REPUTATION EFFECTS IN THE MARKET OF CERTIFIERS: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUDIT INDUSTRY

Certifiers verify unobserved product characteristics for buyers and thereby alleviate informational asymmetries and facilitate trade. When sellers pay for the certification, however, certifiers can be tempted to bias their opinion to favor sellers. Indeed, accounting scandals and inflated credit ratings suggest sellers may prefer to select dishonest certifiers. I test this proposition by estimating the effect of adverse quality signals on audit demand. Exploiting the natural experiment of Arthur Andersen's demise, I find that auditors with worse quality signals experience a fall in demand. This suggests that reputation effects are at work even in the presence of conflicts of interest. (JEL L15, L8, M4)     

THE NATURE OF OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM OAP PRICES

This paper studies the extent and variation in production cost pass‐through for U.S. outsourcing imports. Data from 4,676 products imported through the U.S. overseas assembly program show that outsourcing imports were characterized by incomplete pass‐through of production and trade costs to import prices. Notably, pass‐through was higher for products assembled in high education countries while the response of outsourcing import prices to competing suppliers' prices was largest for products sold by firms in capital‐intense industries. The reasons for these cross‐country and cross‐industry differences, as they relate to theories of outsourcing and trade, are explored. (JEL F1, F2)     

PRICING ANOMALIES IN THE MARKET FOR DIAMONDS: EVIDENCE OF CONFORMIST BEHAVIOR

Some goods are consumed not just for their intrinsic utility but also for the impression their consumption has on others. We analyze the market for such a commodity—diamonds. We collect data on price and other attributes from the inventories of three large online retailers of diamonds. We find that people are willing to pay premiums upward of 18% for a diamond that is one‐half carat rather than slightly less than a half carat and between 5% and 10% for a one‐carat rather than a slightly less than one‐carat stone. Since a major portion of larger gem‐quality diamonds are used for engagement rings, such an outcome is consistent with Bernheim's model of conformism, where individuals try to conform to a single standard of behavior that is often established at a focal point. In this case, prospective grooms signal their desirability as a mate by the size of the diamond engagement ring they give their fiancées. (JEL A1, D4)     

A COMMENT ON COMPETITION AND BIDDING BEHAVIOR: SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE RICE MARKET

In testing agents' responses to increased competition in sealed-bid first price-rice auctions, Meyer [1988] makes two erroneous assumptions: (1) that agents know ex ante the number of bidders in the auction, and (2) that firms forecast resale prices with information unavailable at the time of the auction. These two misspecifications are identified and corrected. A probit model provides a forecast of market competition, and agents' bids are modeled as a function of expected competition and factors affecting the value of each rice lot. The bias toward zero in Meyer's estimated coefficient on market competition is reduced.     

SCHOOL QUALITY AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HOUSING MARKET

In this article, we investigate the relationship between school quality and information disclosure in housing markets. When presented with the option of identifying their local public school in a real estate listing, we find that sellers with homes assigned to higher‐performing schools are more likely to provide this information. We find more evidence of selective disclosure in 2001–2002 than in 2006–2007, when the costs of gathering and disclosing information on school assignments and quality were lower. Furthermore, we find more evidence of strategic behavior among sellers of large single‐family units that presumably appeal to families with children. After controlling for school quality, information disclosure does not appear to affect housing prices. Taken together, our results support the findings of the education literature on the importance of school quality capitalization in residential real estate and they provide the first evidence of strategic information disclosure in housing markets. (JEL L15, I20, R31)     

COMPETITION AND BIDDING BEHAVIOR: SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE RICE MARKET

When objects have uncertain value, the net effect of competition in sealed-bid auctions is ambiguous. The risk of succumbing to the "winner's curse" generally causes bidders to exhibit a non-aggressive response in addition to the standard competitive effect. Sellers can influence the size of the nonaggressive effect by responding to the value uncertainty. This paper focuses specifically on individual bidding behavior in a rice auction market in which sellers issue a product-quality guarantee. The empirical evidence supports my hypothesis that such a guarantee negates the significance of the nonaggressive bidder response.     

