A characterization of the Walras rule

This paper has three purposes. First, we refine the characterization of the Walras rule proposed by Nagahisa (JET 1991) over a more natural and simple domain than the one he employed. We show that the Walras rule is the only social choice rule defined over the domain and satisfying Individual Rationality, Pareto Efficiency, and Local Independence. Second, assuming endowments to be collectively owned, we show that the Walras rule operated from equal division is the only social choice rule satisfying No Envy, Pareto Efficiency, and Local Independence. Third, we show that for every social choice rule satisfying Individual Rationality and Pareto Efficiency, Local Independence is equivalent to a condition of Nash implementation with a game form satisfying convexity.This article is a revised version of Toyama University Working Paper No. 141. We are grateful to Professors William Thomson, Shinsuke Nakamura, Tomoichi Shinotsuka and two anonymous referees for their detailed comments. Nagahisa is grateful for hospitality of the economics department of the University of Rochester.     

Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

We consider the problem of fairly allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We search for solutions satisfying resource-monotonicity, the requirement that all agents be affected in the same direction when the amount to divide changes. Although there are resource-monotonic selections from the Pareto solution, there are none satisfying the distributional requirements of no-envy or individual rationality from equal division. We then consider the weakening of resource-monotonicity obtained by allowing only changes in the amount to divide that do not reverse the direction of the inequality between the amount to divide and the sum of the preferred amounts. We show that there is essentially a unique selection from the solution that associates with each economy its set of envy-free and efficient allocations satisfying this property of one-sided resource-monotonicity: it is the uniform rule, a solution that has played a central role in previous analyses of the problem.     

An alternative characterization of the uniform rule

We consider the problem of allocating some amount of a commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness. This characterization strengthens two interesting results due to Sprumont (1991). Our method of proof involves only elementary arguments.I wish to thank Professor William Thomson for his enormous efforts in supervision. I am grateful to Professor Marcus Berliant and Hideo Konishi for their useful remarks and especially to an anonymous referee for insightful comments. All remaining errors are my own responsibility.     

Social threshold aggregations

A problem of axiomatic construction of a social decision function is studied for the case when individual opinions of agents are given as m-graded preferences with arbitrary integer m ≥ 3. It is shown that the only rule satisfying the introduced axioms of Pairwise Compensation, Pareto Domination and Noncompensatory Threshold and Contraction is the threshold rule.     

The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

We investigate the implications of the “separability principle” for the class of problems allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. The separability principle requires that for two problems with the same population, but possibly different social endowments, in which the preferences of agents may change, if there is a subgroup of agents whose preferences are the same and the total amounts awarded to them are the same, then the amount awarded to each agent in the subgroup should be the same. First, we investigate the logical relations between separability and other axioms. As it turns out, consistency implies separability. Then, we present characterizations of the uniform rule on the basis of separability and also on the basis of other axioms.     

Consistency in one-sided assignment problems

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the division of payoffs to agents is flexible as part of the solution. We take a similar approach to one-sided assignment problems as Sasaki (Int J Game Theory 24:373–397, 1995) for two-sided assignment problems, and we analyze various desirable properties of solutions including consistency and weak pairwise-monotonicity. We show that for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems (i.e., the subset of one-sided assignment problems with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [Pareto indifference and consistency] or [invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2). However, we also prove that on the class of all one-sided assignment problems (solvable or not), no solution satisfies consistency and coincides with the core whenever the core is non-empty (Theorem 4). Finally, we comment on the difficulty in obtaining further positive results for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems in line with Sasaki’s (1995) characterizations of the core for two-sided assignment problems.     

Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity

The unequivocal majority of a social choice rule is a number of agents such that whenever at least this many agents agree on the top alternative, then this alternative (and only this) is chosen. The smaller the unequivocal majority is, the closer it is to the standard (and accepted) majority concept. The question is how small can the unequivocal majority be and still permit the Nash-implementability of the social choice rule; i.e., its Maskin-monotonicity. We show that the smallest unequivocal majority compatible with Maskin-monotonicity is n- ë \fracn-1m û{n-\left\lfloor \frac{n-1}{m} \right\rfloor} , where n ≥ 3 is the number of agents and m ≥ 3 is the number of alternatives. This value is equal to the minimal number required for a majority to ensure the non-existence of cycles in pairwise comparisons. Our result has a twofold implication: (1) there is no Condorcet consistent social choice rule satisfying Maskin-monotonicity and (2) a social choice rule satisfies k-Condorcet consistency and Maskin-monotonicity if and only if k 3 n- ë \fracn-1m û{k\geq n-\left\lfloor \frac{n-1}{m}\right\rfloor}.     

