Sociology after Humanism: A Lesson from Contemporary Science Studies

The field of science studies is the site of an explicit reflection on the ontological premises of sociology, with rival approaches defined by distinctive ways of specifying the basic constituents of reality. This article takes advantage of this debate to compare three types of ontological schemes in terms of their internal coherence and their consequences for sociology. Sociological humanism —represented by proponents of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK)—distinguishes between an immanent domain of social relations, a transcendent and meaningless material reality, and an intermediate, socially constructed level of knowledge, meaning, and culture. Symmetrical humanism —as found in the recent writings of Andrew Pickering—insists that society too should be placed among the constructions, thereby disqualifying it as a source of explanations for human agency and leaving a detached and self-moving human agent. The relational ontology —exemplified by the "actor-network" approach of Bruno Latour and others—makes no a priori distinctions between humans and others, or between transcendent reality and construction, treating these properties as outcomes. The two humanist approaches are found to be incoherent as ontological schemes and also, contrary to the assumptions of the current debate, inimical to sociological explanation. And contrary to the antisociological stance of the actor-network approach, it is found that the relational ontology provides a consistent basis for sociological explanations of human practices.     

Sociology and the case for realism

It is argued that in the present era of ecological threat we need a critical sociology, which requires a realist ontology. Using Beck's Risk society as an example, I maintain that to the extent that postmodernist sociology rejects realism, its critical and substantive potential is compromised. The second half of the article argues that realism must extend also to moral positions, which are assessed in terms of knowledge of the natural and social world. Through various examples it shows that while postmodernist thinkers reject meta-narratives and universal truth, they are inevitably moral realist in practice when talking politics. Contra Bauman, sociology cannot dispense with the project of emancipation. The moral realist discourse of human needs permits us to move from statements about the world to recommendations for action.     

Mindscapes,ontology and global culture transition – 2: Morphogenesis as ‘personal ontology’

Abstract

<![CDATA[Clay Shirky's focus in his book, Here Comes Every-body, is on ‘the power of organizing without organizations’. The challenges from the book's focus and the title of his essay, ‘Ontology is overrated’, come at a time of crisis when practically all the institutions are now under critical public review and Lakoff's ‘new reality’ is reevaluating the roles of language, philosophy, logic and mathematics. Consequently, if Mindscape is considered, institutional ontology and personal ontology are divided into six categories, all antagonistic due to irreconcilable differences regarding priorities. Worst, people experience and define ‘reality’ differently under different circumstances and mindscape modes, depending on the state of their mindscape modes. The result is a multiverse, a global constellation of virtual realities. From some perspectives it would be reasonable to conclude, that the genome strategy presented here together with its implied paradigm merely compete with a host of other myths and metaphors for the imagination.]]>

<![CDATA[True, small world networks are organizing personal ontology in a multiverse of virtual individual realities. Even so, virtual realities do not imply arbitrary realities. All life as we know it is included in the genome's cluster gestalt strategy. Mapping of the human genome marks a turning point because a wrong choice is not an option. Morphogenesis as ontology suggests that the genome and ecology remain in sync by genome corrections that are often experienced as natural catastrophes. Ostensibly, the genome's cluster gestalt strategy consists of producing individual variants of the genome. Only those individuals that survive the dynamics of Earth's ecology and reproduce to continue to contribute code to the gene pool. There are species that reproduce by cloning, others by sexual reproduction. Humans and dogs are just two of countless species that cling desperately to an eventually to be incinerated rock in space.]]>     

Voyaging on the seas of spirit: an ongoing journey towards understanding disability and humanity

In an important article in Disability & Society Hughes argued that ontology is becoming a ‘live issue’ in disability studies. Different sources, including non‐western and aboriginal conceptions of disability and cosmology and the literature on philosophy, religion, palliative and healthcare, suggest that we are missing a critical aspect of humanity in our discussions – the spirit. Drawing upon collectively defined or interpreted experiences of disability identified in non‐Western and aboriginal communities we identify gaps in our ontological discussions which result from taken for granted assumptions that there is only individual experience. When we incorporate spirit in our thinking we become open to emerging ways of understanding disability and humanity. Spirit is a critical, although often intangible, aspect of being alive. Drawing on these sources, ontological discussions around disability leads us to explore how experiences of disability teach us about the multiple dimensions of being human.     

