VOTING FOR INCOME‐IMMISERIZING REDISTRIBUTION IN THE MELTZER–RICHARD MODEL

This paper argues that income received via redistributive transfers, unlike labor income, requires no direct sacrifice of leisure; this makes it attractive to many voters even if it leaves them poorer. This point is made within the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model wherein heterogeneous voters evaluate an income‐redistribution program that finances a lump‐sum transfer to all via a distorting income tax. The political‐equilibrium policy under majority rule is the tax most preferred, utility‐wise, by the median voter. Ironically, this voter, and many poorer voters, may support a redistribution policy that leaves them poorer in income terms but with higher utility. (JEL H2, E6, D72)     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERGENERATIONAL INCOME MOBILITY

The intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members. While much research has been devoted to measuring this reduced‐form parameter, less is known about its underlying structural determinants. Using a model with exogenous talent endowments, endogenous parental investment in children, and endogenous redistributive institutions, we identify the structural parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income. The model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility. Two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions. We offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model. We conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly informative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico‐economic institutions. (JEL E24, J62, J68, P16)     

THE GREAT OVERESTIMATION: TAX DATA AND INEQUALITY MEASUREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1913–1943

Historical measures of income inequality in the United States must grapple with the challenge of data quality. We examine one such problem affecting the well-known estimates of income inequality produced by Piketty and Saez (2003) using the records of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Prior to 1943, incomes were self-reported. Combined with lax enforcement on the part of the IRS, self-reporting of incomes could provide a misleading portrait of the income distribution. To test the accuracy of IRS records, we compare them to independently tabulated state income tax returns between 1919 and 1945 from states with more comprehensive and rigorously enforced tax collection procedures. State income tax records show lower overall levels of income inequality than IRS records. However, we still find that top income concentrations declined across the period between 1929 and World War II. These findings attest to the sensitivity of distributional estimation to the reporting selectivity and economic quality of underlying tax data, suggesting that the existing IRS-derived series systematically overstates top-income concentration in the interwar period. (JEL H2, N32, D31, E01)     

TAX RATES,GOVERNANCE, AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN HIGH‐INCOME COUNTRIES

Approximately 16.7% of output in high‐income OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries is produced informally. I present a model economy where entrepreneurs decide how much of their production to keep informal. Informality carries a risk of getting caught, taxed, and fined. Results from a model with differences in tax rates alone only agree to approximately 23% with data on informality. Taking into account both governance quality and tax rates, agreement between the model's results and data increases to 72%. A policy experiment raising governance quality in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal to Finnish standards reduces informality by 13 percentage points. (JEL E26, H26, J24)     

ALLOCATING INFECTION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SWINE FLU (H1N1) VACCINE

Previous research has isolated the effect of “congressional dominance” in explaining bureaucracy‐related outcomes. This analysis extends the concept of congressional dominance to the allocation of H1N1, or swine flu, vaccine doses. States with Democratic United States Representatives on the relevant House oversight committee received roughly 60,000 additional doses per legislator during the initial allocation period, though this political advantage dissipated after the first 3 weeks of vaccine distribution. As a result political factors played a role in determining vaccine allocation only when the vaccine was in particularly short supply. At‐risk groups identified by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), such as younger age groups and first responders, do not receive more vaccine doses, and in fact receive slightly fewer units of vaccine. (JEL D72, D73, I18)     

THE EFFECT OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: EVIDENCE FOR SWITZERLAND

In political economics, the impact of institutions on income redistribution is mainly studied by comparing different forms of representative democracy. In this article, we analyze the influence of direct democratic institutions on redistribution first focusing on welfare and nonwelfare spending using yearly panel data for Swiss cantons. Then, we estimate a model, which explains the determinants of actually achieved redistribution measured by Gini coefficients. While our results indicate that less public funds are used to redistribute income, inequality is not reduced to a lesser extent in direct than in representative democracies for a given initial income distribution. (JEL D7, D78, I30, H75, H11)     

A THEORY OF THE POLITICALLY OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAX

A theory of the politically optimal tax is developed where tax rates are endogenous and determined by forces in the political market. The theory is used to explain the levels of alcoholic beverage taxes between states in the United States. It is shown that these rates are influenced by the ownership structure existing in the liquor industry, the consumption externalities associated with drinking, the minimum drinking age laws, the earmarking of tax revenues, the enforcement of regulations and real income.     

STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MUTUAL FUND REVOLUTION

We find that higher stock ownership rates are linked to an upward shift in the Republican share of the House popular vote since the late 1980s, consistent with theories that property interests affect voting. To proxy for discontinuous stock ownership rates, we use equity mutual fund costs, which have fallen, are negatively correlated with stock ownership rates and the Republican vote share in the long run, and help explain short‐run changes along with midterm elections, economic conditions, and presidential popularity. Findings suggest that the major parties’ shares of the House popular vote will fluctuate around 50% until other factors trigger a political realignment. (JEL D72, G11)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

NONLINEARITIES AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERTEMPORAL BUDGET CONSTRAINT

We analyze the sustainability of the government's intertemporal budget constraint and the corresponding fiscal reaction function within a nonlinear error‐correction framework. Our empirical analysis, based on Italy, provides some evidence that the Italian government is meeting its intertemporal budget constraint. Nevertheless, we show that the burden of correcting budgetary disequilibria is entirely carried out by changes in the average tax rate, with a weakly exogenous government spending, possibly determined by the political process. We also document some rigidities of the tax instrument, in terms of downward inflexibility of the average tax rate with respect to its long‐run level. Finally, we provide some evidence in favor of a nonlinear adjustment toward a sustainable long‐run equilibrium, as the average tax rate adjusts faster the further away it gets from the equilibrium. By considering the behavior of taxes across the economic cycle, we also provide some evidence of inflexibility of the tax instrument during bad times. (JEL C32, C51, C52, H20, H50)     

EFFICIENT TAX REPORTING: THE EFFECTS OF TAXPAYER LIABILITY INFORMATION SERVICES

The complexity of the individual income tax system can give rise to both under‐ and overreporting of liability, thus creating a wedge between taxpayer perceptions of the price of public services and their actual cost, and potentially leading to budget misallocations and associated efficiency losses. This study uses theory and experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of taxpayer service programs that endeavor to resolve uncertainty over tax liability. To do so, we induce uncertainty over tax liability and investigate the effects of both service accuracy and reliability. We find participants are less likely to file when tax liability is uncertain but the provision of information offsets this effect; furthermore, it appears that simply providing a service, even one that imperfectly reveals liability, increases the propensity to file and the accuracy of the filing. When a service that promises to resolve uncertainty completely is requested but not delivered, the result is underreporting even more severe than in a setting where no service is available. (JEL H2, H26, C91)     

DECOMPOSING TRENDS IN INCOME VOLATILITY: THE “WILD RIDE” AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM

We use 2‐year panels from the Current Population Survey to provide a detailed accounting of family income volatility from 1980 to 2009. Volatility doubled overall, and the increase was most pronounced among the top 1% of the income distribution, but in any given year the level of volatility among the bottom 10% exceeds that of the top. The increased volatility comes from higher instability of head and spouse earnings, other nonlabor income, and from reduced covariance between these income sources with the tax system. This suggests that current tax policy is less effective in mitigating income shocks than previous decades. (JEL J31, I30)     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX AVOIDANCE

We identify the effect of trade liberalization on corporate income tax avoidance in a sample of Chinese manufacturing firms, taking advantage of China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). We find that firms engage in more tax avoidance in industries with larger tariff reductions. Further analysis shows that firms with a lack of cash or a high demand for cash before WTO entry tend to engage in more tax avoidance after WTO entry. Our study also provides evidence that manipulating costs is one way that firms avoid corporate income tax. (JEL D22, F61, F63, H26)     

TAX POLICY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1979–2007

This paper assesses the effects of U.S. tax policy reforms on inequality over around three decades, from 1979 to 2007. It applies a new method for decomposing changes in government redistribution into (1) a direct policy effect resulting from policy changes and (2) the effects of changing market incomes. Over the period as a whole, the tax policy changes increased income inequality by pushing up the income share of high‐income earners (the top 20%). (JEL H23, H31, H53, P16)     

HOW DOES GLOBALIZATION AFFECT THE IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON LABOR INCOME,CAPITAL INCOME,AND CONSUMPTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

This article analyzes the effects of globalization on implicit tax rates (ITRs) on labor income, capital income, and consumption in the EU15 and Central and Eastern European New Member States (CEE NMS). We find supportive evidence for an increase in the ITR on labor income in the EU15, but no effect on the ITR on capital income. There is evidence of convergence in terms of the ITR on consumption, as countries with higher than average ITR on consumption respond to globalization by decreasing their tax rates. There are important differences among the welfare regimes within the EU15. Social‐democratic countries have decreased the tax burden on capital, but increased that on labor due to globalization. Globalization exerts a pressure to increase taxes on labor income in the conservative and liberal regimes as well. Taxes on consumption decrease in response to globalization in the conservative and social‐democratic regimes. In the CEE NMS, there is no effect of globalization on the ITR on labor and capital income, but we find a negative impact on the ITR on consumption in the CEE NMS with higher than average ITR on consumption. (JEL H23, H24, H25, F19, F21)     

