Differential fertility and family limitation in an urban community of Uttar Pradesh

The study relates to an investigation of the fertility pattern of a sample of 1018 wives drawn from Lucknow and Kanpur, the two biggest cities of Uttar Pradesh. The sample is stratified with respect to religion and caste, and income. It reveals significant inter-community differences, Muslims and low-caste Hindus showing nearly equal fertility, and high-caste Hindus and Christians showing comparatively lower levels. The proportion of small families (three children or less) is obviously higher in groups with lower fertility, but there is a wide measure of dispersion in each group. Fertility is seen to decline with a rise in income, but not until we cross the income level of Rs 300 per month. Consistent with the differential trends in fertility, striking variations are also observed in the extent of contraceptive practice in different groups. Groups with lower fertility also show a higher frequency of birth control. Birth controllers have lower fertility than the non-controllers, and birth control appears to play a not inconsequential rôle in causing differential trends in fertility.     

Migrant women of Mindanao: a differential profile from the 1983 National Demographic Survey

Researchers analyzed 1983 data on 3644 ever married 15-49 year old women living in Mindanao, a traditionally Muslim dominated area, in the Philippines to look at differentials in socioeconomic and demographic factors between migrant and nonmigrant women. When they controlled for other variables, differentials existed only for place of residence, religion, and education. Women living in urban areas were more likely to be migrants than nonmigrants (26.9% vs. 18.6%; p.01). Christians also tended to be migrants (92.3% vs. 7.7%; p/01). Yet the coefficient of the interaction between place of residence and Christian was strongly negative (p.01). Thus the odds of an urban resident being a migrant was reduced from 1.46-1.15 when considering Christians. Among Christians, differences in education between migrants and nonmigrants was small. On the other hand, the more educated a Muslim woman was the less likely she was a migrant (p.05). Further all socioeconomic differentials were consistently significant at either the 1% or 5% level for women who migrated 2 times, but not for primary migrants or return migrants. Women who migrated 3 times and those who migrated back to where they had lived earlier, but not to place of birth, were different than nonmigrants in terms of occupation and education only. In the early 1970s, armed conflicts between Muslims and Christians and between government troops and Muslim groups resulted in considerable displacement of families. Yet this conflict could only account for differentials between the 2 religious groups before 1975, but these data could not infer other reasons for migration. Researchers should explore these reasons. These result indicated that policy makers should focus on religious and place of residence differentials rather than migrant/nonmigrant differentials to promote equality among groups of women.     

Fertility levels and differentials in Beirut during wartime: an indirect estimation based on maternity registers

In this paper, total fertility estimates for Greater Beirut in the mid-eighties and early nineties are presented, and changes in socio-religious differentials of fertility across time are explored. The baseline information was recorded from registration details for all maternities in Beirut and its inner suburbs in 1984 and 1991: age of mother, number of children ever-born, hospital class, and religion of newborn. An indirect method was used to estimate total fertility from the joint distribution of mothers by age and parity, and, using hospital class as a proxy for social class, differentials in fertility were investigated by Poisson regression. The estimates of total fertility for Beirut shifted from 2.60 in 1984 to 2.52 in 1991, and were higher for Muslims than for Christians in the two periods. The regression analysis showed that: (1) the difference between the two religious groups persisted after control for social class, and in fact applied to the lower social class; (2) fertility dropped between the two dates in the lower social class, and more so for Muslims than for Christians. In comparison with other countries of the region, the decline in Beirut was found to be relatively modest. If the trends assessed in this study were to continue, the religious-based fertility differentials would taper off progressively in the capital city of Lebanon.     

Women’s fertility, religion and education in a low-fertility population: Evidence from South Australia

The old issue of religion and fertility is examined in relation to women s level of education. In-depth interviews exploring influences on parity for Adelaide parents in 2003–04 suggest that more frequent attendance at religious services in childhood, and affiliation with particular religious denominations, are related to both higher preferred and higher achieved parity, even for women with university education. For some university-educated women, their religious upbringing appears to play a part in negating the traditional relationship between higher education and lower fertility. Quantitative data on religion, fertility and educational level from the 1996 Census for women aged 40–44 in South Australia show that women with No Religion had lower fertility than those With a religion, while university-educated women in New Protestan-New Christian groups had higher fertility than university-educated women in other denominations. The findings provide an understanding of some social conditions that support higher fertility in a low-fertility population. Future fertility research in developed countries should include consideration of the influence of religious affiliation and religiosity at disaggregated levels of inquiry.     