Human Inquiry Systems: Understanding Everyday Social Life And Its Stresses

Abstract

Ever since the rise of modern psychology questions arose as to how to scientifically study human behavior, whether from a socio-cultural perspective (geisteswissenschftlich) or by means of a more rigorous (positive) approach. However once psychology was defined as the study of behavior, it included animal behavior, and the positive approach became the dominant orientation in academic psychology, which made little differentiation between the methods employed in studying man or animal in the laboratories. This article examines the underlying proposition of these two paradigms, including their critical shortcomings and offers a complementary, more humanistic alternative to the study of human behavior, namely hermeneutics and discursive psychology. It will be argued that these alternatives offer a deeper understanding of human actions in a situated field because they attempts to take into account the motives and aims of people's conduct. Ultimately this approach attempts to assess a person's sense of social reality (in addition to the reality of a physical word) in the hope that a dialectic synthesis of laboratory research and hermeneutic understanding will lead to the manifestation of a greater emancipatory interests.     

Digitally Mediated (Dis)embodiment

This article aims to demonstrate that the philosophical anthropology of the German philosopher Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985) enables us to gain a better understanding of the experiential presuppositions and implications of information and communication technologies, such as telepresence and virtual reality, than we can obtain through interpretations that start from a dualistic, Cartesian ontology. With the help of Plessner's concept of "excentric positionality', developed in Stages of the Organic and Man (1928), Hans Moravec's Utopian claims about the possibility of disembodied existence in cyberspace are criticized and an alternative, more adequate interpretation is presented. It is argued that the corporal "poly-excentric positionality' that is inherent in the human experience of telepresence and virtual reality, radicalizes the existential " homelessness' which characterizes human life.     

The post(hu)man always rings twice: theorising the difference of impairment in the lives of people with ‘mental health problems’

A vital debate in British disability studies concerns the question of how impairment can be theorised, taking place between those who claim a critical realist ontology and those who argue for a critical social ontology. Recently, this discussion on impairment issues seems to merge with the agenda of the newly emerging perspective of critical disability studies. In contrast to the recent claim of Vehmas and Watson in Disability & Society that critical disability theorists only engage in a relativistic deconstruction of impairment, as critical disability scholars we explore the recent work of Braidotti who addresses a difference between a deconstructive anti-humanist stance and an affirmative post-humanist turn. Inspired by our empirical research, we theorise the difference of impairment in the lives of people with ‘mental health problems’ that can imply, in theoretical and in practical real-life terms, both a limitation and a potential that matters.     

If it didn't exist we'd have to invent it … Further reflections on the ontological status of the state

In this brief response to Bob Jessop's probing yet sympathetic critique, I clarify further the ‘as if realist’ political ontology of the state. I suggest that critical realism's appeal to the ontological stratification of social reality and to the logic of retroduction are the principal stumbling blocks for ‘as if realists’, that the appeal to state power(s) as distinct from the state as real cannot circumvent the ‘as if realist’ ontological objection to the state as real since both remain conceptual abstractions, but that there is a natural affinity between the strategic‐relational approach developed by Jessop and others and the ‘as if realist’ ontology of the state that I here elucidate.     

The Definition of the Situation: an Analysis of the Ethnomethodological and Dramaturgical View*

The dramaturgical and the ethnomethodological positions on the definition of the situation is discussed, after a brief history of the concept. The ethnomethodologists claim to take their cues from Wittgenstein and Schutz, whereas the dramaturgists take theirs from G. H. Mead; these positions are examined in terms of their relative power to explain the problem of the definition of the situation, concluding that the Meadian position is the more powerful one. It is then argued that the essential sociological ontology—that given expression by Weber and Durkheim—is best realized by adopting some form of the dramaturgical argument.     

