High Sex Ratios at Birth in the Caucasus: Modern Technology to Satisfy Old Desires

During the 1990s, the sex ratio at birth increased considerably and simultaneously in the three independent Caucasian countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. At the end of the first decade of the twenty‐first century, levels remain abnormally high in Armenia and Azerbaijan (above 114 male births per 100 female births) and show erratic trends in Georgia. Analyzing data from demographic surveys carried out around 2005, we confirm the persistence of high sex ratios in these three countries and document significant differences in fertility intentions and behavior according to the sex of the previous child or children that constitute evidence of the practice of sex‐selective abortion. These countries combine societal features and medical systems that make this phenomenon possible: son preference in a context of low fertility and the possibility of prenatal sex selection given easy access to ultrasound screening and induced abortion. Why high sex ratios are observed only in these three countries of the sub‐region remains, however, an open question.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: a search for commonalities

Near-global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post-industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English-speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German-speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer-term factors that may be common to all.     

The links between women’s employment and children at home: Variations in low- and middle-income countries by world region

As fertility declines in low- and middle-income countries, the time women devote to childbearing and rearing may also be reduced. This shift has been described as one of the positive consequences of the demographic transition, as it opens opportunities for women to pursue educational and employment opportunities that were previously constrained by the demands of bearing and raising children. We estimate the numbers of children residing at home (with their mother) for women in 58 countries in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. We then examine the association between women’s employment and having children at home. Finally, we assess trends over recent decades in the relationship between employment and childbearing, and differences in this relationship by mother’s occupation. We find a negative association between women’s employment and having children at home; this association varies substantially by world region, age of child, and mother’s occupation.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities

Near‐global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post‐industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English‐speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German‐speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer‐term factors that may be common to all.     

Educational reversals and first-birth timing in sub-saharan africa: A dynamic multilevel approach

In many areas throughout sub-Saharan Africa, young adult cohorts are less educated than their predecessors because of declines in school enrollments during the 1980s and 1990s. Because a woman with little education typically becomes a mother earlier and has more children than one with better education, and because of a similar well-established relationship between current education and current fertility at the societal level, one might expect such education reversals to raise fertility. However, if there is an additional negative effect of low educational level among currently young women compared with that in the past, which would accord with ideas about the impact of relative deprivation, the total effect of an education reversal may run in either direction. This possibility has not been explored in earlier studies, which have taken a more static approach. We focus on the initiation of childbearing. Using Demographic and Health Survey data from 16 sub-Saharan African countries with multiple surveys, we estimate a fixed-effects multilevel model for first births that includes the woman's own education, community education, and community education relative to the past. There are negative effects of individual and community education, but no effect of relative education. Thus we conclude that education reversals do seem to speed up entry into parenthood.     

The Emergence of Two Distinct Fertility Regimes in Economically Advanced Countries

Beginning in 2000, in economically advanced countries, a remarkable bifurcation in fertility levels has emerged, with one group in the moderate range of period total fertility rates, about 1.9, and the other at 1.3. The upper branch consists of countries in Northern and Western Europe, Oceania and the United States; the lower branch includes Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, and East and Southeast Asia. A review of the major theories for low-fertility countries reveals that none of them would have predicted this specific bifurcation. We argue that those countries with fertility levels close to replacement level have institutional arrangements, and related policies, that make it easier, not easy, for women to combine the worker and mother roles. The institutional details are quite different across countries, suggesting that multiple combinations of institutional arrangements and policies can lead to the same country-level fertility outcome. Canada, the only exception to this bifurcation, illustrates the importance of the different institutional structures in Québec compared to the rest of Canada.     

A global perspective on happiness and fertility

The literature on fertility and happiness has neglected comparative analysis. We investigate the fertility/happiness association using data from the world values surveys for 86 countries. We find that, globally, happiness decreases with the number of children. This association, however, is strongly modified by individual and contextual factors. Most importantly, we find that the association between happiness and fertility evolves from negative to neutral to positive above age 40, and is strongest among those who are likely to benefit most from upward intergenerational transfers. In addition, analyses by welfare regime show that the negative fertility/ happiness association for younger adults is weakest in countries with high public support for families, and the positive association above age 40 is strongest in countries where old-age support depends mostly on the family. Overall these results suggest that children are a long-term investment in well-being, and highlight the importance of the life-cycle stage and contextual factors in explaining the happiness/fertility association.     

