Integrity's place among the character strengths of middle-level managers and top-level executives

One purpose of this study was to extend integrity research in organizations into the ranks of middle management. We therefore examined whether middle-level managers' behavioral manifestations of integrity related to ratings of their performance. Results of hierarchical regression analysis indicated that direct report ratings of a middle-level manager's integrity were positively related to boss ratings of that manager's performance. A second purpose of this study was to understand differences in integrity's relative importance to performance among other character strengths, and as a function of context (e.g., managerial level). We extend research in this area by showing, through relative weight analysis, that integrity was relatively less important to middle-level managers' current performance compared to other character strengths (e.g., social intelligence). In contrast, integrity was relatively more important for the performance of top-level executives — roles middle-level managers may hold in the future. Implications of these results for future research and practice as well as the current study's limitations are discussed.     

Does the Stock Market Gender Stereotype Corporate Boards? Evidence from the Market's Reaction to Directors' Trades

Attitudes towards male and female managers within organizations are well documented, but how the stock market perceives their relative capabilities is less studied. Recent evidence documents a negative short‐run market reaction to the appointment of female chief executive officers and suggests that female executives are less informed than their male counterparts about future corporate performance. These results appear to dispute the stock market value of having women on corporate boards. However, such short‐run market reactions may retain a ‘gender bias’, reflecting the prevalence of negative stereotypes, where the market reacts to ‘beliefs’ rather than ‘performance’. This study tests for such bias by examining the stock market reaction to directors' trades in their own companies' shares, by measuring both the short‐run and longer‐term returns after the directors' trades. Allowing for firm and trade effects, some evidence is found that, in the longer term, markets recognize that female executives' trades are informative about future corporate performance, although initially markets underestimate these effects. This has important implications for research that has attempted to assess the value of board diversity by examining only short‐run stock market responses.     

Effects of Executive Characteristics and Venture Capital Involvement on Board Composition and Share Ownership in IPO Firms*

Combining the agency perspective, resource‐based view and upper echelon research, this paper examines factors affecting board selection and share ownership in initial public offerings (IPOs). In line with socio‐cognitive and behavioural research, it shows that board independence, cognitive capacity and the incentives of non‐executive directors are negatively associated with the experience and power of executive directors, and that large‐block share ownership is positively associated with the intensity and diversity of non‐executives' experience. However, the retained equity by venture capitalists negatively affects board independence and non‐executive directors' interests. The paper suggests a number of avenues for a future contextual analysis of the board development process in ‘threshold’ firms.     

CEO elitist association: Toward a new understanding of an executive behavioral pattern

Scholars have studied how the social associations of corporate executives affect their access to information and their decisions. The entire focus, however, has been on lateral peer-to-peer associations. Prior research has not addressed vertical associations, or the idea that interaction with peer elites yields different perceptions and behaviors than does interaction with parties of lower social status. In this paper, we introduce and develop the concept of elitist association, which we define as a stable behavioral pattern of some corporate executives by which they engage nearly exclusively in associations with other elites while minimizing or even entirely avoiding associations with non-elites. We propose several individual-level antecedents to explain why some executives engage in this behavior more than others. We then discuss the effects of elitist association on executives' access to information, empathy, and social comparison processes — all of which affect their decisions and organizations. Finally, we consider implications for theory as well as for practical affairs.     

THE STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE INFORMATION SYSTEMS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS

This paper reports on a study which attempted to identify the structure of executive information systems and evaluate their relationship to decision making. The study centered on answering the question: “Where and how do senior executives get their decision-making information?” The data, provided by five senior executives, were gathered by a variety of means which included personal interviews, questionnaires, and logs of the executives' incoming-information transactions for a two-week period. Our findings support beliefs that senior executives receive much information from the environment, that informal systems play a role equal to that of formal systems, and that computers do not provide much information directly to an executive. The study also found that internal information is important and that preferred sources and media vary with different decision roles. The authors suggest that the scope of MIS and DSS be broadened to match those information networks managers actually rely on in daily practice.     

Managers as Monitors: An Analysis of the Non‐executive Role of Senior Executives in UK Companies

An important aspect of current governance practice is the use of non‐executive directors to monitor the behaviour of company management. This paper examines the extent to which senior executives are utilized as non‐executives in large UK companies. The results suggest that executive directors are not an important source of non‐executive directors. The average number of non‐executive directorships held by each executive is 0.22. Indeed, 85% of executives hold no additional directorships. The holding of non‐executive directorships is positively related to the strength of board monitoring in the executive's company, executive tenure and company size. Executives in companies with greater growth opportunities and operating in regulated industries are less likely to hold non‐executive directorships.     

