Cohabitation Premium in Men’s Earnings: Testing the Joint Human Capital Hypothesis

This paper provides new evidence on the increase in wage earnings for men due to marriage and cohabitation (in the literature, commonly referred to as marital and cohabitation wage premiums for men). Using data for a sample of white men from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, the paper shows that even after accounting for potential selection bias there is a cohabitation wage premium for men, albeit smaller than the marriage premium. Our analysis shows that a joint human capital hypothesis (a la Benham in J Polit Econ 82(2, Part 2):S57–71, 1974) with intra-household spillover effects of partner’s education can explain the existence of the wage premiums. Our estimates provide some empirical support for the joint human capital hypothesis.     

TEMPTATION‐DRIVEN BEHAVIOR AND TAXATION: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN A LIFE‐CYCLE MODEL

This paper examines the impact of labor and capital income taxes in a stochastic overlapping generations (OLG) economy where agents face borrowing constraints and their behavior is temptation driven. We quantitatively establish that the existence of temptation in preferences may function as an opposing mechanism to modeling choices, such as liquidity constraints, life‐cycle structure, and idiosyncratic earnings risks, that are critical in delivering a positive capital income tax rate. We show that a sufficiently large measure of individuals having self‐control preferences, or alternatively, a sufficiently high cost of exercising self‐control, puts downward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate. (JEL E21, E62, H55)     

Skill-biased technical change, educational choice, and labor market polarization: the U.S. versus Europe

This paper analyzes the effect of recent technical change on the labor market and explains the observed differences in wage inequality among advanced countries. In particular, we focus on the difference between the inequality in the U.S. and in continental Europe. Many studies have indicated a rise in wage inequality in the U.S. over the past three decades. On the other hand, there has been little change in wage inequality in continental Europe. By introducing human capital investment into the model by Acemoglu (Am Econ Rev 89:1259–1278, 1999), we show that ex ante homogeneous economies would have distinct ex post wage distribution. The strategic complementarity between human capital investment and firms’ hiring strategies yields the possibility that multiple equilibria exist, which explains the difference in wage distribution between the U.S. and Europe. In addition, we show that differences in tax or education systems can explain the difference in wage distribution between the U.S. and Europe.     

ARE WORKERS WILLING TO PAY TO JOIN A BETTER TEAM?

Using data from the Major League Baseball free‐agent market, this study is the first to show that the productivity expected of the team a worker will join produces a significant, negative compensating wage differential. The younger workers in the sample drive this result, trading 25% of their wages to join teams with an expected productivity one standard deviation higher. This investment can be recouped if a reasonable increase in human capital occurs. These results are robust to contract length‐wage simultaneity and indicate that investment in human capital motivates the observed tradeoff, suggesting a new pathway through which human capital accumulation can affect wages. Reliable measures of workers' own past productivity and the productivity expected of a worker's future team provide key advantages to identifying these effects. (JEL J31, J24, M54)     

THE OPTIMAL TAXATION OF ASSET INCOME WHEN GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IS ENDOGENOUS: THEORY,ESTIMATION AND WELFARE

This paper derives the Ramsey optimal fiscal policy for taxing asset income in a model where government expenditure is a function of net output or the inputs that produce it. Extending work by Kenneth L. Judd, I demonstrate that the canonical result that the optimal tax on capital income is zero in the medium to long term is a special case of a more general model. Employing a vector error correction model to estimate the relationship between government consumption and net output or the factor inputs that generate it for the United States between 1948Q1 and 2015Q4, I demonstrate that this special case is empirically implausible, and show how a cointegrating vector can be used to determine the optimal tax schedule. I simulate a version of the model using the empirical estimates to measure the welfare implications of changing the tax rate on asset income, and contrast these results with those generated in a version of the model where government consumption is purely exogenous. The shifting pattern of welfare measurements confirms the theoretical results. I calculate that the prevailing effective tax rate on net asset income in the United States between 1970 and 2014 averaged 0.449. Hence abolishing the tax completely does generate welfare improvements, though only by the equivalent of between 1.103% and 1.616% permanent increase in consumption—well under half the implied welfare benefit when the endogeneity of the government consumption is ignored. The maximum welfare improvement from shifting part of the burden of tax from capital to labor is the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption of between only 1.491% and 1.858%, and is attained when the tax rate on asset income is lowered to between 0.148 and 0.186. Allowing the tax rate to vary over time raises the maximum welfare benefit to 1.865%. All the results are very robust to a wide range of elasticities of labor supply. (JEL E62, H21, H50)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