The spread of primary schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa: implications for fertility change

In 1980 Caldwell hypothesized that the time of the onset of the fertility transition in developing countries would be linked with the achievement of “mass formal schooling.” This article applies Demographic and Health Survey data to assess schooling patterns and trends for 23 sub‐Saharan African countries, using the percentage of 15–19‐year olds who have completed at least four years of schooling as an indicator of progress in education. As background to that assessment, the article includes a review of the sparse literature on the links between children's schooling and fertility decline. The analysis strongly supports Caldwell's hypothesis with empirical evidence of the much stronger negative relationship between fertility decline and grade 4 attainment in those countries that have attained mass‐schooling levels than in those that have not yet achieved such levels.     

China's Below‐Replacement Fertility: Recent Trends and Future Prospects

Between 1970 and 1990, China experiencoed a rapid and sharp fertility decline—from total fertility rates of approximately six births to two. The degree to which Chinese fertility has continued to fall after 1990 is controversial. We use survey data from the 1997 National Population and Reproductive Health Survey and from the 2001 Reproductive Health and Family Planning Survey to document recent trends in Chinese fertility. Our estimates provide further evidence that China's fertility is well below‐replacement level at the turn of the twenty‐first century—with TFR levels of approximately 1.5 children per woman. Trends in parity‐specific cohort fertility by age also suggest below replacement completed fertility for cohorts still in the childbearing years. In the article's second section, we identify key components of low period fertility in order to frame our discussion of two questions: 1) in what ways is Chinese low fertility different from/similar to that in other low‐fertility countries? And 2) what are the likely future trends in Chinese fertility?     

New Cohort Fertility Forecasts for the Developed World: Rises,Falls, and Reversals

With period fertility having risen in many low‐fertility countries, an important emerging question is whether cohort fertility trends are also reversing. We produce new estimates of cohort fertility for 37 developed countries using a new, simple method that avoids the underestimation typical of previous approaches. Consistent with the idea that timing changes were largely responsible for the last decades' low period fertility, we find that family size has remained considerably higher than the period rates of 1.5 in many “low‐fertility” countries, averaging about 1.8 children. Our forecasts suggest that the long‐term decline in cohort fertility is flattening or reversing in many world regions previously characterized by low fertility. We document the marked increase of cohort fertility in the English‐speaking world and in Scandinavia; signs of an upward reversal in many low‐fertility countries, including Japan and Germany; and continued declines in countries such as Taiwan and Portugal. We include in our forecasts estimates of statistical uncertainty and the possible effects of the recent economic recession.     

The End of the Fertility Transition in the Developed World

By the late 1990s the average period total fertility rate in the developed world had declined to 1.6, a level substantially lower than projected in the 1970s and 1980s. This article examines recent trends and patterns in fertility in the developed world with particular emphasis on the effects and implications of changes in the timing of childbearing. The main objective is to demonstrate that while fertility in these countries is indeed low, women's childbearing levels are not as low as period measures such as the total fertility rate suggest. To obtain a full understanding of the various dimensions of fertility change. several indicators are examined, including period and cohort fertility by birth order and childbearing preferences. An analysis of these indicators demonstrates that period fertility measures in many developed countries are temporarily depressed by a rise in the mean age at childbearing. The distortion of the TFR is as great as 0.4 births per woman in Italy and Spain. These effects have been present in many developed countries since the 1970s and could continue for years into the future. But tempo effects are temporary, and once the postponement of childbearing ends—as it eventually must—the corresponding fertility‐depressing effect stops, thus putting upward pressure on period fertility. Countries with very low fertility and substantial tempo effects may well experience rises in fertility in the near future if the timing of childbearing stabilizes. Even if this happens, however, it seems unlikely that fertility will rebound to the replacement level.     

低生育率陷阱:是事实还是神话?