Pay Dispersion and Executive Behaviour: Evidence from Innovation

Compensation packages are widely used to motivate top executives. Pay dispersion among a firm's executives, however, can be associated with the antithetic effects of social comparison and individual motivation, with unclear implications for the company. We focus on innovation activities, which represent an important channel through which pay dispersion can affect firm performance, and test our predictions by exploring innovative output as a function of executives’ pay dispersion in a panel of US firms. We find that executive pay dispersion acts as a double‐edged sword. On the one hand, the higher the dispersion in variable pay, the higher the innovation. On the other hand, the larger the dispersion in fixed pay, the lower the innovation. Results are robust to a number of tests, such as restricting the analysis to executives with direct responsibility for innovation projects and considering individual incentives in the form of cash pay.     

Aufsichtsratsverflechtungen und ihr Einfluss

This article examines the development of executive compensation of the German DAX corporations from 2001 to 2006. A higher executive compensation requires an approval of the supervisory board. Accordingly, we investigate the social network of the board of directors of these companies and use several variables describing the structure of this network as covariates of the development of the executive compensation in a panel analysis. Fixed and time effects panel estimations imply that a rising number of executives in the supervisory board of other companies results in increasing compensation. By contrast, executive compensation decreases when the supervisory board of the respective company is controlled by a growing number of executives from foreign companies.     

The Market for Non‐Executive Directors: Does Acquisition Performance Influence Future Board Seats?

This paper investigates whether non‐executive directors associated with good (bad) board decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors. This question is addressed by assessing whether the post‐acquisition performance of acquiring companies influences the number of non‐executive directorships that non‐executives involved in these acquisitions hold subsequent to the acquisition. We find that non‐executives on the boards of acquirers that increase (omit or cut) their dividend subsequently hold more (fewer) non‐executive directorships in listed companies. Our findings suggest that the non‐executive labour market is efficient and rewards (penalizes) non‐executives for good (bad) acquisitions.     

Building the Complementary Board. The Work of the Plc Chairman

This article addresses the critical issue of board effectiveness, and in particular the conditions under which chairmen as well as other non-executives can make an effective and positive contribution to the strategic direction and control of companies. It is informed by qualitative interview-based research with chairmen, chief executives and non-executive directors in major UK companies which focused on the now typically separate role and work of the company chairman. The article argues that in the governance debate too much attention has been given to issues of board structure and composition to the neglect of issues related to the knowledge and motives of individual non-executives, and how their energies are combined in processes of board accountability. Drawing upon directors’ experiences, the article examines the bases that underpin and the positive potential of what are termed ‘complementary’ board relationships, through which a chairman can contribute directly to the performance of the chief executive, as well as create the conditions for other non-executives to contribute to the performance of the executive team. The article also explores the negative dynamics of what are termed ‘complimentary’ relationships between executives and non-executive directors and how these sometimes inadvertently come to weaken board accountability and create the conditions for an external crisis of confidence.     

Physician executives breaking out of middle management

Physician executives are slowly moving into top management jobs, holding the same stature on senior management teams as chief financial officers and executive vice presidents. Learn how the role of the physician executive is evolving and how opportunities are expanding for even more physicians to assume the top-level posts.     

Effects of leader intelligence,personality and emotional intelligence on transformational leadership and managerial performance

This study investigates the effects of intelligence, personality traits and emotional intelligence on transformational leadership and the effective performance of leaders in the organizational context. Data were collected from 134 midlevel managers from a large Brazilian company that operates in the energy sector. Our findings suggest that leadership effectiveness, as measured by the achievement of organizational outcomes, is a direct function of a leader's transformational behaviors, and is an indirect function of individual differences (experience, intelligence and conscientiousness) that work through transformational behaviors. A negative effect of neuroticism on leadership effectiveness was also observed. In addition, while emotional intelligence seemed to be statistically related to transformational leadership if considered in isolation, when ability and personality were controlled for, the effect became non-significant. We discuss implications for theory, research and practice.     