Who moves and who stays? Rural out-migration in Nigeria

Data from the nationally representative 1993 Migration and Urbanization Survey of Nigeria are used to simultaneously examine the patterns of rural-rural and rural-urban migration in Nigeria. A multinomial logistic regression model predicts the independent and collective association between individual, household, and regional variables and migration from rural areas to rural and urban destinations. Associations between education, religion and ethnicity and migration propensities exist at the national level. The Kanuri-Shua Arabs are generally non-migrants, the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba are predominantly rural-rural migrants and the Igbo-Ibibio and Urhobo-Isoko-Edo are predominantly ruralurban migrants. Christians are significantly more mobile than Muslims. While the highly educated are most likely to choose an urban destination, a significant proportion migrate to other rural areas. Concern over population concentration is not supported, as rural migrants move to all regions and to urban and rural areas.     

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

This article explores the relationship between kinship institutions and sex ratios in India at the turn of the twentieth century. Because kinship rules vary by caste, language, religion, and region, we construct sex ratios by these categories at the district level by using data from the 1901 Census of India for Punjab (North), Bengal (East), and Madras (South). We find that the male-to-female sex ratio varied positively with caste rank, fell as one moved from the North to the East and then to the South, was higher for Hindus than for Muslims, and was higher for northern Indo-Aryan speakers than for the southern Dravidian-speaking people. We argue that these systematic patterns in the data are consistent with variations in the institution of family, kinship, and inheritance.     

The conflicting effects of delayed marriage and declining divorce rates on cumulative fertility in Indonesia

The impact of nuptiality patterns on fertility in Indonesia is examined with multivariate analysis controlling for 8 socioeconomic variables. Data were obtained from the 1987 Indonesian Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. Marriage is usually universal by age 35, and in this study all women 30 years had been married at least once. 20% were married at 15 years and 45% married at 18 years. For those married more than once, prevalence of 1st marriage was 7% for women 15-24 years, 15% for 25-34 years, and 29% for 35-49 years. In 1976 and 1987, the age at 1st marriage and number of times married were both strongly and negatively correlated. The % never marrying between 15-49 years rose from 21.5% to 26.4% between 1980-87. Cumulative fertility w as related to both age at 1st marriage and number of times married. Muslim women, women in Java and Bali, and rural women all marry at younger ages. 27% of the variance in age at 1st marriage is explained by women aged 25-34, current residence, region, religion, language, education, and work or not before marriage. The number of times married is also associated with socioeconomic characteristics without control, i.e., Muslim women 25-34 years were 3 times more likely to have been married more than once than in other faiths. With controls for socioeconomic factors, only 13% of the variance is explained and being Muslim has no statistically significant effect. The important net effects were being interviewed in Balinese, age, and age at 1st marriage. In the analysis of cumulative fertility, age at 1st marriage consistently is related to cumulative fertility in almost every socioeconomic group when age and number of times married is controlled for. Women married more than once have lower fertility. 36% of the variance is explained by all the variables. Being married more than once leads to having 2.1 fewer children. A 5-year delay in marriage leads to .75-1.1 fewer children. When other variables are controlled for, neither educational level nor prior work experience has a statistically significant effect on cumulative fertility. In the contraception analysis, women married more than once used contraception less. Among women 35-49, those marrying later had higher contraceptive use, but in general contraceptive use declined with age. More information is needed on why marriage patterns are changing.     

Christian–Muslim differences in child survival in Egypt

Ethnic and religious inequalities in child survival have been documented in many countries. In Egypt, during the 1980s and 1990s, Christians had higher childhood mortality than Muslims despite their higher socio-economic status (SES) and concentration in urban areas. This paper explores reasons for this Christian–Muslim mortality gap. Data for this study are drawn from Egypt’s 1988, 1992, 1995, 2005 and 2008 Demographic and Health Surveys, which recorded the respondents’ religious affiliation. The main analysis compares children of Christian and Muslim mothers in survival to age five using proportional hazards Cox regression models. Results indicate that differences in the regional distributions of Christians and Muslims positively contributed to the mortality gap during the 1980s–1990s. The majority of Christians resided in Upper Egypt where childhood mortality rates were considerably higher than in other regions. However, only part of higher Christian mortality can be explained by their regional concentration. In Upper Egypt, despite their higher SES, as well as greater urban residence, Christians had higher mortality than Muslims. These findings are at odds with research demonstrating the significance of SES and urban concentration in explaining ethnic–religious mortality gaps.     