UNION POWER,COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

We study Ramsey policies and optimal monetary policy rules in a dynamic New Keynesian model with unionized labor markets. Collective wage bargaining and unions' monopoly power amplify inefficient employment fluctuations. The optimal monetary policy must trade off between stabilizing inflation and reducing inefficient unemployment fluctuations induced by unions' monopoly power. In this context the monetary authority uses inflation as a tax on union rents and as a mean for indirect redistribution. Results are robust to the introduction of imperfect insurance on income shocks. The optimal monetary policy rule targets unemployment alongside inflation. (JEL E0, E4, E5, E6)     

CONSEQUENCES OF OFFSHORING TO DEVELOPING NATIONS: LABOR-MARKET OUTCOMES,WELFARE, AND CORRECTIVE INTERVENTIONS

Our parsimonious two-country (developed country and developing country) model of offshoring provides nuanced results. These include cases where wages monotonically improve, as well as where wages exhibit an inverted-U relationship with offshoring cost reductions. We identify conditions under which these relationships hold. Since global welfare always rises with improvements in offshoring technology, we find that there is a role for a minimum wage (alternatively, wage tax) in the developing country. We derive such a policy's optimal level. There is also the possibility of a developed country optimal offshoring tax for extracting terms-of-trade benefits. We, finally, analyze the two-country Nash equilibrium in policies. (JEL F11, F13, F16, F66, O19, O24)     

HOW DOES GLOBALIZATION AFFECT THE IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON LABOR INCOME,CAPITAL INCOME,AND CONSUMPTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

This article analyzes the effects of globalization on implicit tax rates (ITRs) on labor income, capital income, and consumption in the EU15 and Central and Eastern European New Member States (CEE NMS). We find supportive evidence for an increase in the ITR on labor income in the EU15, but no effect on the ITR on capital income. There is evidence of convergence in terms of the ITR on consumption, as countries with higher than average ITR on consumption respond to globalization by decreasing their tax rates. There are important differences among the welfare regimes within the EU15. Social‐democratic countries have decreased the tax burden on capital, but increased that on labor due to globalization. Globalization exerts a pressure to increase taxes on labor income in the conservative and liberal regimes as well. Taxes on consumption decrease in response to globalization in the conservative and social‐democratic regimes. In the CEE NMS, there is no effect of globalization on the ITR on labor and capital income, but we find a negative impact on the ITR on consumption in the CEE NMS with higher than average ITR on consumption. (JEL H23, H24, H25, F19, F21)     

TAXING LEISURE COMPLEMENTS

Ever since Corlett and Hague, it has been understood that it tends to be optimal on second‐best grounds to (relatively) tax complements to leisure and subsidize substitutes because doing so helps to offset the distorting effect of taxation on labor supply. Yet, Atkinson and Stiglitz’s optimal income/commodity tax analysis claims to demonstrate the opposite, and derivations in leading texts on optimal taxation offer opposing conclusions regarding the sign of optimal deviation of commodity taxes from uniformity. It is demonstrated that the optimality of relatively taxing leisure complements is indeed correct, and conflicting results are explained. (JEL H21, H24)     

Occupational Human Capital and Wages: The Role of Skills Transferability Across Occupations

