Efficiency‐wage Unemployment and Economic Welfare in a Model of Endogenous Growth

This paper examines positive and normative implications of efficiency‐wage‐induced unemployment within a model of endogenous growth. Sector‐specific impacts of the wage rate on labour efficiency establish a correlation between the growth rate and the rate of unemployment. The sign of this correlation is determined by the intersectoral wage differential. Despite the existence of unemployment, decisive positive properties of the full‐employment model are preserved. However, welfare implications of the full‐employment model may be reversed. The optimal policy can be to reduce growth, while at the same time raising unemployment.     

联合经济批量模型中的损失补贴与利益分配问题研究

针对单供应商和单采购商构成的供应链系统,分采购商占主导地位和供应商占主导地位两种情形,讨论了采购商的最优订货决策与供应商的最优生产决策,以及它们合作情形下的系统最优决策,给出了采购商和供应商各自独立决策与联合决策下,它们各自的成本函数以及供应链系统的总成本函数.最后,通过比较独立决策与联合决策下采购商和供应商的成本函数,分析了联合经济批量模型中的损失补贴与利益分配问题.     

互联网共享出行的物信关系与时空经济分析

本文从时空经济视角出发讨论了互联网出行服务在中国获得重要进展的原因,补充了共享经济概念,解释了大数据对于物信关系与结构演变的意义,总结了互联网共享出行的经济时空特点和发展条件,并分析了其在交通运输领域带来的影响。认为互联网出行服务利用数据化手段改善体验场景,以新的时空匹配模式推动改变原有交通格局,为解决传统集约性交通供给效率与离散化交通需求的矛盾提供了重要思路。提出的物信关系与结构分析框架也有助于深入认知各类互联网经济。     

Inflation and Welfare

This paper surveys research on the welfare cost of inflation. New estimates are provided, based on U.S. time series for 1900–94, interpreted in a variety of ways. It is estimated that the gain from reducing the annual inflation rate from 10 percent to zero is equivalent to an increase in real income of slightly less than one percent. Using aggregate evidence only, it may not be possible to estimate reliably the gains from reducing inflation further, to a rate consistent with zero nominal interest.     

费用分摊、选票分配与业主财富转移

运用制度经济理论和分析方法,考察了不同费用分摊方式与不同选票分配规则组合情形下业主之间的财富转移问题,以及选用不同的投票决定规则水平对业主间财富转移问题的影响.结果显示,业主个人的经济利益(收益与费用分摊)和相应的选票数的差异越大,财富被侵蚀的机会就越大.为有效避免财富转移问题并使项目实施有效率,在具有不同面积分布的小区里,选用不同的选票分配规则和决定规则是必要的.     

Allocation of seminar applicants

The allocation of seminar applicants is an important issue in educational planning, and each semester a university administration has to deal with this kind of problem. The task here is to reconcile the preferences and priorities of the students, professorships and the university administration itself. This paper shows that if the planning procedure is based on a simple selection strategy, the capacity utilization can be suboptimal; this result is evidenced by a simulation study. To remedy this deficit—and to justify the respective interests—we propose a mixed-integer goal programming approach for assigning students to seminar courses. In addition, we show that this problem can be reformulated into a linear one. All investigations in this paper are illustrated by a real-world application for the University of Hagen, Germany.     

Delegation,Union Leaders and Capital Allocation

This paper looks upon the effects of delegation of the bargaining process within unions. It investigates the allocation of capital when investment is sunk and there is an absence of binding contracts. Although capital investment is inefficient, capital allocation can be improved by precommitment. Strong union members precommit by hiring a weak leader, whilst weak union members hire a strong union leader. Governments can increase the efficiency of capital by reducing the intrinsic union strength, but could reduce the efficiency of capital if intrinsic internal union leader strength is reduced.     