Was Cicourel’s critique in Methods and Measurement in Sociology too radical?

This article is a contribution to a mini symposium on the 50th anniversary of the publication of A V Cicourel’s Method and Measurement in Sociology (1964). The central theme of the book is reviewed – the problem of the relationship between everyday language and cultural meanings, and the language of measurement in social research – and the lack of an adequate ontology of social actors is identified as being the cause of the problem. The solution offered by Alfred Schütz – that social scientific language should be derived from everyday language – is discussed and it is argued that this was probably too radical at the time the book was published, and is still generally neglected in the social sciences.     

Mobilization by Different Means: Nativity and GOTV in the United States

We compare the impact of 15 randomized get‐out‐the‐vote (GOTV) field experiments on naturalized and U.S.‐born voters. We find that mobilization increased turnout among U.S.‐born Latinos, but had no measurable effect among Latino naturalized citizens. In contrast, GOTV increased turnout among naturalized Asian Americans but had no measureable effect among U.S.‐born Asian Americans. Race politics scholars have long argued that the terms we use to describe ethnoracial groups mask significant internal heterogeneity. We show how this heterogeneity affects voter mobilization, demonstrating the importance of seeing nativity and national origin as critical lines of demarcation that affect how certain individuals are mobilized to participate in politics. ¹      

Bourdieu and the Logic of Practice: Is All Giving Indian-Giving or is "Generalized Materialism" Not Enough? For the memory of Louis Dumont

I argue here that in the end Bourdieu's theory of practice fails to overcome the problem on which it expressly centers, namely, subject-object dualism. The failure is registered in his avowed materialism, which, though significantly "generalized," remains what it says: a materialism. In order to substantiate my criticism, I examine for their ontological presuppositions three areas of his theoretical framework pertaining to the questions of (1) human agency (as seen through the conceptual glass of the habitus), (2) otherness, and (3) the gift. By scrutinizing Bourdieu's powerful and progressive social theory, with an eye to finding fault, I hope to show the need to take a certain theoretical action, one that is patently out of keeping with the usual self-presentation and self-understanding of social science. The action I have in mind is this: because the problem of subject-object dualism is in the first place a matter of ontology, in order successfully to address it there must take place a direct shift of ontological starting point, from the received starting point in Western thought to one that projects reality in terms of ambiguity that is basic. With this shift the dualism of subject and object dissolves by definition, leaving a social reality that, for reasons of its basic ambiguity, is best approached as a question of ethics before power.     

Balls Enough: Manliness and Legitimated Violence in Hell's Kitchen

This article presents one example of how masculinity and hierarchy are exercised through violence in organizations. It draws on the empirical data of 15 episodes from the US reality television series Hell's Kitchen, in which 15 cooks compete for the job of Chef in one of celebrity chef Gordon Ramsay's restaurants. Ramsay's task is to lead the cooks towards a hegemonic masculinity valid in the restaurant context. An important feature is the contestant's ability to deal with Ramsay's fiery temper and fits of rage. The winner is the person who succeeds in approaching Ramsay's standards in terms of culinary art and leadership qualities, which in his terminology is referred to as manliness. Ramsay's aggressive style of management is possible to recognize, explain and to a certain extent justify as a way of running a restaurant. But what if his tongue‐lashings are to be understood, not as a possible way to train skilled chefs, but instead are called violence? Gender‐oriented organizational studies stress the importance of paying attention to acts of violence in organizations rather than disregarding it as organizational culture or tradition. Using concepts and perspectives from masculinity theory and feminist studies on men's violence against women, the purpose of this article is to analyse the micro practices of how masculinity and hierarchy are exercised through violence in the restaurant environment. As will be argued, reality television can be understood, not so much as a reflection but rather as an exaggeration of real life. It can be seen as a distorting mirror that enlarges and at the same time perverts the micro practices of reality. The aim is dual; to investigate the link between masculinity and legitimated violence in organizations and to give prominence to the potential of reality television visualizing the normalization of violence in organizations.     

