EFFICIENT TAX REPORTING: THE EFFECTS OF TAXPAYER LIABILITY INFORMATION SERVICES

The complexity of the individual income tax system can give rise to both under‐ and overreporting of liability, thus creating a wedge between taxpayer perceptions of the price of public services and their actual cost, and potentially leading to budget misallocations and associated efficiency losses. This study uses theory and experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of taxpayer service programs that endeavor to resolve uncertainty over tax liability. To do so, we induce uncertainty over tax liability and investigate the effects of both service accuracy and reliability. We find participants are less likely to file when tax liability is uncertain but the provision of information offsets this effect; furthermore, it appears that simply providing a service, even one that imperfectly reveals liability, increases the propensity to file and the accuracy of the filing. When a service that promises to resolve uncertainty completely is requested but not delivered, the result is underreporting even more severe than in a setting where no service is available. (JEL H2, H26, C91)     

Tax compliance depends on voice of taxpayers

Reducing the social distance between taxpayers and tax authorities boosts taxpayers’ acceptance of tax load and tax compliance. In the present experiment participants had the opportunity to pay their tax due either as one single compliance decision or as separate compliance decisions for each type of requested contribution (coined voice on contributions). In addition, contributions were either distributed according to a fixed scheme exogenously chosen, or participants had the possibility to change the distribution pattern (coined voice on distribution). Furthermore information about participants’ contributions was either clearly related to the tax context or related to government public expenditures (coined context). Besides analyzing the effect of voice and context on compliance, order of tax payments was controlled for in the analyses. Results show that having voice on tax contributions and on tax distribution leads to higher compliance. Moreover, compliance was higher in the context avoiding tax framing.     

TAX-RATE UNCERTAINTY, FACTOR SUPPLIES, AND WELFARE

Uncertainty about prospective changes in tax rates may increase factor supplies, and hence the tax base, permitting a reduction in tax rates that could result in a net increase in welfare. Under empirically relevant assumptions about attitudes towards risk we find that when an individual exclusively saves or works, the tax base rises in response to greater tax-rate uncertainty, so that welfare could indeed increase. However, when an individual both saves and works, the supply of the randomly taxed factor declines with increased uncertainty, implying that tax revenue and welfare decrease when the nonrandom tax rate is sufficiently low.     

Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules

This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. Under this rule, termed the bounded rule, taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits by a tax authority, so that the audit probability depends on the joint decisions among the taxpayers. We compare the bounded rule to the widely studied flat-rate rule, where taxpayers are informed that they will be audited with a constant probability. The experimental evidence shows that, as theoretically predicted, the bounded rule induces the same level of compliance as the flat-rate rule when strategic uncertainty is low, and a higher level of compliance when strategic uncertainty is high. The bounded rule also induces distinctive tax evasion dynamics compared to the flat-rate rule. The results suggest that increasing the level of strategic uncertainty among taxpayers could be an effective device to deter tax evasion.     

Tax morale and fairness in conflict an experiment

Most people pay their taxes most of the time, even if the expected disutility from enforcement is too low to deter tax evasion. One potential reason is tax morale and, more specifically, rule following. In a lab experiment, we show that the willingness to pay taxes just because participants are told they are supposed to pay is indeed pronounced. Yet compliance is reduced if participants learn that income is heterogeneous. The effect is driven by participants with the lowest income. The reduction obtains irrespective of the tax regime. If the tax is proportional to income, or progressive, participants become more skeptical about the willingness of participants with high income to comply.     

AMBIGUITY ABOUT AUDIT PROBABILITY, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND TAXPAYER WELFARE

We show that an increase in uncertainty about the probability of being audited (ambiguity) increases tax compliance for ambiguity-averse taxpayers but reduces compliance for ambiguity lovers. Because experimental evidence reveals considerable heterogeneity with respect to ambiguity preferences, we conclude that fostering uncertainty about the probability of being audited may not be an effective policy for increasing taxpayer compliance. Moreover, because the tax authority can neither categorize nor screen taxpayers on the basis of their preferences for ambiguity, it is not likely to be either a useful or a desirable instrument for increasing taxpayer welfare. (JEL H26 , D81 )     

Work performance and tax compliance in flat and progressive tax systems

Different tax systems, and their impact on work motivation and tax compliance are significant issues in contemporary political and economic debates. The proportional feature of a flat tax system is assumed to lead to higher performance, while the fairness of the redistributive progressive tax system is assumed to result in higher tax compliance. However, empirical findings on the topic are inconclusive. Both work performance and tax compliance under different tax systems were examined in an experiment, with special attention devoted to the effect of a change in tax systems. A flat tax system was supposed to induce greater work performance, whereas a progressive tax system was expected to increase tax compliance based on fairness perceptions, allowing for the opposite effect due to higher complexity. Furthermore, it was assumed that performance and tax payments would be influenced by motives of self-interest. The design included 20 rounds with a real-effort task in each round, determining participants’ experimental income. Participants (N = 191) made decisions about their tax payments from round-to-round in four different experimental conditions: (1) a flat tax system, (2) a progressive tax system, (3) starting with a flat and changing to a progressive, and (4) starting with a progressive and changing to a flat tax system. Results indicate higher work performance in a progressive system. However, a change from a progressive tax system to a flat system led to increased tax compliance.     

