An empirical analysis of union election outcomes in the electric utility industry

Unions in the electric utility industry consistently won a greater percentage of elections between 1970 and 1989 than did unions in other industries. Several factors significantly affected union victory rates at electric utilities: when the election was held, the union involved, the size of the utility, the percent of the state’s labor force unionized, the number of eligible voters, whether the election involved multiple-unions, and whether the election was Regional- or Board-directed.     

The political effects of grievance handling by stewards in a local union

This study develops and tests three long-standing propositions about the relationship between grievance-handling behavior and political outcomes in a local union: (1) more favorable grievance handling enhances the steward’s likelihood of re-election; (2) the more the political support obtained in an election, the greater the steward’s ability to affect grievance outcomes favorably; and (3) as the relationship between management and the union evolves, grievance handling becomes more efficient and effective. Data on grievances and election results of Ford-UAW Local 400 from the 1950s were used to test hypotheses derived from these propositions; most received substantial, significant support.     

The use of information technology in a strike

Conclusion Exhausted by almost eight months of striking, the CEP members urged their union officers to take a radical proposal to the Herald: forget the seniority clause, which the company had maintained was the main stumbling block. Many union members believed that the Herald and Conrad Black didn’t care about seniority and had picked it as an issue in full confidence that it was the one item no union would drop. But since nothing else was working, despite evidence the Herald was suffering severe circulation and corporate-image losses, it was time to call the employer’s bluff. The company seemed to be taken by surprice at the CEP’s abandoning of the cherished principle when union and compeny representatives met in front of an official of the Alberta government. But within a few days, Gaynor was saying publicly there were other issues in the way, not just seniority. Despite the innovative use of electronic communications during the strike, there was no hope of obtaining a settlement if the Herald wasn’t forced to negotiate with the union. The provincial government, however, failed to enforce provisions of its weak labor laws that required “bargaining in good faith.”     

Unionism and voter turnout

Conventional wisdom suggests that union members and their families are more politically active, and more likely to vote, than nonmembers. This study presents, to our knowledge, the first systematic empirical examination of that conventional wisdom. Results suggest that union members are more likely than nonmembers to vote in a general election, and that union campaign efforts increase voter turnout generally. There is no evidence, however, that union family members are more likely to vote than nonmembers, or that union status affects an individual’s likelihood of voting in a primary election. The authors wish to thank Robert Perloff, Donna Sockell, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. This study was partially supported by a Columbia University Graduate School of Business Faculty Research Fellowship and a Faculty Research Grant from the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Business.     

Predicting the decisions to vote and support unions in certification elections: An integrated perspective

This article develops and empirically tests a model of the dual decision-making process employees undergo to guide their behavior during organizing campaigns and elections. The model combines principles of risk-aversion theory with more traditional views that election decisions stem from cost-benefit analyses of union representation. Previous research lacks this integrated approach to the study of election behavior. Regression analyses on a sample of approximately 16,000 certification elections strongly supported the use of risk-aversion theory to predict employees’ willingness to formally participate in elections. Furthermore, we found that time exhibited a statistically significant, negative relationship with voting participation rates, the percentage of union votes, and union victories. The results also indicated that a saturation effect may exist for delays in the election process. Financial support for this research was provided by the Syracuse University Research Fund. The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions that significantly improved the paper.     

The effect of experience on faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining: A cross-temporal analysis

We used multivariate analysis to investigate the change in the attitudes and expectations of AAUP members in a Midwestern university. Two models were developed to measure faculty attitudes toward the union, at the time of the election and four years after the election. The effect of experience on faculty attitudes toward the union is captured by comparing the results of the two models. Our findings suggest major differences in faculty attitudes and expectations prior to and after the union’s arrival. The results of our study have essential policy implications for unions in formulating successful strategies and for faculty in developing realistic expectations of collective bargaining.     

Equity market response to union decertification petitions and elections

The effect of union decertification elections on the valuation of corporations is examined using a standard event study methodology. Cumulative abnormal daily common stock returns for 203 NYSE and AMEX listed firms are estimated for the day on which a petition for a decertification election is filed and for the day on which the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certifies the decertification election outcome. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that successful union decertifications increase firm valuation and unsuccessful ones reduce firm valuation. The primary carrier of valuation information is the date the NLRB confirms the decertification election results. The petition file date yields little, if any, information about the firm’s capitalization. The authors thank the directors of the regional NLRB offices and the editor of this journal for their assistance. The usual caveats concerning errors and omissions apply. Correspondence should be directed to William L. Huth.     

Union commitment and membership support for political action: An exploratory analysis

Union political activity has always been controversial, even among union members. Research has shown that a sizable minority of union members question the propriety of union political involvement and disagree with union leaders on public policy issues. It has also shown, however, that union members’ commitment to the union may be positively associated with members’ political support. This study extends this research by statistically estimating the relationship between union commitment and members’ support for their national union’s political involvement. Based on the questionnaire responses of several hundred local union members, the findings support a positive relationship between union commitment and political support. The authors wish to thank John Delaney and Cynthia Fisher and an anonymous referee for their comments on an earlier draft of the paper. They also wish to thank the numerous union participants in the study.     

The economics of the decision to join a union

This article attempts to bring about a synthesis of the theory of human capital and the disparate and largely empirical literature on the impact of unions on an individual worker’s terms and conditions of employment. This is done by modeling the decision of a worker to join a unionized firm or vote for a union in an NLRB election. From this model both the theoretically correct valuation and some empirical estimates of the value of the major wage and nonwage (seniority, discipline and discharge, strikes, dues) impacts of unions are presented. Extensions to risk averse workers, free rider problems, union elections and contract ratification votes are also briefly considered.     