WAR OF ATTRITION: EVIDENCE FROM A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT ON MARKET EXIT

We report an experiment designed to study whether inefficient firms are systematically driven from overcrowded markets. Our data set includes a series of 3,800 wars of attrition of a type modeled by Fudenberg and Tirole in 1986. We find that exit tends to be efficient and exit times conform surprisingly well to point predictions of the model. Moreover, subjects respond similarly to implementations framed in terms of losses as they do to those framed in terms of gains. (JEL D21, L11, C92)     

STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY: EVIDENCE FROM THE GENERAL AVIATION MARKET

This paper examines the impact of a strict product liability standard on the accident rate in the general aviation (GA) industry. Liability expenses increased by 775% between 1976 and 1986, reducing the sales of new GA aircraft by 90% and increasing the age of the GA fleet. Using both aggregate and model‐specific data, our results indicate that the increase in the age of the GA fleet increased the accident rate by 25%–35% during 1981–2000. In addition, the higher price of GA aircraft boosted sales of homebuilt planes, which have higher accident and fatality rates than GA aircraft. (JEL K13, L62, L15)     

EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVE TERRITORIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIANA BEER MARKET

The welfare effects of vertically imposed exclusive territories and the appropriate antitrust policy toward them have long been debated. This paper sheds light on the exclusive-territory controversy by examing the effects of Indiana's 1979 ban on the grant of exclusive territories to beer wholesalers. Using time-series data for 1948–1990 we find the ban reduced beer consumption in Indiana by 6 percent. Coupled with previous evidence that Indiana's ban reduced price, our results suggest that exclusive territories in the beer industry increase demand and enhance welfare by stimulating the provision of dealer services.     

DURABLE GOODS PRICE CYCLES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM THE TEXTBOOK MARKET

We study the pricing policy of a monopolist selling a durable good with the features of a textbook. We assume buyers differ in their valuation of the good and propensity to resell, and identify the possibility of a positive relationship between the quantity of used goods and the price of a new good, and also a higher price for new goods in the last period before a new edition is introduced. Our empirical analysis supports this model: textbook prices increase as the share of used textbooks increases and the end of the current edition approaches. (JEL D420, L120)     

THE LONDON BOMBINGS AND RACIAL PREJUDICE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HOUSING AND LABOR MARKET

This paper investigates the impact of the London bombings on attitudes toward ethnic minorities, examining outcomes in housing and labor markets across London boroughs. We use a difference‐in‐differences approach, specifying “treated” boroughs as those with the highest concentration of Asian residents. Our results indicate that house prices in treated boroughs fell by approximately 2% in the 2 years after the bombings relative to other boroughs, with sales declining by almost 6%. Furthermore, we present evidence of a rise in the unemployment rate in treated compared to control boroughs, as well as a rise in racial segregation. (JEL J15, J71, R21)     

LABOR CONTRACTS AND FLEXIBILITY: EVIDENCE FROM A LABOR MARKET REFORM IN SPAIN

This paper evaluates the effects of a labor market reform in Spain that removed restrictions on fixed‐term or temporary contracts. Our empirical results are based on longitudinal firm‐level data that cover observations before and after the reform. We posit and estimate a dynamic labor demand model with indefinite and fixed‐term labor contracts, and a general structure of labor adjustment costs. Experiments using the estimated model show important positive effects of the reform on total employment (i.e., a 3.5% increase) and job turnover. There is a strong substitution of permanent by temporary workers (i.e., a 10% decline in permanent employment). The effects on labor productivity and the value of firms are very small. In contrast, a counterfactual reform that halved all firing costs would produce the same employment increase as the actual reform, but much larger improvements in productivity and in the value of firms. (JEL J23, J32, J41)     

THE LAW OF ONE PRICE REVISITED: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF INTERNATIONAL PRICES

This paper is an empirical investigation of the long-run behavior of international prices at the microeconomic level. It analyzes the time-series behavior of a unique set of carefully matched, disaggregated export prices for manufactured goods from the U.S., Gemany, and Japan over the period 1974–90. The results provide little evidence of a long-run linear relationship between global prices of similar export goods from different sources, casting doubts on the empirical relevance of the law of one price.     