20世纪80年代以后,欧洲国家生育率持续下降,一些国家生育率降到并持续保持极低的水平,这种现象引起了西方人口学界乃至大众的广泛关注,很多学者对欧洲持续的低生育率现象及其原因进行了探讨,其中最有影响的理论之一是鲁茨等人提出的低生育率陷阱。按照鲁茨等人的观点,一国总和生育率一旦降到1.5以下,就会产生一种低生育率自我强化机制,于是,生育率就如同掉进了陷阱,很难再回升到1.5以上。本文介绍了低生育率陷阱的概念和作为其理论核心的低生育率自我强化机制并从人口学机制、社会学机制和经济学机制分析了低生育率自我强化机制本身的缺陷,从理论上论证低生育率陷阱可能存在的问题,在这一基础上笔者结合近年来欧洲一些低生育率国家生育率回升的事实,认为低生育率陷阱究竟是事实还是神话,还需要进一步的理论证明和实践检验。     

Probabilistic Projections of the Total Fertility Rate for All Countries

We describe a Bayesian projection model to produce country-specific projections of the total fertility rate (TFR) for all countries. The model decomposes the evolution of TFR into three phases: pre-transition high fertility, the fertility transition, and post-transition low fertility. The model for the fertility decline builds on the United Nations Population Division’s current deterministic projection methodology, which assumes that fertility will eventually fall below replacement level. It models the decline in TFR as the sum of two logistic functions that depend on the current TFR level, and a random term. A Bayesian hierarchical model is used to project future TFR based on both the country’s TFR history and the pattern of all countries. It is estimated from United Nations estimates of past TFR in all countries using a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The post-transition low fertility phase is modeled using an autoregressive model, in which long-term TFR projections converge toward and oscillate around replacement level. The method is evaluated using out-of-sample projections for the period since 1980 and the period since 1995, and is found to be well calibrated.     

Latest-Late Fertility? Decline and Resurgence of Late Parenthood Across the Low-Fertility Countries

After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950–2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990–2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.     

Book reviews

Fertility has declined to below replacement levels in many of the modern industrialized countries during the last three decades. This decline has been explained by various modern socio-economic characteristics, such as the change in women's status, their increased participation in non-familial activities, modern consumption patterns, and increasing costs of raising ‘quality’ children. The Jewish population of Israel is a modern society with such characteristics. Yet, total fertility in Israel during the 1980s was at least one child higher than in most European countries. It is shown that social heterogeneity makes this an over-simplified comparison. Indeed, it is the high fertility of the orthodox population among the two major ethnic groups, combined with the decline towards below-replacement fertility of the non-orthodox, which produces the high mean fertility of the entire population. While during the 1950s and 1960s the major explanations of fertility variation were concerned with ethnicity and socio-economic status, these were replaced by religiosity in the 1970s and the 1980s.     

Birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures

This article explains that birth delays skew developing world's fertility figures. When successive groups of women who have delayed childbearing start having children, the rapid fertility decline stalls. Such change in the timing of childbearing skews the total fertility rate (TFR). Analysis of the tempo component of TFR trends in Taiwan suggests that tempo effects reduced its TFR by about 10% in the late 1970s and early 1990s and by about 19% in the late 1980s. In Colombia, on the basis of increasing mean maternal age at childbirth between the 1970s and the late 1980s, tempo distortions of the TFR during the most of the 1980s seem likely. Moreover, many developing countries are now experiencing rapid fertility declines that are in part attributable to tempo changes. These changes have accelerated past fertility transitions, but they also make these countries vulnerable to future stalls in fertility when the delays in childbearing end. Since fertility reductions caused by tempo effects lead to real declines in birth rates and hence in population growth, countries that wish to reduce birth rates can take actions that encourage women to delay marriage and the onset of childbearing.     

Did the association between fertility and female employment within OECD countries really change its sign?

