

在弹性需求和物品易变质条件下数量折扣定价模型

研究在弹性需求和易变质物品条件下,当供应商和零售商独自决策时,供应商如何确定最优数量折扣问题。基于Stackelberg博奕建立了数学模型,证明了零售商的出售价格随供应商出售价格的降低而降低,从而需求量增大。当供应商给予价格折扣时,零售商的利润是增加的。在此基础上,给出了最优数量折扣的计算方法。对供应商和零售商单独决策时,供应商利用数量折扣对供应链进行协调产生的系统利润与供应商和零售商联合决策时的系统利润做了数值分析和比较。结果表明,供应商采用数量折扣的方法使供应链协调是有效的;价格折扣随价格敏感系数的增大而增大,随变质率的增大而减小。     

Supplier–Buyer Negotiation Games: Equilibrium Conditions and Supply Chain Efficiency

In a decentralized supply chain, supplier–buyer negotiations have a dynamic aspect that requires both players to consider the impact of their decisions on future decisions made by their counterpart. The interaction generally couples strongly the price decision of the supplier and the quantity decision of the buyer. We propose a basic model for a repeated supplier–buyer interaction, during several rounds. In each round, the supplier first quotes a price, and the buyer places an order at that price. We find conditions for existence and uniqueness of a well‐behaved subgame‐perfect equilibrium in the dynamic game. When costs are stationary and there are no holding costs, we identify some demand distributions for which these conditions are met, examine the efficiency of the equilibrium, and show that, as the number of rounds increases, the profits of the supply chain increase towards the supply chain optimum. In contrast, when costs vary over time or holding costs are present, the benefit from multi‐period interactions is reduced and after a finite number of time periods, supply chain profits stay constant even when the number of rounds increases.     

A joint economic lot size model for raw material ordering,manufacturing setup,and finished goods delivering

In this research we consider a single-manufacturer single-buyer supply chain problem where the manufacturer orders raw materials from its supplier, then using its manufacturing processes converts the raw materials to finished goods, and finally delivers the finished goods to its customer. The manufacturer produces the product in batches at a finite rate and periodically delivers the finished goods at a fixed lot size to its customer, who has a constant demand rate. An integrated inventory control model, making joint economic lot sizes of manufacturer's raw material ordering, production batch, and buyer's ordering, is developed to minimize the mean total cost per unit time of the raw materials ordering and holding, manufacturer's setup and finished goods holding, the buyer's ordering, and inventory holding. Numerical examples are also setup to illustrate that jointly considering the inventory costs above results in less mean total cost than that of considering them separately.     

产能有限的供应商主导的双渠道分销策略研究

在供应商产能有限的背景下,研究供应商的最优分配策略和双渠道分销的问题。根据期望利润最大化建立供应商渠道分配模型,依据纳什均衡确定供应商的最优定价、最优产能和最优分销策略。结果表明,在双渠道策略的情况下,供应商应该优先满足销售企业的销售量。若供应链的销售量恰好得到满足,供应商应该按最优产能生产。供应商的渠道选择与供应商产能、供应链各节点的盈利能力和生产成本有关。     

Optimal Quantity Discount Design with Limited Information Sharing*

In this article we address the optimal quantity discount design problem of a supplier in a two‐stage supply chain where the supplier and the buyer share annual demand information only. The supply chain faces a constant deterministic demand that is not price sensitive and operates with fixed setup costs in both stages. We show that the supplier can actually moderate a cost‐minimizing buyer to order in quantities different than the buyer's optimal order quantity in the traditional setting and develop a multi‐breakpoint quantity discount scheme that maximizes supplier's expected net savings. The proposed multi‐breakpoint discount scheme can be easily computed from the available information and, while also maximizing the supplier's net savings, is very effective in achieving high levels of supply chain coordination efficiency in the presence of limited information.     

The Value of Production Schedule Integration in Supply Chains

This study explores the value of integrated production schedules for reducing the negative effects of schedule revisions in supply chains involving buyer and supplier firms. A stochastic cost model is developed to evaluate the total supply chain cost with integrated purchasing and scheduling policies. The model minimizes the costs associated with assembly rate adjustment, safety stock, and schedule changes for all supply chain members. Through experimentation, the paper examines the impact of several environmental factors on the value of schedule integration. This study finds that schedule integration can lead to overall cost savings in a supply chain, but some firms may have to absorb costs in excess of those they would incur with independent scheduling. Environments with high inventory holding costs and long supplier lead times may not find it beneficial to adopt an integrated schedule. Forecast effectiveness plays a critical role in realizing the benefits of schedule integration. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research.     

需求扰动下供应链反向保理的鲁棒决策

反向保理运用买方信誉缓解中小供应商资金困境,现实中需求扰动时有发生并影响供应链决策。探讨供应商资金约束背景下"买方驱动"反向保理对供应链运营的作用规律,运用极大极小法构建单供应商和单零售商组成的二级供应链模型,得到只知均值和方差时的供应链决策和收益。研究表明:鲁棒决策能为反向保理时需求信息缺失的供应链提供有效而稳健的决策,降低信用违约风险;基于供应链关系的反向保理增强了供应链合作;供应商信誉损失风险不会成为零售商主导反向保理实施的阻碍。丰富了金融与运营交互作用的理论研究。     

联合经济批量模型中的损失补贴与利益分配问题研究

针对单供应商和单采购商构成的供应链系统,分采购商占主导地位和供应商占主导地位两种情形,讨论了采购商的最优订货决策与供应商的最优生产决策,以及它们合作情形下的系统最优决策,给出了采购商和供应商各自独立决策与联合决策下,它们各自的成本函数以及供应链系统的总成本函数.最后,通过比较独立决策与联合决策下采购商和供应商的成本函数,分析了联合经济批量模型中的损失补贴与利益分配问题.     

基于供应链金融的银行贷款价值比研究

供应链金融是金融业面向供应链的创新服务。考虑单一供应商和单一零售商构成的二级供应链,产品市场为典型的报童模型,零售商以其与制造商签订的产品采购合同向银行申请抵押贷款。将供应链上下游企业的决策引入银行基于下侧风险控制模式的贷款价值比决策模型,刻画供应链的决策对采购合同抵押价值的影响。首先确定了贷款价值比的解析式,然后讨论了其与批发价格、回购率等供应链决策的关系,并确定了相应的取值区间。     

Managing Disruptions in Decentralized Supply Chains with Endogenous Supply Process Reliability

Supply disruptions are all too common in supply chains. To mitigate delivery risk, buyers may either source from multiple suppliers or offer incentives to their preferred supplier to improve its process reliability. These incentives can be either direct (investment subsidy) or indirect (inflated order quantity). In this study, we present a series of models to highlight buyers’ and suppliers’ optimal parameter choices. Our base‐case model has deterministic buyer demand and two possibilities for the supplier yield outcomes: all‐or‐nothing supply or partial disruption. For the all‐or‐nothing model, we show that the buyer prefers to only use the subsidy option, which obviates the need to inflate order quantity. However, in the partial disruption model, both incentives—subsidy and order inflation—may be used at the same time. Although single sourcing provides greater indirect incentive to the selected supplier because that avoids order splitting, we show that the buyer may prefer the diversification strategy under certain circumstances. We also quantify the amount by which the wholesale price needs to be discounted (if at all) to ensure that dual sourcing strategy dominates sole sourcing. Finally, we extend the model to the case of stochastic demand. Structural properties of ordering/subsidy decisions are derived for the all‐or‐nothing model, and in contrast to the deterministic demand case, we establish that the buyer may increase use of subsidy and order quantity at the same time.