Performance of weather-conditional rebates under different risk preferences

Retailers who sell seasonal products often face challenges in demand management due to weather uncertainty. In many cases, they make their ordering and pricing decisions prior to the regular selling season but the vast majority of sales do not occur until after the season starts, during which unfavorable weather conditions may result in high monetary losses. To protect against such adverse financial outcomes, retailers may offer weather-linked promotions such as weather rebates and induce customers to make early purchases. Specifically, weather-conditional rebates are incentives offered in an advance promotional period to be paid to the early buyers if the weather state in the regular season is unfavorable. In the presence of seasonal weather uncertainty, risk attitudes of retailers and buyers may play an important role on the effectiveness of these promotions. In this paper, we analyze the performance of weather-conditional rebates by explicitly considering the impact of different risk behaviors. First, we study the case in which the retailer and customers are risk-neutral and show that the weather-conditional rebates are effective in increasing the retailer's profits. Under the assumption of the retailer's risk-neutrality, we conduct a simulation study to investigate the impact of customers' alternative early-purchase behaviors on the performance of the rebate program. Next, we consider a risk-averse retailer. We model the retailer's risk aversion primarily in the mean–variance framework and find that the rebate program can be designed to increase the mean profit and reduce the profit variance simultaneously. Furthermore, by combining the rebate program with a financial instrument such as binary weather options, the retailer can obtain greater benefits from weather-conditional rebates.     

Early Sales of Seasonal Products with Weather‐Conditional Rebates

Some retailers of seasonal products adopt weather‐conditional rebate programs to induce early sales and increase profits. In such promotions, customers who buy the product in an advance preselling period are offered rebates if a pre‐specified weather condition is realized during the later normal selling season. We investigate the potential benefits of these programs for retailers. We show that the weather‐conditional rebate program can increase sales by price discriminating among a customer's post‐purchase states. Taking advantage of the early sales, it can also reduce the inventory holding cost and ordering cost, and hence can increase the retailer's expected profits. In addition, we numerically investigate the sensitivity of the rebate program's effectiveness to the model parameters and illustrate its advantages over an advance‐discount policy.     

The Effect of Delayed Incentives on Supply Chain Profits and Consumer Surplus

We examine the use of consumer cash mail‐in rebates offered by a manufacturer in a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. Our analysis indicates that rebates are profitable for manufacturers if consumers are inconsistent in the sense that their rebate valuation when they make purchase decisions is independent of their redemption probabilities when they make redemption decisions. If the manufacturer keeps the wholesale price unchanged, then the rebate increases the retailer's profit by a larger amount than the increase in the manufacturer's profit. If the manufacturer jointly optimizes the wholesale price and rebate, then the increase in the manufacturer's profit is twice the increase in the retailer's profit. The retailer responds to rebates by increasing the retail price, which increases the margin paid by consumers who do not redeem the rebate. On average, consumer surplus decreases when it is optimal for manufacturers to offer rebates. We suggest incentive schemes that make it worthwhile for retailers to limit the price increase. In these incentive schemes, the manufacturer imposes a negative relationship between the rebate value and the retail price. We show that such incentives increase supply chain profits.     

Optimal Pricing and Rebate Strategies in a Two‐Level Supply Chain

For many product categories, manufacturers and retailers often offer rebates to stimulate sales. Due to certain adverse effects, however, some manufacturers and retailers are contemplating the elimination of their rebate programs. This paper sheds light on the debate about the value of rebate programs by presenting a model for evaluating the conditions under which a firm should offer rebates in a competitive environment. Specifically, we consider a two‐level supply chain comprising one manufacturer and one retailer. Each firm makes three decisions: the regular (wholesale or retail) price, whether or not to offer rebates, and the rebate value should the firm decide to launch a rebate program. We determine the equilibrium of a vertical competition game between the manufacturer (leader) and the retailer (follower), and we provide insights about how competition affects the conditions under which a firm should offer rebates in equilibrium.     

Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation

Recent studies in marketing and distribution channels have shown that the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers is shifting. Based on this observation, we investigate a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer in this paper. We first develop retailer-dominant non-cooperative game models by introducing a sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price; then we analyze two cooperative scenarios, in which the Nash bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under the assumption that the manufacturer and the retailer are risk-neutral, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can bargain to cooperate at any level of retail-market demand uncertainty with exogenous retail price. However, the cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty with endogenous retail price: it can be implemented if the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small, and the measure of retail-market demand uncertainty does not exceed an upper bound. Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the retailer's dominance over the manufacturer increases with the increase in the sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price under a limitation of retail-market demand uncertainty. Numerical analyses also show that the retailer's dominance decreases with the increase in retail-market demand uncertainty.     

Pricing Policy in a Supply Chain: Negotiation or Posted Pricing

This article examines the choice of pricing policy (posted pricing or negotiation) toward end customers in a supply chain. Many retailers actively decide whether or not to encourage negotiation on the shop floor. Of course, the retailer's pricing policy influences not only the retailer's profit, but also the profits of the manufacturers who sell through the retailer. However, little is known about the forces that shape the pricing policy when two self‐interested parties interact in a supply chain. We consider two alternative models depending on who has the power to decide the pricing policy: the manufacturer or the retailer. We find that an increase in the wholesale price weakens the retailer's ability to price discriminate through negotiation. Therefore, the retailer prefers negotiation at lower wholesale prices and posted pricing at higher wholesale prices. We also find that whenever the retailer prefers negotiation, the manufacturer does too. Therefore, the retailer's discretion over the pricing policy causes friction only when the retailer wants to use posted pricing, while the manufacturer wishes the retailer to use negotiation. We show that such friction arises only when product availability or the cost of negotiation is moderate. In this case, we show that the manufacturer may offer a substantial discount to persuade the retailer to negotiate. Surprisingly, in this region of friction, a decrease in the supply chain's capacity or an increase in negotiation costs (both of which are typically considered as worsening the retailer's business environment) translates into higher profit for the retailer.     

Joint Pricing and Contingent Free-Shipping Decisions in B2C Transactions

We consider an online retailer's joint pricing and contingent free-shipping (CFS) decisions in both monopoly and duopoly structures, which is an important marketing-operations interface problem. We begin by investigating the impacts of a retailer's decisions on consumers' purchase behaviors, and show that the CFS strategy is useful to acquire the consumers with large order sizes. Then, we compute the probability of repeated purchases, and construct an expected profit function for an online retailer in the monopolistic setting. We find that the fixed shipping fees may have the largest impact on the retailer's profit among all shipping-related parameters, and the retailer can benefit more from homogeneous markets than from heterogeneous ones. Next, we consider the competition between two retailers in the duopoly structure, and analytically show that, if two retailers have identical fixed and variable shipping fees, then their equilibrium decisions are equal. In order to numerically find a Nash equilibrium for two retailers, we develop a simulation approach using Arena and OptQuest. Our simulation-based examples suggest that, as a result of the competition, the two retailers should decrease their profit margins but increase their CFS cutoff levels if they have the same fixed and also the same variable shipping fees.     

Markdown Budgets for Retail Buyers: Help or Hindrance?

For many retailers, markdown decisions are taken by retail buyers whose compensation is based on sales revenue so their objective is to maximize it through the season. This implies that the buyers' objectives are not perfectly aligned with the overall profitability the firm. Many retailers set markdown budgets prior to the season to control margin erosion and increase profitability. Markdown budget constrains the buyers on the amount of discounts that they can apply on a given inventory of merchandise and sets a limit on the dollar value of markdowns for the season. While markdown budgets may be useful in preventing excessive discounts, they can have a detrimental effect on the buyers' ability to respond to poor market and remove distressed inventory. We investigate the effectiveness of this practice in aligning the incentives of buyers with that of the firm, and provide guidance on how these budgets should be established ahead of time. We consider a firm with a fixed inventory of a seasonable item, and a single chance to mark the price down. The retailer knows only the demand distribution at the beginning of the season, but the market information is revealed during the season to the buyer. We first characterize the buyer's markdown policy and understand the circumstances under which this can be different from the retailer's markdown policy. We use our model to determine the optimal markdown budget and quantify its effectiveness considering different factors such as the level of demand uncertainty, initial markup, and market's responsiveness to markdowns.     

