Flexibility, Hierarchy, Markets

The conclusion that organizations need to become more strategically flexible as a response to increasing environmental dynamism and uncertainty has been an important feature of recent contingency theories of organization design. In this literature organizations have been analysed from the perspective of the development of networks of organizations concentrating on their core competencies and contracting among themselves on a stable long-term basis. This model of inter-firm relationships provides an alternative mode of organizational structuring to that arising from vertical integration, which, by contrast, is seen as fostering strategic inflexibility. In the literature on corporate restructuring and changes in ownership form arising from the markets and hierarchies perspective, we see a similar emphasis on the dysfunctional consequences of large-scale bureaucratic organization. Changes in ownership form are seen as a major means of providing more effective managerial control. In this paper we argue that linking the literature on flexibility emanating from contingency theories of organizational design and the markets and hierarchies perspective provides important new insights into current and emerging forms of organization.     

Bacon, Boole, the EPA, and Scientific Standards

The scientific standards of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) include the use of retrospective meta-analysis. This analysis entails a use of the theory of probability that is only a simulation and cannot accurately measure the confidence that should be placed in the results. The uncertainty necessary for probability is, in a retrospective study, simulated rather than real. There are three logical forms for establishing a proposition. In the logic of the syllogism, a proposition is established by deduction from assumed propositions. In the logic of the physical sciences, a proposition is established by its ability to predict the outcomes of future experiments. In the logic of the courtroom, a proposition is established by its ability to explain past events. The logic of the courtroom operates under the handicap of working with nonrepeatable events. It is more subject to the preferences of the judge than the logic of the physical sciences or that of the syllogism. Because the logic of the courtroom is less reliable than either the logic of the physical sciences or that of the syllogism, it is the logic of last resort, i.e., it is used only when the other two are not applicable. Under the EPA scientific standards, the logic of the courtroom is accepted for establishing propositions about the physical world. As the logic of the courtroom is less reliable than that of the physical sciences, this practice increases the likelihood of errors.     

Ownership concentration,contestability, family firms,and capital structure

This study analyses the distribution of power among the several blockholders of a firm and the identity of those blockholders as a determinant of firm leverage. Using a sample of 694 firms from 12 Western European countries, our results support a negative relationship between ownership concentration in the hands of the main blockholder and firm leverage. Moreover, we detect that the presence of a second and third large shareholder (beyond the first blockholder) has a significant positive effect on the leverage ratio. In addition, the results show that contestability in family firms plays a more relevant role. Finally, we show that family firms do have significant impact on firm leverage level, and this impact varies depending on the legal framework and institutional environment. In our main sample the results show family firms negatively affect market leverage, supporting the theory that family firms are more averse to an increase in the debt level due to the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress as a result of having an under-diversified portfolio. In contrast, the opposite effect is found in the sample that excludes the United Kingdom. This last result cannot be explained by agency theory, given that family businesses are those that suffer less from Type I agency problems. This result suggests either some difficulty in financing their investments by issuing new equity or the need to use debt as a signal of the quality of its investments. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests.     

Comments on globalization, interdisciplinary research, myopia and parochialism, government, convergence, and culture

Globalization presents social scientists with a wide variety of issues and challenges that cut across disciplinary boundaries. Disciplinary boundaries encourage specialization and advances in understanding aspects of social behavior, but specialization also creates barriers to more comprehensive understanding of social behavior such as globalization. Successful interdisciplinary efforts entail gains from trade across disciplinary specializations. The papers in this volume help outline an agenda for interdisciplinary investigation of globalization to knock down disciplinary boundaries and encourage gains from trade that further our understanding of globalization. But much work remains before we see real fruits from such efforts.     

Trust,Emotion, Sex,Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield

Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views, controversy, and conflict have become pervasive. Research has begun to provide a new perspective on this problem by demonstrating the complexity of the concept risk and the inadequacies of the traditional view of risk assessment as a purely scientific enterprise. This paper argues that danger is real, but risk is socially constructed. Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. In addition, our social and democratic institutions, remarkable as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the risk arena. Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power. Scientific literacy and public education are important, but they are not central to risk controversies. The public is not irrational. Their judgments about risk are influenced by emotion and affect in a way that is both simple and sophisticated. The same holds true for scientists. Public views are also influenced by worldviews, ideologies, and values; so are scientists' views, particularly when they are working at the limits of their expertise. The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the complex, sociopolitical nature of risk point to the need for a new approach—one that focuses upon introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision making in order to make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.     