An attempt at evaluation of the economic and social factors [influencing] the Polish population's fertility formation

This analysis of economic determinants of fertility in Poland shows that couples' fertility decisions are negatively influenced by factors affecting family income. Social and demographic factors were found to be unrelated to fertility. 17 socioeconomic measures were grouped as those expressing the level of economic development and determining family income size, those reflecting the level of socioeconomic development and determining the level of children's education, and those characterizing the level of social development and determining the need for health care and social security. The level of actual fertility is modeled as a linear function of variables in a main components factor analysis. Average monthly pay in the national economy (37.6%), the sold industrial production per person (13.8%), and the global agricultural production per person (13.2%) account for 64.6% of the variance. Among the social factors, findings indicate that a higher feeling of security is related to lower fertility, but economic factors have a stronger influence. Voivodeships are grouped as having low levels of economic development (24), as having high educational levels (24), and as having low levels of social security (24). Voivodeships with low levels of economic development and high parity include all the grouped voivodeships with the exception of three. Low-security voivodeships showed mixed patterns of fertility. High-education voivodeships showed a weak correlation with high fertility. Only three voivodeships have low economic and security factors and high education factors, and only one voivodeship has high fertility. Of the three voivodeships with high security and economic factors and low education factors, all have low parity.     

How Do Education and Family Planning Accelerate Fertility Decline?

Education and family planning can both be influenced by policy and are thought to accelerate fertility decline. However, questions remain about the nature of these effects. Does the effect of education operate through increasing educational attainment of women or educational enrollment of children? At which educational level is the effect strongest? Does the effect of family planning operate through increasing contraceptive prevalence or reducing unmet need? Is education or family planning more important? We assessed the quantitative impact of education and family planning in high-fertility settings using a regression framework inspired by Granger causality. We found that women's attainment of lower secondary education is key to accelerating fertility decline and found an accelerating effect of contraceptive prevalence for modern methods. We found the impact of contraceptive prevalence to be substantially larger than that of education. These accelerating effects hold in sub-Saharan Africa, but with smaller effect sizes there than elsewhere.     

The Effect of Parental Education on Marital Fertility in Developing Countries

The effects of parents' education on marital fertility are analysed with data from 38 Surveys in the WFS programme, and a two-parameter model in which the age-dependent level of fertility and a duration-dependent slope of fertility are estimated. The level parameter reflects post-partum infecundity and, in some populations, contraceptive spacing of births. The slope parameter reflects parity-specific birth control. The effects of the husband's and of the wife's education are estimated, both before and after adjustment for other socio-economic factors. The schooling of the wife emerges as a more decisive influence on fertility than that of the husband, with substantial net effects even after controlling for urban-rural residence, husband's socio-economic status and wife's employment. In Latin America and the Arab states, monotonic declines in marital fertility are found, as the level of the wife's education increases. However, in many Asian and African populations, the highest fertility is observed among women with moderate exposure to schooling, because the relaxation of traditional spacing mechanisms is not matched by increased birth control. This regional diversity cannot be explained convincingly by national levels of economic development or efforts made to popularize contraception, but appears to relect ill-understood cultural factors.     

Why are uneducated women in India using contraception? A multilevel analysis

While women's education continues to be strongly associated with lower fertility in India, an important feature of India's current fertility transition is the spread of contraceptive use among uneducated women. Indeed, changes in their fertility are now making the major contribution to the country's overall fertility decline. We use multilevel statistical procedures to investigate the variation in contraceptive use among uneducated women across India. The analysis suggests that, while many of the expected socio-economic variables play their part, there are also considerable diffusion effects in progress, many of which operate at levels beyond the uneducated women's own individual circumstances. For example, we find significant relationships with others' use of contraception and others' education. Mass media exposure also emerges as an important diffusion channel. The multilevel analysis also reveals significant clustering of contraceptive use at different levels, much of which is accounted for by the variables included in the models.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

Socio-demographic Correlates of Subjective Well-being in Urban India

This study aimed to explore subjective well-being (SWB) in an urban Indian sample. Adults (n = 1099) belonging to two wards in the city of Bangalore in South India, responded to a study-specific questionnaire. This paper is based on data generated as part of an ongoing larger study looking at correlates of SWB. Almost equal number of men and women responded to the study and their age ranged from 20 to 81 years (mean age 37 years). Majority of them were married, Hindus, from middle socio-economic status, had studied above pre-university level and more than half were earning. The mean scores on positive affect (40.9), negative affect (27.6) and life satisfaction (24) suggested above average levels of SWB. Higher age, being married, having higher education, higher income and working in a full time job seemed to improve life satisfaction and decrease negative affect. Religion was also significantly associated with negative affect. Step-wise regression analysis suggested that only education and income were important predictors of positive affect, while negative affect was better predicted by age, income, work status and religion. Life satisfaction was predicted by income, age and education. The important correlates of SWB for men and women were somewhat different. Overall, sociodemographic variables have minimal effect on SWB in urban India and research needs to explore other predictors of SWB.     