IQ IN THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION: EVIDENCE FROM IMMIGRANT EARNINGS

We show that a country’s average IQ score is a useful predictor of the wages that immigrants from that country earn in the United States, whether or not one adjusts for immigrant education. Just as in numerous microeconomic studies, 1 IQ point predicts 1% higher wages, suggesting that IQ tests capture an important difference in cross‐country worker productivity. In a cross‐country development accounting exercise, about one‐sixth of the global inequality in log income can be explained by the effect of large, persistent differences in national average IQ on the private marginal product of labor. This suggests that cognitive skills matter more for groups than for individuals. (JEL J24, J61, O47)     

DID THE EURO FOSTER ONLINE PRICE COMPETITION? EVIDENCE FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PRICE COMPARISON SITE

We study the impact of the Euro on prices charged by online retailers within the European Union. Our data span the period before and after the Euro was introduced, cover a variety of products, and include countries inside and outside of the Eurozone. After controlling for cost, demand, and market structure effects, we show that the pure Euro changeover effect is to raise average prices in the Eurozone by 3 % and average minimum prices by 7%. Finally, we develop a model of online pricing in the context of currency unions and show that these price patterns are broadly consistent with those of clearinghouse models. (JEL D400, D830, F150, L130, M370 )     

RAISING THE STAKES IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA

The ultimatum game has generated considerable interest because experimental evidence strongly rejects the standard game-theoretic predictions. A limitation to this general result is the possibility that experimental results are an artifact of small stakes. Implementing the ultimatum game in Indonesia makes it possible to raise the stakes to three times the monthly expenditure of the average participant. Even with these sizable incentives, results do not uniformly approach the sub-game perfect, selfish outcomes. More specifically, responders become more willing to accept a given percentage offer at higher stakes, but proposer behavior is largely invariant to stake changes. ( JEL C91, C78)     

THE IMPACT OF HIGH-TECH CAPITAL ON PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIA

This article examines the relationship between high-tech capital use and productivity. Using Australian data, some evidence is found of a positive relationship between high-tech capital use and productivity in the market sector, but there is much less evidence of excess returns. These results are robust to the use of a variety of different measures of high-tech capital. At the industry level however, the relationship is significant and positive for only some industries. This suggests that the benefits of investment in high-tech capital are not spread evenly across the economy. (JEL O3 )     

THE PASS‐THROUGH OF BEER TAXES TO PRICES: EVIDENCE FROM STATE AND FEDERAL TAX CHANGES

From a policy perspective, it is crucial to understand how changes in beer taxes affect retail beer prices. This study provides new evidence of the pass‐through rate of state beer taxes to prices in a post‐merger era. Our estimates that use state‐level beer tax changes suggest that a 10‐cent increase in beer taxes raises retail prices by about 17 cents. Comparable findings from the 1991 federal beer tax increase show a rise in retail beer prices of 19–22 cents. Our findings suggest that consumers fully bear the burden of increased beer taxes. (JEL H2, I0, D4)     

DIVIDEND POLICY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU

We study the dividend policy of firms in regulated network industries, focusing on the impact of different regulatory regimes and government control. We link payout and smoothing decisions to different regulatory mechanisms (cost‐based vs. incentive regulation) and state versus private ownership. We test our predictions on a panel of listed European electric utilities, accounting for potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory and ownership patterns. We find that incentive‐regulated firms smooth their dividends less than cost‐based regulated firms and that they report higher target payout ratios. Consistent with the interest group theory of regulation, we find that incentive regulation schemes are less likely when the state is still an important shareholder in the sector. Additionally, our results show that government control undermines the efficiency‐enhancing effects of incentive regulation on dividend policy, for example, lower smoothing is only due to private firms. (JEL G35, L51, L32, L9)     

PRODUCT SAFETY IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY: EVIDENCE FROM THE RAILROADS

It is sometimes argued that a relaxation of price controls in a regulated industry would lead to a decrease in profits and hence to an incentive for firms to skimp on safety. Theory does not allow us to sign the relationship between prices and safety a priori. Analysis of data from the railroad industry from 1963–67 indicates 1) profitable railroads have fewer accidents per mile than do unprofitable roads; 2) for profitable roads, if there is any relationship at all between accidents and profitability it is positive: more profitable roads have more accidents (per mile); and 3) for unprofitable roads, accident rates rise as losses rise.