PRICING,PRODUCTION, AND PERSISTENCE

Though built with increasingly precise microfoundations, modern optimizing sticky price models have displayed a chronic inability to generate large and persistent real responses to monetary shocks, as recently stressed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000). We trace this lack of persistence to a standard view of the cyclical behavior of real marginal cost built into current sticky price macro models. Using a fully articulated general equilibrium model, we develop an alternative perspective on real marginal cost that leads to substantial persistence. Based on an important role for materials input, variable capacity utilization, and labor adjustment on the extensive margin, this alternative view also makes the sticky price model display volatility and comovement of factor inputs and factor prices more closely in line with conventional wisdom about business cycles and various empirical studies of the dynamic effects of monetary shocks. (JEL: E31 E32)     

Leadership in the digital era: A review of who,what, when,where, and why

Leadership as a social influence process has always involved a complex set of phenomena that demands an interdisciplinary lens. Leadership scholarship has now entered into a digital era. In a digital era, the overall phenomenon is changing, as are the tools through which we study it, demanding a new “lens” through which we view leadership. Yet, this raises the question, to what extent is leadership different in a digital era? In acknowledgement of this trend, a special issue was commissioned at The Leadership Quarterly that sought to stimulate the imagination of leadership scholars and practitioners. In the current work, we begin with a brief review of who, what, when, where and why of digital leadership. We cover leadership in informal contexts (e.g., social media), generalization from face-to-face to virtual contexts, computational modeling, the leveraging of technology (e.g., machine learning; Big Data), as well methodological how-to guides. We then plot a path forward for leadership scholars in the dawn of the digital era.     

Effectiveness, accountability, and efficiency

Management of health care is compromised by its singular reliance on billing information--i.e., a claims trail tells little of what providers think. It relates to neither prevention of disease nor reduction of unnecessary health care costs. Billing information is not the substrate to be used in the pursuit of appropriateness, effectiveness, and value. To improve medical management of health care, a protected, but accessible clinical database is needed.     

REDISTRIBUTION,PORK, AND ELECTIONS

Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on ‘wedge’ issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically‐based patronage—or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide‐the‐dollar environments. The model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right‐wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution, and under which rich voters support left‐wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution. The model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs. The model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior, and it describes why right‐wing parties should have an advantage over left‐wing ones in majoritarian systems.     

Culture, Cosmopolitanism, and Risk Management

Most cultural approaches to risk management deal with the connections between the forms of social relations within groups and the risk concerns of those groups. According to these theories, a certain limited set of different relational forms (usually three, four, or five) lead to specific, different and conflicting, risk concerns. In contrast to these theories, cosmopolitanism is an approach to culture that focuses, not on forms of sociality, but on changes among forms—expansions and contractions in the inclusivity of forms and movement by persons from one form of sociality to another. Relative to other cultural theories, cosmopolitanism thus is much more concerned with the solution of risk management problems than with their origins. Cosmopolitanism can be thought of as a cultural continuum, with cosmopolitanism at one end and pluralism at the other. Cosmopolitan persons are more open to cultural change—and thus the solution of risk management problems. In this article, we outline our new theory of cosmopolitanism, describe a method for measuring it and present an experimental study that tests some implications of the theory. Results from the study support the theory by showing that, compared to pluralistic respondents, cosmopolitan respondents are more inclusive in their risk management judgments—that is, they express equal concern for a local and a national issue, whereas the pluralistic respondents express greater concern in the local case. We discuss the risk management implications of a cosmopolitan approach to culture.     

Firms,Destinations, and Aggregate Fluctuations

This paper uses a data base covering the universe of French firms for the period 1990–2007 to provide a forensic account of the role of individual firms in generating aggregate fluctuations. We set up a simple multisector model of heterogeneous firms selling to multiple markets to motivate a theoretically founded decomposition of firms' annual sales growth rate into different components. We find that the firm‐specific component contributes substantially to aggregate sales volatility, mattering about as much as the components capturing shocks that are common across firms within a sector or country. We then decompose the firm‐specific component to provide evidence on two mechanisms that generate aggregate fluctuations from microeconomic shocks highlighted in the recent literature: (i) when the firm size distribution is fat‐tailed, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations, and (ii) aggregate fluctuations can arise from idiosyncratic shocks due to input–output linkages across the economy. Firm linkages are approximately three times as important as the direct effect of firm shocks in driving aggregate fluctuations.     

LEGAL STANDARDS,ENFORCEMENT, AND CORRUPTION

Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Because enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials, the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per capita income and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the “tollbooth view” of regulation, the standard chosen by a self‐interested government is a non‐monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a benevolent regulator. International evidence on environmental regulation shows that standards correlate positively with per‐capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistent with the model's predictions for benevolent governments. (JEL: D73, K42, L51)     

Process Improvement,Learning, and Real Options

We use a real‐options approach to analyze investments in process improvement. We develop a simple, stochastic model of a firm making investment decisions in process improvement. Our analysis offers several interesting insights into investments in process improvement. First, early investment in process improvement results in valuable knowledge, which helps increase the value of the option to invest in process improvement in future periods. This may motivate a firm to invest in process improvements as early as possible. Second, it may be optimal for a firm to stop investing when such investments do not create enough value in the later stages of the investment horizon. Third, although one would expect the state of a firm's process relative to that of other firms to impact a firm's decision to invest in process improvement, this study finds that the impetus is conditional and identifies these conditions. Finally, in such an environment, the delay of investment in process improvement incurs an opportunity cost for a firm, and we show that the traditional net present value rule must incorporate this opportunity cost and the knowledge‐induced change in future option values to lead to a correct investment decision.     