CAMPBELL SOUP'S CONTINUOUS REPLENISHMENT PROGRAM: EVALUATION AND ENHANCED INVENTORY DECISION RULES

Campbell Soup's continuous replenishment (CR) program is a novel innovation designed to improve the efficiency of inventory management throughout the supply chain. With CR (1) retailers pay a constant wholesale price but continue to participate in consumer promotions, (2) retailers transmit to the supplier daily inventory information via electronic data interchange (EDI), and (3) the supplier assumes responsibility for managing retailer inventories, i.e., vendor managed inventories (VMI). We develop simple inventory management rules to operate CR, and we test these rules with a simulation using actual demand data provided by Campbell Soup. On this sample we find that retailer inventories were reduced on average by 66% while maintaining or increasing average fill rates. This improvementreduces a retailer's cost of goods sold by 1.2%, which is significant in the low profitmargin grocery industry. Furthermore, these savings could have been achieved without VMI.     

When Does a Retailer's Advance Selling Capability Benefit Manufacturer,Retailer, or Both?

Advance selling (AS) from a retailer to consumers is commonly observed in practice. With an AS capability, a retailer has the option to sell in advance or not. Having the AS option seems to increase flexibility and thus profit for a retailer. However, we show that the AS option can hurt the retailer's profit as well as supply chain performance. We identify two thresholds for a product's marginal production cost. A retailer's AS option benefits both the manufacturer and retailer when the marginal production cost is high, that is, above both thresholds. It benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer when the marginal production cost is moderate, that is, between the two thresholds. The result is ambiguous when the marginal production cost is low, that is, below both thresholds. We find that consumer valuation uncertainty under AS is the key driving force for the surprising result that having the retailer's AS option can hurt the retailer. When compared to the scenario where the retailer does not have the AS option, we find that the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price weakly decreases under the retailer's AS option if the marginal production cost is high. The statement is reversed if the marginal production cost is moderate or low.     

Cooperative sales promotion with a point-sharing policy: Advantages and limitations

Consumption-point programs have been commonly implemented in retail industries in efforts to promote sales and improve customer loyalty. In Korea, many retailers from different industries use a point-sharing policy to augment the conventional consumption-point program of each retailer. In a multi-retailer coalition under such a cooperative sales promotion policy, by purchasing from one coalition retailer, customers earn points that they can redeem points at other retailers in the coalition. On one hand, the introduction of this policy gives customers great flexibility for redeeming earned points, which can increase the demand at all retailers who promote the policy. On the other hand, the additional product costs associated with the points created by one retailer may spill over and be partly borne by other retailers, possibly distorting the coalition members’ equilibrium decisions under decentralized control. Under the general assumptions about the demand functions, we developed a model consisting of two retailers with fixed retail prices and addressed the retailers’ equilibrium decisions under a pure point-sharing policy. The findings suggest that the policy resulted in a cost spillover phenomenon. Then, we revealed that a pure point-sharing policy may fail to maximize the total profit of the coalition. Moreover, we showed that a pure point-sharing policy does not dominate the individual point scheme, which may explain the reason that point sharing is useful but not ubiquitously used in the real world. Our numerical examples also illustrate the way a pure point-sharing policy influences retailers’ profits when retail prices are decision variables. To improve the overall profit under the point-sharing policy further, we propose a target rebate contract to coordinate a pair of retailers. This contract can maximize the total profit and arbitrarily split the profit between retailers.     

Fairness in Selling to the Newsvendor

This paper studies the impact of fairness concerns on supply chain performance (SCP) in the two‐party newsvendor setting. We extend prior fairness analysis to a wide range of demand distributions, and also allow the degree and definition of fairness to assume a broader range of preferences than those in prior literature. Contrary to prior literature, we find that if the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is not sufficiently large, regardless of demand variability, a fair‐minded retailer makes no difference to system efficiency when facing a traditional profit‐maximizing supplier. Only when the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is above a threshold can the retailer's fairness concern improve the system efficiency for sufficiently high demand uncertainty. In order for the retailer's fairness concern to improve expected profits of both parties compared to the traditional supply chain case (win–win), the demand uncertainty cannot be too low, the retailer is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity, and his ideal allocation to the supplier is within a specific range. If only the supplier is concerned for fairness, the results range from worsening to improving (but not coordinating) the system and a win–win situation is impossible. Finally, when both the supplier and retailer are fair‐minded, SCP is improved unless both parties prefer to allocate small portions of system profit to the other. Again, win–win will be achieved only when the demand uncertainty is sufficiently high, the retailer's ideal allocation is within a certain range, and he is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity.     