拥挤的空间,挤压的时间——竞争思维模式的中介作用和经济流动性感知的调节作用北大核心CSSCI

社会拥挤和时间稀缺感是当前社会两大普遍问题,目前尚欠缺对两者因果关系的研究。基于隐喻理论和社会拥挤的新近研究,通过四个实验探讨社会拥挤对时间稀缺感的影响。研究结果表明,社会拥挤增强消费者的时间稀缺感,即“拥挤的空间,挤压的时间”效应;消费者的竞争思维模式在该效应中发挥中介作用,经济流动性感知对该效应起调节作用。此外,进一步探究了该效应引起的系列行为结果。本文拓宽了隐喻理论的应用范围,丰富了社会拥挤的消费者认知研究。     

贫困减少与经济增长和收入不平等的关系研究——基于时序数据

基于时间序列分析方法,以1981年～2004年贫困发生率、基尼系数和农村人均纯收入等相关指标,从时序雏度考察贫困人口的变动与经济增长和收入不平等的长期均衡关系和相互作用机制.Johansen协整检验结果表明,3个变量之间存在着一定的长期协整性:格兰杰因果检验发现,农村人均纯收入和基尼系数能够预测贫困发生率的变化,反之不能成立;误差修正模型显示,贫困发生率对农村人均纯收入的弹性系数为正,对基尼系数的弹性系数为负.且前者大于后者.由此认为,农村人均纯收入的提高是促进贫困减少的影响因素,收入不平等在一定程度上阻碍了贫困减少,经济增长对贫困减少的积极效应大于收入不平等对贫困减少的消极效应.因此,在目前中国经济增长时期,确保农民收入大幅度增加、努力缓解收入差距是贫困减少的有效途径.     

Union Power in a Welfare State

Abstract. Most West European countries have suffered from stagflation for many years. Mainstream economics has debated the question in particular in terms of the demand and supply of goods, labour and capital. But in recent contributions a new element has been introduced: the institutional structure of the economy as a source of imbalances. In this article we focus on the institutions of the labour market. For more than a century West European unions have been struggling to transform market economies into a more efficient and just order. Moral persuasion, strikes, and revolutionary threats were their main weapons. After the Second World War governments yielded to the pressure by building up, together with the unions, a welfare state. During the sixties however, the struggle was renewed, although the governments continued to improve the social security system and maintained their responsibility for full employment. A short sketch will be given of the ideological struggle during the first half of the twentieth century, leading to a significant institutional change: the transformation of a system of private wage bargaining into a collective wage bargaining system. Then the neoclassical, the Marxist and the Keynesian view on the effects of union power on the economic performance of a market economy and of a welfare state will be presented. The conclusion is drawn that the methods required to transform a market economy into a welfare state are anomalies as soon as a welfare state is more or less realized. This is particularly so, because the transformation of a welfare state into a centrally planned economy cannot be considered desirable. In present circumstances, it would be appropriate to pay more attention to the design of an extensive system of mediation and arbitrage to reduce the use of the strike weapon.     

“应付职工薪酬——职工福利费”的核算方法

根据<企业会计准则第9号--职工薪酬>、<企业所得税法实施条例>等有关规定,本文介绍了职工福利费的性质、扣除标准和具体的核算方法.并针对不同情况进行举例说明.     

新股询价发行中的价格区间与配售策略

询价制在新股首次公开发行中正变得日益流行和重要.运用机制设计理论建模分析了承销商如何在新股询价发行过程中制定最优的发行底价和折价水平以得到合适的价格区间,并在发生超额认购时对投资者采取最优的配售策略.研究结果表明当价格区间与配售量满足激励约束条件时,可以达到让知情投资者搜集信息并如实报价的均衡,此外.折价及发行底价均与配售额关系密切,通过策略地分配股票,可以有效降低折价水平并保证较高的发行底价,进一步减少融资成本.     

基于竞争的航班座位分配问题研究

主要研究水平竞争(相同航线的竞争)下的座位控制问题。证明了纳什均衡的存在性,且对竞争条件下各票价等级可获得的座位总数与无竞争条件下的座位总数进行了比较。分析结果表明:水平竞争下竞争性订票限额与垄断者订票限额之间的大小取决于溢出乘客(被一家公司拒绝而转移到另一家公司的乘客)所属的需求类型。     

知识经济时代的人才配置与管理

知识经济的推动力是掌握了现代科技知识和具有综合能力的人才。为此,对人才引进合理的配置与管理意义重大。人才的配置要依据机会成本原理、边际效用原理、资源配置原理、乘数原理等经济理论;人才管理要实施限制管理、诱导管理、弹性管理的“人性化”管理的模式。只有合理地配置和管理人才,才能使社会达到人尽其才,才尽其用,使有限的高质量的人才流向社会最需要和效益最高的地方去。     