How female literacy affects fertility: the case of India

Recent studies indicate that there is a direct correlation between increased literacy and decreased fertility. This link was demonstrated in study that covered 90% of India's population. Studies in other developing countries have confirmed this finding. In addition, high literacy rates have been found to correspond to high infant survival rates. Researchers also found that there was little change in the relationship between literacy and fertility when they were both controlled for different levels of urbanization. The problem is that only 1 in 4 Indian women are literate. However, India's government has a program in place the goal of which is to have universal literacy. In Kerala, female literacy is the highest (65%). And at 3.4 children/women, it has 1 of the lowest fertility rates. For the 14 states studied, the total fertility rate was 5.0 children/woman, the child mortality rate was 126/1000, and the female literacy rate was 22%. In contrast in Rajasthan where female literacy is 11% (the lowest of the 14 states studied) fertility is the highest at 6.0 children/woman. No state with higher than average fertility had higher than average female literacy rates. Literate women are likely to have more surviving children because they are more aware of good health practices, and they tend to live in better circumstances. As a result, couples need fewer births to reach their desired family size.     

Pervasive Muslim-Hindu fertility differences in India

Using the 1993 Indian Family and Health Survey, we examined Muslim-Hindu differences in (1) the parity-specific intent to have another child and (2) given a stated intent for no more children, reports of the current use of contraceptives. We found that Muslims are much more likely than Hindus to intend to have additional children and, among those who do not want more children, Muslims are much less likely than Hindus to use contraceptives. These findings are robust to model specification and pervasive across the states of India. This national study provides the context within which local studies should be enmeshed and begs for general (as opposed to place-specific) explanations for these pervasive differences.     

Hispanic Fertility,Religion and Religiousness in the U.S.

Is the higher fertility of Hispanics in the United States due to their religion and/or to their greater religiousness? Evidence from national survey data indicates no difference in fertility between Protestant and Catholic Hispanic women but Hispanics are more religious than non-Hispanics in terms of the perceived importance of religion in their personal lives. Religiousness is associated with higher fertility but Hispanic fertility is higher than non-Hispanic fertility regardless of religion or religiousness. Ethnic differences in education and income in turn are more important for fertility than the religious dimension.     

Evolution of fertility and mortality

Historical and current fertility trends in both Quebec and Canada as a whole are surveyed. While fertility among French Canadians was higher than that in neighboring provinces until the mid-20th century, in 1968 Quebec's crude birthrate was the lowest in Canada, and in 1972 it was 13.8 vs. 15.9 (the national birthrate). This reversal is explained in terms of the demographic transition theory, the declining influence of organized religion, and new opportunities for social mobility for minority groups. The birthrate throughout Canada is also declining. Although recent cohort studies are incomplete because women have not yet finished their reproductive years, it appears that completed family size will be lower than at any time in Canadian history. The period total fertility rate indicates an average family size of 1.8 children in 1976, but it is unclear whether this represents an actual reduction in family size or the postponement of childbearing. The sharpest fertility decline has been among women aged 35-49, but peak fertility rates have shifted from the 20-24 age group to those aged 25-29. Fertility is negatively related to education, and the lowest fertility is found among the intermediate income groups. Since the 1969 lifting of the ban on contraceptive sales and advertising, family planning activities have been stepped up. Also removed was the total ban on abortion. In 1975 there were 14.9 therapeutic abortions per 100 live births, but it has been charged that abortion standards are being applied inequitably from hospital to hospital.     

A Study Of Differential Fertility In Bombay

This study is based on special tabulations of the "order of pregnancy," as reported on the birth certificate, according to mother's age, locality, and religion and father's state of birth and duration of stay in Bombay, India. The sample consists of 50 percent of the births registered in 1960 in Bombay (where birth registration has a fairly high degree of completeness).Despite the limitations of statistical information on the complex of factors influencing fertility, it wasfound that three indicators derived from the 1961 census could numerically account for 51 percent of the total variance of the parity averages in the sections of Bombay. Overcrowding (which is an indicator of the level of living) had the strongest influence and accounted alone for 44 percent of the variance. Knowledge of thereligious patternraised thepercentage to49, whileinclusionof theilliteracy measure added only another two to this percentage.An assessment of fertility differences by religious groups, as well as by place of origin of the father, is then carried out. The data show significant differences among religious groups, with Moslems and Buddhists having the highest parity averages, followed by Hindus and Jains. A considerably lower level is shown by Christians, but the lowest parity level is that of the small Parsi community. Mothers whose husbands were born in the south and east were found to show the lowest parity level, while those who have north-born husbands showed the highest level.Finally, the data show consistent increase in age-standardized parity averages with increase of the duration of stay in Bombay. This pattern is observed for each of the three main geographic regions of origin. While this increase is difficult to explain on the basis of the available data, the fact that the pattern of parity differences among regions persists from one duration group to the next lends support to the conclusion that little assimilation seems to have been taking place.