THE OPTIMAL TAXATION OF ASSET INCOME WHEN GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IS ENDOGENOUS: THEORY,ESTIMATION AND WELFARE

This paper derives the Ramsey optimal fiscal policy for taxing asset income in a model where government expenditure is a function of net output or the inputs that produce it. Extending work by Kenneth L. Judd, I demonstrate that the canonical result that the optimal tax on capital income is zero in the medium to long term is a special case of a more general model. Employing a vector error correction model to estimate the relationship between government consumption and net output or the factor inputs that generate it for the United States between 1948Q1 and 2015Q4, I demonstrate that this special case is empirically implausible, and show how a cointegrating vector can be used to determine the optimal tax schedule. I simulate a version of the model using the empirical estimates to measure the welfare implications of changing the tax rate on asset income, and contrast these results with those generated in a version of the model where government consumption is purely exogenous. The shifting pattern of welfare measurements confirms the theoretical results. I calculate that the prevailing effective tax rate on net asset income in the United States between 1970 and 2014 averaged 0.449. Hence abolishing the tax completely does generate welfare improvements, though only by the equivalent of between 1.103% and 1.616% permanent increase in consumption—well under half the implied welfare benefit when the endogeneity of the government consumption is ignored. The maximum welfare improvement from shifting part of the burden of tax from capital to labor is the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption of between only 1.491% and 1.858%, and is attained when the tax rate on asset income is lowered to between 0.148 and 0.186. Allowing the tax rate to vary over time raises the maximum welfare benefit to 1.865%. All the results are very robust to a wide range of elasticities of labor supply. (JEL E62, H21, H50)     

THE IMPACT OF PAYING INTEREST ON RESERVES IN THE PRESENCE OF GOVERNMENT DEFICIT FINANCING

This paper reexamines the impact that paying interest on reserves has on price level indeterminacy, volatility, and economic well‐being. Unlike the previous literature, this model includes an after‐tax deficit financed by assets (bonds and reserves) whose returns are linked. I show that the number of steady‐state equilibria and the corresponding level of indeterminacy are equal to, or greater than, those arising in the no‐interest economy. When the level of indeterminacy is the same, the economic volatility is reduced by paying interest. However, greater indeterminacy in the interest economy results in greater volatility. Finally, paying interest on reserves can enhance welfare. (JEL D6, E3, E5)     

THE HABIT OF GIVING

Many charitable organizations believe it is worthwhile to solicit very small donations, particularly from young people, because these gifts form a habit of giving which leads to larger donations in the future. Indeed, there is some evidence of a positive correlation between giving when young and giving when old. However, such a correlation, by itself, does not constitute evidence of habit formation. Using data on alumni contributions to a university, we assess whether the correlation is due to habit formation—true state dependence—or to unobservable factors such as affinity to the school. We further examine whether habits form by the mere act of giving or based on the amount given. We implement an instrumental variables approach using the fact that performance of the school's athletic teams and solicitation by one's former roommates generate shocks to giving while young that are plausibly uncorrelated with giving when older. There is strong evidence of habit formation on the extensive margin, but not in the amount given. This finding has important implications for fundraising strategies, charities' accounting practices, and tax policy. (JEL D64, D91, D12)     

RISING TOP INCOMES AND INCREASED BORROWING IN THE REST OF THE DISTRIBUTION

One potential consequence of rising top‐income concentration is borrowing by less‐affluent households attempting to maintain relative living standards. This paper evaluates the “keeping up with the Joneses” phenomenon, examining the responsiveness of payment‐to‐income ratios for different debt types across the income distribution to changes in income among affluent households. The analysis provides evidence for the responsiveness of debt to rising top incomes. Middle‐ and upper‐middle‐income households take on more housing‐related debt and have higher payments in places with higher top‐income levels. Among lower‐income households non‐mortgage borrowing and debt payments decline, consistent with restrictions in the supply of credit. (JEL D63, D14)     

SODA WARS: THE EFFECT OF A SODA TAX ELECTION ON UNIVERSITY BEVERAGE SALES

We examine how soda sales changed due to the campaign attention and election outcome of a local excise tax on sugar‐sweetened beverages. Using panel data of beverage sales from university retailers in Berkeley, California, we estimate that soda purchases relative to control beverages significantly dropped immediately after the election, months before the tax was implemented in the city of Berkeley or on campus. Supplemental scanner data from off‐campus retailers reveal this result is not unique to the university setting. Our findings suggest soda tax media coverage and election outcomes can have larger effects on purchasing behavior than the tax itself. (JEL D12, H20, C23, I38, Q18)