Book Review: Welfare Reform,James Madison and Federalism

Public Organization Review -     

“福利赶超”与“增长陷阱”:拉美的教训

20世纪80年代拉美经济经历了"失去的十年",90年代的增长也乏善可陈。对这一问题的反思,国内基本以总结新自由主义的教训为主。但事实上,对拉美影响深远且至今仍充满活力的却是民粹主义的福利赶超。我们的分析表明,福利赶超在相当大的程度上影响了拉美的发展历程,其教训主要体现在3个方面:一是忽视发展阶段的经济赶超;二是忽视财政限制的福利赶超;三是忽视市场机制的政府主导。总结拉美民粹主义福利赶超的教训,对于当前中国发展的政策含义在于:(1)重视初次分配的重要性;(2)提高社会保障水平应与发展阶段相适应;(3)打造民生工程应尊重市场机制。     

An Overview of Welfare Reform in Italy

Samuelson stated in 1967 that “the beauty about social insurance is that ... everyone who reaches retirement age is given benefit privileges that far exceed anything he has paid in”. Such an optimistic belief seems to have been widely shared in Italy, where until the beginning of the reform process in 1992 social security could be described as a continuous succession of highly generous and diversified promises of payment made by the state to the different categories of workers on the basis of salary earned in the final stage of working life. The pension reform introduced by the Dini government in 1995 led to the adoption of a contribution-based method of calculation, which meant a return to the forgotten “golden rule” that the financial equilibrium of pay-as-you-go systems is ensured only if the implicit yield is equal to the rate of growth of the taxable basis of social security contributions. Equilibrium would thus be safeguarded, restoring itself automatically after any accidental disruption caused by demographic or economic upheaval, and operating regardless of the capacity and will of governments and of the majorities supporting them. The great efforts made to build up sufficient consensus with respect to such radical modifications of principle were, however, accompanied by a marked caution in bringing the system into full effect. This has left the country with the problem of accelerating transition to the new mechanism of calculating contributions, applied initially only to the newly employed and pro rata to workers with less than 18 years of contributions paid in, thereby making for a very long period of transition. In such a connection, a recent proposal has suggested that the state should try to induce workers to agree freely to a reduction in their accrued pension entitlements through the public system in return for a share in the process of privatization. If government were to repay the pension debt “below par”, this would allow for greater savings on future expenditure by using part of the revenues of privatization to pay off the pension debt in advance rather than by using these sums to pay off the national debt. More radical approaches aiming at cutting back social spending, would fail to take into account the risks involved in the collapse of public trust and of the structures that have hitherto guaranteed the cohesion of Italian society and the conditions for entrepreneurial commitment. On the other hand, an unbridled bottom-up proliferation of networks of social cohesion, supplementary voluntary bodies and non-profit initiatives may involve the risk of further arbitrary action being taken in the name of income redistribution. The social market requires bottom-up action on the part of associations, but also the guarantee of state-imposed rules that are equal for all parties and of a market that is free from the distortions of competition regulated from the top. A welfare state that has too often disguised the redistribution of resources in non-transparent forms must be replaced by a transparent welfare system effecting an explicit redistribution of resources and allowing a suitably regulated market to operate without indulging continually in further forms of “correction”. This calls for the introduction of a microchip “citizen card”, able to offer characteristics both of uniformity and of fine-tuning in terms of specific conditions of age, income, assets, education, etc., so as to permit forms of selection and/or cost sharing where desirable. Some of the rights to welfare services incorporated in the “citizen card” could in fact be assigned in monetary form but restricted to specific uses. Such “social money”, conveniently based on modern technological transaction structures, could become the money of the state sector, the private sector, and the third sector of non-profit organizations and associations, enabling all parties to respond to the objective demand expressed by citizens in conditions of competition that are free of supply-side distortion.     

A Social Welfare Theory of Trade Unions

There have been recent advances in the understanding of trade unions by modeling union objectives as maximizing a neoclassical utility function. While this literature is most relevant for autonomous and homogeneous local unions, there are also numerous large, heterogeneous trade unions in many countries. This paper illustrates that social choice theory presents a more realistic framework for explicitly modeling the aggregation of potentially diverse preferences within trade unions.