Taxpayer attitudes toward tax audit risk

Theoretical analyses on tax evasion usually assume that the taxpayer's behavior conforms to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for behavior under uncertainty, namely that the taxpayer is generally risk averse. This study found that the taxpayers' attitudes toward risk could be affected by (1) whether taxpayers perceive a tax payment as reduced income or as a loss; and (2) the magnitude of the tax savings and penalty structure. The findings, in general, agree more with the prospect theory than with the classical expected utility theory.     

Empathy,sympathy, and tax compliance

This paper examines the effect of “empathy” and “sympathy” on tax compliance. We run a series of laboratory experiments in which we observe the subjects’ decisions in a series of one-shot Tax Compliance Games presented at once and with no immediate feedback. Importantly, we employ methods to identify subjects’ sympathy, such as the Davis Empathic Concern Scale and questions about frequency of prosocial behaviors; we also use priming in order to promote subjects’ empathy. Our results suggest that the presence of sympathy in most cases encourages more tax compliance. Our results also suggest that priming to elicit empathy also has a positive impact on tax compliance. These results support the inclusion of noneconomic factors in the analysis of tax compliance behavior.     

Casino Taxation in Macao: An Economic Perspective

Macao’s gaming industry has experienced dramatic growth for 8 years, yet with certain social costs due to compulsive gambling. The government has come under pressure for tax cuts even though its gaming receipts are falling relatively to the casino retained revenue. The request for tax relief is triggered by a recent decline in net profit despite fast growing gross gaming revenue under favorable market conditions. This is very likely caused by a substantial hike in casino operating costs due to increased competition and might also signal the presence of the principal-agent problem. Given the regressivity of gaming tax with respect to net profit, it is no surprise that casinos with lower profitability are more prone to seek tax cuts. The source of Macao gaming profit hinges on three distinct factors: rising demand from China, monopoly location for casinos, and market structure of oligopoly. These factors provide economic justifications for the current tax regime of Macao with a strong ability to pass tax burdens on to massive visitors. The government relies on casino tax revenue to deal with gambling related problems and promote local diversified development. Pushing for tax variability may create policy instability, business uncertainty, and unpredictable prosperity in the long term.     

Risk behavior in decision-making in a multi-person-setting

When people have to make a choice in an individual setting between a known-risk option and an untested situation of uncertainty, the majority prefers the known risk over the uncertainty of the alternative. The confrontation with an unfamiliar situation in an environment including other participants allows for new mechanisms in risk-perception and risk-evaluation. People tend to become other-directed and use the behavior and consequences of actions of other people in the environment to assess risk. Our investigations show that warning signals observable in the behavior of other participants in the setting reinforce people's preference for known risks over uncertainty.     

Political–economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case

 A political–economic environment is studied in which two parties, representing different constituencies of citizens, compete over a proportional tax rate to be levied on private endowments, to finance a public good. Although parties know the distribution of citizen traits (preferences and endowments), they are uncertain about the distribution of traits among the citizens who will turn up at the polls. This uncertainty engenders an endogenously derived function π(t ₁, t ₂) giving the probability that any one tax policy t ₁ will defeat another t ₂ in the election. Equilibrium existence theorems are proved, and the nature of equilibrium is compared with the equilibrium that exists when Downsian parties (ones whose objective is to maximize the probability of victory) face uncertainty. Both constituency-representing parties and uncertainty are needed to generate equilibria in which parties propose different policies. Received: 4 April 1995/Accepted: 2 April 1996     

ON THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S SERVICE AND ENFORCEMENT

Built on the seminal work of Graetz et al. (1986), this study considers a model of tax compliance in which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) services as well as audits taxpayers as in the real world. Taxpayers are uncertain about whether their incomes are eligible for deduction/exemption, and may seek advice from the taxpayer service provided by the IRS to mitigate the uncertainty. We show: (1) while the society's preferred quality of taxpayer service is likely to be sufficiently high, the IRS's preferred quality of taxpayer service is only at an intermediate level; and (2) the conflict between the society and the IRS tends to be intensified as the cost of tax audits becomes lower. Evidence in support of our results is addressed. We also extend our model to addressing the issue of corruption in tax administration and to considering a dynamic model. (JEL D82, H26, K42)     

Examining the efficacy of the GameSense gambling prevention programme among university undergraduate students

This article describes a study assessing the effectiveness of a gambling prevention programme, GameSense, in modifying gambling cognitions and intentions among university undergraduate students of diverse ethnicities (N = 122). Although GameSense is a widely used intervention, the effectiveness in modifying gambling cognitions and behaviours has not yet been demonstrated. In the present study, randomly assigned treatment participants completed the programme and then played a gambling game in which they could win tokens for a desired prize. Control participants played the game but did not receive the prevention programme. At the end of the game, all participants completed measures assessing gambling cognitions, immediate and future gambling intentions, and their desire to continue gambling. Programme participants showed increased knowledge about gambling, increased resistance to gambling fallacies, and fewer immediate and future intentions to continue gambling regardless of how much they won or lost, compared to the no-treatment control group. The present results indicate that the GameSense programme is effective in altering cognitions about gambling and immediate and future intentions to continue gambling. Results are discussed in terms of the modification of gambling cognitions following completion of the intervention programme and the changes in future gambling behaviour as a consequence of those changed cognitions.     

