TWO-PART PRICING FOR A MULTI-PRODUCT MONOPOLIST

This paper examines profit-maximizing multi-part pricing arrangements by multi-product monopolists. The results indicate that prices set by such firms will deviate from the marginal-cost-pricing efficiency norm when multi-part tariffs can be set on only a subset of the firm's product line. Per unit prices will be set above marginal cost when the monopolist sells goods that are substitutes, while per unit prices for complements may be set above or below marginal cost. In either case, the pricing strategy will involve increasing the demand for goods on which an entry fee can beset.     

DOES THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKE1 BENEFIT ITS MEMBERS?

This paper estimates the welfare consequences for members of the Central American Common Market if they abolish their union by imposing tariffs against each other. An imperfect substitutes trade model is used and direct estimates are provided for the effects of the union. These are important advances over previous studies, which relied on perfect substitutes models and merely imputed the effects of the union by assuming that it left either market shares or income elasticities of demand constant in member countries. The union is shown to impose static welfare losses on the members, which contradicts the results of previous studies.     

THE SUBSTITUTABILITY OF BLACK, HISPANIC, AND WHITE LABOR

This paper analyzes the extent of labor market competition among blacks, hispanics, and whites in the United States. The specification of a generalized Leontief production function leads to an empirically tractable system of input demand functions. The estimation of the demand system, using the 1976 Survey of Income and Education, reveals that (a) blacks and hispanics are complementary inputs; (b) hispanics and whites may also be complements; and (c) blacks and whites are not complements and may be substitutes.     

Does philanthropy reduce inequality?

Wealthy individuals often voluntarily provide public goods that the poor also consume. We show that, rather than reducing it, such philanthropy may aggravate absolute inequality in welfare achievement, while leaving the change in relative inequality ambiguous. Additionally, philanthropic preferences may increase the effectiveness of policies to redistribute income, instead of weakening them. Our results thus suggest that philanthropy and direct redistribution may often be better viewed as complements, rather than substitutes, in the context of inequality reduction. In so doing, they also bring into question the general normative case for large tax deductions for charitable contributions.     

DEMAND FOR DIFFERENTIATED DURABLE PRODUCTS: THE CASE OF THE U.S. COMPUTER PRINTER MARKET

This paper develops an estimation technique for analyzing the impact of technological change on the dynamics of consumer demand in a differentiated durable products industry. The paper presents a dynamic model of consumer demand for differentiated durable products that explicitly accounts for consumers' expectations of future product quality and consumers' outflow from the market that arises endogenously from their purchase decisions. The timing of consumers' purchases is formalized as an optimal stopping problem. A solution to that problem defines the hazard rate of product adoptions, while the nested discrete choice model determines the alternative‐specific purchase probabilities. Integrating individual decisions over the population distribution generates rich dynamics of aggregate and product‐level sales. The empirical part of the paper applies the model to data on the U.S. computer printer market for 1998–1999. The estimates support the hypothesis of consumers' forward‐looking behavior, allowing for better demand forecasts and improved measures of welfare gains from introducing new products. (JEL L11, C35, D91)     

No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods

We show that efficient anonymous incentive compatible (dominant strategy) mechanisms for public goods eliminate externalities, i.e., each individual is unable to change the welfare of anyone else. The characterization is used to derive existence and non-existence results for models with a finite number of individuals and to explain existence results in the continuum. A similar characterization and conclusions are demonstrated for private goods in (J Econ Theory 85:169–225, 1999). However, unlike private goods, elimination of externalities with public goods implies that individuals cannot change the outcome. Hence, such mechanisms provide only weak incentives for truth-telling.     

Private provision of public goods under price uncertainty

In this paper, price uncertainty is introduced into the model of voluntary provision of public goods. The analysis is carried out depending upon whether individuals make real or nominal contributions. We highlight the significant factors that determine the complex effects of changes in uncertainty on the level of provision, the level of welfare, and the gaps between equilibrium and optimal values of these variables. In particular, we show that in some situations it would be desirable to introduce artificial randomness in prices in order to alleviate the free rider problem and to increase welfare.We are indebted to two referees for their comments and suggestions.     

Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods

We reconsider the problem of provision and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. The efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible. We show that this rule is characterized in economies with a continuum of agents by efficiency, a natural upper bound on everyone's welfare, and a property of solidarity with respect to changes in population and preferences. Received: 3 August 1995 / Accepted : 29 April 1997     

Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case

One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. We impose Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, a weak notion of no-envy, a welfare lower bound based on each agent’s ranking of the subsets of goods, and a monotonicity property w.r.t. changes in preferences. We prove that there is a rule satisfying these axioms. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, together with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying each fairness axiom and not discriminating between goods.     

Demand cross elasticity without substitutability: An experiment

We study a market in which goods are produced under low marginal costs with a poor degree of substitutability among products. In this environment we ran an experiment to explain why prices are interdependent even when preferences are independent. We compare our results to previous theoretical and laboratory experimental literature on price fairness. We find that even in the absence of interaction among subjects, price fairness/unfairness does play a major role in the decision to accept or reject a deal. Subjects tend to be more resistant to a price increase and reject a deal when the preferred product is not referenced to price increases of not substitute products, if these products are considered to be a benchmark for fair conduct. Thus demand cross elasticity can arise between products that are not substitutes. This result has important implications for antitrust policy. In delineating a market perimeter, fairness concerns suggest that products that are similar but not interchangeable should be included in the relevant antitrust market.     

CONGLOMERATES AND REGULATION

Conglomerates operating integrated productions in different regulated and unregulated sectors may benefit of scope economies. However, the precise size of these synergies is often unknown to both rival firms and regulators. We show that the conglomerate's private information on scope economies may negatively affect both the regulated and the unregulated sectors depending on the precise nature of competition (strategic substitutes or complements). We also unveil a novel effect of regulation that involves an informational externality to the conglomerate's rivals. Notwithstanding these complications, and independently of the nature of competition, we show that in our model it is desirable, as for welfare, to let the firm run integrated productions, unless diseconomies of scope may realize. (JEL L51, L43, L52)     

QUALITY DIFFERENCES,THIRD‐DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION,AND WELFARE

We propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences. In each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets. Local firms produce higher‐quality goods than the global firm. If the quality levels of the local firms' products are the same, price discrimination is never welfare‐decreasing. If they differ, discrimination is welfare‐increasing if quantity increases. Because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination, there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination. (JEL D43, D60)     

Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods

This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A _k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B _l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.     

Community welfare organisations in Australia: Activism or industry?

This paper reports on an investigation of the work undertaken by community groups in Australia. Specifically, it highlights the role of community welfare organisations in socio-political contexts undergoing change. Different operating rationalities, corresponding to shifting political and economic imperatives, are examined. An overview of the development of the community welfare sector since 1970 reveals tendencies towards bifurcation and convergence as strategic responses to different socio-political conjunctures. Analysis of the contemporary preoccupation with the rationale of the market indicates a rehearsal of the bifurcation tendencies that characterised the sector in the 1970s. Yet shifts in the organisational relations between the state and the community welfare sector and the appearance of new strategic responses to the operating logics of the market also suggest that it is time for the development of different discursive frameworks in which to think about work in the community welfare sector.     

Public goods and Arrovian social choice

A social welfare function satisfying Arrow's independence axiom is constant or authoritarian if it generates continuous and transitive social preferences over the space of allocations of public and private goods, and individual preferences have the classical economic properties. The social welfare function will be oligarchial if it generates continuous and quasitransitive social preferences and satisfies a weak version of the Pareto criterion in addition to the independence axiom.This work was supported by the National Sciences Foundation grant no. SES 9007953. I am grateful to anonymous referees whose suggestions led to several substantial improvements.     

A Quality-of-Play Model of a Professional Sports League

Assuming that consumers value both the absolute and relative quality of play, I compare the choice of ticket prices, team qualities, and number of games played in a noncooperative outcome versus that chosen by a social planner. I find that the nature of consumer preferences regarding the quality of play determines whether the demand for talented players are strategic complements or substitutes. A strong preference by fans for a superior team makes players strategic substitutes, and a concern for a high quality of play and competitive balance make players strategic complements. Moreover, when fans only value the relative quality of play, there is an overemployment of talented players in the noncooperative outcome versus the socially optimal outcome; when they only value the absolute quality of play then there is an underemployment of talented players in the noncooperative outcome.     