Manufacturer Rebate Competition in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer

We consider manufacturer rebate competition in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling to a common retailer. We fully characterize the manufacturers’ equilibrium rebate decisions and show how they depend on parameters such as the fixed cost of a rebate program, market size, the redemption rate of rebate, the proportion of rebate‐sensitive consumers in the market and competition intensity. Interestingly, more intense competition induces a manufacturer to lower rebate value or stop offering rebate entirely. Without rebate, it is known that more intense competition hurts the manufacturers and benefits the retailer. With rebate, however, more intense competition could benefit the manufacturers and hurt the retailer. We find similar counterintuitive results when there is a change in some other parameters. We also consider the case when the retailer subsidizes the manufacturers sequentially to offer rebate programs. We fully characterize the retailer's optimal subsidy strategy, and show that subsidy always benefits the retailer but may benefit or hurt the manufacturers. When the retailer wants to induce both manufacturers to offer rebate, he always prefers to subsidize the manufacturer with a higher fixed cost first. Sometimes the other manufacturer will then voluntarily offer rebate even without subsidy.     

Using Advance Purchase Discount Contracts under Uncertain Information Acquisition Cost

We study the use of advance purchase discount (APD) contracts to incentivize a retailer to share demand information with a dual‐sourcing wholesaler. We analyze such contracts in terms of two practical considerations that are relevant in this context but have been overlooked by previous work that has largely studied the direct offer of APD to customers: the retailer's information acquisition cost and the wholesaler's limited information about that cost. The wholesaler's limited knowledge of the retailer's cost leads to a departure—from the normal “full observability” APD design—that is asymmetric and depends on the extent of unobservability; if the uncertainty is small (resp., large) then the optimal discount is higher (resp., lower) than in the case of full observability. An APD contract that ignores the retailer's cost or the wholesaler's uncertainty about it will yield fewer benefits for the wholesaler and the supply chain. We offer a numerical illustration (calibrated on real industry data) establishing that for a representative product, an APD contract can improve the wholesaler's profit margin by as much as 3.5%.     

Pre‐Orders for New To‐be‐Released Products Considering Consumer Loss Aversion

Advance selling through pre‐orders is a strategy to transfer inventory risk from a retailer to consumers. A newsvendor retailer can have three strategies to choose from: no advance selling allowed (NAS), moderate advance selling with a moderate discount for pre‐orders (MAS), and deep advance selling with a deep discount for pre‐orders (DAS). This research studies how a retailer could design an advance selling strategy to maximize her own profits. We find some interesting results. For example, there exist two thresholds for the selling season profit margin and two thresholds for consumer's expected valuation. For products with higher profit margin than the high threshold on profit margin, a retailer should always use DAS. For products with medium profit margin within the two thresholds, a retailer should adopt MAS if consumer's expected valuation is lower than the high threshold and use DAS otherwise. For products with lower profit margin than the low threshold, a retailer should use NAS, DAS, or MAS, respectively, if consumer's expected valuation is lower than the low threshold, higher than the high threshold, or between the two thresholds, respectively. Through sensitivity analyses, we also show the effects of multiple consumer characteristics on a retailer's optimal advance selling strategy.     

Price promotions,operations cost,and profit in a two-stage supply chain

The phenomenon in which demand variability increases as one moves upstream in the supply chain has been often observed in practice. This so-called “bullwhip effect” often increases upstream operations costs, including inventory holding and transportation costs. Price variations are considered to be one of the primary causes of the bullwhip effect, and thus everyday low price (EDLP) strategies are commonly recommended to counter the negative impacts of the bullwhip effect. However, trade promotions continue to play an important role in the U.S. supermarket industry as well as other industries. This paper investigates this apparent inconsistency between the literature and practice by employing a deterministic, two-stage supply chain model composed of a single supplier and a single retailer. We demonstrate that even though the use of trade promotions can indeed increase a retailer's and supplier's operations costs, these costs may be more than offset by increased revenues, even in the absence of explicit coordination. That is, if the supplier judiciously applies a trade promotion strategy and the retailer passes some of this discount to its customers, then under certain conditions, the resulting supply chain profit can exceed that under an EDLP strategy. We provide a broad set of computational results that validate this conclusion and discuss the resulting managerial insights.     