Price perception and confirmation bias in the context of a VAT increase

This paper examines a potential confirmation bias in price perception in consequence to a real-world event and different explanations for such a confirmation bias. In a panel design conducted 2 months before and after a raise in value-added tax (VAT), 303 participants had to estimate the current prices for four products affected and four products not affected by this raise in VAT and the anticipated or recalled prices of these products. Before the VAT increase, an undifferentiated belief in strong future price increases was prevalent. After the VAT increase, a confirmation bias was found: in retrospect, participants reported price increases that were significantly higher than the official price development and in line with an undifferentiated belief in marked price increases. Two theoretical explanations for confirmation bias, i.e., the biased use of price information and the selective distortion of memory, fit the data.     

How income and tax rates provoke cheating – An experimental investigation of tax morale

Anecdotal evidence suggests that tax morale diminishes with income and with levels of taxation. We designed an experiment that enables identification of causal effects. Subjects carry out a sequence of real effort tasks. The income earned varies with individual differences in effort (combined with variances related to skill or luck) and with the exogenously given length of the tasks. For each task, subjects privately roll a die, whose value determines the tax rate, which is then reported by subjects. This provides subjects with an incentive to cheat. Tax morale diminishes with higher effort, which might find ethical justification, but also with longer tasks, which would not. We implement treatments that vary the range of taxation. Contrary to widespread belief, participants’ tax morale is invariant to these treatments. Our findings are best explained by a psychological force that tempts rich people to cheat more. This force does not seem to be related to fairness ideals that are prominent in theories of distributional justice nor to absolute levels of taxation.     

Stock investors’ preference for short-term vs. long-term bonuses

Bonuses in the finance sector may be based on too short time intervals for environmental and social factors to be taken into account in investment decisions. We report two experiments to investigate whether investors prefer short-term to long-term bonuses. In Experiment 1 employing 27 undergraduates, preferences were measured for four short-term certain bonuses, evenly distributed across a time interval, and one certain long-term bonus at the end of the time interval. A majority chose the short-term bonuses, and in order for the long-term bonus to be equally preferred it had to be about 40% higher than the four added short-term bonuses. Experiment 2 employing another 36 undergraduates introduced outcome uncertainty that more accurately reflects the choices stock investors face. The participants again choose between a long-term bonus and four distributed short-term bonuses. It was shown that uncertainty made more participants prefer the long-term bonus to the added short-term bonuses than when the outcome was certain. A smaller increase of the long-term bonus of about 20% was now required to make it equally attractive as the four added short-term bonuses.     

WHAT MOTIVATES POLITICAL PREFERENCES? SELF‐INTEREST,IDEOLOGY, AND FAIRNESS IN A LABORATORY DEMOCRACY

Substantial prior literature has established that subjects in laboratory experiments are typically willing to sacrifice their own well being to make financial allocations more equal among participants. We test the applicability of this result in an environment that contains some of the key contextual issues that are usually excluded from more abstract games, but which might be important in situations involving income redistribution. Our general finding is that votes for a redistributive tax are almost entirely in accordance with self‐interest: above‐average earners vote for low tax rates and below‐average earners vote for high tax rates. A measure of subjects' preferences for fairness or equality, their self‐reported economic ideology, is not directly related to their voting behavior in this experiment. Because the ideology measure should be correlated with any intrinsic preferences regarding inequality aversion, we conclude that any preferences for fairness or inequality that our subjects possess are not strong enough to overcome self‐interest in this context. We do, however, find evidence for a possible indirect effect of ideology on choice behavior in that more conservative subjects tend to be more responsive to their self‐interest than the more liberal subjects. (JEL C90, D63)     

The influence of tax authorities on the employment of tax practitioners: Empirical evidence from a survey and interview study

Tax practitioners play a crucial role in the degree of taxpayers’ compliance – a role that has increased as tax systems worldwide have become more complex. However, little is known about tax authorities’ impact on taxpayers’ decisions to employ tax practitioners. Based on earlier research on motivations to employ a tax practitioner and the extended slippery slope framework of tax compliance, we conducted two studies which provide some answers. A survey study – comprising a representative sample of 500 Austrian self-employed taxpayers – revealed that financial gain is not the most important reason to employ a tax practitioner but instead the motivation to avoid problems with the tax authorities. Related to that, we also find that taxpayers’ perception of tax authorities wielding coercive power motivates them to employ tax practitioners. In the interview study with 33 self-employed taxpayers and 30 tax auditors, taxpayers indicated that they sought to avoid contact with tax officers by employing tax practitioners. This finding was supported by tax officers who reported preferring interaction with tax practitioners over direct contact with taxpayers. The two studies point to the complex relationship between taxpayers, tax authorities and tax practitioners, and allow the drawing of theoretical and practical implications.