The power and pay of international union officials

Secondary data are used to examine the relationship between the power of international union presidents and their pay. The analysis supported the hypotheses that (1) power and pay were positively related and (2) the relationship is more pronounced in unions that are larger and are less effective in bargaining as well as during periods characterized by conflict over the president’s role. While highlighting the political dimensions of union organizations, the data also support previous studies that found international union officers’ salaries to have a “rational” basis in the union’s bargaining effectiveness. I am indebted to Gabriella Belli for help with a number of statistical issues.     

Union membership,economic rents,and migration behavior

This study represents an extension of the human capital paradigm as it relates to an individual’s decision to migrate. It differs from previous studies by incorporating union membership, a labor market variable, into the model. In effect, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 granted a monopoly bargaining position to unions. The theoretical implication of a union’s monopoly bargaining position is that union wage levels will increase relative to nonunion wages. The increase of relative wages results in union membership granting a property right that possesses positive net present value and hence reduces an employed union member’s probability of migrating. Additionally, the supra-competitive remuneration of union members results in a surplus of labor supplied to union firms. Employers respond by using quality screening to hire workers from the larger labor pool. As a result, unemployed union members will on average possess higher levels of human capital, which will increase their probability of migrating above that of their unemployed nonunion cohorts.     

Mediation outcomes and sources of impasse: An empirical investigation

This study examines two of the four determinants of mediation effectiveness identified in Kochan and Jick’s (1978) model of the public sector mediation process: source of impact and situational factors. Questionnaire data were directly obtained from 240 Bangladesh management and union officials. Discriminant analysis identified several sources of impasse for both union and management groups, but no situational factors were found to accurately predict case settlement. Results are discussed in terms of U.S. public sector mediation research.     

Determinants of the decertification process: Evidence from employer-initiated elections

There have been relatively few studies on why workers choose to decertify a union as their bargaining unit and virtually no empirical studies on the outcomes of employer-initiated representation elections. Using data from the NLRB monthly election reports (1977–1981), we attempt to analyze the factors that seem to influence the outcomes of employer-initiated representation elections with an incumbent union. Variables in our analysis include size of the election unit, region, industrial classification, type of incumbent union, and the state of the local economy. While the data show a concentration of elections on the West Coast, there is no significant difference in the ability of unions there to “win” decertification elections.     

Unions in the 2000 election: A strategic-choice perspective

In the 2000 elections, organized labor mounted a“massive“ political effort. The AFL-CIO spearheaded a program that emphasized both grassroots and“checkbook” politics. Labor 2000, however, represented much more than an attempt to influence elections. Political action, dedicated to a“Working Families Agenda“ became a strategy of choice to elect candidates, influence lawmakers, mobilize union members, and recruit workers into the labor movement. In this paper, I examine Labor 2000 from a strategic-choice perspective. Specifically, I look at the scope and variety of labor's political effort; how labor allocated its political resources; the degree of competition it faced; and the election outcomes. In addition, I examine the effort in terms of its potential for transforming unions. Data from a variety of sources, some of which have not been previously used, are examined to put Labor 2000 into perspective as a strategy. The results indicate that labor did have some success in mobilizing union members politically. However, labor's impact proved insufficient to achieve immediate national election goals. Questions remain about the wisdom of political action as a strategy of choice, especially in terms of its viability as an instrument for institutional revival.     

Patterns and determinants of union growth in the hospital industry

Recent changes in the National Labor Relations Act have increased the possibility that union coverage will expand among private non-profit hospitals. This study examines the success of union organizing efforts in the industry during the 1974–1978 period. The analysis focuses on the influence of environmental and organizational variables as well as the nature of the election process itself. The results suggest that hospital union success is largely dependent uponprior union success in the hospital (+), voter turnout (−) and unit size (−). The annual rate of election victories is predicted to fall to nearly 25 % by 1983 from an average of 50% in the 1974–1978 period.     

Protective service unions’ political activities and department expenditures

This paper examines how police and firefighter unions’ political activities influence departmental expenditures. Unlike prior research, we measure unions’ political activity independently of union bargaining power. Results indicate that a protective service union’s electoral activities positively affect departmental expenditures, and these effects are attributable to union political power rather than multilateral collective bargaining power. The authors thank Steve Blumenfeld, Wally Hendricks, Asghar Zardkoohi, and an anonymous referee for their excellent comments and suggestions.     

Voces populi and the art of listening

The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favourite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles allowing the strategic use of a given cyclic profile. Theorems 2, 3 and 4 establish conditions for an anonymous and neutral 3-candidate single-seat election to be monotonic and still avoid this strategy completely. Plurality elections combine these properties; among the others ‘conditional IRV’ gives the strongest challenge to the plurality winner. Conditional IRV is extended to any number of candidates. Theorem 5 is an impossibility of Gibbard–Satterthwaite type, describing three specific strategies that cannot all be avoided in meaningful anonymous and neutral election methods.     

NLRB v. Lechmere: Union quest for access

Union attempts to organize nonemployee places of business have traditionally placed employers and union members at odds. In 1992, the United States Supreme Court ended a longstanding rule that the rights of these parties should be balanced in order to determine whether the union’s right to access or the employer’s property right predominated. As it now stands, the rule is that nonemployee union members have no right of access to an employer’s private property unless extreme special circumstances exist, such as isolated work locations where employees have no access to union information. The Supreme Court’s ruling is one that significantly curtails union solicitation. This paper discusses the development of this rule.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.