董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性

董事会治理是影响高管薪酬契约有效性的关键,已有研究主要从董事会结构层面展开,缺乏对董事会内部运作机制与高管薪酬契约有效性关系的具体分析。基于董事权威不平衡性的治理效应视角,系统考察了董事会非正式层级与高管薪酬契约有效性的逻辑关系及其作用机理,得出了一些具有重要价值的结论,主要包括:1.董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节作用,且主要体现在业绩下滑的样本公司中,表明董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬契约的影响主要体现在公平性和风险匹配性方面。2.只有当最高层级董事身份为独立董事时,董事会非正式层级对高管薪酬业绩敏感性具有显著的负向调节效应。3.董事会非正式层级增强了高管薪酬的行业和地区薪酬敏感性,进一步验证了董事会非正式层级的社会公平效应。论文的研究为从微观运作层面理解董事会治理和高管薪酬契约有效性提供一种新的视角和结论,对于优化董事会治理和提高高管薪酬契约有效性等均具有重要借鉴意义。     

The use and effectiveness of top executive dismissal

We provide a systematic assessment of the empirical evidence on the use and effectiveness of top executive dismissal as a governance and performance improvement mechanism. Our results suggest that poor individual and firm performance significantly increase the likelihood of executive dismissal. A strong power base might help under-performing top executives to extend their tenure in office, but effective ownership and governance structures can provide a counterweight to such entrenchment behaviors. However, our review casts doubt on the effectiveness of top executive dismissal as a means to enhance future firm performance: employing meta-analytical techniques we show that, although the dismissal announcement leads to positive abnormal returns, it has no significant effect on long-term measures of firm performance. On the basis of our findings, we develop a conceptual model of the possible antecedents and consequences of top executive dismissal. We derive implications for boards involved in situations of executive dismissal and for the successors of dismissed executives, and we provide directions for future leadership research on executive dismissal.     

Reaching the Board: Factors Facilitating the Progression of Marketing Executives to Senior Positions in British Companies

The scarcity of marketing executives on the boards of directors of large British companies has been the subject of much discussion in recent years. Yet empirical research into the antecedents of board membership for marketing managers has been sparse. This study surveyed senior marketers in 209 registered companies in the food and beverages manufacturing sector with the aim of establishing some of the main factors that distinguish marketing managers who had attained board level positions and those who had not. Possible determinants of board membership covered by the investigation comprised the personal background of the manager (elite credentials, functional specialism, knowledge of general and financial management, social behaviour, emotional intelligence), the competitive environment of the business, whether marketing performance was measured systematically, and the degree of the sales orientation of the firm.     

The effect of the board and executive committee characteristics on the degree of internationalization

Many corporate governance observers agree that when firms encounter dramatically changed competitive environments, the board of directors may become involved in the strategy formation process. Based on Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D., 1996. Strategic leadership: top executives and their effects on organizations. West, Minneapolis, MN.) conceptual model, we examine the effects of the board of directors and executive committee characteristics on the degree of internationalization of the U.S. telecommunications industry during the 12 years after AT&T’s 1984 divestiture. We also examine the effects of the regulatory environment and core business growth on the degree on internationalization during this time. We find support linking executive committee characteristics and regulatory environment to the degree of internationalization. Characteristics of the entire board are consistently found to be insignificant.     

Driven mechanisms of board commitment: A modified corporate CANE model

The study employs a sample of US S&P 100 firms to explore the driving factors affecting the level of board commitment. We modified Clark’s (1998) CANE model and developed a corporate CANE model that is applicable for board commitment. Supporting our model, we find that primary drivers of board commitment (through board personal agency) are non-financial factors including board independence, size, gender diversity, professional experience/skills, industrial and financial experiences, senior executives' compensation, and strictly board independence. These board compositions significantly enhance the level of board commitment, except the board size. On the other hand, whilst we find significant impact for the market-based factors, i.e. board commitment level tends to increase with market value (Tobin's Q), we find weak or no evidence on the effects of accounting-based factors. This suggests that the board task value is influenced by the actual perception of the market participants rather than ‘documented’ figures.     

Impact of rater personality on transformational and transactional leadership ratings

This study addresses the role of rater personality in ratings of transformational and transactional leadership. In a naturalistic field study, we found that rater personality (i.e., agreeableness, openness, extraversion, and conscientiousness) was positively associated with ratings of transformational leadership, but significant rater personality effects were not found in an experimental study where leadership behavior was invariant. These results suggest that disagreements among raters about leaders' behaviors are not due solely to random error and may instead reflect true differences either in (a) the behaviors leaders exhibit toward individual followers or (b) personality-related differences between followers in attention to and recall of leadership behaviors. We also found that personality (of subordinates and peers) was not randomly distributed across leaders, though clustering effects were generally small. Practically, our results suggest that (a) individual reports of leadership may be better at predicting leadership outcomes than aggregated group reports – especially those related to individual attitudes and behaviors – though they are rarely used in the literature; (b) aggregation is complicated because rater personality is associated with leadership ratings and is not randomly distributed across leaders; and (c) corrections for measurement error based on inter-rater agreement may not be appropriate due to non-random unique rater variance.