Trust, confidence, procedural fairness, outcome fairness, moral conviction, and the acceptance of GM field experiments

In 2005, Swiss citizens endorsed a moratorium on gene technology, resulting in the prohibition of the commercial cultivation of genetically modified crops and the growth of genetically modified animals until 2013. However, scientific research was not affected by this moratorium, and in 2008, GMO field experiments were conducted that allowed us to examine the factors that influence their acceptance by the public. In this study, trust and confidence items were analyzed using principal component analysis. The analysis revealed the following three factors: "economy/health and environment" (value similarity based trust), "trust and honesty of industry and scientists" (value similarity based trust), and "competence" (confidence). The results of a regression analysis showed that all the three factors significantly influenced the acceptance of GM field experiments. Furthermore, risk communication scholars have suggested that fairness also plays an important role in the acceptance of environmental hazards. We, therefore, included measures for outcome fairness and procedural fairness in our model. However, the impact of fairness may be moderated by moral conviction. That is, fairness may be significant for people for whom GMO is not an important issue, but not for people for whom GMO is an important issue. The regression analysis showed that, in addition to the trust and confidence factors, moral conviction, outcome fairness, and procedural fairness were significant predictors. The results suggest that the influence of procedural fairness is even stronger for persons having high moral convictions compared with persons having low moral convictions.     

CHOICE,COMPETITION, AND PUPIL ACHIEVEMENT

Choice and competition in education have recently found growing support from both policy‐makers and academics. Yet evidence on the actual benefits of market‐orientated reforms is at best mixed. Moreover, although the economic rationale for choice and competition is clear, in existing work there is rarely an attempt to distinguish between the two concepts. In this paper, we study whether pupils in Primary schools in England with a wider range of school choices achieve better academic outcomes than those whose choice is more limited; and whether Primary schools facing more competition perform better than those in a more monopolistic situation. In simple least squares regression models we find little evidence of a link between choice and achievement, but uncover a small positive association between competition and school performance. Yet this could be related to endogenous school location or pupil sorting. In fact, an instrumental variable strategy based on discontinuities generated by admissions district boundaries suggests that the performance gains from greater school competition are limited. Only when we restrict our attention to Voluntary Aided schools, which have more freedom in managing their governance and admission practices, do we find some evidence of a positive causal link between competition and pupil achievement. (JEL: I20, H70, R5)     

Ambiguity,Learning, and Asset Returns

We propose a novel generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model which permits a three‐way separation among risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and intertemporal substitution. We apply this utility model to a consumption‐based asset‐pricing model in which consumption and dividends follow hidden Markov regime‐switching processes. Our calibrated model can match the mean equity premium, the mean risk‐free rate, and the volatility of the equity premium observed in the data. In addition, our model can generate a variety of dynamic asset‐pricing phenomena, including the procyclical variation of price–dividend ratios, the countercyclical variation of equity premia and equity volatility, the leverage effect, and the mean reversion of excess returns. The key intuition is that an ambiguity‐averse agent behaves pessimistically by attaching more weight to the pricing kernel in bad times when his continuation values are low.     

Complexity,simplicity, simplexity

“In the midst of order, there is chaos; but in the midst of chaos, there is order”, John Gribbin wrote in his book Deep Simplicity (p. 76). In this dialectical spirit, we discuss the generative tension between complexity and simplicity in the theory and practice of management and organization. Complexity theory suggests that the relationship between complex environments and complex organizations advanced by the well-known Ashby’s law, may be reconsidered: only simple organization provides enough space for individual agency to match environmental turbulence in the form of complex organizational responses. We suggest that complex organizing may be paradoxically facilitated by a simple infrastructure, and that the theory of organizations may be viewed as resulting from the dialectical interplay between simplicity and complexity.     

Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy

Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views, controversy, and overt conflict have become pervasive. Risk-perception research has recently begun to provide a new perspective on this problem. Distrust in risk analysis and risk management plays a central role in this perspective. According to this view, the conflicts and controversies surrounding risk management are not due to public ignorance or irrationality but, instead, are seen as a side effect of our remarkable form of participatory democracy, amplified by powerful technological and social changes that systematically destroy trust. Recognizing the importance of trust and understanding the "dynamics of the system" that destroys trust has vast implications for how we approach risk management in the future.     

Medicine, management, and me.

What is medical management? How do you learn about it? How do you get into it? Is there a future in it? Is medical management for you? Can you do it? What will it mean to your original plans for your life in medicine? Is it worth the sacrifice? Get comfortable. I have a story to tell you. It may help if you hear about medical management from a medical director who has preceded you. I doubt I can answer all your questions. I can, however, tell you about one physician's visions, expectations, decisions, experiences, and rewards from what can be loosely called "medical management." If you find something of help in your decision making in this account, my telling it is worthwhile.