Recent literature finds that in OECD countries the cross-country correlation between the total fertility rate and the female labor force participation rate, which until the beginning of the 1980s had a negative value, has since acquired a positive value. This result is (explicitly or implicitly) often interpreted as evidence for a changing sign in the time-series association between fertility and female employment within OECD countries. This paper shows that the time-series association between fertility and female employment does not demonstrate a change in sign. Instead, the reversal in the sign of the cross-country correlation is most likely due to a combination of two elements: First, the presence of unmeasured country-specific factors and, second, country-heterogeneity in the magnitude of the negative time-series association between fertility and female employment. However, the paper does find evidence for a reduction in the negative time-series association between fertility and female employment after about 1985.I benefited from stimulating discussions with Arnstein Aassve, Pau Baizan, Francesco Billari, Henriette Engelhardt, Hans-Peter Kohler and Alexia Prskawetz and a seminar in Rostock. Further, I am grateful to two anonymous referees for very useful suggestions that improved essentially the content of the paper. In addition, I thank Susan Masur, Susann Backer, and Elizabeth Zach for language editing. The views expressed in this paper are the authors own views and do not necessarily represent those of the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research. Responsible editor: Junsen Zhang.     

The End of “Lowest‐Low” Fertility?

Total fertility rates fell to previously unseen levels in a large number of countries beginning in the early 1990s. The persistence of TFRs below 1.3 raised the possibility of rapid population aging and decline. We discuss the recent widespread turnaround in so‐called lowest‐low‐fertility countries in Europe and East Asia. The number of countries with TFRs below 1.3 fell from 21 in 2003 to five in 2008. Moreover, the upturn in the TFR was not confined to lowest‐fertility countries, but affected the whole developed world. We explore the demographic explanations for the recent rise in TFRs stemming from fertility timing effects as well as economic, policy, and social factors. Although the current economic downturn may suppress TFRs in the short run, we conclude that formerly lowest‐low‐fertility countries will continue to see increases in fertility as the transitory effects of shifts to later childbearing become less important.     

Unemployment,Nonstandard Employment,and Fertility: Insights From Japan’s “Lost 20 Years”

In this study, we examine relationships of unemployment and nonstandard employment with fertility. We focus on Japan, a country characterized by a prolonged economic downturn, significant increases in both unemployment and nonstandard employment, a strong link between marriage and childbearing, and pronounced gender differences in economic roles and opportunities. Analyses of retrospective employment, marriage, and fertility data for the period 1990–2006 indicate that changing employment circumstances for men are associated with lower levels of marriage, while changes in women’s employment are associated with higher levels of marital fertility. The latter association outweighs the former, and results of counterfactual standardization analyses indicate that Japan’s total fertility rate would have been 10 % to 20 % lower than the observed rate after 1995 if aggregate- and individual-level employment conditions had remained unchanged from the 1980s. We discuss the implications of these results in light of ongoing policy efforts to promote family formation and research on temporal and regional variation in men’s and women’s roles within the family.     

Birth and death in cities in the developing world

City dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa have increased roughly 600% in the last 35 years. Throughout the developing world, cities have expanded at a rate that has far outpaced rural population growth. Extensive data document lower fertility and mortality rates in cities than in rural regions. But slums, shantytowns, and squatters' settlements proliferate in many large cities. Martin Brockerhoff studies the reproductive and health consequences of urban growth, with an emphasis on maternal and child health. Brockerhoff reports that child mortality rates in large cities are highest among children born to mothers who recently migrated from rural areas or who live in low-quality housing. Children born in large cities have about a 30% higher risk of dying before they reach the age of 5 than those born in smaller cities. Despite this, children born to migrant mothers who have lived in a city for about a year have much better survival chances than children born in rural areas to nonmigrant mothers and children born to migrant mothers before or shortly after migration. Migration in developing countries as a whole has saved millions of children's lives. The apparent benefits experienced in the 1980s may not occur in the future, as cities continue to grow and municipal governments confront an overwhelming need for housing, jobs, and services. Another benefit is that fertility rates in African cities fell by about 1 birth per woman as a result of female migration from villages to towns in the 1980s and early 1990s. There will be an increasing need for donors and governments to concentrate family planning, reproductive health, child survival, and social services in cities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because there child mortality decline has been unexpectedly slow, overall fertility decline is not yet apparent in most countries, and levels of migration to cities are anticipated to remain high.