An axiomatic approach to intergenerational equity

We present a set of axioms in order to capture the concept of equity among an infinite number of generations. There are two ethical considerations: one is to treat every generation equally and the other is to respect distributive fairness among generations. We find two opposite results. In Theorem 1, we show that there exists a preference ordering satisfying anonymity, strong distributive fairness semiconvexity, and strong monotonicity. However, in Theorem 2, we show that there exists no binary relation satisfying anonymity, distributive fairness semiconvexity, and sup norm continuity. We also clarify logical relations between these axioms and non-dictatorship axioms. Received: 30 August 2000/Accepted: 18 March 2002 This paper is based on Chapt. 4 of my Masters Thesis [15] submitted to Kobe University, and won the Kanematsu Fellowship from the Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration of Kobe University in May 2001. I am grateful to Jun Iritani for helpful discussions and encouragement, two anonymous referees of this journal, three anonymous referees of the Kanematsu Fellowship, Eiichi Miyagawa, Noritsugu Nakanishi, Nguyen Huu Phuc, Hiroo Sasaki, Koji Shimomura, William Thomson, and Toyoaki Washida for detailed comments. I also thank participants at the spring meeting of Japanese Economic Association at Yokohama City University in May 2000, at the annual meeting of the Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies in Tsukuba in September 2000, and at the Kanematsu Fellowship Seminar at Kobe University in May 2001 for valuable comments.     

Consequences, opportunities, and procedures

This paper reflects on consequentialism which underlies the traditional normative economics. It asserts that the informational basis of normative economics should be expanded so that the intrinsic value of social choice procedures should be properly taken into account along with the value of their consequences. Three examples – the problem of fair cake division, the role of competition in the promotion of economic welfare, and bilateral trade restrictions – are invoked to pinpoint the services rendered by procedural considerations in making social welfare judgements. The Pareto libertarian paradox is also re-examined within the extended framework incorporating procedural considerations along with consequential considerations. Received: 25 March 1997 / Accepted: 8 July 1997     

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems

We investigate the implications of balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other hand, balanced cost reduction requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with either one of our two main axioms, balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction.     

Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules

We consider the problem of selecting the locations of two (identical) public goods on an interval. Each agent has preferences over pairs of locations, which are induced from single-peaked rankings over single locations: each agent compares pairs of locations by comparing the location he ranks higher in each pair. We introduce a class of “double median rules” and characterize it by means of continuity, anonymity, strategy-proofness, and users only. To each pair of parameter sets, each set in the pair consisting of $(n+1)$ parameters, is associated a rule in the class. It is the rule that selects, for each preference profile, the medians of the peaks and the parameters belonging to each set in the pair. We identify the subclasses of the double median rules satisfying group strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, and double unanimity (or efficiency), respectively. We also discuss the classes of “multiple median rules” and “non-anonymous double median rules”.     

Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences

In this paper we analyze the relationship between social decision functions (SDF) and fixed agenda social choice correspondences (fixed agenda SCC), satisfying some rationality conditions (such as Pareto, Independence, Monotonicity, Neutrality or Anonimity), with the aim of translating known results on the existence of individuals with veto power into the fixed agenda framework (e.g., Blair and Pollak [2], Blau and Deb [3], …). In order to do this, a new independence condition (which we call Pseudo-Independence), as well as a notion of veto power, are introduced in the context of fixed agenda SCC. The conclusion is that, by fixing the agenda, under Independence and Pareto assumptions, the existence of individuals with veto power cannot be avoided. Received: 6 November 1995 / Accepted: 9 September 1997     

A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof,efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, tops-onlyness, and continuity. These domains (called partially single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem. We are grateful to an associate editor of this journal for comments that helped to improve the presentation of the paper and to Matt Jackson for suggesting us the interest of identifying a maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules. We are also grateful to Dolors Berga, Flip Klijn, Howard Petith, and a referee for helpful comments. The work of Alejandro Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis. The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya, and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while Alejandro Neme was visiting the UAB unde r a sabbatical fellowship from the Generalitat de Catalunya.     