Evaluation and social policy. Some reflections on ideas and institutions

This paper discusses the relationship between evaluation as a meta- and as a technical activity in the field of social policy, with special reference to the British experience. Evaluation as a meta-activity is defined to be the analysis of the values and criteria to be used: a process which assumes that the definition of problems is itself problematic. Evaluation as a technical activity is defined to be the application of agreed criteria to agreed policy problems. From this distinction, it is argued, some important implications flow for the role of the universities and the funding of research.     

Class and comparison: subjective social location and lay experiences of constraint and mobility

Lay perceptions and experiences of social location have been commonly framed with reference to social class. However, complex responses to, and ambivalence over, class categories have raised interesting analytic questions relating to how sociological concepts are operationalized in empirical research. For example, prior researchers have argued that processes of class dis‐identification signify moral unease with the nature of classed inequalities, yet dis‐identification may also in part reflect a poor fit between ‘social class’ as a category and the ways in which people accord meaning to, and evaluate, their related experiences of socio‐economic inequality. Differently framed questions about social comparison, aligned more closely with people's own terms of reference, offer an interesting alternative avenue for exploring subjective experiences of inequality. This paper explores some of these questions through an analysis of new empirical data, generated in the context of recession. In the analysis reported here, class identification was common. Nevertheless, whether or not people self identified in class terms, class relevant issues were perceived and described in highly diverse ways, and lay views on class revealed it to be a very aggregated as well as multifaceted construct. It is argued that it enables a particular, not general, perspective on social comparison. The paper therefore goes on to examine how study participants compared themselves with familiar others, identified by themselves. The evidence illuminates social positioning in terms of constraint, agency and (for some) movement, and offers insight into very diverse experiences of inequality, through the comparisons that people made. Their comparisons are situated, and pragmatic, accounts of the material contexts in which people live their lives. Linked evaluations are circumscribed and strongly tied to these proximate material contexts.The paper draws out implications for theorizing lay perspectives on class, and subjective experiences of inequality.     

Interactionism in the age of ubiquitous telecommunication

ABSTRACT

The following paper aims to engage recent reconsiderations of Gibson’s theory of affordances and Goffman’s concept of copresence in the context of the material turn – especially in the form expressed by Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory. The paper’s central claim is that microsociology cannot avoid engaging material turn theory. It will be argued that contemporary attempts to reconceptualize classical microsociological frameworks set out on a path that invariably leads to problems investigated by thinkers like Latour: as communication technology advances, the importance of mediated interaction grows, prompting attempts to update interactionism for non-face-to-face interactions such as teleconferencing, social networks and virtual reality. These new social situations are then made sense of in terms of the way these technologies have a transformative effect on interaction. This effect ? be it a modifier of the temporal structure of the interaction, or of the interactional capacity of the agents ? is argued to always lead back to a central question of the material turn: if technology is a static transformational effect, where is its agency? Or, conversely: if a technological object’s effect is uniform across all external factors, how is that not a form of technological determinism? The paper investigates whether attempts to avoid determinism manage to keep Latourian metaphysics at bay. The paper concludes by suggesting that contemporary social theory must work towards a middle way that does not gloss over important contributions of material turn theorists whilst also not ignoring the importance of considering human political responsibility.     

Thinking through tragedy: critical distance and the law of genre

Abstract

This article focuses on two problems associated with tragedy. One ancient: what is it that draws us to the dramatic presentation of events of terrible suffering and loss? And one modern: namely, that while tragedies are still performed and appreciated, little new tragedy is being written. It will be argued in relation to the second problem that the vitality of tragedy as a dramatic form requires a less rigid approach to what might be considered tragic. And in relation to the first problem it will be argued that this more expansive conception of tragedy will allow an understanding of the ‘pay-off’ of tragedy in a way that draws both on the tradition that focuses on tragedy as cathartic therapeutic, and on the tradition that sees it as a thought laboratory that allows ethical dilemmas to be posed and explored from different perspectives. This argument constitutes a two-fold dialectical synthesis (emotional and intellectual approaches to tragedy on the one hand and the technical and popular use of the word ‘tragedy’ on the other) and the effect of this is to facilitate an understanding of tragedy as establishing a ‘critical distance’ that sets the scene for the possibility of thinking.     