ASYMMETRIC SUBSTITUTABILITY: THEORY AND SOME APPLICATIONS

Economists usually describe goods as being either (gross) complements or (gross) substitutes. Yet, what is less known is that one good may be a gross substitute for a second good, while the second good is a gross complement to the first good. This article develops a theory of asymmetric gross substitutability and suggests some potential examples and applications. ( JEL D11)     

Natural implementation in public goods economies

In this paper, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice correspondences to be Nash implemented by “natural” mechanisms in economies with arbitrary numbers of private and public goods. We find that when there exist only one public good and an arbitrary number of private goods, the Lindahl correspondence is implementable by a natural quantity mechanism in which each agent announces his own consumption bundle of private goods and input vectors for public goods. However, regardless of the numbers of private and public goods, the Pareto correspondence is not implementable even by any natural price ⁿ -quantity mechanism in which each agent reports a price vector of private goods and all agents’ personalized price vectors of public goods, in addition to his own consumption bundle of private goods and input vectors for public goods.     

Caring for informal caregivers: policy approaches to the provision of direct support services

Despite being the backbone of modern welfare states, the informal care sector for elderly people in need of long-term care is highly dysfunctional. The majority of informal caregivers are overburdened on account of their care-related activities, although an evolving market for support services directly aimed at relieving informal caregivers is observable. In this paper, we examine the reasons for the imperfect exchange between demand and supply in this market, applying the economic theory of market failure. Through a case study of Austria based on an empirical, qualitative survey of all direct support services and their suppliers on the national level as well as in three provinces, an understanding of this market's main players and mechanisms is derived. Thus, the authors determine that three different system types can be identified beyond the historical regional discrepancies. They illustrate the approaches to service provision for informal caregivers: centralized and public, laissez-faire and private, and a radically decentralized network for informal caregivers. Still, lack of information, social and psychological barriers, as well as high transaction costs, are identified which undermine the support service market for informal care. If the costs of the formal long-term care sector are to be contained despite demographic developments, better policy approaches will be necessary to overcome this challenge. In light of this, recommendations are derived to ensure a better exchange between supply and demand. By providing an initial empirical understanding and analysis of this market and its imperfections, the authors pioneer future quantitative research in this field.     

Occupational licensing and the transition from welfare to work

Occupational licensing laws erect barriers to entry into various labor markets, impeding the upward mobility of welfare recipients seeking to transition into employment. This paper, recognizing that labor market interventions have often been used precisely because of this effect, proceeds to examine various restrictions which directly affect low-skilled workers in the U.S. economy who now have stronger incentives to participate in labor markets in response to recent welfare policy reforms. Three distinct types of labor market restrictions are identified: (1) the licensing of professional, high-skilled occupations tends to crowd workers into lower-skilled occupations, lowering such wages and thus weakening work incentives among the welfare population; (2) quantity license restrictions (permits which set quotas limiting the overall number of suppliers in a market) suppress demand for low-skilled workers, and may substantially reduce work opportunities and, thus, incentives. Taxi license restrictions alone, for instance, may result in several hundreds of thousands of lost employment opportunities throughout the United States; and (3) quality license restrictions, where entrants face higher entry costs (typically through educational requirements above the requirements of the market), may paradoxically provide welfare recipients with enhanced opportunities for employment, particularly when coupled with job-training subsidies typically extended to welfare recipients. This we call a “de facto liberalization” of occupational licensure. While incumbent workers are certain to resist enhanced entry by welfare recipients into licensed occupations, vocational schools should aggressively support such entry, affording a possible realpolitik to the migration path envisioned. More interestingly, once entry has accelerated under de facto liberalization, occupational license rents will predictably decline, thus increasing the likelihood of explicit liberalization, and further opening labor markets to competitive entry.