Inequality, new directions: full ethical foundation and consequences

Deriving comparisons and measures of inequality from full ethical foundations was a main innovation of the 1960s and pursuing it is still a most fruitful direction. This implies using “equal equivalents” and some principles particularly rich in meanings. Multidimensional inequalities can be measured and compared thanks to the “equal-equivalent manifolds”. The “equal-equivalent utility function” defines individual “welfare” cleaned of differences in sui generis individual tastes and hedonic capacities deemed irrelevant for “macrojustice”. Then, equal allocation is a deeper end-value than equal welfare but has to be complemented by free choice for freedom, Pareto efficiency and a demanded partial self-ownership. The result is the richly multi-meaning “equal-labour income equalization”.     

Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox

The Ostrogorski paradox refers to the fact that, facing finitely many dichotomous issues, choosing issue-wise according to the majority rule may lead to a majority defeated overall outcome. This paper investigates the possibility for a similar paradox to occur under alternative specifications of the collective preference relation. The generalized Ostrogorski paradox occurs when the issue-wise majority rule leads to an outcome which is not maximal according to some binary relation φ defined over pairs of alternatives. We focus on three possible definitions of φ, whose sets of maximal elements are respectively the Uncovered Set, the Top-Cycle, and the Pareto Set. We prove that a generalized paradox may prevail for the Uncovered Set. Moreover, it may be avoided for the same issue-wise majority margins as for the Ostrogorski paradox. However, the issue-wise majority rule always selects a Pareto-optimal alternative in the Top-Cycle. Gilbert Laffond and Jean Lainé are grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Choice rules with fuzzy preferences: Some characterizations

Consider an agent with fuzzy preferences. This agent, however, has to make exact choices when faced with different feasible sets of alternatives. What rule does he follow in making such choices? This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a class of binary choice rules called the α satisfying rule. When α=1, this rule is the Orlovsky choice rule. On the other hand, for α≤1/2, the rule coincides with the M _α rule that has been extensively analyzed in the literature on fuzzy preferences. Received: 3 August 1995/Accepted: 19 November 1997     

A quantitative discursive dilemma

The typical judgment aggregation problem in economics and other fields is the following: a group of people has to judge/estimate the value of an uncertain variable y, which is a function of k other variables, i.e., y = D(x ₁, . . . , x _k ). We analyze when it is possible for the group to arrive at collective judgements on the variables that respect D. We consider aggregators that fulfill Arrow’s IIA-condition and neutrality. We show how possibility and impossibility depend on the functional form of D, and generalize Pettit’s (2001) binary discursive dilemma to quantitative judgements.     

Aggregation of smooth preferences

Suppose p is a smooth preference profile (for a society, N) belonging to a domain P ^N . Let σ be a voting rule, and σ(p)(x) be the set of alternatives in the space, W, which is preferred to x. The equilibrium E(σ(p)) is the set {x∈W:σ(p)(x) is empty}. A sufficient condition for existence of E(σ(p)) when p is convex is that a “dual”, or generalized gradient, dσ(p)(x), is non-empty at all x. Under certain conditions the dual “field”, dσ(p), admits a “social gradient field”Γ(p). Γ is called an “aggregator” on the domain P ^N if Γ is continuous for all p in P ^N . It is shown here that the “minmax” voting rule, σ, admits an aggregator when P ^N is the set of smooth, convex preference profiles (on a compact, convex topological vector space, W) and P ^N is endowed with a C ¹-topology. An aggregator can also be constructed on a domain of smooth, non-convex preferences when W is the compact interval. The construction of an aggregator for a general political economy is also discussed. Some remarks are addressed to the relationship between these results and the Chichilnisky-Heal theorem on the non-existence of a preference aggregator when P ^N is not contractible. Received: 4 July 1995 / Accepted: 26 August 1996     

Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited

Two resolution schemes for the impossibility theorems on the Gibbard-Kelly claims of libertarian rights, which are rather contrasting with each other, are proposed and their implications discussed. The first scheme asserts that there exists a collective choice rule satisfying the Pareto principle and the Gibbard-Kelly libertarian claims if there exists at least one socially unconcerned individual. The second scheme asserts existence of an eligible collective choice rule if there exists at least one liberal individual.     

The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks

This article considers the provision of two public goods on tree networks where each agent has a single-peaked preference. We show that if there are at least four agents, then no social choice rule exists that satisfies efficiency and replacement-domination. In fact, these properties are incompatible, even if agents’ preferences are restricted to a smaller domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. However, for rules on an interval, we prove that Miyagawa’s (Soc Choice Welf 18:527–541, 2001) characterization that only the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule satisfy both of these properties also holds on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Moreover, if agents’ peak locations are restricted to either the nodes or the endpoints of trees, rules exist on a subclass of trees. We provide a characterization of a family of such rules for this tree subclass.