Reason and reparation

Conclusion Critical theory is critical because it reflects on the circumstances of its own existence. It is critical too because it takes utopia seriously, which means, in part, never short-circuiting the distance between reality and Utopia. Reparative reason, it has been argued, is no substitute for this philosophical project, but a source of support for it, one better suited to the concerns of the Frankfurt School than eros. What both reparative reason and the reparative impulse require is guidance as to the most deserving objects of our care and concern. Critical theory can provide this guidance.At least two objections to this reformulation of critical theory in light of Klein's insights into love, hate, and reparation are possible. The first would argue that reparation remains insufficiently relational, still selfish, more concerned with the satisfaction of the one who makes reparation than its object. The second objection is almost the opposite of the first, that reparation lacks what makes eros such a powerful oppositional force: not merely its selfish, demanding character, but its teleological orientation. Freed of the distorting effects of social domination, eros requires no guidance. By its very nature it seeks out the truly beautiful and good, much as Plato argued in the Symposium and Phaedrus. Such objections are, I believe, quite mistaken. They do not, however, lack insight into the issues involved.Regarding the first objection, Klein argues that we seek to make reparation out of genuine concern for the object. Reparation is truly an object-related passion, motivated by our relationship to the object, our love for it. Reparation may reduce guilt and anxiety, but this is an effect, not a cause. But, if reparation puts the object first, there is nonetheless an individualistic cast to the Kleinian account missing in Benjamin and Chodorow. For Klein, we care for others not because they are part of us, but because they are different, and we are concerned about them. In a certain limited sense the other remains an object, not in Freud's sense of an object of our drives, whose humanity is unimportant, but as a person who is distinct and separate from ourselves. This does not make reparation selfish. It does make it an expression of individuality, not its denial or transcendence.Regarding the second objection, it is true that reparation is not as autonomous as eros, and perhaps not as inherently oppositional either. But, neither is it as subject to corruption as eros (repressive desublimation), for reparation harnesses not the desire for pleasure, but guilt over the harm we have done to others. But, perhaps it was a mistake all along to try to found critical theory in eros, as though biology (Marcuse calls eros a biological basis for socialism) could take the place of critical consciousness, social opposition, or a revolutionary class. Insofar as it finds a material basis for hope for a better world in apparently transhistorical human attributes (albeit attributes that exist only within particular histories), reparation supports the Utopian project of the Frankfurt School. Reparation is, however, no deus ex machina. Historically situated human beings will have to confront the tragedy of human history on their own, a tragedy that stems, ultimately, from the way in which our fear and aggression constitute a world that requires so much reparation. It is, of course, this insight that keeps reparation from short-circuiting the path to utopia. For not only does reparation not exist apart from particular histories, but it does not exist independently of the hatred and aggression that bring it into being.     

Beyond the Structure/Agency Dualism: An Evaluation of Giddens’Theory of Structuration*

In this paper an evaluation of Giddens’theory of structuration is focused on two related issues: first, the degree to which Giddens provides a theory of action which transcends the structure/agency dualism and, second, whether such a transcendence is possible. In the first instance, it is demonstrated that Giddens exaggerates the powers of agents at the expense of structural constraints. Second, it is argued that transcendence of structure/agency dualism and the specification of a definitive ontology of action is not possible and that the merit of structuration theory lies in its use as a sensitizing device for empirical research.     

Opportunity sets and individual well-being

 An opportunity set ranking rule assigns an ordering of opportunity sets to each individual utility function (defined on the universal set of alternatives) within the domain of this rule. Using an axiomatic approach, this paper characterizes a general class of opportunity set ranking rules which are based on the utilities associated with the elements of an opportunity set. It is argued that the addition of an alternative to a given opportunity set is not necessarily desirable in terms of overall well-being, and this position is reflected in replacing a commonly used monotonicity axiom with an alternative condition. Received: 15 May 1995/Accepted: 14 December 1995