The Role of Slotting Fees in the Coordination of Assortment Decisions

Large numbers of new products introduced annually by manufacturers may strain the relationship between retailers and manufacturers regarding assortments carried by retailers. For example, many retailers in the grocery industry will agree to broaden their assortments only if the manufacturer agrees to pay slotting fees for the new products. We investigate the role played by slotting fees in coordinating the assortment decisions in a supply chain. To do so, we study a single‐retailer, single‐manufacturer supply chain, where the retailer decides what assortment to offer to end customers. Double marginalization results in a discrepancy between the retailer's optimal assortment and the assortment that maximizes total supply chain profits. We consider a payment scheme that is analogous to slotting fees used in the grocery industry: the manufacturer pays the retailer a per‐product fee for every product offered by the retailer in excess of a certain target level. We show that, if the wholesale price is below some threshold level, this payment scheme induces the retailer to offer the supply‐chain‐optimal assortment and makes both parties better off.     

Supply Chain Design and Carbon Penalty: Monopoly vs. Monopolistic Competition

This paper studies whether imposing carbon costs changes the supply chain structure and social welfare. We explore the problem from a central policymaker's perspective who wants to maximize social welfare. We consider two stakeholders, retailers, and consumers, who optimize their own objectives (i.e., profits and net utility) and three competitive settings (i.e., monopoly, monopolistic competition with symmetric market share, and monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share). For the monopoly case, we find that when the retailer's profit is high, imposing some carbon emission charges on the retailer and the consumers does not substantially change the supply chain structure or the social welfare. However, when the retailer's profit is low, imposing carbon costs optimally can lead to a significant increase in social welfare. Moreover, the impact of imposing carbon emission charges becomes more significant when the degree of competition increases. Additionally, the quantum of benefit may depend only on factors common across industries, such as fuel and carbon costs.     

Two-period pricing and ordering policy for the dominant retailer in a two-echelon supply chain with demand uncertainty

Retailing channels are increasingly being dominated by ‘power’ retailers who are in a position to dictate prices and ordering schedules to manufacturers and suppliers. A dominant retailer, such as Wal-Mart, has the ‘power’ to decide retail prices of products because there are so many manufacturers who are keen to sell their products through or to such a large and powerful retailer. Several products, such as electronic products, can be sold in the market for some periods during their lifecycles before they retreat, except when they are not popular with consumers after been introduced. Therefore, in case of such products, the retailer should not just consider a single-period pricing and ordering policy. It should make dynamic pricing and ordering decisions based on market demand forecast, in order to obtain maximum cumulative profit from the product during its lifecycle. In this study, we consider this scenario and construct a two-period model to discuss pricing and ordering problems for a dominant retailer with demand uncertainty in a declining price environment. We show that the maximum expected profit function is continuous concave, so the optimal solution to pricing and ordering policy exists and it is the one and only. We also analyze sensitivity of retailer's expected profit to the effects of parameters of price-discount sharing scheme and market demand.     

The Retail Space‐Exchange Problem with Pricing and Space Allocation Decisions

We consider retail space‐exchange problems where two retailers exchange shelf space to increase accessibility to more of their consumers in more locations without opening new stores. Using the Hotelling model, we find two retailers’ optimal prices, given their host and guest space in two stores under the space‐exchange strategy. Next, using the optimal space‐dependent prices, we analyze a non‐cooperative game, where each retailer makes a space allocation decision for the retailer's own store. We show that the two retailers will implement such a strategy in the game, if and only if their stores are large enough to serve more than one‐half of their consumers. Nash equilibrium for the game exists, and its value depends on consumers’ utilities and trip costs as well as the total available space in each retailer's store. Moreover, as a result of the space‐exchange strategy, each retailer's prices in two stores are both higher than the retailer's price before the space exchange, but they may or may not be identical.