This paper examines the effect of accumulated human capital, and particularly occupational human capital, on the workers’ wages. Unlike previous studies that apply occupational tenure as a proxy for occupational human capital, this paper applies the concept of Shaw’s (1984) occupational human capital to capture the transferability of occupational skills and estimates a new measure of occupational human capital, so-called occupational investment. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) from 1979 to 2000, the key findings of this paper suggest that occupational skills from the previous jobs can also affect the workers’ wages at the current job and that occupational investment is one of the important sources of wages supporting the Shaw’s original work on wage determination. Specifically, 5 years of (3-digit) occupational investment relative to current occupational tenure could lead to a wage increase of 7.7 to 18.4 %. I also find that the general labor market experience accounts for a large share of workers’ wages.     

PARETO IMPROVING MINIMUM WAGE LAWS

By increasing the expected wage in low skill jobs, a minimum wage law can reduce the incentive for low skill workers to imitate high skill workers in the signalling process. The gain from reduced investment in the signal can more than offset the loss from unemployment among low skill workers so that total output increases. Moreover, with an appropriate poll tax on workers to compensate owners of capital, the law can make all workers and owners of capital better off.     

CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION AND THE ROLE OF WAGE INCENTIVES WITH ENDOGENOUS MONITORING TECHNOLOGY

The importance of high salaries to circumvent bureaucratic corruption has been widely recognized in the policy debate. Yet, there appears to be much reluctance when it comes to the implementation. In this paper, we argue that deterring corruption through wage incentives may become prohibitively expensive that the government finds it optimal to accept higher net revenues at the expense of honesty. Deviating from the existing literature, we set an endogenous monitoring technology that allows us to capture the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives to deter bribery. We find that the government is better‐off either completely eliminating corruption or accepting corruption by offering wages lower than the market wage. Offering public wage premium that does not deter bribery is suboptimal. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do it either through wage incentives or monitoring. The role of wage incentives decreases in societies with higher level of dishonesty. (JEL D73, H26, J33, J41)     

“The Motherhood Wage Gap for Women in the United States: The Importance of College and Fertility Delay”

One of the stylized facts from the past 30 years has been the declining rate of first births before age 30 for all women and the increase rate of first births after age 30 among women with four-year college degrees (Steven P. Martin, Demography, 37(4), 523–533, 2000). What are some of the factors behind womens decision to postpone their childbearing? We hypothesize that the wage difference often observed between like-educated mothers and non-mothers (Jane Waldfogel, Journal of Labor Economics, 16, 505–545, 1998a; Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(1) 137–156, 1998b) may be affected by the postponement of childbearing until after careers are fully established. Hence, we focus on college-educated women because they are typically more career-oriented than their non-college educated counterparts and also the group most often observed postponing maternity. We use individual-level data on women from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) in order to control for individual-level unobserved heterogeneity as well as human capital characteristics, such as actual work experience, in our empirical analysis. We estimate wage equations, first producing base-line results to compare to the existing literature. Then, we expand the basic wage equation model to address fundamental econometric issues and the education/fertility issue at hand. Our empirical findings are two-fold. First, we find that college-educated mothers do not experience a motherhood wage penalty at all. In fact, they enjoy a wage boost when compared to college-educated childless women. Second, fertility delay enhances this wage boost even further. Our results provide an explanation for the observed postponement of maternity for educated women. We argue that the wage boost experienced by college-educated mothers may be the result of their search for family–friendly work environments, which, in turn, yields job matches with more female-friendly firms offering greater opportunities for advancement.JEL Codes: J13 and J3     

MILITARY SPENDING AND THE GROWTH‐MAXIMIZING ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC CAPITAL: A CROSS‐COUNTRY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper we present an endogenous growth model to analyze the growth maximizing allocation of public investment among N different types of public capital. Using this general model of public capital formation, we analyze the stability of the long‐run equilibrium and we derive the growth‐maximizing values of the shares of public investment allocated to the different types of public capital, as well as the growth‐maximizing tax rate (amount of total public investment as a share of GDP). Then we proceed with an empirical investigation of the theoretical implication of the model that both the effects of the shares of public investment and the tax rate on the long‐run growth rate are non‐linear, following an inverse U‐shaped pattern. Using data of public investment in infrastructure and military capital formation, we derive empirical estimations that confirm the theoretical implications of the model. (JEL E62, H56, O40).     

Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxation with Human and Physical Capital

We develop a perfect foresight, overlapping generations model with intragenerational inequality and endogenous human and physical capital investment, and we calculate welfare costs for marginal reforms of taxation and public spending. Welfare costs are uniformly lower than in the equivalent static model where human and physical capital are fixed. Most of the upward bias in static estimates arises from fixed human capital because welfare cost is predominantly tax leakage from lower effective labor supply, but reallocating time between education and labor can leave effective labor supply unchanged. Hence, adjustments in human capital have an important mitigating influence on marginal welfare costs. (JEL D91, H20, H31, H41, J22, J24 )     

CAN THE HUMAN CAPITAL APPROACH EXPLAIN LIFE‐CYCLE WAGE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN RACES AND SEXES?

Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth–1979 cohort (NLSY79), this paper shows the importance of postschool human capital investment in describing both gender and racial wage gaps. The empirical results suggest that male-female wage gaps, regardless of race, are mainly caused by gender differences in the human capital production process; generally, men gain more work experience and therefore have lower marginal costs of human capital production. Black-white lifetime wage differentials could partly result from higher implicit interest rates for blacks, while the deterioration of black males' relative economic status as they age can be attributed to higher depreciation rates of their human capital stock. ( JEL J24, J30, C61)     

WHY DO GOVERNMENTS END UP WITH DEBT? SHORT‐RUN EFFECTS MATTER

This paper reconsiders the impact of public debt in an economy with heterogeneous households and incomplete markets to emphasize the short‐run effects of an increase in public debt. As compared to models that rest on steady‐state analysis, we show that the welfare gains of a public debt increase are substantially higher when transitional dynamics are accounted for. The additional debt issue allows for a temporary reduction in the income tax rate, which stimulates labor supply and generates an overshooting of the interest rate. The short‐run gains create a temptation to deviate toward higher levels of debt. Debt increases continue to generate welfare gains even when debt is considerably higher than its long‐run optimal level. (JEL E60, H60)     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOCIAL MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS: THE CASE OF THE MELTZER‐RICHARD ECONOMY

In previous studies on the social marginal cost of public funds (SMCF), the existing tax system has been assumed to be either arbitrary or optimal. This note explores another possibility: the existing tax system itself represents a political equilibrium. Our exploration proceeds in Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) political economy of redistributive taxation. An interesting feature of our finding is that the degree of income inequality as measured by the ratio of mean to median income can play an important role in estimating the SMCF and judging whether the level of redistribution is excessive or inadequate. (JEL D61, D72, H21)     

EFFICIENT TAX REPORTING: THE EFFECTS OF TAXPAYER LIABILITY INFORMATION SERVICES

The complexity of the individual income tax system can give rise to both under‐ and overreporting of liability, thus creating a wedge between taxpayer perceptions of the price of public services and their actual cost, and potentially leading to budget misallocations and associated efficiency losses. This study uses theory and experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of taxpayer service programs that endeavor to resolve uncertainty over tax liability. To do so, we induce uncertainty over tax liability and investigate the effects of both service accuracy and reliability. We find participants are less likely to file when tax liability is uncertain but the provision of information offsets this effect; furthermore, it appears that simply providing a service, even one that imperfectly reveals liability, increases the propensity to file and the accuracy of the filing. When a service that promises to resolve uncertainty completely is requested but not delivered, the result is underreporting even more severe than in a setting where no service is available. (JEL H2, H26, C91)